Hyde Park Venture Partners Fund III, L.P. v. FairXchange, LLC
This text of Hyde Park Venture Partners Fund III, L.P. v. FairXchange, LLC (Hyde Park Venture Partners Fund III, L.P. v. FairXchange, LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Chancery of Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
HYDE PARK VENTURE PARTNERS ) FUND III, L.P. and HYDE PARK ) VENTURE PARTNERS FUND III ) AFFILIATES, L.P., ) ) ) Petitioners, ) ) v. ) C.A. No. 2022-0344-JTL ) FAIRXCHANGE, LLC, a Delaware ) limited liability company, as successor ) in liability to FAIRXCHANGE, INC., a ) Delaware corporation, ) ) Respondent. )
POST-TRIAL MEMORANDUM OPINION
Date Submitted: March 22, 2024 Date Decided: July 30, 2024
A. Thompson Bayliss, Samuel D. Cordle, Anthony R. Sarna, ABRAMS & BAYLISS LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Attorneys for Petitioners.
David E. Ross, Garrett B. Moritz, Adam D. Gold, Elizabeth M. Taylor, ROSS ARONSTAM & MORITZ LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Attorneys for Respondent.
LASTER, V.C. This is an appraisal proceeding. The court’s task is to determine the fair value
of FairXchange, Inc. (“FairX” or the “Company”). Valuing a corporation is difficult.
For FairX, that is especially true.
FairX was a Delaware corporation that operated a nascent securities exchange
catering to retail investors who wanted to trade commodity futures. FairX built fast,
reliable, and adaptable technology to run its exchange, and the same technology could
be used for retail trading in cryptocurrency futures.
FairX was privately held, so there was no trading price. FairX was early in its
development, so its operations lacked any track record. And FairX sought to achieve
great things: Just as the Robinhood trading platform used a disruptive market-
maker-pays business model to bring zero-to-low cost trading in equities and equity-
derivatives to retail users, FairX sought to do the same thing for futures. FairX’s was
a version of Schrödinger’s cat. If an investor opened the valuation box in five years,
then FairX could be a unicorn worth billions. Or FairX could be dead.
This appraisal proceeding exists because a near-term merger preempted the
unboxing. For roughly a six-month period from September 2021 to February 2022,
large cryptocurrency players sought to become vertically integrated by acquiring
companies that ran exchanges. All of the targets were in the early stages of their
development, yet the amounts that acquirers were willing to pay for those companies
soared. A bidding contest for one of FairX’s peers—ErisX—topped out at over $550
million.
1 After the ErisX deal, FairX’s CEO desperately wanted a near-term exit of his
own. Despite never having been involved in a sale process before, FairX’s CEO
attempted to conduct one himself. Without securing prior approval from the board of
directors (the “Board”), he solicited an acquisition proposal from Coinbase Global,
Inc., the cryptocurrency juggernaut. Both before and after Coinbase provided a letter
of intent, FairX’s CEO made rookie mistakes. Rather than seeking to create a
competitive dynamic, he reassured Coinbase that he would get the deal done. He also
negotiated improved consideration for himself and two senior managers at the same
time he softly asked Coinbase to increase its price. He plainly left value on the table.
On January 11, 2022, Coinbase agreed to acquire FairX for $330 million (the
“Merger Agreement”). The consideration took the form of $265 million in Coinbase
stock and $65 million in cash. The transaction closed on February 1, 2022 (the
“Merger”). Between signing and closing, Coinbase’s stock price declined, and the
value of the consideration dropped to $310.4 million.
Hyde Park Venture Partners (“Hyde Park”) managed two venture capital
funds that owned approximately 15% of FairX’s equity. Ira Weiss, the Hyde Park
partner who sponsored the investment, served on the Board. Appalled by the CEO’s
actions and convinced of FairX’s great potential, Weiss argued for a banker-led sale
process. For that he was attacked and removed from the Board. After his removal,
Weiss advocated publicly that FairX’s stockholders reject the Merger. They approved
it instead. After the Merger closed, the two Hyde Park funds sought appraisal.
2 The Delaware Supreme Court has cautioned that “[t]here may be no perfect
methodology for arriving at fair value for a given set of facts.”1 This is one of those
cases. Even though neither party has asked the court to look to the deal price, it is
the least bad method for determining fair value. The record does not support a
synergy deduction, nor any adjustment to reflect a change in value between signing
and closing. The fair value of FairX for purposes of this appraisal proceeding is $330
million. That equates to $10.42 per share.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Trial took place over three days. Six fact witnesses and two experts testified
live. The parties introduced 2,525 exhibits, as well as deposition transcripts from
twenty-eight witnesses. In the pre-trial order, the parties agreed to 144 stipulations
of fact.
Although FairX is named as the respondent in this appraisal proceeding, the
real parties in interest are the selling stockholders, led by FairX’s CEO (collectively,
the “Selling Stockholders”). In the Merger Agreement, the Selling Stockholders
agreed to indemnify Coinbase for any appraisal award that exceeded the Merger
consideration. This decision therefore refers to the Selling Stockholders as taking the
positions that FairX nominally espoused.
1 Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Global Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 22–
23 (Del. 2017).
3 As often happens in an appraisal proceeding, the parties offered starkly
different depictions of the company to be valued. Hyde Park mustered the bulk of the
contemporaneous documents to show that FairX management and its backers were
optimistic about its prospects. Hyde Park also sought to prove that management
prepared projections in the ordinary course of business that are sufficiently reliable
to use for valuation purposes. The Selling Stockholders collected negative statements
from fewer documents and used those statement and their testimony to denigrate
FairX. They also sought to discredit the projections they prepared.
In this case, the record reveals precisely when the Selling Stockholders created
their litigation narrative. On January 5, 2022, after speaking with a Delaware lawyer
from their outside law firm and learning about appraisal proceedings, the Chairman
of the Board prepared and circulated to other insiders an “Outline of [FairX’s]
Operative Reality Today.”2 In it, the Chairman laid out a “narrative . . . . to show . . .
that we really did have a deliberative process” and to portray the sale to Coinbase as
the only option for a company with “[z]ero prospect[s]” and “virtually no chance of
success.”3
On the whole, Hyde Park’s account was more credible. Unfortunately, that
account does not solve the court’s valuation problem.
2 JX 1622.
3 Id.
4 In an appraisal proceeding, each side bears the burden of proving its own
factual contentions and valuation positions.4 The record supports the following
factual findings.5
A. The Company
In 2019, Neal Brady, Cliff Lewis, and Harsha Bhat founded LMX Labs, LLC—
later known as FairX—with the goal of revolutionizing how retail investors trade
futures. Just as Robinhood had done for the equities market, FairX sought to flip the
prevailing futures-market business model by charging market makers for order flow
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
HYDE PARK VENTURE PARTNERS ) FUND III, L.P. and HYDE PARK ) VENTURE PARTNERS FUND III ) AFFILIATES, L.P., ) ) ) Petitioners, ) ) v. ) C.A. No. 2022-0344-JTL ) FAIRXCHANGE, LLC, a Delaware ) limited liability company, as successor ) in liability to FAIRXCHANGE, INC., a ) Delaware corporation, ) ) Respondent. )
POST-TRIAL MEMORANDUM OPINION
Date Submitted: March 22, 2024 Date Decided: July 30, 2024
A. Thompson Bayliss, Samuel D. Cordle, Anthony R. Sarna, ABRAMS & BAYLISS LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Attorneys for Petitioners.
David E. Ross, Garrett B. Moritz, Adam D. Gold, Elizabeth M. Taylor, ROSS ARONSTAM & MORITZ LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Attorneys for Respondent.
LASTER, V.C. This is an appraisal proceeding. The court’s task is to determine the fair value
of FairXchange, Inc. (“FairX” or the “Company”). Valuing a corporation is difficult.
For FairX, that is especially true.
FairX was a Delaware corporation that operated a nascent securities exchange
catering to retail investors who wanted to trade commodity futures. FairX built fast,
reliable, and adaptable technology to run its exchange, and the same technology could
be used for retail trading in cryptocurrency futures.
FairX was privately held, so there was no trading price. FairX was early in its
development, so its operations lacked any track record. And FairX sought to achieve
great things: Just as the Robinhood trading platform used a disruptive market-
maker-pays business model to bring zero-to-low cost trading in equities and equity-
derivatives to retail users, FairX sought to do the same thing for futures. FairX’s was
a version of Schrödinger’s cat. If an investor opened the valuation box in five years,
then FairX could be a unicorn worth billions. Or FairX could be dead.
This appraisal proceeding exists because a near-term merger preempted the
unboxing. For roughly a six-month period from September 2021 to February 2022,
large cryptocurrency players sought to become vertically integrated by acquiring
companies that ran exchanges. All of the targets were in the early stages of their
development, yet the amounts that acquirers were willing to pay for those companies
soared. A bidding contest for one of FairX’s peers—ErisX—topped out at over $550
million.
1 After the ErisX deal, FairX’s CEO desperately wanted a near-term exit of his
own. Despite never having been involved in a sale process before, FairX’s CEO
attempted to conduct one himself. Without securing prior approval from the board of
directors (the “Board”), he solicited an acquisition proposal from Coinbase Global,
Inc., the cryptocurrency juggernaut. Both before and after Coinbase provided a letter
of intent, FairX’s CEO made rookie mistakes. Rather than seeking to create a
competitive dynamic, he reassured Coinbase that he would get the deal done. He also
negotiated improved consideration for himself and two senior managers at the same
time he softly asked Coinbase to increase its price. He plainly left value on the table.
On January 11, 2022, Coinbase agreed to acquire FairX for $330 million (the
“Merger Agreement”). The consideration took the form of $265 million in Coinbase
stock and $65 million in cash. The transaction closed on February 1, 2022 (the
“Merger”). Between signing and closing, Coinbase’s stock price declined, and the
value of the consideration dropped to $310.4 million.
Hyde Park Venture Partners (“Hyde Park”) managed two venture capital
funds that owned approximately 15% of FairX’s equity. Ira Weiss, the Hyde Park
partner who sponsored the investment, served on the Board. Appalled by the CEO’s
actions and convinced of FairX’s great potential, Weiss argued for a banker-led sale
process. For that he was attacked and removed from the Board. After his removal,
Weiss advocated publicly that FairX’s stockholders reject the Merger. They approved
it instead. After the Merger closed, the two Hyde Park funds sought appraisal.
2 The Delaware Supreme Court has cautioned that “[t]here may be no perfect
methodology for arriving at fair value for a given set of facts.”1 This is one of those
cases. Even though neither party has asked the court to look to the deal price, it is
the least bad method for determining fair value. The record does not support a
synergy deduction, nor any adjustment to reflect a change in value between signing
and closing. The fair value of FairX for purposes of this appraisal proceeding is $330
million. That equates to $10.42 per share.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Trial took place over three days. Six fact witnesses and two experts testified
live. The parties introduced 2,525 exhibits, as well as deposition transcripts from
twenty-eight witnesses. In the pre-trial order, the parties agreed to 144 stipulations
of fact.
