IHC Health Services Inc. v. ELAP Services

CourtDistrict Court, D. Utah
DecidedJuly 12, 2019
Docket2:17-cv-01245
StatusUnknown

This text of IHC Health Services Inc. v. ELAP Services (IHC Health Services Inc. v. ELAP Services) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Utah primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
IHC Health Services Inc. v. ELAP Services, (D. Utah 2019).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART IHC HEALTH SERVICES, INC., a INTERMOUNTAIN’S SHORT FORM non-profit Utah corporation, DISCOVERY MOTION CONCERNING ELAP’S REFUSAL TO PRODUCE ITS Plaintiff, COMMUNICATIONS WITH vs. INTERMOUNTAIN PATIENTS (ECF NO. 70) ELAP SERVICES, LLC, a limited-liability company, Civil No. 2:17-cv-01245-JNP-EJF Defendant. Judge Jill N. Parrish

Magistrate Judge Evelyn J. Furse

Before the Court is Intermountain’s Short Form Discovery Motion Concerning ELAP’s Refusal to Produce its Communications with Intermountain Patients (“Motion”) (ECF No. 70). On June 27, 2019, the Court held oral argument on the Motion. Having considered the parties’ briefing and argument, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART the Motion as set forth below. Intermountain asks the Court to make a sweeping ruling finding that that ELAP cannot assert the attorney-client privilege under Utah R. Evid. 504(c), that the requested communications do not fall within the four categories of privileged communications set forth in Utah R. Evid. 504(b)(2)(a)-(d), and that the work product doctrine does not permit ELAP to withhold the requested information. (ECF No. 70.) The Court does not have enough information or sufficient briefing to make such a ruling and declines to do so at this time. However, based on the parties’ briefing and arguments, the Court finds that certain of the communications involving ELAP and patients are not privileged. ELAP has not demonstrated that communications involving ELAP and patients made prior to the time an attorney was engaged to represent the patient are protected by the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine. See Allred v. Saunders, 2014 UT 43, ¶ 25, 342 P.3d 204 (stating that the “burden [is] on the party asserting a privilege to establish that the material sought is protected from discovery”). “The attorney-client privilege protects information given by a client to an attorney

that is ‘necessary to obtain informed legal advice—which might not have been made absent the privilege.’ ” S. Utah Wilderness All. v. Automated Geographic Reference Ctr., 2008 UT 88, ¶ 33, 200 P.3d 643 (quoting Gold Standard, Inc. v. Am. Barrick Res. Corp. (“Gold Standard II”), 801 P.2d 909, 911 (Utah 1990)). Utah Rule of Evidence 504, which codifies the attorney-client privilege, defines “communications” subject to the privilege as including “advice, direction, or guidance” given by a lawyer “in the course of providing legal services,” and “disclosures of the client and the client’s representative” to a lawyer related to the “client’s legal services.” Utah R. Evid. 504(a)(7). Such communications are privileged only if “confidential,” meaning they are “not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those to whom disclosure is in furtherance of

rendition of legal services to the client or to those reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication.” Utah R. Evid. 504(a)(8). “However, the mere existence of an attorney-client relationship ‘does not ipso facto make all communications between them confidential.’ ” Gold Standard II, 801 P.2d at 911 (quoting Anderson v. Thomas, 159 P.2d 142, 147 (Utah 1945)). For example, communications relating to the creation of an attorney-client relationship are generally not privileged or otherwise protected from disclosure. See Gold Standard II, 801 P.2d at 910–12 (finding that that a retainer agreement “describing the creation of an attorney- client relationship” and not “contain[ing] any legal strategies, theories, or conclusions” is not protected by the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine). Thus, “to rely on the attorney-client privilege, a party must establish: (1) an attorney-client relationship, (2) the transfer of confidential information, and (3) the purpose of the transfer was to

