Hybrid International, LLC v. Scotia International of Nevada, Inc.

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: December 8, 2025
• Docket: 2:19-cv-02077
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 6 * * *

7 HYBRID INTERNATIONAL, LLC, Case No. 2:19-CV-2077 JCM (EJY)

8 Plaintiff(s), ORDER

9 v.

10 SCOTIA INTERNATIONAL OF NEVADA, INC., 11 Defendant(s). 12

13 Presently before the court is defendants Warren Barber and Max Barber’s (collectively 14 “defendants”) motion to vacate or set aside judgment. (ECF No. 114). Plaintiffs Johnathan 15 16 Schultz and Hybrid International, LLC (“Hybrid”) filed a response (ECF No. 115). 17 Also before the court is the defendants’ motion to extend time to file a reply brief in 18 support of their motion to vacate or set aside judgment. (ECF No. 116). Plaintiffs filed a 19 response (ECF No. 118), to which defendants replied (ECF No. 119). 20 The court has sufficient information to decide the instant motions based on the filings and 21 22 thus denies any request for oral argument. See LR 78-1. 23 I. Background 24 A. Procedural History 25 The instant case arose from a failed joint venture between Hybrid and Scotia 26 International of Nevada, Inc. (“Scotia”), to create a carbon fines processing business. Most of 27 28 the preliminary facts have been discussed in previous orders. Seeing that the parties are 1 intimately familiar with the facts of the case, the court will highlight only those that are relevant 2 to the present motion. 3 In 2023, this court granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs as to their claims of 4 breach of contract, breach of good faith and fair dealing, and intentional misrepresentation. 5 6 (ECF No. 107). In accordance with this decision, the court awarded judgment against Scotia in 7 the amount of $500,000, and punitive damages against all defendants in the amount of $500,000. 8 (ECF No. 108). 9 B. Facts 10 1.Dorothy Barber 11 12 Defendants Warren Barber and Max Barber operated Scotia International with Dorothy 13 Barber, wife to Warren and mother to Max. In mid-2023, after the resolution of this case, 14 Dorothy Barber was diagnosed with early on-set dementia. (ECF No. 108, Ex. 1 ¶¶ 10, 16). She 15 passed away on January 15, 2024. (Id. ¶ 12). She had served as Scotia’s chief financial officer 16 during the parties’ business relationship; defendants left all financial information and approvals 17 18 to her, without any oversight or review. (ECF No. 114 at 3–4). Defendants claim that the 19 symptoms and impact of this disease reach as far back as 2018, impacting her ability to manage 20 Scotia’s finances during the critical period of the parties’ business transactions. (Id. at 11). 21 2. Johnathan Schultz and Hybrid 22 Defendants claim that they were approached by the U.S. Department of Homeland 23 24 Security in 2024 for assistance on an investigation into plaintiff Johnathan Schultz’s activities. 25 (Id., Ex. 1 ¶ 20). Defendants allege that Schultz and Hybrid have engaged in a scheme to 26 smuggle gold from South Africa to the United States. Johnathan Schultz is the founder of 27 Hybrid, as well as several other precious gem and metal refineries. (Id., Ex. 13). 28 1 One of these businesses is a South African-based company called Hybrid Diamonds and 2 Gold (Pty) Ltd (“Hybrid S.A.”). On November 5, 2021, the South African government issued a 3 warrant listing Hybrid S.A. as violating the country’s Precious Metals Act, Prevention of 4 Organized Crime Act, and 2nd Hand Goods Act. (Id., Ex. 9 at 60, 62). 5 6 Schultz was mentioned as a related party due to his management position at Hybrid S.A. 7 (See id.). However, the National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa’s (NPA) attempt to 8 extradite him for these proceedings failed because the high court of South Africa determined that 9 the NPA lacked the authority to extradite him. (See id., Ex. 12). 10 The status of the case is unclear. Plaintiffs claim that the charges against Hybrid S.A. 11 12 were dropped in November 2022, and defendants imply that it is still pending. (ECF No. 114 at 13 14–15, 22; ECF No. 115 at 7). 14 On June 27, 2025, the defendants filed the present motion to set aside the court’s order 15 and judgment, on the grounds of (1) extraordinary circumstances and (2) newly discovered 16 evidence. (ECF No. 114 at 21–23). 17 18 II. Legal Standard 19 Rule 60(b) “provides for reconsideration [of a judgment] only upon a showing of (1) 20 mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) fraud; (4) a void 21 judgment; (5) a satisfied or discharged judgment; or (6) ‘extraordinary circumstances’ which 22 would justify relief.” Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry, 950 F.2d 1437, 1442 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing 23 24 Backlund v. Barnhart, 778 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1985)). 25 Rule 60(b)(6)’s catch-all provision “applies only when the reason for granting relief is 26 not covered by the other five bases for granting relief set forth in Rule 60.” Delay v. Gordon, 27 475 F.3d 1039, 1044 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Cmty. Dental Servs. v. Tani, 282 F.3d 1164, 1168 n.8 28 1 (9th Cir. 2002)). Accordingly, a movant seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(6) must show that 2 “extraordinary circumstances prevented [the movant] from seeking earlier, more timely relief.” 3 United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 984 F.2d 1047, 1049 (9th Cir. 1993); Valdez v. 4 United Airlines Holdings, Inc., No. 23-2825, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 12905, *5 (9th Cir. May 28, 5 6 2025). 7 Rule 60(b)(6) has been used sparingly as an equitable remedy to prevent manifest 8 injustice. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 984 F.2d 1047. “[T]he decision to grant Rule 60(b)(6) 9 relief is a case-by-base inquiry that requires the trial court to intensively balance numerous 10 factors, including the competing policies of the finality of judgments and the incessant command 11 12 of the court’s conscience that justice be done in light of all the facts.” Phelps v. Alameida, 569 13 F.3d 1120, 1133 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Stokes v. Williams, 475 F.3d 732, 736 (6th Cir. 2007). 14 III. Discussion 15 As a preliminary matter, and with good cause appearing, the court considers the 16 defendants’ reply as timely filed nunc pro tunc. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B). 17 18 The court now analyzes the defendants’ motion to vacate or set aside judgment. (ECF 19 No. 114). 20 A. “Newly Discovered Evidence” 21 Defendants argue that there is “newly discovered evidence” that Dorothy Barber, Scotia’s 22 chief financial officer, could not comprehend the nature of the 2019 transactions that she 23 24 approved because she was experiencing symptoms of dementia. (ECF No. 114 at 11). Ms. 25 Barber was diagnosed with dementia in 2024, but defendants claim that she would have had 26 symptoms back in 2019. (Id.). 27 28 1 Defendants later frame Ms. Barber’s diagnosis and alleged 2019 symptoms as evidence 2 of “extraordinary circumstances” warranting relief under 60(b)(6). (Id.). However, Rule 3 60(b)(6)’s catch-all provision “applies only when the reason for granting relief is not covered by 4 the other five bases for granting relief set forth in Rule 60.” Delay, 475 F.3d at 1044. 5 6 Accordingly, arguments pertaining to “newly discovered evidence” of Ms. Barber’s dementia 7 fall under Rule 60(b)(2). 8 A Rule 60(b)(1), (2), or (3) motion must be filed no more than a year after the entry of 9 the judgment or order. Fed. R. Civ. P 60(c). Defendants filed the instant motion on June 27, 10 2025, more than two years after this court’s order granting plaintiffs’ motion for entry of 11 12 monetary judgment. (ECF No. 107). The court finds that the “newly discovered evidence” 13 arguments as to Ms. Barber’s dementia and ability to comprehend the transactions are untimely 14 and will therefore not be considered any further by the court. (ECF No. 114 at 11–12; ECF No. 15 119 at 5–6, 10). 16 B. “Extraordinary Circumstances” 17 18 1. Reason for delay 19 Defendants argue that they are entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(6) because the contract 20 was illegal or void as a matter of public policy and also harmed innocent third parties. (ECF No. 21 114 at 2). The court is not persuaded by any of the reasons the defendants provide, as laid out 22 below: 23 24 Defendants claim that plaintiffs engaged in a money laundering scheme, but this 25 argument has already been dismissed by the court as a collateral issue to this case. (ECF No. 114 26 at 20; ECF No. 40 at 8). 27 28 1 Defendants also provide a statement from a third party speculating that Schultz smuggled 2 gold into the United States, based in part on Schultz’s failure to provide customs documents 3 upon request. (ECF No. 114, Ex. 6). The third party lacks personal knowledge of the veracity of 4 this claim and within the same letter admits that Schultz told him the gold ore “originated from 5 6 his South African gold networks in various networks, including…carbon fines.” (Id.). 