Although FairX is named as the respondent in this appraisal proceeding, the
real parties in interest are the selling stockholders, led by FairX’s CEO (collectively,
the “Selling Stockholders”). In the Merger Agreement, the Selling Stockholders
agreed to indemnify Coinbase for any appraisal award that exceeded the Merger
consideration. This decision therefore refers to the Selling Stockholders as taking the
positions that FairX nominally espoused.
1 Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Global Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 22–
23 (Del. 2017).
3 As often happens in an appraisal proceeding, the parties offered starkly
different depictions of the company to be valued. Hyde Park mustered the bulk of the
contemporaneous documents to show that FairX management and its backers were
optimistic about its prospects. Hyde Park also sought to prove that management
prepared projections in the ordinary course of business that are sufficiently reliable
to use for valuation purposes. The Selling Stockholders collected negative statements
from fewer documents and used those statement and their testimony to denigrate
FairX. They also sought to discredit the projections they prepared.
In this case, the record reveals precisely when the Selling Stockholders created
their litigation narrative. On January 5, 2022, after speaking with a Delaware lawyer
from their outside law firm and learning about appraisal proceedings, the Chairman
of the Board prepared and circulated to other insiders an “Outline of [FairX’s]
Operative Reality Today.”2 In it, the Chairman laid out a “narrative . . . . to show . . .
that we really did have a deliberative process” and to portray the sale to Coinbase as
the only option for a company with “[z]ero prospect[s]” and “virtually no chance of
success.”3
On the whole, Hyde Park’s account was more credible. Unfortunately, that
account does not solve the court’s valuation problem.
2 JX 1622.
3 Id.
4 In an appraisal proceeding, each side bears the burden of proving its own
factual contentions and valuation positions.4 The record supports the following
factual findings.5
A. The Company
In 2019, Neal Brady, Cliff Lewis, and Harsha Bhat founded LMX Labs, LLC—
later known as FairX—with the goal of revolutionizing how retail investors trade
futures. Just as Robinhood had done for the equities market, FairX sought to flip the
prevailing futures-market business model by charging market makers for order flow
and rebating a portion of that revenue to brokers. That payment stream in return
would incentivize brokers to route their trades to FairX and enable the brokers to
lower or eliminate the commissions they charged. FairX also planned to offer
innovative nano-sized futures contracts that would be more attractive to retail
investors, just as Robinhood offered lower-cost investments in fractional shares. And
FairX planned to provide retail investors with free market data.
4 Fir Tree Value Master Fund, LP v. Jarden Corp., 236 A.3d 313, 322 (Del.
2020) (cleaned up). 5 Citations in the form “PTO ¶ ––” refer to stipulated facts in the pre-trial order.
Dkt. 166. Citations in the form “[Name] Tr.” refer to witness testimony from the trial transcript. Citations in the form “[Name] Dep.” refer to witness testimony from deposition transcripts. Citations in the form “JX ––– at ––” refer to trial exhibits and their internal page numbers. If a trial exhibit lacks internal page numbers, then the citations use the last three digits of the control number. If trial exhibits use paragraph numbers, then the citations use those.
5 Brady, Lewis, and Bhat were industry veterans, and FairX was not their first
rodeo. Brady became FairX’s CEO. He had worked for twenty-five years in the
commodities space. Earlier, Brady co-founded ErisX, a FairX competitor, where he
served as CEO. After quarreling with the firm’s lead investor, Brady sold his stake
and left. That decision haunted him, and in October 2021, when the Chicago Board
Options Exchange (“CBOE”) agreed to buy ErisX for over $550 million, Brady was
apoplectic. He craved a similar exit, and days later, he unilaterally launched a sale
process by soliciting an offer from Coinbase. Sadly, Brady had no experience selling
a company. He repeatedly blundered and left value on the table.
Lewis became Chairman of the Board. Before co-founding FairX, he had
worked for over thirty years in the commodities world. He was a longtime Brady ally
who thought ErisX had treated Brady unfairly and that Brady deserved an exit. He
overcame his initial misgivings about the sale process to help Brady complete the
Merger. He created the Selling Stockholders’ made-for-litigation account.
Bhat became the Chief Technology Officer and oversaw the build-out of FairX’s
trading platform. Before co-founding FairX, Bhat had developed some of the world’s
fastest and most feature-rich trading platforms. Bhat built ErisX’s cash crypto and
crypto futures platforms, plus low latency cash trading platforms for other companies.
Boris Ilyevsky joined FairX in October 2020 as its Chief Product and Strategy
Officer. During his career, Ilyevsky built three equity options markets. He spent
seventeen years building the International Securities Exchange (“ISE”), which
brought electronic options to retail trading. Ilyevsky was Brady’s right-hand man.
6 B. Perfect Timing
FairX’s founders sought to take advantage of explosive growth in retail
trading, and they could not have chosen a better time. From 2014 to 2019, retail
futures trading grew by an astounding 30% year over year. Although they could not
see the future when they started FairX, retail futures trading during the COVID
pandemic would increase by another 80%. Even as the pandemic waned, the levels of
retail trading continued. Consumer interest in crypto was also building, and by
December 2020, Brady saw crypto futures as a billion-dollar opportunity.
To implement their retail-focused futures strategy, Bhat and his engineering
team built a world-class trading platform from scratch. The technology was fast,
reliable, and adaptable.
The biggest threat to FairX’s business plan was the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange (“CME”), which held a near monopoly in futures trading. CME, however,
was not focused on retail investors. As the dominant incumbent, CME was also
unlikely to change its strategy.
Instead, what CME offered was highly liquid trading markets, because
virtually all of the average daily volume (“ADV”) of trading in futures took place on
its exchange. To obtain the most accurate prices, brokers and market makers will
flock to the exchange that offers the greatest ADV and associated liquidity, resulting
in winner-take-all network effects for the most popular market. FairX’s business
model depended on convincing brokers and market makers to support a second,
retail-oriented exchange by routing retail clients to FairX in sufficient volume to
7 create a highly liquid market. Either FairX would achieve the goal and succeed, or it
would fail.
There were also regulatory hurdles. To act as an exchange, FairX needed to
secure a license to act as a designated contract maker (the “Exchange License”). FairX
also either needed to obtain a license to act as a derivatives clearing organization (the
“Clearing License”) or find a business partner who would clear the trades taking place
on FairX’s exchange.
C. The Series A Round
In November 2019, FairX completed a Series A financing round, raising $5.6
million at a pre-money valuation of $15.6 million. Hyde Park led the round and
invested $1.5 million. Paul Finnegan, a legendary investor and the former chair of
Madison Dearborn Partners, invested as well. So did John Rompon of Marjo
Investments. So did JR Brown Associates. And so did TD Ameritrade, a leading retail
broker and one of the strongest firms for futures trading.
The Series A stockholders had the right to designate one director. They
selected Weiss, the Hyde Park partner who sponsored its investment. Weiss is a
Clinical Professor of Accounting and Entrepreneurship at The University of Chicago
Booth School of Business. TD Ameritrade secured a Board observer seat and
appointed J.B. Mackenzie, one of Brady’s good friends.
D. Assembling The Key Pieces
After the Series A round, FairX began accumulating the pieces that success
would require. In April 2020, FairX applied to the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (the “CFTC”) for its Exchange License. Rather than also seeking a 8 Clearing License, FairX contracted with Nodal Clear (“Nodal”) to clear its trades.
Nodal had a Clearing License, but not for third-party trades. Nodal applied to the
CFTC for approval to clear third-party trades.
In August 2020, FairX secured a license from Bloomberg to use its S&P BSE
500 Index for testing and demonstrations. In return, FairX gave Bloomberg a right of
first offer (“ROFO”) if anyone sought to acquire FairX. DLA Piper, which acted as
FairX’s outside counsel, drafted the ROFO so it could be used to create a sense of
competition and lead to a higher price.
E. The Series B Round
In September 2020, FairX completed a Series B round, raising $13.8 million at
a pre-money valuation of $42 million. Hyde Park again led the round, investing $5
million in exchange for 2,667,521 shares of Series B preferred stock. Other investors
included Finnegan (2,667,050 shares) and Battery Ventures (533,504 shares). Datek,
another leading online broker, purchased 224,879 shares. FairX granted Finnegan a
Board observer seat.
In November 2020, the CFTC approved FairX’s Exchange License, enabling
FairX to act as an exchange. The CFTC also granted Nodal’s request to clear third
party trades. FairX had overcome the two regulatory hurdles it faced.
F. Initial Contact With Coinbase
Meanwhile, Coinbase was exploring offerings in cryptocurrency futures.
Coinbase hoped to accelerate its entry into the futures market by acquiring an entity
with an Exchange License. To capture as much of the economics as possible, Coinbase
9 wanted to clear its own trades, which meant acquiring an entity with a Clearing
License. Ideally, the same target would have both.
FairX was already toying with the idea of using its platform for retail trading
in crypto futures. In March 2021, Brady spoke with Coinbase about crypto products
that could trade on FairX’s exchange. Those discussions continued sporadically over
the following months.
G. The Series B1/B2 Round
In April 2021, FairX completed a Series B1/B2 round, raising $7.5 million at a
pre-money valuation of $105 million. The principal purpose of the round was to secure
investments from brokers and market makers. FairX believed that if brokers and
market makers invested in FairX, then they would be more likely to use its exchange.
FairX’s management team created a set of projections to market the round.
The management team sent the projections to investors and later to venture debt
lenders, including Silicon Valley Bank.
The projections represented management’s best estimate of FairX’s future cash
flows. That said, FairX was a new and potentially revolutionary business, so
management had no track record to build on. The projections were optimistic and
assumed FairX would hit its milestones.
Three strategic partners invested in the Series B1/B2 round: Tradovate, a
broker, and XTX and Virtu, two market makers. FairX’s existing investors also
purchased shares.
10 H. The June 2021 Soft Launch
Since its inception, FairX had operated in stealth mode to avoid attention from
CME and other potential competitors. As FairX consistently hit its milestones,
management began planning a demonstration to show how well FairX’s technology
worked. A heavily marketed launch risked alarming competitors if it went well and
disappointing potential customers if it went poorly. A quiet launch might fail to
attract customers.
Brady and his team decided on a quiet launch. If it went well, they expected to
use the results to build momentum with brokers and market makers over the
following months.
FairX initially expected TD Ameritrade, E*TRADE, and Tradovate to
participate in the soft launch, but TD Ameritrade and E*TRADE insisted on FairX
hitting minimum volume and liquidity targets before they would route trades to the
exchange. For a new launch, FairX could not guarantee that. After initially delaying
the launch in hopes that TD Ameritrade and E*TRADE would come around, FairX
decided to launch with Tradovate as its only broker.
