OPINION ON APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
MALONEY, Judge.
Appellant was charged by complaint with creating a public nuisance in violation of a city ordinance, convicted in a bench trial in municipal court, and assessed a fine of $1,000.00. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Huynh v. City of Houston, 874 S.W.2d 184 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994). We granted appellant’s petition for discretionary review to determine whether Tex.Code Crim. ProeAnn. art. 1.14 and this Court’s opinion in Studer v. State, 799 S.W.2d 263 (Tex.Crim.App.1990), apply to complaints filed in municipal court. We also granted review to determine whether Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 1.13(a) requires a written waiver of trial by jury where the offense is a misdemeanor punishable by fine only.
I.
In 1985, the Texas Legislature amended Article V, § 12 of the Texas Constitution1 [481]*481and article 1.14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.2 We took the opportunity to address those amendments for the first time in Studer, supra. Studer itself involved the adequacy of an information. As a preliminary issue, we determined to resolve “what is meant by the terms ‘indictment’ and ‘information’ under the amendment to Art. V, § 12, of the Constitution and newly enacted Art. 1.14(b).” Studer, 799 S.W.2d at 266. We concluded that, pursuant to article 1.14(b), “an indictment (or information) is still an indictment (or information), at least as contemplated by Art. V, § 12, though it be flawed by matters of substance such as the absence of an element.” Id. at 271.
The Court of Appeals held that under article 1.14 and Studer, supra, it need not address appellant’s contentions regarding alleged defects in the complaint because appellant failed to raise the defects before the date on which the trial commenced. Huynh, 874 S.W.2d at 185. The Court of Appeals reasoned that “indictments, informations and complaints are all charging instruments through which criminal proceedings are formally initiated in the courts” and even though article 1.14 refers expressly only to indictments and informations “we see no persuasive reason to apply a different rule in a misdemeanor proceeding which is initiated in municipal courts by way of complaint[.]” Id.
We are unwilling to take such a leap beyond the express and limited language of the statute. Article 1.14 specifically addresses “indictments and informations” and does not mention “complaints”, a third form of charging instrument, dealt with elsewhere in the Code.3 While numerous other provisions in the Code expressly refer to all three types of charging instruments, article 1.14 does not. See, e.g., Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. arts. 17A.02 (addressing allegation of name of defendant corporation in “complaint, indictment, or information”); 21.15 (pertaining to sufficiency of allegations of recklessness or criminal negligence in “complaint, information, or indictment”); 21.24(a) (“[tjwo or more offenses may be joined in a single indictment, information, or complaint”); 28.061 (providing for discharge of defendant if motion to set aside “indictment, information, or complaint for failure to provide a speedy trial is sustained”); 44.01(a)(1) (providing that state can appeal from dismissal of “indictment, information, or complaint” or any portion thereof). We recognize that in Studer we occasionally spoke in terms of “charging instruments,” but we were over-broad in the use of that phrase in the context there. Studer dealt specifically with article V, § 12 and article 1.14, both of which deal expressly and exclusively with “indictments and informations” and do not mention “complaints.” Were article 1.14 to refer to “charging instruments” in place of “indictments and informations,” we would be compelled to agree with the Court of Appeals that as a charging instrument in the municipal court context, a complaint would be covered thereunder. However, we are without authority to project such an intention in the face of the statute’s specific and plain lan[482]*482guage.4 As we stated in Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex.Crim.App.1991):
... the text of the statute is the law in the sense that it is the only thing actually adopted by the legislators, probably through compromise, and submitted to the Governor for her signature. We focus on the literal text also because the text is the only definitive evidence of what the legislators (and perhaps the Governor) had in mind when the statute was enacted into law. There really is no other certain method for determining the collective legislative intent or purpose at some point in the past, even assuming a single intent or purpose was dominant at the time of enactment. Yet a third reason for focusing on the literal text is that the Legislature is constitutionally entitled to expect that the Judiciary will faithfully follow the specific text that was adopted.
(emphasis in original). We continue to adhere to these principles.5
II.
Appellant complained before the Court of Appeals that the trial court erred by proceeding to trial without a jury when appellant had not executed a written jury waiver in accordance with Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 1.13. The Court of Appeals rejected that claim, holding that article 1.13 does not apply to municipal courts. Huynh, 874 S.W.2d at 185. The court reasoned that article 45.25 which specifically addresses jury waivers in municipal court does not require that waivers be in writing. We agree.