obtain legal advice.” S. Utah Wilderness, 2008 UT 88, ¶ 33, 200 P.3d 643. ELAP argues that the communications it had with patients for whom it ultimately obtained legal counsel are privileged because ELAP is the patients’ representative and the communications were made to facilitate the rendition of legal services. (ECF No. 79 at 2–3.) ELAP claims that under Moler v. CW Management Corporation, 2008 UT 46, 190 P.3d 1250, communications between a client and a client representative, made even before the clients retained counsel, are privileged. (ECF No. 79 at 2–3.) While the Moler decision left open the possibility that such communications could be privileged, the Utah Supreme Court did not find that the communications in that case were privileged and remanded the case to the district court to determine in the first

instance whether the third party at issue was even a “representative” within the meaning of Rule 504. Moler, 2008 UT, ¶¶ 4, 14, 15, 20, 21. Here, ELAP has not demonstrated that the patients at issue designated it as their “representative” within the meaning of Rule 504. ELAP’s bare assertion that it is the patients’ representative and retained counsel for them is not sufficient to show that it is a “client’s representative” under Rule 504. Moreover, ELAP has not shown that any of the communications it had with patients prior to retaining an attorney contain legal strategy, advice, or any other information that the attorney-client privilege would protect. The fact that patients complained to ELAP about balance billing or may have asked ELAP for an attorney to represent them is not a request for legal advice. Nor are the fact of attorney representation or the basic contours of such representation protected by the attorney- client privilege.

Documents are protected by the work product doctrine only if they are prepared in anticipation of litigation. Gold Standard II, 801 P.2d at 910. To satisfy this requirement, the primary purpose of the document must be to assist in pending or impending litigation, which means that it was “either created for use in pending or impending litigation or intended to generate ideas for use in such litigation.” Id. at 910– 11. “The mere possibility that litigation may occur or even ‘the mere fact that litigation does eventually ensue’ is insufficient to cloak materials with the mantle of work product protection.” Gold Standard, Inc. v. Am. Barrick Res. Corp., 805 P.2d 164, 170 (Utah 1990) (quoting Binks Mfg. Co. v. Nat’l Presto Indus., Inc., 709 F.2d 1109, 1118 (7th Cir. 1983)). ELAP has not shown that Intermountain threatened or initiated litigation against

any of the patients prior to the time ELAP purportedly obtained counsel for them, and Intermountain maintains that this has not occurred. (See ECF No. 70-1 at 9 (stating that “Intermountain has never initiated litigation against any ELAP-affiliated Patients,” and ELAP has not “provided evidence that Intermountain has ‘threatened’ litigation against such patients”). Therefore, ELAP has not demonstrated that communications between itself and patients are protected from disclosure by the work product doctrine. ELAP indicated in its Opposition that during the meet and confer process it offered “to withdraw its privilege objection as to communications involving only ELAP and a patient if Intermountain would limit its requests so as not to seek otherwise privileged communications involving ELAP, the patient, and the lawyer retained by ELAP to represent the patient.” (ECF No. 79 at 2.) The Court finds that it is these documents—which ELAP has offered to produce anyway—that are not protected by the

attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine.

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Related

Gold Standard, Inc. v. American Barrick Resources Corp.
801 P.2d 909 (Utah Supreme Court, 1990)
Gold Standard, Inc. v. American Barrick Resources Corp.
805 P.2d 164 (Utah Supreme Court, 1990)
Moler v. CW Management Corp.
2008 UT 46 (Utah Supreme Court, 2008)
Allred v. Saunders
2014 UT 43 (Utah Supreme Court, 2014)
Anderson v. Thomas
159 P.2d 142 (Utah Supreme Court, 1945)
Krahenbuhl v. The Cottle Firm
2018 UT App 138 (Court of Appeals of Utah, 2018)

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Bluebook (online)
IHC Health Services Inc. v. ELAP Services, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ihc-health-services-inc-v-elap-services-utd-2019.