The soft launch took place on June 28, 2021. The technology worked flawlessly.
The Company’s investors thought the event confirmed the investment thesis.
The next challenge for FairX was to increase the trading volume and associated
liquidity. The low volume associated with the soft launch would not cut it. To increase
volume, FairX began offering additional incentives for brokers to route trades to its
11 exchange. That was a good way to create near-term liquidity, but paying for trades
was not a viable long-term strategy.
I. The Series C Round
In August 2021, Brady decided that FairX would not be able to attain sufficient
trading volume without offering crypto futures.6 He envisioned re-positioning FairX
as a crypto futures exchange with a major player like Coinbase supplying the trades
and five to eight market makers providing liquidity.
To pursue the crypto-futures plan, Brady wanted a deeper commercial
relationship with Coinbase. He and Coinbase had been speaking intermittently about
crypto products. To reset the discussion, Brady sent Coinbase a plan under which
FairX would launch retail trading in crypto futures by the fourth quarter of 2021.
To fund the move into crypto, FairX sought to raise a Series C round. Brady
and his team thought an investment from Coinbase would supercharge investor
interest, so they approached Coinbase about that as well.
In August 2021, Coinbase conducted due diligence on FairX. In early
September 2021, Coinbase offered to invest at least $5 million in a Series C round
6 JX 470 at 1. In this email, Brady referred to the soft-launch as a “failure.” In
this proceeding, FairX has tried to depict Brady’s comment as applying to the soft launch as a whole. In reality, Brady was referring only to the levels of trading volume and liquidity, which were insufficient to attract large brokers and market makers to its exchange. The technology was not a failure. It worked flawlessly. And the low volume and liquidity were not unexpected. FairX had planned to use the success of a quiet launch to establish relationships with additional brokers and market makers.
12 through its venture capital arm. Coinbase also indicated it was open to co-leading the
round.
Coinbase wanted to make its investment in conjunction with a commercial deal
with FairX. That was music to Brady’s ears. Later that month, Coinbase applied with
the CFTC to be a licensed crypto broker that could offer cryptocurrency futures.
On September 12, 2021, Weiss asked Brady what valuation he was targeting
for the Series C round. Brady said that before Coinbase expressed interest, he had
been targeting a pre-money valuation of $150 million. With Coinbase investing,
Brady thought the pre-money valuation could range from $200 million to up to $400
million, depending on how specific the commercial agreement was.
J. The Crypto Tsunami
FairX’s plain to reorient towards cryptocurrency futures took place against a
backdrop of increasing interest in crypto and a spate of acquisitions as large crypto
players sought to become vertically integrated. On August 31, 2021, FTX announced
that it was buying LedgerX. At the time, FTX was the leading US-regulated
cryptocurrency exchange.
The FTX acquisition sparked market interest in firms that could trade crypto
futures. Brady called the deluge of market interest a “crypto tsunami.”
Four crypto companies approached FairX during September 2021. The U.S.
head of Crypto.com said that his company wanted to buy a futures exchange and
expressed interest in FairX. Bitstamp asked whether FairX was open to an
13 acquisition and wanted to continue the discussions. Polymarket and Kraken asked if
FairX was for sale.
For its part, Coinbase had already decided to acquire a company with an
Exchange License and ideally a Clearing License. By September 2021, Coinbase had
narrowed its list of targets to ErisX, FairX, and Bitnomial. Coinbase decided to
pursue ErisX first because it had both licenses. FairX was the second choice.
ErisX had already started a banker-led sale process. Coinbase submitted a bid
of $300 million, but ErisX entered into exclusivity with CBOE. Coinbase upped its
bid to $400 million, and CBOE countered at $564 million. Coinbase raised its offer to
$450 million, but ErisX took the higher bid.
As soon as Coinbase learned it had lost, the deal team turned to FairX.
Coinbase felt burned by its experience with ErisX and wanted to secure its target
without another bidding war. To that end, Coinbase realized that one of FairX’s
alternatives to a sale would be to complete its Series C round and remain
independent. To stop that from happening, Coinbase interfered with the round.
FairX had approached Andreesen Horowitz, a premier venture capital firm,
about investing in its Series C round. Andreesen Horowitz was a major investor in
Coinbase, so FairX asked Coinbase if they could tell Andreesen Horowitz that
Coinbase was interested in co-leading the round. Coinbase gave its approval. After
14 approaching Andreesen Horowitz, FairX thought a round co-led by Coinbase and
Andreesen Horowitz was a realistic possibility.7
Then, in direct violation of its non-disclosure agreement with FairX, Coinbase
contacted Andreesen Horowitz. To reduce the attractiveness of the Series C round as
an option, Coinbase asked Andreesen Horowitz to string out its response to FairX.
Andreesen Horowitz obliged.8 Those machinations reduced the attractiveness of the
Series C round as an alternative for FairX. By contrast, if Coinbase and Andreesen
Horowitz had led the Series C round, then it would have been a done deal.
As it was, FairX’s principal investors were ready to invest in a Series C Round.
Hyde Park, Finnegan, and Battery Ventures all expressed interest. Securing new
investors was more difficult, at least without being able to point to Coinbase leading
the round or co-leading it with Andreesen Horowitz.
K. Brady Solicits A Bid From Coinbase.
The news that CBOE was buying ErisX for over $550 million sent Brady into
a tailspin. Brady had been one of the co-founders of ErisX, and he felt cheated out of
his $25 million share of the proceeds. He wanted an exit of his own, and he turned to
Coinbase in hopes of achieving one.
On October 21, 2021, Brady emailed Greg Tusar of Coinbase, writing:
With the ErisX acquisition, I wanted to sync up on [Coinbase’s] strategy in the CFTC space, and see if we could partner in a more
7 See JX 826.
8 See JX 990.
15 transformational way. Having founded ErisX, I have a very good idea of how we could do what CBOE is setting out to achieve . . . or what Coinbase might have been able to do with an ErisX.9
The Coinbase deal team recognized the email for what it was: an invitation to make
a bid. Brady did not secure Board authorization before that outreach.
That night, Brady worked until 3:00 in the morning on what he called his “‘buy
me’ plan.”10 On October 22, Brady met with the Coinbase team and told them that
FairX was “open to a full acquisition.” The Coinbase meeting attendees thought
Brady “was practically jumping out of his chair saying we needed to do something.”11
After the meeting, Tusar asked about a specific figure. Brady emailed back,
“‘less than 550’ 😉.”12 That had been the price for ErisX. Through his message, Brady
capped the value of any deal for FairX.
Brady never informed the Board about those discussions.
L. Brady Contacts Other Players.
On October 23, 2021, Brady reached out to Crypto.com, Bitstamp, and Kraken.
He wanted an exit, and he was not yet sure if Coinbase would take the bait.
9 JX 852 (emphasis added).
10 JX 854 (emphasis added).
11 JX 864 at 2–3.
12 Id. at 2.
16 To ensure that Coinbase focused on an acquisition, Brady sent an email on
October 24, 2021, in which he rejected Coinbase’s offer to invest $5 million or more in
the Series C round. He wrote:
While we appreciate Coinbase’s interest in participating in our Series C round for a small amount, we don’t think the framework we’ve been operating under . . . fits the moment: this market opportunity is too big . ...
In terms of structure . . . . [i]f this were an outright acquisition of FairX, they key questions are 1) do we both agree this is best done as part of a consortium? and 2) if so, what is the optimal sequence – to have Coinbase buy first and then invite additional participants, or does the consortium get assembled at the start?13
Brady again addressed price: “[A]s I said on Friday, . . . [o]ur sense of the proper value
is somewhere between that pre-launch post-money valuation [$115 million] and the
~$550M or so that we understand has been recently paid for ErisX.”14
Brady sent drafts and the final version of his email to Bhat and Ilyevsky. He
even sent the final email to his spouse. He did not inform the Board. Instead, he told
Bhat and Ilyevsky to “[k]eep [Brady’s October 24 email] on the private email and
don’t respond.”15 They complied.
13 JX 892 (formatting added) (emphasis added).
14 Id.
15 JX 1317.
17 M. Two Event-Filled Days
Over October 28 and 29, 2021, Brady reached a deal with Coinbase. He did not
involve the full Board, and he spent more effort optimizing his personal payout than
negotiating the deal consideration.
1. October 28
On October 28, 2021, at 2:23 PM, Coinbase sent Brady a letter of intent (the
“Initial LOI”). It contemplated acquiring FairX for $285 million, comprising $235
million in Coinbase stock and $50 million in cash.16 The Initial LOI proposed equity
awards for Brady, Ilyevsky, and Bhat (the “Key Employees”) with the awards vesting
in equal amounts over a three-year period.
At 10:43 PM, Brady forwarded the Initial LOI to his spouse. She did not work
for the Company or in the industry. Brady never forwarded the Initial LOI to the
Board. Brady deliberately kept Weiss in the dark because he expected Weiss to
disagree over both the valuation and how Brady had solicited the transaction. 17 In
his response to the Initial LOI, Brady assured Coinbase that “there is an amazing
opportunity ahead of us as one team.”18
Brady then focused on his own payout. At 11:26 PM that night, he asked his
counsel at DLA Piper, “if we ask for more up front, say 50% in consideration at Close,
16 JX 959.
17 See Brady Tr. 302–03; Ilyevsky Tr. 586.
18 JX 963 at 2.
18 does that ‘cost’ [CoinBase] anything . . . ?”19 Brady also asked counsel to confirm that
he and Lewis could prevail over Weiss in any Board vote.20
2. October 29
Brady had shared the Initial LOI with Lewis. At 8:44 AM on October 29, 2021,
Lewis emailed Brady about getting a higher price for the Company. He told Brady
that he “saw . . . a potential opportunity to extract value if . . . [Coinbase] didn’t value
the noncrypto trading” and that they should not “miss[] a chance to start a bidding
war.”21 Brady did not respond in writing, telling Lewis, “call you in ~30.”22
Brady turned to Rompon for advice on negotiating a better package for the Key
Employees. Rompon was a former attorney who led a venture capital fund that
invested in the Company. Rompon sent back a blank email with the subject line “Call
Me When Received” and attached a file named “NB Net.xlsx,” presumably a reference
to “Neal Brady Net.”23 The analysis addressed different vesting schedules that Brady
could ask for and showed that a 40/20/20/20 vesting schedule would give Brady the
most consideration at closing.
19 JX 1006 at 3.
20 Id. at 2 (“I have 2 of the 3 seats.”).
21 Lewis Dep. 377, 382.
22 JX 973.
23 JX 975; Brady Tr. 381–82.
19 Later that day, Brady asked Coinbase for a 40/20/20/20 vesting schedule.24 On
price, he softly asked that Coinbase get “closer to a 3x on [FairX’s] last round [of]
$112M,” or $336 million.25 He told Coinbase that those changes would make the deal
a “slam dunk” that “we can get signed . . . quickly.”26
Shan Aggarwal, who led the Coinbase deal team, was coyly non-committal.