Chapter 45 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Justice and Corporation Courts,6 contains a comprehensive compilation of provisions concerning proceedings in municipal courts, ranging from initiation of the complaint through the judgment and sentence. Proceedings in municipal court differ in many respects from proceedings in district and other courts. For instance, the municipal judge need not charge the jury in writing unless requested by the defendant. Tex. Code Crim.Proe.Ann. art. 45.01. Jurors are summoned via the “pick-up” jury method. Id. at art. 45.24; see also Cantu v. Samples, 581 S.W.2d 195, 196 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1979) (jurors in municipal court summoned orally by “pick-up” method). A defendant’s pleading may be oral or in writing, at his election. Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 45.33. Article 45.24 specifically provides that defendants in municipal court “may waive a trial by jury; and in such case, the justice shall hear and determine the cause without a jury.” This article does not require that the waiver be in writing. While various provisions of the Code outside of Chapter 45 might expressly pertain to proceedings in municipal court, see p. 3, supra (listing provisions expressly applicable to “complaints” as charging instruments), article 1.13(a) which requires a written jury waiver, does not.
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OPINION ON APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
MALONEY, Judge.
Appellant was charged by complaint with creating a public nuisance in violation of a city ordinance, convicted in a bench trial in municipal court, and assessed a fine of $1,000.00. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Huynh v. City of Houston, 874 S.W.2d 184 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994). We granted appellant’s petition for discretionary review to determine whether Tex.Code Crim. ProeAnn. art. 1.14 and this Court’s opinion in Studer v. State, 799 S.W.2d 263 (Tex.Crim.App.1990), apply to complaints filed in municipal court. We also granted review to determine whether Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 1.13(a) requires a written waiver of trial by jury where the offense is a misdemeanor punishable by fine only.
I.
In 1985, the Texas Legislature amended Article V, § 12 of the Texas Constitution1 [481]*481and article 1.14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.2 We took the opportunity to address those amendments for the first time in Studer, supra. Studer itself involved the adequacy of an information. As a preliminary issue, we determined to resolve “what is meant by the terms ‘indictment’ and ‘information’ under the amendment to Art. V, § 12, of the Constitution and newly enacted Art. 1.14(b).” Studer, 799 S.W.2d at 266. We concluded that, pursuant to article 1.14(b), “an indictment (or information) is still an indictment (or information), at least as contemplated by Art. V, § 12, though it be flawed by matters of substance such as the absence of an element.” Id. at 271.
The Court of Appeals held that under article 1.14 and Studer, supra, it need not address appellant’s contentions regarding alleged defects in the complaint because appellant failed to raise the defects before the date on which the trial commenced. Huynh, 874 S.W.2d at 185. The Court of Appeals reasoned that “indictments, informations and complaints are all charging instruments through which criminal proceedings are formally initiated in the courts” and even though article 1.14 refers expressly only to indictments and informations “we see no persuasive reason to apply a different rule in a misdemeanor proceeding which is initiated in municipal courts by way of complaint[.]” Id.
We are unwilling to take such a leap beyond the express and limited language of the statute. Article 1.14 specifically addresses “indictments and informations” and does not mention “complaints”, a third form of charging instrument, dealt with elsewhere in the Code.3 While numerous other provisions in the Code expressly refer to all three types of charging instruments, article 1.14 does not. See, e.g., Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. arts. 17A.02 (addressing allegation of name of defendant corporation in “complaint, indictment, or information”); 21.15 (pertaining to sufficiency of allegations of recklessness or criminal negligence in “complaint, information, or indictment”); 21.24(a) (“[tjwo or more offenses may be joined in a single indictment, information, or complaint”); 28.061 (providing for discharge of defendant if motion to set aside “indictment, information, or complaint for failure to provide a speedy trial is sustained”); 44.01(a)(1) (providing that state can appeal from dismissal of “indictment, information, or complaint” or any portion thereof). We recognize that in Studer we occasionally spoke in terms of “charging instruments,” but we were over-broad in the use of that phrase in the context there. Studer dealt specifically with article V, § 12 and article 1.14, both of which deal expressly and exclusively with “indictments and informations” and do not mention “complaints.” Were article 1.14 to refer to “charging instruments” in place of “indictments and informations,” we would be compelled to agree with the Court of Appeals that as a charging instrument in the municipal court context, a complaint would be covered thereunder. However, we are without authority to project such an intention in the face of the statute’s specific and plain lan[482]*482guage.4 As we stated in Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex.Crim.App.1991):
... the text of the statute is the law in the sense that it is the only thing actually adopted by the legislators, probably through compromise, and submitted to the Governor for her signature. We focus on the literal text also because the text is the only definitive evidence of what the legislators (and perhaps the Governor) had in mind when the statute was enacted into law. There really is no other certain method for determining the collective legislative intent or purpose at some point in the past, even assuming a single intent or purpose was dominant at the time of enactment. Yet a third reason for focusing on the literal text is that the Legislature is constitutionally entitled to expect that the Judiciary will faithfully follow the specific text that was adopted.
