Hyde v. Hyde

590 So. 2d 727, 1991 La. App. LEXIS 2980, 1991 WL 236338
Louisiana Court of Appeal·Decided November 13, 1991·No. No. 91-366·Published·Cited by 5 cases

Opinion

FORET, Judge.

This case involves two declaratory actions filed by Restaurant Management Systems, Inc. (RMSI) and Michael Hyde to determine the ownership of 32.5% of the voting stock in RMSI. The stock in dispute was transferred from William Hyde to Mary Olga Hyde pursuant to a community property agreement.

The trial court previously ruled, pursuant to a quo warranto proceeding1 filed by William Hyde that the stock transfer from William to Mary was incomplete for failure to comply with the provisions of RMSI’s Corporate Buy-Out Agreement.2

[729]*729The trial court, by declaratory judgment, found that all the requirements of the Corporate Buy-Out Agreement have now been satisfied and that the disputed 32.5% of the voting shares of RMSI have been validly transferred to Mary Olga Hyde, who is now the recognized owner of said shares. Michael Hyde, appellant herein, appeals from the judgment of the trial court.

FACTS

A summary of the procedural and historical background of this case is necessary for an understanding of the issues presented.

RMSI was formed for the purpose of owning a subsidiary corporation in Texas, which Texas corporation owns and operates two Burger King Restaurants in Beaumont, Texas. The stock of RMSI was owned by two brothers, Michael and William Hyde. William initially owned seventy-five percent (75%) of the issued and outstanding common voting shares of RMSI, with Michael receiving twenty-five percent (25%) thereof. Subsequent thereto, William transferred to Michael another ten percent (10%) of his previously-issued voting common shares. At the time of William’s divorce from his wife, Mary Olga Hyde, he owned sixty-five percent (65%) of the common outstanding voting shares of RMSI, and Michael owned thirty-five percent (35%) thereof.

William and Mary Olga Hyde were divorced by final decree on August 13, 1987. Pursuant to the divorce and their community property settlement, Mary was to receive one-half (V2) of William’s sixty-five percent (65%), or 32.5%, of the common outstanding voting shares of RMSI. It is this transfer of 32.5% of the shares of RMSI stock which has sparked this litigation.

The procedural history of this litigation can be condensed to the following:

1.There is present litigation pending in Texas in which William Hyde seeks to have Michael Hyde removed as an officer, agent, or employee of RMSI and to require Michael to tender his shares of stock in the corporation. This proceeding has been abated pending a determination in Louisiana as to who is the owner of the stock which William Hyde sought to transfer in his divorce settlement with Mary Olga Hyde.

2. William Hyde filed a writ of quo war-ranto in Louisiana alleging that Michael Hyde was wrongfully usurping the office of Vice President and Director of RMSI. William asserted that Mary Olga Hyde was the holder of one-half (½) of his stock, or 32.5% of the outstanding voting common stock of RMSI, and that she voted at a previous directors meeting that Michael be removed from office. The trial court held that Mary was not a valid shareholder of RMSI at the time of the alleged directors’ vote, and, therefore, could not vote Michael out of office. The trial court held that, although the stock was not yet “transferred” to Mary Hyde, it was still “transferable” once the conditions of the Buy-Out Agreement were met. The court limited its ruling to the issue of the quo warranto proceeding, i.e., whether Michael held office legally. The court did not address or determine the issue of stock ownership of the disputed 32.5% of RMSI stock during the quo warranto proceeding. The court found that the language of the Corporation Buy-Out Agreement was unambiguous and clear.

3. Thereafter, Michael held a shareholders and directors meeting of RMSI and gave himself the option to purchase the alleged shares of RMSI which were transferable to Mary Olga Hyde. It was this meeting and Michael’s subsequent action in setting up his own board of directors and electing his own officers to RMSI that precipitated a second writ of quo warranto being filed by William Hyde. The trial court held that the disputed stock was still subject to an option in favor of the corporation which was necessary to resolve prior to determining any issues as to ownership or transferability of the stock. This finding was not appealed.

4. On June 22, 1990, a Board of Directors meeting of RMSI was held. At this meeting, RMSI declined to exercise its option to purchase the 32.5% of the disputed voting shares which were allegedly trans[730]*730ferred to Mary Olga Hyde. The Board of Directors then moved, seconded and approved a resolution that the corporation decline to assign the same option to the shareholders pursuant to the Buy-Out Agreement.

5. Having performed all necessary corporate action wherein the corporation not only declined to exercise the option, but also declined to assign said option to the remaining shareholders, an action for declaratory judgment was filed by RMSI and consolidated with another action for declaratory judgment filed by Michael Hyde, praying that the court declare the owner of the disputed shares of stock.

After hearing, the trial court found that the corporation’s option had been validly declined and furthermore, the corporation had validly declined to assign the option to its main shareholders in accordance with its rights under the Buy-Out Agreement. The trial court ruled that the corporation’s option could be assigned to the remaining shareholders solely through an action of the Board of Directors. Further, the trial court found that since the Board of Directors had declined to assign that right, the stock was now “transferred” and was owned by Mary Olga Hyde, entitling her to vote as a shareholder of RMSI.

ISSUES

Was the trial court correct in finding that William Hyde validly transferred a portion of his stock to Mary Olga Hyde? In determining the true owner of the disputed stock, we must also determine whether the trial court erred in finding that Michael Hyde was not entitled to an option to become owner of the disputed stock which William transferred to Mary pursuant to the Corporate Buy-Out Agreement of RMSI.

DISCUSSION

It is undisputed that the Corporate BuyOut Agreement of RMSI is controlling as to the transfer of the disputed stock.

Article IV of the Corporate Buy-Out Agreement pertains specifically to a transfer of RMSI stock pursuant to a divorce or separation. Article IV, quoted in extenso, states as follows:

“ARTICLE IV.
DIVORCE OR SEPARATION
4.1 Option of a Divorced or Separated Shareholder

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Hyde v. Hyde, 590 So. 2d 727, 1991 La. App. LEXIS 2980, 1991 WL 236338 (La. Ct. App. 1991).

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