Brady responded that he was on board either way: “Appreciate anything you can do
and will do everything I can on my end to get this done.”27 Brady forwarded the email
exchange to his spouse but not the Board.28
3. The Revised LOI
At 8:35 PM that same day, Coinbase sent Brady a new LOI (the “Revised
LOI”).29 It provided for an improved vesting schedule just short of Brady’s ask
(35/15/25/25) and a higher headline price of $330 million, just short of Brady’s
suggestion of $336 million.30 The new split would be $265 million in stock and $65
million cash.
24 JX 978; Brady Tr. 383.
25 JX 966.
26 Id.
27 JX 978.
28 JX 977.
29 JX 979.
30 Id.
20 Still in the dark, Weiss asked Brady that afternoon if Coinbase was “leaning
in on a larger [Series C] round size[.]”31 Based on Coinbase’s involvement and the
addition of crypto futures, Weiss proposed an $80 million round with a pre-money
valuation of $520 million.32 Instead of mentioning either the Initial LOI or the
Revised LOI, Brady obfuscated: “I think they are definitely leaning in. We broke
through the past week and the business guys are really committed.”33 Weiss
continued to believe (wrongly) that the ongoing FairX-Coinbase discussions
contemplated a larger round and a commercial agreement, not an acquisition.
After a 6:00 PM follow-up call with Aggarwal, Brady and Lewis crowed about
how they would make more money on the FairX deal than they would have on ErisX. 34
Having secured the payout he wanted, Brady focused on doing everything he could to
ensure the deal closed.
4. Brady Resists Advice From His Directors, Observers, and Advisors.
On the evening of October 29, 2021, Brady forwarded the Revised LOI to
Weiss.35 Brady stripped his email of Coinbase’s cover message, which referenced the
31 JX 981.
32 Id.; see Weiss Tr. 50–52.
33 JX 981.
34 See JX 983.
35 JX 1017.
21 Initial LOI. Weiss did not learn of the Initial LOI until days later, when DLA Piper
mentioned it in passing.36
After seeing the Revised LOI, Weiss, Finnegan, Rompon and Scott Kapp of
DLA Piper raised process concerns. Finnegan wanted to shop the deal because “FairX
had [a] shot at being [a] unicorn.”37 Rompon wanted FairX to hire a banker to make
something happen “with another zero or two” and account for “the non-Crypto stuff”
“which [Coinbase] . . . is not really paying for[.]”38 Finnegan and Rompon
brainstormed about potential bidders to convince Brady to shop the deal.39 Kapp and
Rompon agreed FairX would benefit by slowing down, fleshing out the LOI, and
soliciting other bidders.40
Brady resisted. He “want[ed] to move full steam ahead with the current
Coinbase offer.”41 On October 30, 2021, Brady told Ilyevsky and Bhat that he had
been “talking to [Weiss], Finnegan, and [] Kapp all day, arguing them away from
fantasies about shopping this deal, improving the terms, or . . . VC funding and
36 Weiss Tr. 55.
37 JX 1004; Finnegan Tr. 683–84.
38 JX 1046; JX 1055.
39 JX 1057.
40 JX 1011.
41 JX 1029.
22 secondary liquidity for management.”42 Bhat praised Brady for “doing the messy work
. . . !!”43 When Weiss raised his concerns on a group call, Lewis vented: “Unbelievable
jerk[.]”44 Brady replied: “I’m closing this [Coinbase] deal for sure now. The alternative
of sticking around got even worse.”45
N. A “Quick Pass” On The ROFO
Kapp advised Brady that he could use Bloomberg’s ROFO to slow down the
process, secure a competing bid, and put competitive pressure on Coinbase.46 Brady
decided to go in the opposite direction by getting Bloomberg “to return a quick ‘we
pass[.]’”47 Kapp agreed with Finnegan and Weiss about the importance of seeking a
better deal and creating competitive pressure, but he recognized that Brady and
Lewis wanted to take the Coinbase deal.48
Brady sent Bloomberg the ROFO notice on November 1—three days after
receiving the Revised LOI.49 He told Bloomberg that FairX had decided to engage in
42 JX 1000.
43 Id.
44 JX 1070.
45 Id.
46 JX 1001; JX 1014.
47 JX 1000.
48 JX 1055.
49 Brady Tr. 385–86.
23 a sale transaction, even though the Board had not even convened formally, let alone
approved a sale.50 He asked Bloomberg to return a quick pass so the Coinbase
transaction could go forward.51
Brady told Coinbase what he was doing, but not the Board.52 As Kapp had
foreseen, Coinbase was initially concerned that Bloomberg would submit a competing
bid.53 Rather than using that concern to create competitive pressure, Brady told
Coinbase not to worry.54
On November 3, 2021, Brady told Coinbase that Bloomberg had passed on the
ROFO. Weiss learned about what Brady had done from Finnegan. Understandably
frustrated, he told Brady: “Please do not take these actions until there is board
consensus.”55 Brady was so out of his depth and so committed to the Revised LOI that
he turned to Coinbase for “guidance on sequencing” the transaction process.56
50 Brady Tr. 386.
51 Brady Tr. 316; JX 1684.
52 Brady Tr. 316; JX 123; JX 1095.
53 JX 1041 at 3; Aggarwal Tr. 527.
54 Aggarwal Tr. 527–28; see JX 1064 at 1 (“Neal was confident that he could get
[Bloomberg] to decline to submit an offer within ~48 hours[.]”). 55 JX 1095; accord Weiss Tr. 58 (“[W]e just started talking about whether it
made sense to pursue this acquisition . . . [the] ROFO had been set up . . . to help with [negotiating] leverage . . . . We hadn’t even had one board meeting to discuss this.”). 56 JX 1041; see JX 1064.
24 O. The Leadup To The Next Board Meeting
The next Board meeting was scheduled for November 8, 2021. During the
leadup, Weiss and Finnegan found themselves aligned on the need to explore the
possibility of a better price. Weiss emphasized that FairX had plenty of capital and
did not need a near-term deal. He cautioned against selling before the Company’s
impending launch of retail crypto futures. He also expressed concerns about
management prioritizing a negotiation over their vesting schedules.57 Weiss proposed
a dual-track process for exploring other options: (1) hire a banker and conduct a
market check, and simultaneously (2) continue to pursue the Series C round.
Finnegan advised that foregoing a competitive auction process would be
“unusual in this environment,” when the market was “quite frothy.”58 He emphasized
that “a substantial Series C . . . with or without [Coinbase] . . . is achievable at a
similar value.”59 He also noted that the capital raise could provide “significant
liquidity to Management.”60 He thought they should not sell for less than $500
million.61
57 JX 1098; Weiss Tr. 61–64.
58 JX 1133; Finnegan Dep. 120; Weiss Tr. 67–68.
59 JX 1133.
60 Id.
61 Id.; Finnegan Tr. 680–81, 686; Weiss Tr. 70.
25 Brady and his management team wanted to stick with the Revised LOI. They
wrote of Weiss as a “lost cause,” but they thought they could persuade Finnegan to
support the deal.62
To that end, Brady’s spouse drafted an email that he sent to Finnegan. In it,
Brady offered a partial mea culpa: “I really took to heart your concerns about whether
price discovery was adequately achieved . . . I would like to share some . . . proprietary
information with you prior to the board meeting . . . . I think I have done you a
disservice by not sharing . . . these insights earlier . . . .”63 Brady then spoke with
Finnegan, using talking points that Kapp had prepared. Finnegan initially stuck to
his guns and insisted that the Company was worth $500 million, but Brady refused
to go back on price. Eventually, Brady wore down Finnegan.
To ensure he wasn’t missing something, Weiss wanted to contact the
Company’s strategic investors to obtain their perspectives on the size of the
Company’s market opportunity and their sense of the Company’s value. By this time,
the strategic investors knew about the Revised LOI. Yet after he told the Board what
he planned to do, Brady, Lewis, and Kapp went ballistic. Kapp threatened Weiss with
a lawsuit if he proceeded.64 Brady and Lewis immediately reached out to those same
investors to warn them about Weiss and poison the well.
62 JX 1144.
63 JX 1120.
64 See JX 1152.
26 P. The November 8 Board Meeting
On November 8, 2021, the Board held its first formal meeting since FairX
received the Initial LOI. Brady did not disclose that he had invited an offer. He also
did not mention that he had rejected Coinbase’s Series C commitment. Instead, Brady
described Coinbase’s offer as “unsolicited.”65
Brady also did not report on his negotiations with Coinbase over the vesting
schedules for Key Employees or his discussions with Coinbase about Bloomberg’s
ROFO. He did not disclose that Crypto.com had expressed interest in buying the
Company or that he was scheduled to speak with its CEO on November 16. Instead,
Brady gave everyone the impression that the Company did not have a good backup
plan. Yet he had told Lewis exactly the opposite, and the management team believed
that a deal with Crypto.com was feasible.66
To dissuade the Board from treating the ErisX deal as a comparable
transaction for valuation purposes, Brady and Lewis told the Board that ErisX likely
received a premium because it was a crypto-enabled platform, had its own Clearing
License, and was backed by a consortium of investors and partners.67 In reality,
Brady and Lewis thought that FairX was more valuable than ErisX.68
65 JX 1171 at 2.
66 Brady Tr. 395–96; Ilyevsky Tr. 589.
67 JX 1171.
68 See Lewis Dep. 353 (“‘Did you believe that FairX was more valuable than
ErisX? Answer: Yes.’”); Brady Tr. 426 (“I am very much in alignment with Cliff’s 27 Brady recommended that the Board approve the Revised LOI and pursue the
Coinbase deal. To placate concerns about the deal process, he agreed to “discuss
attempting to increase the purchase price with . . . Coinbase[.]”69
Brady went through the motions when seeking a higher price. On November
9, 2021, he told Tusar of Coinbase that he had “pain in the ass preferreds and if they
could give ‘a little more’ that would grease it. But I said let’s talk about that after we
sort the process/legal points . . . and that we’ll make this happen.”70 On November 11,
Brady and Lewis met with Coinbase to have the price discussion that the Board
wanted. Brady did not make a specific demand or propose a specific number.71
Coinbase got the message. They thought Brady and Lewis were “checking a
box” rather than making a strong ask.72 They also realized that the request was
“really coming from FairX’s preferred stockholders.”73 The Coinbase team “declined
views there.”); JX 836 (“We have a lot more to offer than ErisX.”); see Brady Tr. 398 (stating that that FairX was “way ahead” of ErisX); id. (agreeing that “ErisX’s futures complex had zero volume over three years of operation.”). 69 JX 1171.