(emphasis in original). We continue to adhere to these principles.5
II.
Appellant complained before the Court of Appeals that the trial court erred by proceeding to trial without a jury when appellant had not executed a written jury waiver in accordance with Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 1.13. The Court of Appeals rejected that claim, holding that article 1.13 does not apply to municipal courts. Huynh, 874 S.W.2d at 185. The court reasoned that article 45.25 which specifically addresses jury waivers in municipal court does not require that waivers be in writing. We agree.
Chapter 45 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Justice and Corporation Courts,6 contains a comprehensive compilation of provisions concerning proceedings in municipal courts, ranging from initiation of the complaint through the judgment and sentence. Proceedings in municipal court differ in many respects from proceedings in district and other courts. For instance, the municipal judge need not charge the jury in writing unless requested by the defendant. Tex. Code Crim.Proe.Ann. art. 45.01. Jurors are summoned via the “pick-up” jury method. Id. at art. 45.24; see also Cantu v. Samples, 581 S.W.2d 195, 196 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1979) (jurors in municipal court summoned orally by “pick-up” method). A defendant’s pleading may be oral or in writing, at his election. Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 45.33. Article 45.24 specifically provides that defendants in municipal court “may waive a trial by jury; and in such case, the justice shall hear and determine the cause without a jury.” This article does not require that the waiver be in writing. While various provisions of the Code outside of Chapter 45 might expressly pertain to proceedings in municipal court, see p. 3, supra (listing provisions expressly applicable to “complaints” as charging instruments), article 1.13(a) which requires a written jury waiver, does not. Given Chapter 45’s comprehensive and specific applicability to the unique municipal court context, we hold that article 45.24 which specifically addresses jury waiver in the municipal court context is controlling, to [483]*483the preclusion of article 1.13.7
Appellant argues that because article 1.13 expressly applies to “prosecution for any offense other than a capital felony case” and we have held that article 1.13 applies to misdemeanor offenses in county courts, Ex rel. Curry v. Carr, 847 S.W.2d 561, 562 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), there is no reason it should not apply to misdemeanor offenses tried in municipal court. Both article 1.13 and article 45.24 address jury waiver. In Cheney v. State, 755 S.W.2d 123 (Tex.Crim.App.1988), we discussed at length the construction of two provisions that are in pari materia. We defined in pari materia as follows:
It is a settled rule of statutory interpretation that statutes that deal with the same general subject, have the same general purpose, or relate to the same person or thing or class of persons or things, are considered as being in pari materia....
Cheney, 755 S.W.2d at 126 (quoting 53 Tex. Jur.2d, Statutes, Section 186, page 280). If two provisions are determined to be in pari materia, and one is more general and the other more detailed, the latter will prevail. Id. We emphasized, however, that “the rule is not applicable to enactments that cover different situations and that were apparently not intended to be considered together Id. (quoting 53 Tex.Jur.2d, Statutes, Section 186, page 280, and adding emphasis). While article 1.13 and 45.24 both deal with the same general subject, jury waiver, they nevertheless cover different situations, as article 45.24 is specifically applicable to jury waiver in municipal court and article 1.13 does not so specify. The fact we have interpreted article 1.13 as applicable to misdemeanor offenses in general does not render it applicable to misdemeanor offenses tried in the unique municipal court context.8
Appellant’s second ground for review is overruled and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed as to that issue. Appellant’s first ground for review is sustained, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed as to that issue, and we remand this cause to that Court to consider appellant’s points of error pertaining to defects in the complaint.