7 Furthermore, defendants claim that the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) 8 requested their cooperation in an investigation into Schultz’s activities, but the court cannot 9 verify the relevance of the DHS’s contact, if any, with defendants to the instant contract dispute. 10 (ECF No. 114 at 21). 11 12 Finally, defendants attempt to support their argument with a November 3, 2021, warrant 13 out of South Africa indicting Hybrid S.A. for violations of the country’s Precious Metals Act, 14 Prevention of Organized Crime Act, and 2nd Hand Goods Act. (Id., Ex. 9 at 60, 62). The 15 indictment of one of Schultz’s South African-based companies, however, is collateral to the 16 merits of whether the parties formed the Nevada-based joint venture in contravention of the law. 17 18 See Street, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167299, at *12. Schultz indicates in his emails that he clearly 19 intended to import gold and other precious material to the United States, but this does not prove 20 that the contract was a scheme for gold smuggling as defendants claim. (ECF No. 114 at 4–5; 21 see Ex. 2). Accordingly, there is no evidence tending to show that enforcing the contract would 22 contravene the law or violate public policy. 23 24 Setting aside or vacating a previous order under Rule 60(b)(6) is an extraordinary 25 remedy. See Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 984 F.2d 1047. None of defendants’ evidence bears 26 on the issue of contract breach or formation between the parties and it is insufficient to warrant 27 the extraordinary remedy of reopening this case. (See ECF Nos. 114, 119). 28 1 2. Interest in finality of the judgment and prejudice to plaintiff 2 Moreover, defendants filed the instant motion more than two years after the order 3 granting plaintiff’s motion for entry of monetary judgment. (ECF No. 107). Reopening the case 4 now, when there is little evidence of extraordinary circumstances, would undermine the court’s 5 6 interest in finality of its judgment and prejudice the plaintiffs. See Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 7 984 F.2d at 1050; Phelps, 569 F.3d at 1133 (9th Cir. 2009). Further, plaintiffs have apparently 8 collected over $400,000 of the judgment, and disturbing the judgment now would greatly 9 prejudice the plaintiffs, who have a right to collect such judgment.1 (See ECF No. 114 at 11). 10 3. Other considerations 11 12 The court is unpersuaded by defendants’ argument that plaintiffs are unjustly enriched or 13 “double dipping” with this outcome. (See ECF No. 114 at 23–24). Defendants argue that 14 because five payments made by Scotia to Hybrid between June 27, 2019, and September 30, 15 2019, totaling more than $500,000, plaintiffs had already been reimbursed for their half of the 16 joint venture investment. (Id. at 23; Ex. 4). Further inquiry shows that this is unlikely to be the 17 18 case. 19 The face of the wire transfers and cashier’s checks indicate that they are payments for 20 “Engineering design re Carbon Processing Equipment”—not a reimbursement of Hybrid’s joint 21 venture investment. (Id., Ex. 4; see also ECF No. 115–Ex. A). Moreover, Schultz requested 22 reimbursement of the $500,000 investment on September 16, 2019—after the date of the fourth 23 24 transfer from Scotia to Hybrid. (ECF No. 114–Ex. 4; ECF No. 115–Ex. 1 at 59). 25 26

27 1 Whether plaintiffs are appropriately collecting the judgment appropriately is collateral to whether they are 28 entitled to the judgment at issue; the court accordingly declines to consider the defendants’ argument that third parties are being harmed by the plaintiffs’ collection efforts. 1 Finally, whether defendants could have learned of facts presented here during the 2 pendency of the litigation is immaterial, as they fail to establish that the contractual relations 3 between the parties were illegal. This court finds that the defendants have not met the high bar 4 required to reopen a case under 60(b)(6). See, e.g., Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 984 F.2d at 5 6 1049. 7 IV. Conclusion 8 Accordingly, 9 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that defendants’ motion to 10 extend time (ECF No. 116) be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED. Defendants’ reply is timely 11 12 filed nunc pro tunc. 13 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants’ motion to vacate or set aside (ECF No. 14 114) be, and the same hereby is, DENIED. 15 DATED December 8, 2025. 16

17 __________________________________________ UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28