70 JX 1207; see Aggarwal Tr. 537–39.
71 Brady Tr. 330–31.
72 JX 1230.
73 Aggarwal Tr. 539–44; see JX 1230.
28 to increase the transaction consideration” with the expectation that the Company
would execute the Revised LOI.74
After hearing that Coinbase held firm on price, Finnegan moved off his target
price of $500 million. He concluded that the best path forward was to execute the
Revised LOI.75 Brady executed it that same day.76
Brady then snubbed Crypto.com. He was scheduled to speak with its CEO on
November 16. Kapp advised canceling the call, lest any rumors reach Coinbase. When
Brady did, Crypto.com asked to reschedule. Brady obfuscated: “Boris was going to
send you a note . . . before I hit ‘cancel’ but must have had connectivity issues . . . .
Unfortunately the next couple of weeks are going to be difficult . . . . We’ll reach back
out after Thanksgiving . . . .”77 Brady never reached back out to Crypto.com. Two
weeks later, Crypto.com announced that it was acquiring Small Exchange, another
company in the same space as FairX.
Q. Brady Schemes To Remove Weiss.
Meanwhile, Brady and his team began working with Kapp and his colleagues
at DLA Piper on removing Weiss from the Board. On November 9, 2021, Lewis had
74 Aggarwal Tr. 543–44.
75 JX 1254.
76 JX 1229.
77 JX 1284; see Brady Tr. 387–88; Ilyevsky Tr. 590.
29 attended a strategy meeting with DLA Piper lawyers. Lewis’s notes state: “Ira
impuned [sic] LOI[.] Should we kick Ira off Board.”78
Weiss irritated Brady and his allies even more when he proposed to consult
with a financial advisor about valuation. On November 17, 2021, he reported to the
Board that he had “identified some of the better bankers in the space” and that he
would “like to reach out to them just to get an overall sense of valuation for companies
like LedgerX and ErisX.”79 Kapp instructed Weiss to stop. To mollify Weiss, FairX
hired Architect Partners, a boutique investment bank.80 But Brady only gave them
authority to negotiate with Coinbase within the scope of the Revised LOI.
Just before Thanksgiving, Coinbase sent FairX a first draft of a merger
agreement. It called for FairX to represent that the Board approved the merger
agreement unanimously.81 Coinbase included the requirement because they knew
Weiss had raised objections to the merger.82 Lewis and Brady decided that to
accommodate Coinbase, they should “kick Ira off [the] board.”83
78 JX 1197.
79 JX 1295.
80 JX 1325.
81 JX 2010.0061.
82 Aggarwal Tr. 546–49.
83 JX 1316.
30 On December 1, 2021, Brady asked for Weiss’s resignation. Weiss refused.
FairX then asked Coinbase to modify the unanimous approval requirement. Coinbase
refused and told Brady “to get that shareholder on board . . . .”84 Kapp told them that
Weiss was “very unlikely” to support the deal “unless Coinbase raises the purchase
price,” adding “and let me be very clear that’s not what we are asking.”85
The preferred stockholders had the power to remove Weiss. To rally support
for Weiss’s removal, Brady told the preferred stockholders that Weiss was “disruptive
and counterproductive.”86
On December 7, 2021, Weiss asked for books and records related to the deal
negotiations. Portraying Weiss’s request as proof that he was being obstructive,
Brady and his team asked the preferred stockholders to remove Weiss by written
consent. The preferred stockholders removed Weiss the next day. FairX then rejected
Weiss’s books and records demand on the theory that he was no longer a director.
Coinbase asked to be kept apprised of any further developments involving
Weiss. Coinbase also pressed for a holdback from the deal consideration plus
indemnification for any appraisal action so that the Selling Stockholders would be on
the hook for 100% of any post-Merger litigation. FairX and the Selling Stockholders
agreed.
84 JX 1454 at 6.
85 Id. at 5.
86 Swanson Dep. 91; see Brady Tr. 332–33.
31 R. Making A Record
In addition to removing Weiss, Brady and his team began preparing for
litigation. During a strategy meeting with DLA Piper on November 9, 2021, one of
the firm’s Delaware lawyers raised the possibility of an appraisal proceeding and
explained that Delaware appraisal decisions often use company projections in a
discounted cash flow methodology.87 Brady, Lewis, and the management team
immediately recognized that the projections they had created for the Series B1/B2
round and for the aborted Series C round would support values above the deal price.88
After Weiss’s removal, litigation seemed more likely. On January 5, 2022,
Lewis circulated an email titled “Outline of Operative Reality Today.”89 Using the
term “Operative Reality” was a tell. That term figures prominently in Delaware
appraisal jurisprudence; it is not commonly used in other contexts.
Lewis’s “Outline” described what became FairX’s litigation narrative: “[I]f we
didn’t move ahead quickly with [Coinbase] (no . . . banker, etc.), they’d go elsewhere.
If they went elsewhere, we were dead ducks . . . .”90 Lewis also created a document
called “Summary of Key Changes to FairX Operative Reality” that listed talking
87 JX 1196.
88 Id.; Brady Tr. 402–04.
89 JX 1622; Brady Tr. 409–10.
90 JX 1622 at 1.
32 points for the litigation narrative.91 Lewis wanted FairX witnesses to say “we didn’t
do ‘forecasts’ but rather ‘if/then’ models,” that “we really did have a deliberative
process,” and that the “[s]oft launch was softer than expected.”92 He also wanted
FairX witnesses to say that “FTX buying LedgerX followed by . . . CBOE buying ErisX
. . . [l]eft only [Coinbase] as a crypto partner option,” and that “[n]one of the top tier
VCs approached for Series C were interested even when we thought [Coinbase] would
lead the round.”93
Lewis’s narrative omitted key events, such as the approaches by Crypto.com,
Kraken, and other platforms about whether FairX was for sale. It also omitted
management’s belief that that FairX had other options.94 And it failed to mention
what Brady had learned about Coinbase backchannelling with Andreessen Horowitz
to slow-roll the Series C round.
Management understood their marching orders. Brady and Ilyevsky began
gutting the Series C projections the next day. On January 10, 2022, Brady circulated
projections that reduced five-year gross revenue by ~28% and EBITDA by ~85%
compared to the Series C projections.95 The following day, Ilyevsky cut the projections
91 Id. at 3.
92 Id.
93 Id. (formatting added).
94 Ilyevsky Tr. 589.
95 JX 1647.
33 further. His set reduced five-year gross revenue by ~59% and EBITDA by ~98%
compared to the Series C projections.96
On January 11, 2022, the Board approved the Merger Agreement. It was
executed later that day. The Board also approved the final minutes for the November
8 and 12 Board meetings. The minutes tracked Lewis’s litigation narrative.
S. The Merger Closes.
On January 12, holders of a majority of FairX’s voting power approved the
Merger. On January 25, FairX disseminated an information statement to its
stockholders. Anticipating that Weiss would seek appraisal, the information
statement asserted that Weiss had provided substantial input to the Series C
projections and emphasized that they were no longer reliable. On February 1, the
Merger closed.
After closing, Coinbase managed FairX’s business as the Coinbase Derivatives
Exchange. Today, with the help of FairX’s pre-Merger partners,97 the business unit
trades crypto futures with around $20–30 million in notional value traded daily.98
96 JX 1648.
97 FairX’s brokers (Tradovate, Ironbeam, Stage 5), market makers (Hudson
River Trading, Virtu, Budo), FCMs (StoneX), and vendors (Bookmap, CQG, Rithmic, Sierra Chart, TradingView, DXFeed) all facilitate trading volume or provide trading- related services for Coinbase’s exchange. Ilyevsky Tr. 600–04; JX 587 at 2; JX 2011; PTO ¶¶ 29, 39–45. 98 JX 2012.
34 Coinbase did not value and had no strategic interest in FairX’s non-crypto
futures business. After the Merger, Coinbase deemphasized that business and did not
budget resources for it. As a result, trading volume on the platform largely ceased.
T. This Litigation
On February 3, 2022, Hyde Park submitted a demand for appraisal. On April
18, 2022, Hyde Park filed this appraisal proceeding. The parties conducted discovery
and litigated the case through trial.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
“An appraisal proceeding is a limited legislative remedy intended to provide
shareholders dissenting from a merger on grounds of inadequacy of the offering price
with a judicial determination of the intrinsic worth (fair value) of their
shareholdings.”99 In its seminal decision on the meaning of fair value, the Delaware
Supreme Court provided the following explanation:
The basic concept of value under the appraisal statute is that the stockholder is entitled to be paid for that which has been taken from him, viz., his proportionate interest in a going concern. By value of the stockholder’s proportionate interest in the corporate enterprise is meant the true or intrinsic value of his stock which has been taken by the merger. In determining what figure represents this true or intrinsic value, . . . the courts must take into consideration all factors and elements which reasonably might enter into the fixing of value. Thus, market value, asset value, dividends, earning prospects, the nature of the enterprise and any other facts which were known or which could be ascertained as of the date of the merger and which throw any light on future prospects of the merged corporation are not only pertinent to an
99 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. (Technicolor I), 542 A.2d 1182, 1186 (Del.
1988).
35 inquiry as to the value of the dissenting stockholders’ interest, but must be considered . . . .100
The Delaware Supreme Court has adhered to that definition ever since.101
To determine the fair value of a stockholder’s proportionate interest in the
corporation, the court must “envisage the entire pre-merger company as a ‘going
concern,’ as a standalone entity, and assess its value as such.”102 When doing so, the
court must value the corporation based on its “operative reality” at the time of the
merger.103 “The underlying assumption in an appraisal valuation is that the
dissenting shareholders would be willing to maintain their investment position had
100 Tri-Cont’l Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Del. 1950).
101 Brigade Leveraged Cap. Structures Fund Ltd. v. Stillwater Mining Co., 240
A.3d 3, 10 (Del. 2020) (explaining that a stockholder should be awarded “‘his proportionate interest in [the] going concern’” (alteration in original) (quoting Dell, 177 A.3d at 21)); Verition P’rs Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., 210 A.3d 128, 132–33 (Del. 2019) (per curiam) (“[F]air value is . . . the value of the company to the stockholder as a going concern,” defined as the stockholder’s “proportionate interest in a going concern.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); accord Montgomery Cellular Hldg. Co. v. Dobler, 880 A.2d 206, 222 (Del. 2005); Paskill Corp. v. Alcoma Corp., 747 A.2d 549, 553 (Del. 2000); Rapid-Am. Corp. v. Harris, 603 A.2d 796, 802 (Del. 1992); Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1144 (Del. 1989); Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d 137, 141 (Del. 1980); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Francis I. duPont & Co., 334 A.2d 216, 218 (Del. 1975). But see DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value P’rs, L.P., 172 A.3d 346, 371 (Del. 2017) (describing fair value inquiry as examining whether stockholders “receive fair compensation for their shares in the sense that it reflects what they deserve to receive based on what would fairly be given to them in an arm’s-length transaction”). 102 Dell, 177 A.3d at 20.
