Icahn v. Icahn, No. Fa98 0168862 S (Jun. 9, 1999)

1999 Conn. Super. Ct. 6903
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
DecidedJune 9, 1999
DocketNo. FA98 0168862 S
StatusUnpublished

This text of 1999 Conn. Super. Ct. 6903 (Icahn v. Icahn, No. Fa98 0168862 S (Jun. 9, 1999)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Icahn v. Icahn, No. Fa98 0168862 S (Jun. 9, 1999), 1999 Conn. Super. Ct. 6903 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999).

Opinion

[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION de DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND STAY PROCEEDINGS CT Page 6904
The parties to this dissolution action were married in New York City, New York, on March 21, 1979. Both the plaintiff, Liba Icahn, and the defendant, Carl C. Icahn, resided in the state of New York almost continuously with the exception of approximately one year when the defendant resided in Greenwich, Connecticut and the plaintiffs recent move to Connecticut in November of 1998. The parties have been involved in contentious divorce proceedings in New York for the past five years. There is a divorce action brought by the defendant pending in Westchester County, New York. Much of what has transpired between the parties over the past five years is not relevant to the two main issues raised by the defendant's motion to dismiss the Connecticut action. The two relevant issues are: (1) whether this court has subject matter jurisdiction; and (2) whether Connecticut is an inconvenient forum.1

In Amodio v. Amodio, 247 Conn. 724, 727-28, ___ A.2d ___(1999), the Supreme Court reviewed

the distinction between a trial court's "jurisdiction' and its "authority to act' under a particular statute. Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of a court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it. 1 Restatement (Second), Judgments § 11. A court does not truly lack subject matter jurisdiction if it has competence to entertain the action before it. Monroe v. Monroe, 177 Conn. 173, 185, 413 A.2d 819, appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 801, 100 S.Ct. 20, 62 L.Ed.2d 14 (1979). Once it is determined that a tribunal has authority or competence to decide the class of cases to which the action belongs, the issue of subject matter jurisdiction is resolved in favor of entertaining the action. Craig v. Bronson, 202 Conn. 93, 101, 520 A.2d 155 (1987). It is well established that, in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged. Connecticut Light Power Co. v. Costle, 179 Conn. 415, 420-21 n. 3, 426 A.2d 1324 (1980). (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

"An action for dissolution of a marriage obviously is a civil action. Smith v. Smith, 150 Conn. 15, 19, 183 A.2d 848 (1962). The Superior Court has exclusive jurisdiction of all complaints CT Page 6905 seeking a dissolution of marriage. General Statutes § 46b-42. Section 46b-44 establishes a residency requirement, satisfaction of which is essential to confer on the court subject matter jurisdiction over a dissolution action." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Charles v. Charles, 243 Conn. 255, 257,701 A.2d 650 (1997), cert. denied, ____ U.S. ___. 118 S.Ct. 1838, 140 L.Ed.2d (1998). General Statutes § 46b-44 provides in pertinent part:

(a) A complaint for dissolution of a marriage or for legal separation may be filed at any time after either party has established residence in this state. (b) Temporary relief pursuant to the complaint may be granted in accordance with sections 46b-56 and 46b-83 at any time after either party has established residence in this state. (c) A decree dissolving a marriage or granting a legal separation may be entered if: (1) One of the parties to the marriage has been a resident of this state for at least the twelve months next preceding the date of the filing of the complaint or next preceding the date of the decree.

The plaintiff in this case established residence in Stamford, Connecticut in November of 1998 and filed the present dissolution action at that time. The court, pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-44, has jurisdiction and the authority to enter a judgment after the plaintiff has resided in this state for one year next preceding the date of the complaint." Based on the statutes, this court has subject matter jurisdiction over this dissolution action.

In reliance on Fahy v. Fahy, 227 Conn. 505, 515, 630 A.2d 1328 (1993), the defendant argues that "if a trial court cannot render a decision on one of the elements of the mosaic, it cannot effectively construct the remainder of the mosaic." The defendant posits that this court cannot render judgment on the issues of child support, custody, or alimony based on the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) and the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UTFSA). The present case is one in which the plaintiff seeks dissolution of the marriage. Child support, custody, and spousal support are claims raised by the plaintiff in her prayer for relief. The parties have lived apart for approximately five years and the plaintiff has had custody of the minor child who attends a private boarding school in Wallingford, Connecticut. Custody does not appear to be a disputed issue and should it become one, the defendant can then raise dismissal of CT Page 6906 the custody aspect of this case. As to support, both child and spousal, there were orders of support issued by the state of New York. It is unclear to this court whether such orders are currently effective.

The defendant's second ground for the motion to dismiss is that even if the court determines that Connecticut has jurisdiction, it should choose not to exercise such jurisdiction because this state would be an inconvenient forum. "As a rule, when a court finds it has jurisdiction over a cause of action, it has both the right and the duty to exercise that power." Sabinov. Ruffolo, 19 Conn. App. 402, 405, 562 A.2d 1134 (1989). "As a common law matter, the doctrine of forum non conveniens vests discretion in the trial court to decide where trial will best serve the convenience of the parties and the ends of justice." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Union Carbide Corporation v.Aetna Casualty Surety Co., 212 Conn. 311, 319,

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1999 Conn. Super. Ct. 6903, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/icahn-v-icahn-no-fa98-0168862-s-jun-9-1999-connsuperct-1999.