Ian Woodner v. Julius Sankin and Joseph A. Garfield

D.C. Circuit

Ian Woodner v. Julius Sankin and Joseph A. Garfield

289 F.2d 873, 110 U.S. App. D.C. 132, 1961 U.S. App. LEXIS 4621

CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit

DecidedMay 4, 1961

Docket16142

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 289 F.2d 873 (Ian Woodner v. Julius Sankin and Joseph A. Garfield) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Ian Woodner v. Julius Sankin and Joseph A. Garfield, 289 F.2d 873, 110 U.S. App. D.C. 132, 1961 U.S. App. LEXIS 4621 (D.C. Cir. 1961).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Appellant brought suit for a declaratory judgment that he was entitled to recover a deposit paid to appellees toward the purchase of real estate. The District Court sat without a jury. After hearing plaintiff’s evidence, the court found that the contract provisions entitling appellees to retain the deposit upon appellant’s failure to complete the transaction did not constitute a penalty, and dismissed the complaint. We find no reversible error. Plaintiff-appellant did not make a prima facie case that the contract provision was unreasonable or unconscionable, or that any other ground existed for the grant of relief. While we reach the merits of the claim in the interests of avoiding circuity of action, we express no opinion as to whether, or if so under what conditions, a suit for a declaratory judgment is an appropriate remedy in controversies of the present sort.

Affirmed.

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PER CURIAM.

Appellant brought suit for a declaratory judgment that he was entitled to recover a deposit paid to appellees toward the purchase of real estate. The District Court sat without a jury. After hearing plaintiff’s evidence, the court found that the contract provisions entitling appellees to retain the deposit upon appellant’s failure to complete the transaction did not constitute a penalty, and dismissed the complaint. We find no reversible error. Plaintiff-appellant did not make a prima facie case that the contract provision was unreasonable or unconscionable, or that any other ground existed for the grant of relief. While we reach the merits of the claim in the interests of avoiding circuity of action, we express no opinion as to whether, or if so under what conditions, a suit for a declaratory judgment is an appropriate remedy in controversies of the present sort.

Affirmed.

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Bluebook (online)

289 F.2d 873, 110 U.S. App. D.C. 132, 1961 U.S. App. LEXIS 4621, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ian-woodner-v-julius-sankin-and-joseph-a-garfield-cadc-1961.

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