103 Id.
36 the merger not occurred.”104 Consequently, the trial court must assess “the value of
the company . . . as a going concern, rather than its value to a third party as an
acquisition.”105 The court must also value the entity “based on its business plan at
the time of the merger.”106 “The time for determining the value of a dissenter’s shares
is the date on which the merger closes.”107
A. Burdens Of Proof And The Court’s Task
The appraisal statute states that “the Court shall determine the fair value of
the shares exclusive of any element of value arising from the accomplishment or
expectation of the merger[] [or] consolidation . . . .”108 That statutory language places
the obligation to determine fair value squarely on the court.109 The statutory mandate
alters the burden of proof and affects the court’s approach to the case.
104 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. (Technicolor II), 684 A.2d 289, 298 (Del.
1996). 105 M.P.M. Enters., Inc. v. Gilbert, 731 A.2d 790, 795 (Del. 1999); accord Golden
Telecom, Inc. v. Global GT LP, 11 A.3d 214, 217 (Del. 2010) (“[F]air value” means “the value to a stockholder of the firm as a going concern, as opposed to the firm’s value in the context of an acquisition or other transaction.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 106 Glob. GT LP v. Golden Telecom, Inc., 993 A.2d 497, 507 (Del. Ch. 2010),
aff’d, 11 A.3d 214 (Del. 2010). 107 Stillwater, 240 A.3d at 17.
108 8 Del. C. § 262(h).
109 Gonsalves v. Straight Arrow Publ’rs, Inc., 701 A.2d 357, 361 (Del. 1997).
37 First, because of the statutory mandate, the allocation of the burden of proof
in an appraisal proceeding differs from a traditional liability proceeding. In an
appraisal proceeding, “both sides have the burden of proving their respective
valuation positions by a preponderance of [the] evidence.”110 “No presumption,
favorable or unfavorable, attaches to either side’s valuation.”111 “Each party also
bears the burden of proving the constituent elements of its valuation position[,] . . .
including the propriety of a particular method, modification, discount, or
premium.”112
Second, the court has to arrive at a valuation, even if none of the parties’
attempts are persuasive. “In discharging its statutory mandate, the Court of
Chancery has discretion to select one of the parties’ valuation models as its general
framework or to fashion its own.”113 The Court of Chancery may “adopt any one
expert’s model, methodology, and mathematical calculations, in toto, if that valuation
is supported by credible evidence and withstands a critical judicial analysis on the
110 Jarden, 236 A.3d at 322 (cleaned up).
111 Pinson v. Campbell-Taggart, Inc., 1989 WL 17438, at *6 (Del. Ch. Feb. 28,
1989).
In re Appraisal of Stillwater Mining Co. (Stillwater Trial), 2019 WL 112
3943851, at *18 (Del. Ch. Aug. 21, 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff’d sub nom. Brigade Leveraged Cap. Structures Fund Ltd. v. Stillwater Mining Co., 240 A.3d 3 (Del. 2020). 113 M.G. Bancorporation, Inc. v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513, 525–26 (Del. 1999)
(emphasis added).
38 record.”114 Or the court “may evaluate the valuation opinions submitted by the
parties, select the most representative analysis, and then make appropriate
adjustments to the resulting valuation.”115
If neither party satisfies its burden, “the court must then use its own
independent judgment to determine fair value.”116 As Chief Justice Strine observed
while serving on this court, “I cannot shirk my duty to arrive at my own independent
determination of value, regardless of whether the competing experts have provided
widely divergent estimates of value, while supposedly using the same well-
established principles of corporate finance.”117 Put differently, “[w]hen . . . none of the
parties establishes a value that is persuasive, the Court must make a determination
based upon its own analysis.”118
Contrary to the statutory language and precedent, the Selling Stockholders
argue that the trial court cannot make its own valuation determination, even if it
114 Id. at 526.
115 Jesse A. Finkelstein & John D. Hendershot, Appraisal Rights in Mergers
and Consolidations, 38-5th C.P.S. (BNA), at A-31 (2010 & 2017 Supp.) (collecting cases). 116 Gholl v. eMachines, Inc., 2004 WL 2847865, at *5 (Del. Ch. Nov. 24, 2004);
see Gonsalves, 701 A.2d at 361 (emphasizing the trial court’s responsibility to “independently determine the value of the shares that are the subject of the appraisal action”). 117 Del. Open MRI Radiology Assocs., P.A. v. Kessler, 898 A.2d 290, 310–11 (Del.
Ch. 2006). 118 Cooper v. Pabst Brewing Co., 1993 WL 208763, at *8 (Del. Ch. June 8, 1993).
39 rejects the parties’ methodologies as unpersuasive. For that proposition, they rely on
Aruba, a per curiam decision in which the Delaware Supreme Court reversed the trial
court for deploying a valuation methodology that “neither party argued for.”119 The
Selling Stockholders conclude, based on Aruba, that (i) the trial court cannot adopt a
valuation methodology that “neither party argued for . . . as the fair value under
[Section] 262” and (ii) the trial the court can only use a methodology that was
“subjected to the crucible of pretrial discovery, expert depositions, cross-expert
rebuttal, expert testimony at trial, and cross examination at trial.”120
Evaluating those assertions requires considering what happened in Aruba.
While that appraisal action was progressing through trial and post-trial briefing, the
Delaware Supreme Court issued the important rulings in DFC and Dell. The trial
court requested supplemental briefing after the issuance of each decision. In the
supplemental brief submitted after Dell, the respondent argued that its unaffected
trading price was the single most important marker for its fair value. In support of
that proposition, the respondent cited publicly available statistics indicating that the
market for its stock was efficient and asked the trial court to determine fair value
using the thirty-day average of its pre-deal-announcement trading price.121
119 Aruba, 210 A.3d at 140.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 131.
40 In rendering its decision, the trial court sought to incorporate the teachings of
DFC and Dell. Both parties had presented DCF methodologies, but both DFC and
Dell warned trial courts about the subjectivity of DCF valuations and the importance
of giving weight to market-based indicators. Those admonitions applied to the DCF
valuations in Aruba, so the trial court did not rely on them.122
Attempting to adhere to DFC and Dell, the trial court looked to the deal price
and the unaffected trading price as market-based indicators of fair value.123 Using
the deal price as a valuation indicator meant that the trial court needed to deduct the
value of the synergies allocated to the seller in the purchase price. There was no direct
evidence regarding the allocation, and the parties agreed that it was not possible to
determine with precision what portion of the final deal price reflected synergy
value.124 The respondent’s expert conceded that the synergy allocation “cannot be
accurately measured.”125 The trial court attempted to determine an appropriate
synergy deduction, but regarded the figure as unreliable.126 Believing that the
unaffected trading price was a more reliable indication of standalone value, the trial
122 Verition P’rs Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc. (Aruba Trial), 2018
WL 922139, at *52 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2018) (subsequent history omitted). 123 Id. at *51–55.
124 Id. at *44.
125 Id.
126 Id. at *53.
41 court used the unaffected trading price of $17.13 per share to determine fair value;
the trial court did not rely on the deal-price-less-synergies metric.127
The Delaware Supreme Court reversed and determined fair value to be $19.10
per share, which the high court regarded as the result of a deal-price-less-synergies
metric.128 The justices remanded with instructions for the trial court to enter
judgment using that amount.129
In addition to reversing the trial court’s application of valuation principles,
the Delaware Supreme Court reprehended the trial court for having “injected due
process and fairness problems into the proceeding” by requesting supplemental
briefing on Dell’s use of the unaffected trading price, noting that “the extent to which
the market price approximated fair value was never subjected to the crucible of
pretrial discovery, expert depositions, cross-expert rebuttal, expert testimony at trial,
127 Id. at *54–55. The market price also has the advantage of being a valuation
method that is “generally accepted in the financial community.” Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713. The deal-price-less-synergies method is a judicial innovation traceable to the Union Illinois decision. See Union Illinois 1995 Inv. Ltd. P’ship v. Union Fin. Grp., Ltd., 847 A.2d 340, 357 (Del. Ch. 2004) 128 See Aruba, 210 A.3d at 130, 131, 134, 141. In fact, the respondent had not
developed that valuation indicator by starting with the deal price and deducting a synergy allocation. The respondent proceeded in the opposite direction by starting with the buyer’s internal DCF valuation of $19.10 per share, then argued that by paying $24.67 per share, the buyer necessarily gave the seller over half of the synergies. See C.A. No. 11448, Dkt. 163 at 1, 3, 30, 41. The ostensible deal-price-less- synergies value of $19.10 per share thus was a plain vanilla DCF valuation. See generally In re Appraisal of Regal Ent. Gp., 2021 WL 1916364, at *46 (Del. Ch. May 13, 2021). 129 Aruba, 210 A.3d at 142.
42 and cross examination at trial.”130 The per curiam decision also reproved the trial
court for adopting that methodology rather than using one of the party’s methods,
explaining that “[t]he reason for pretrial discovery and trial is for parties to have a
chance to test each other’s evidence and to give the fact-finder a reliable basis to make
an ultimate determination after each side has a fair chance to develop a record and
to comment upon it.”131 The Delaware Supreme Court rebuked the trial court for
requesting supplemental briefing after that process was complete, then using its own
valuation methodology after rejecting the alternatives that the parties advanced.132
The Selling Stockholders read Aruba broadly as holding that a trial court
cannot rely on any valuation methodology that the parties themselves did not
advance and which therefore was not subject to (i) “the crucible of . . . pretrial
discovery and trial” and (ii) testing by the parties after “a fair chance to develop a
record and comment upon it.” I must take that interpretation seriously, because
having served as the trial judge in Aruba, I have no desire to receive another dose of
appellate medicine.
But I do not think that is the lesson that should be drawn from Aruba, because
it would run contrary to the authorities that interpret Section 262(h) as requiring
130 Id. at 139–140.
131 Id. at 140.
132 Id. (describing the request for supplemental briefing as “troubling” and
“antithetical to the traditional hallmarks of a Court of Chancery appraisal proceeding”).
43 that the trial court make its own valuation determination if the trial court finds that
none of the parties’ methodologies are persuasive. The Aruba decision did not cite,
much less overrule, any of those precedents.
Instead, the Delaware Supreme Court seem to have been moved by “the
evident plausibility of [the petitioner’s] concern that the trial judge was bent on using
the thirty-day average market price as a personal reaction to being reversed in a
different case.”133 In response to a motion for reargument in which the petitioner
advanced that charge, I issued an opinion in which I attempted to respond and
explain why I used the unaffected market price.134 The per curiam decision said the
justices accepted my word on that point,135 but the opinion nevertheless feels like a
decision censuring the trial judge for acting improperly in that specific case. The
opinion does not suggest an intent to overrule prior precedent and set out a new
framework for appraisal cases in which the trial court lacks the power to make its
133 Id.
134 Verition P’rs Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., 2018 WL 2315943
(Del. Ch. May 21, 2018). In short, after thoroughly reviewing DFC and Dell and listening to the oral arguments, I had the impression that the justices had come to view the shares’ trading price as a meaningful and desirable valuation indicator, at least for a public company target in an arm’s length transaction. See id. at *7–15. That assessment turned out to be grossly wrong.
