Icahn v. Icahn

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Icahn v. Icahn

295 A.D.2d 566, 744 N.Y.S.2d 703, 2002 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6779

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJune 24, 2002

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 295 A.D.2d 566 (Icahn v. Icahn) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Icahn v. Icahn, 295 A.D.2d 566, 744 N.Y.S.2d 703, 2002 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6779 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2002).

Pincite

Opinion

—In a matrimonial action, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Shapiro, J.), entered August 4, 2000, which denied her motion to vacate a judgment of the same court, entered March 9, 2000, upon her default in appearing at a hearing, awarding her former attorney an attorney’s fee.

Ordered that the order is reversed, with costs, the motion is granted, the judgment entered March 9, 2000, is vacated, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Westchester County, for further proceedings in accordance herewith.

To vacate her default in appearing at a hearing to determine the amount of an attorney’s fee owed to her former counsel, the [567]*567appellant was required to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense (see Law Firm of Joel R. Brandes, P.C. v Ferraro, 257 AD2d 610). She did so, and the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying her motion. Ritter, J.P., Altman, Adams and Crane, JJ., concur.

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—In a matrimonial action, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Shapiro, J.), entered August 4, 2000, which denied her motion to vacate a judgment of the same court, entered March 9, 2000, upon her default in appearing at a hearing, awarding her former attorney an attorney’s fee.

Ordered that the order is reversed, with costs, the motion is granted, the judgment entered March 9, 2000, is vacated, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Westchester County, for further proceedings in accordance herewith.

To vacate her default in appearing at a hearing to determine the amount of an attorney’s fee owed to her former counsel, the [567]*567appellant was required to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense (see Law Firm of Joel R. Brandes, P.C. v Ferraro, 257 AD2d 610). She did so, and the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying her motion. Ritter, J.P., Altman, Adams and Crane, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

295 A.D.2d 566, 744 N.Y.S.2d 703, 2002 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6779, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/icahn-v-icahn-nyappdiv-2002.

Opinion

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