The per curiam opinion also interpreted attempts at self-deprecation as snark, such as my comment when requesting supplemental briefing on Dell in part because I “learned how many errors [I] made in the Dell matter.” Aruba, 210 A.3d at 131. Plainly that did not land as intended. 135 Aruba, 210 A.3d at 140 (“We take him at his word.”)
44 own valuation determination. Given that context, I cannot read Aruba as preventing
a trial court from making its own finding on valuation after the valuations the parties
advance prove unpersuasive. That is what the appraisal statute requires.136
To bolster their reading of Aruba, the Selling Stockholders cite post-Aruba
decisions which stress that the trial court must “base its fair value decision on the
record made by the parties at trial.”137 That statement of law refers to the factual
record that the parties have created. Even if the trial court finds the parties’
valuations to be unpersuasive and adopts its own, the trial court must rely on the
record that the parties created.138 What the trial court ultimately must do is “justify
its methodology (or methodologies) according to the facts of the case and relevant,
accepted financial principles.”139
136 One could harmonize Aruba with prior precedent by envisioning that after
a trial court rejected the parties’ valuation positions and made its own determination, then the trial court would permit the parties to conduct supplemental discovery, followed by a supplemental hearing about the determination that the trial court made. The Aruba decision does not hint at that type of procedure. 137 Jarden, 236 A.3d at 320, 325; accord In re Solera Ins. Coverage Appeals, 240
A.3d 1121, 1136 (Del. 2020). 138 That interpretation fits with one of the Aruba decision’s principal criticisms,
which concerned the trial court’s request for supplemental briefing about the attributes of Aruba’s common stock. See Aruba, 210 A.3d at 141 (“[T]he Vice Chancellor himself injected the thirty-day average market price as his own speculative idea.”). 139 Dell, 177 A.3d at 22 (footnote omitted).
45 B. The Valuation Methodologies
When seeking to prove fair value, the parties to may rely on “any techniques
or methods which are generally considered acceptable in the financial community and
otherwise admissible in court,” subject only to the statutory mandate to exclude value
arising from the merger.140 Although the appraisal inquiry might seem to involve
neutral principles of valuation, “corporate finance is not law.”141
The appraisal exercise is, at bottom, a fact finding exercise, and . . . by functional imperative, the evidence, including expert evidence, in one appraisal case will be different from the evidence presented in any other appraisal case. Different evidence, of course, can lead to different decision paths and different outcomes.142
“What is necessary in any particular appraisal case is for the Court of Chancery to
explain its fair value calculus in a manner that is grounded in the record before it.”143
The company in this case is particularly hard to value. FairX was privately
held, so it lacks a public market for its shares. That absence eliminates a potentially
reliable valuation indicator while also making it difficult to construct valuation ratios
140 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983).
141 In re Appraisal of Jarden Corp. (Jarden Trial), 2019 WL 3244085, at *1
(Del. Ch. July 19, 2019), aff’d 236 A.3d at 322. 142 Id.; accord Merion Cap. L.P. v. Lender Processing Servs., Inc., 2016 WL
7324170, at *16 (Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 2016) (noting that an argument which succeeds in one case “may not prevail in another case if the proponents fail to generate a similarly persuasive level of probative evidence or if the opponents respond effectively”). 143 Jarden, 236 A.3d at 325 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted);
accord Stillwater, 240 A.3d at 16.
46 to use in a comparable companies or comparable transactions analysis. Not only that,
but the Company was still at an early stage in its growth and did not yet generate
free cash flow. Making matters worse, the Company was pursuing a disruptive
business model that would likely generate binary results. Either the Company would
succeed brilliantly, or it would go to zero.
1. The Selling Stockholders’ Valuation Indicia
The Selling Stockholders did not offer a specific assessment of fair value, and
their position on valuation evolved over the course of the case. Their expert opined
that the value of FairX was lower than the Merger consideration at the effective time,
which the expert valued at $310.4 million.144 In their pre-trial brief, the Selling
Stockholders argued for a valuation “of about $154 million.”145 In their post-trial brief,
they again advocated a ceiling, this time asserting that “the evidence points to a fair
value of no more than ~$150 million.”146 To support that ceiling, the Selling
Stockholders offered a grab bag of what they described as market-based indicators.
a. Financing Rounds
The Selling Stockholders argue that the pre- and post-money valuations for
FairX’s three financing rounds represent observable market prices on which the court
can rely. That type of evidence is helpful, but weak.
144 JX 1939.0006; Pascarella Dep. 12.
145 Dkt. 167 at 8, 56.
146 Dkt. 193 at 5.
47 The financing rounds have the advantage of being negotiated transactions: “In
a typical venture financing,” the lead investor “negotiate[s] [with management] the
pre-money valuation and key terms.”147 And that is the problem. Rather than
bargaining first over the price, then shifting to bargaining over key terms, negotiators
address both. That results in tradeoffs between the price term and non-price terms.148
The value of the round reflects the value of the company for purposes of investors who
are investing under a specific set of terms. As a result, “pre-money valuations for
financing rounds are squishy.”149
Here, the round most proximate to the valuation date was the abandoned
Series C round, where FairX sought to raise capital on a pre-money valuation of
around $150 million. In theory, the failure to close a particular round at a particular
pre-money valuation would imply that the fair value of the company was lower than
that valuation. In this case, however, Coinbase interfered with the Series C round by
securing Andreesen Horowitz’s agreement to slow-roll its response, and Brady took
147 Spencer Williams, Venture Capital Contract Design: An Empirical Analysis
of the Connection Between Bargaining Power and Venture Financing Contract Terms, 23 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 105, 126 (2017). 148 Id. at 124. See id. at 125–36 (identifying key terms in a preferred stock
equity financing); id. at 155–59 (finding empirical support for connections between price term and non-price terms). 149 Basho Techs. Holdco B, LLC v. Georgetown Basho Invs., LLC, 2018 WL
3326693, at *39 (Del. Ch. July 6, 2018) (collecting authorities and declining to treat a pre-money valuation as a “reliable indicator of value”), aff’d Davenport v. Basho Techs. Holdco B, LLC, 221 A.3d 100 (Del. 2019).
48 the Series C round off the table when he solicited a bid from Coinbase. If Brady had
instead secured a commercial agreement and Andreesen Horowitz had expressed
interest, then the Company’s pre-money valuation would have been much higher.
Brady told Weiss in September 2021 that without Coinbase, he would target a pre-
money valuation of $150 million. With Coinbase, the pre-money valuation could range
from $200 million up to $400 million.
The Selling Stockholders claim that Hyde Park cannot value FairX based on a
ballpark estimate tied to an uncompleted financing round that contemplated a
commercial agreement that was never signed. This assertion fails to take into account
the reason why FairX never secured the agreement. In a but-for world where Brady
did not solicit a bid from Coinbase and take the Series C round off the table, the
Company might well have secured a commercial agreement from Coinbase and raised
capital at a pre-money valuation of $200 million to $400 million. The conditionality
and ballpark nature of the valuation estimates weaken their evidentiary value, but
they are considerations.
The Selling Stockholders look back to FairX’s most recent completed round—
the Series B1/B2 round in April 2021—when management negotiated a pre-money
valuation of $100 million. That valuation was stale for purposes of the valuation date
because, after the completion of that round, FairX hit multiple milestones, including
a successful demonstration of its technology, additional broker and market-maker
partners, and increasing trading volume. The Selling Stockholders contend that
49 FairX’s value decreased between April 2021 and the valuation date, but that
assertion is not credible. FairX made substantial progress over that period.
Under different circumstances, a valuation round might provide probative
evidence of fair value. In this case, the Series B1/B2 round does not, and the
evidentiary value of the incomplete Series C round is weak.
b. The Small Exchange Transaction
The Selling Stockholders next point to Crypto.com’s acquisition of the Small
Exchange for $64 million, arguing that was a comparable transaction implying a
similar valuation for FairX. The Selling Stockholders posit that even if FairX was
twice as valuable, that only would imply a valuation of $128 million.
Hyde Park proved that Small Exchange was not a significant competitor for
FairX and that its acquisition was not comparable. Among other things, Small
Exchange pursued a traditional business model that would not disrupt CME, it
offered complex products and used antiquated technology, and it had no path to
offering crypto products.150
Crypto.com’s purchase of Small Exchange supports Hyde Park’s argument that
Crypto.com was serious about an acquisition and could well have competed for FairX
if Brady had not snubbed its CEO, but Crypto.com’s acquisition of Small Exchange is
not a comparable transaction. This decision does not give weight to this indicator.
150 See JX 31 at 2–3; JX 273; JX 292 at 8; Brady Tr. 360–63; Aggarwal Dep. 53–
54.
50 c. Hyde Park’s Internal Valuations
The Selling Stockholders next point to Hyde Park’s internal valuations,
observing that in December 2021, Hyde Park carried its investment in the Company
at $100 million, representing the book value implied by their investment in the Series
B1/B2 round. After the Merger, Hyde Park marked up the value of their investment
based on the deal price, minus a 10% discount to reflect the volatility of Coinbase’s
common stock. The Selling Stockholders argue that the court should rely on Hyde
Park’s own valuations.
Hyde Park’s carrying values are subject to the accounting rules and do not
carry significant weight for this proceeding. Hyde Park decided to carry the
investment in FairX at book value, which is permissible for accounting purposes.
Those valuations did not reflect going concern value. It is possible that in another
case, the court might give weight to an internal valuation, but not this time.
d. The 409A Valuation
The Selling Stockholders next point to a Rule 409A valuation that FairX
procured in April 2021. That valuation generated a figure of $40 million, which the
Board approved. But the purpose of a Rule 409A valuation is to support “the exercise
price for granting options and common stock to . . . employees, directors, and others
to comply with IRC [Section] 409A and as an input for valuations pursuant to ASC
718 for financial reporting purposes.”151
151 JX 738 at 4.
51 Hyde Park’s expert testified credibly that the Rule 409A valuation was both
stale and unreliable. FairX hit many milestones after the issuance of the Rule 409A
valuation. Also, startup companies use Rule 409A valuations to set the exercise price
for stock options, and that purpose can influence the valuation output. A low exercise
price, for example, increases the value of the options for employees, resulting in
greater retention and incentive effects. The FairX 409A valuation of $0.59 per share
suggests those incentives were in play. The Rule 409A valuation in this case is also a
substantial outlier. Given these factors, the court gives no weight to the 409A
valuations.
e. The Reactions Of Sophisticated Investors
The Selling Stockholders finally point to the reactions of stockholders to a
letter Weiss circulated in December 2021 in which he urged stockholders to vote
against the Merger because FairX “could be worth at least $1 billion by the end of
2022.”152 The investors instead supported the Merger, suggesting that they did not
place significant reliance on the projections or credit the upside case. That market
indication carries some probative value, and the court relies on it when assessing fair
value.
152 JX 1548.
52 f. The Conclusion Regarding The Selling Stockholders’ Valuation Indicators
The Selling Stockholders’ valuation indicators provide some evidence of value,
but the collection is relatively weak. The probative value of the indicators is also
undercut by (i) the evidence that the Selling Stockholders constructed a litigation
narrative, (ii) their decision not to offer an affirmative valuation, and (iii) the
evolution of their valuation position throughout the case. This decision gives some
weight to the price talk about what could have been achieved in a Series C round if
Coinbase had not interfered. This decision also gives some weight to the rejection of
Hyde Park’s valuation arguments by sophisticated stockholders.
2. Hyde Park’s DCF Analysis
In contrast to the Selling Stockholders, Hyde Park offered a specific valuation
based on a DCF model. That model yielded a fair value estimate of $573 million, or
$19.76 per share. As the proponent of valuing the Company using that method, Hyde
Park bore the burden of proving its reliability.
The DCF method is a technique that is generally accepted in the financial
community. “While the particular assumptions underlying its application may always
be challenged in any particular case, the validity of [the DCF] technique qua
valuation methodology is no longer open to question.”153 It is a “standard” method
that “gives life to the finance principle that firms should be valued based on the
153 Campbell-Taggart, 1989 WL 17438, at *8 n.11.
53 expected value of their future cash flows, discounted to present value in a manner
that accounts for risk.”154
The problem in this case is not with the method, but with the inputs. Without
reliable projections, “any values generated by a DCF analysis are meaningless.” 155
Hyde Park’s expert built his DCF model on the Series C projections, which are too
speculative to be reliable.
The Series C projections exhibit many of the attributes that make a set of
projections reliable. “When evaluating the suitability of projections, Delaware cases
express a strong preference for management projections prepared in the ordinary
course of business and available as of the date of the merger.”156 As Chief Justice
Strine explained while serving on this court,
Traditionally, this court has given great weight to projections of this kind because they usually reflect the best judgment of management, unbiased by litigation incentives. That is especially so when management provides estimates to a financing source and is expected by that source (and sometimes by positive law) to provide a reasonable best estimate of future results.157
154 Andaloro v. PFPC Worldwide, Inc., 2005 WL 2045640, at *9 (Del. Ch. Aug.
19, 2005). 155 LongPath Cap., LLC v. Ramtron Int’l Corp., 2015 WL 4540443, at *18 (Del.
Ch. June 30, 2015) (citation omitted); accord Gkatzimas Tr. 788. 156 Regal, 2021 WL 1916364, at *21 (collecting authorities).
157 Del. Open MRI, 898 A.2d at 332 (footnotes omitted).
54 That is the case here. FairX’s management team did its best to prepare a
reliable set of projections and pressure test them. The projections were then used in
the ordinary course of business to solicit equity investments and when applying for
loans from banks. Management thought the revenue assumptions and cost
assumptions were reasonable. The projections also did not depend meaningfully on
Coinbase. No one contemporaneously thought of the projections as speculative,
inflated, or unachievable. Those arguments came later, as part of the Selling
Stockholders’ litigation strategy.
The difficulty lies in FairX’s disruptive business model. No one had ever tried
to do what FairX hoped to accomplish for retail futures trading, and FairX was a
startup with no track record. Management’s projections reflected how FairX would
perform if everything went according to plan.
Projecting results for a new business is inherently speculative. Because of that
fact, courts generally reject efforts to prove lost-profits damages for a new business
that has no history of making profits.158 This court has followed a similar practice in
158 E.g., Metro Storage Int’l LLC v. Harron, 275 A.3d 810, 860 (Del. Ch. 2022)
(“Delaware courts regularly refuse to award damages based on the lost profits from a new business, deeming evidence of lost profits to be too speculative, uncertain, and remote when there is no history of prior profits.”); Re v. Gannett Co., 480 A.2d 662, 668 (Del. Super. 1984) (“Courts have required that loss of future profits be established by substantial evidence and not be left to speculation. This requirement has given rise to a concept that as a general rule, evidence of expected profits from a new business is too speculative, uncertain and remote to be considered where there is no history of prior profits.” (citations omitted)), aff’d, 496 A.2d 553 (Del. 1985).
55 appraisal proceedings by declining to credit projections for a new business without
any operating track record.159
Likewise here, the projections that FairX management created are too
speculative to use. They represent FairX’s hoped-for reality, not its operative reality.
There is also ample evidence that many sophisticated investors did not credit
the projections. Those investors passed on investing in the Series C round, and they
later supported the Merger rather than banking on FairX’s success. And Weiss
admitted at trial that he thought “it was a coin flip, 50/50, as to whether FairX would
make the Series C projections[.]”160 The court therefore declines to use the DCF
methodology as a valuation input.161
C. The Court’s Valuation Conclusion
Without a persuasive valuation case from either side, the court must appraise
the value of FairX’s shares. There is one valuation input that both sides rejected: the
deal price of $330 million.
In this case, neither side asks the court to consider the deal price. That was
understandable. The Selling Stockholders want a result far below deal price, and
159 E.g., Gearreald v. Just Care, Inc., 2012 WL 1569818, at *1, 6 (Del. Ch. Apr.
13, 2012). 160 Weiss Tr. 100.
161 Hyde Park’s expert prepared a comparable companies analysis and a precedent transaction analysis. He regarded those analyses as confirmatory support for the output of his DCF analysis. All three methodologies depended on the Series C projections. See Gkatzimas Tr. 812, 845, 862, 871.
56 Hyde Park wants a result far above deal price. The joint rejection of the deal price
also makes sense because, as the Factual Background reveals, the sale process had
many flaws. Importantly, however, those flaws all fell on FairX’s side of the ledger.
Hyde Park proved that because of those flaws, Brady left value on the table. Before
considering synergies, the deal price in this case operates as a probable floor, not a
ceiling.
The Selling Stockholders argue that a trial court should ignore any process
failures because they do not affect standalone value. They also cite the Delaware
Supreme Court’s statement in Dell that “[t]he issue in an appraisal is not whether a
negotiator has extracted the highest possible bid,”162 as well as the justices’ statement
in DFC that fair value “does not mean the highest possible price that a company
might have sold for.”163
A court can take those admonitions into account and consider how the sale
process unfolded when assessing whether a deal price provides insight into fair value.
That seems particularly appropriate for a difficult-to-value company like FairX.
Because of where FairX was in its life cycle, its value depended heavily on
whether a counterparty believed FairX’s vision and growth story. Had it been publicly
traded, FairX could have been a story stock, with its value varying more closely
162 Dell, 177 A.3d at 33.
163 DFC, 172 A.3d at 370.
57 tracking the level of enthusiasm for retail trading in commodity futures or crypto
rather than projections of reliable cash flows.
In that sense, FairX was more like an ancient coin, a rare baseball card, or a
work of art. The value of those non-cash generating assets depends on what people
will pay, and what people pay depends not only on external market factors, but also
how the sale process is conducted. If Sotheby’s or Christie’s conducts the auction, then
the asset will likely generate a better price than if a local sheriff tries to sell the item
on the courthouse steps. For FairX, there is a comparable difference between a thirsty
and inexperienced CEO negotiating hurriedly from a position of weakness and an
investment banker conducting a meaningful sale process. There is even a difference
between a thirsty and inexperienced CEO negotiating against Coinbase and someone
else with more experience negotiating against Coinbase. One need not try to imagine
the highest price that someone might have paid to think that the price Brady secured
was comparatively low.
For purposes of appraisal, using the deal-price metric also requires assessing
whether any synergies affected the deal price. The court must exclude synergies
because the appraisal statute mandates that the court determine the fair value of the
corporation “exclusive of any element of value arising from the accomplishment or
expectation of the merger.”164
164 8 Del. C. § 262(h).
58 The Selling Stockholders did not present any evidence of synergies. Relying on
its valuation expert, they argue that Coinbase must have expected substantial
synergies, but no one attempted to quantify them. As the party that bore the burden
of providing the amount of a synergy deduction, that omission is fatal.
The Delaware Supreme Court acknowledged in Dell that “[t]here may be no
perfect methodology for arriving at a fair value for a given set of facts.”165 In this case,
there is not a persuasive methodology for arriving at fair value. On this record, the
least bad methodology is the deal price.
D. The Change In Value Between Signing And Closing
In an appraisal proceeding, the court must determine the fair value of the
dissenter’s shares as of the date on which the merger closes.166 The valuation date is
“not the date the merger agreement is executed.”167 “Thus, if the value of the
corporation changes between the signing of the merger agreement and the closing,
then the fair value determination must be measured by the ‘operative reality’ of the
corporation at the time of the merger.”168 Ordinarily, “the party seeking an
adjustment to the deal price reflecting a valuation change between signing and
165 Dell, 177 A.3d at 22–23.
166 Stillwater, 240 A.3d at 17.
167 Solera, 240 A.3d at 1135.
168 Stillwater, 240 A.3d at 17.
59 closing bears the burden to identify that change and prove the amount to be
adjusted.”169
Hyde Park did not argue that FairX’s fair value changed between signing and
closing. The Selling Stockholders did, pointing to a decline in Coinbase’s stock price
that caused the value of the merger consideration to decrease from $330 million to
$310.4 million. But a decline in an acquirer’s stock price does not necessarily
correspond to a change in the target’s value, particularly when the acquirer is
comparatively large and the target comparatively small.170 Neither party made a
persuasive case that the value of FairX changed between signing and closing.
III. CONCLUSION
The most reliable metric for determining the fair value of the petitioners’
shares is the deal price of $330 million. Accordingly, the fair value of the Company as
of the date of the Merger was $10.42 per share. Hyde Park is entitled to this amount,
plus pre- and post-judgment interest at the legal rate, compounded monthly, with the
legal rate changing from period to period with adjustments in the statutory reference
rate.
169 Id.
170 Cf. BCIM Strategic Value Master Fund, LP v. HFF, Inc., 2022 WL 304840,
at *31 (Del. Ch. Feb. 2, 2022) (“[T]he reaction of the Company’s stock price to the Earnings Beat cannot be used to measure the change in the Company’s value between signing and closing.”); In re PetSmart, Inc., 2017 WL 2303599, at *31 (Del. Ch. May 26, 2017) (declining to find a change in value between signing and closing because “short-term [changes]” were unlikely to be “indicative of a long-term trend”).
60 The parties will submit a form of order designed to bring this case to a close at
the trial court level. If there are additional issues that must be addressed, the parties
will submit a joint letter identifying those issues and proposing a path for resolving
them.
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
Hyde Park Venture Partners Fund III, L.P. v. FairXchange, LLC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hyde-park-venture-partners-fund-iii-lp-v-fairxchange-llc-delch-2024.