United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
No. 93-8398.
Tho Van HUYNH, Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
Stacy L. KING, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.
Sept. 23, 1996.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. (No. 2:92-cv-55-WCO), William C. O'Kelley, Judge.
Before TJOFLAT, Chief Judge, BIRCH, Circuit Judge, and SMITH*, Senior Circuit Judge.
BIRCH, Circuit Judge:
Tho Van Huynh ("Huynh") appeals the judgment of the district
court denying his petition for habeas corpus relief filed pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Huynh was convicted of robbery, felony
murder, and malice murder. He enumerates in his petition three
grounds that he contends warrant habeas relief: (1) ineffective
assistance of counsel, (2) insufficiency of evidence to support his
conviction for malice murder, and (3) double jeopardy. For the
reasons that follow, we reverse the district court's order, direct
that the writ be granted with respect to Huynh's armed robbery
conviction and sentence, and remand for proceedings consistent with
this opinion regarding the remaining claims.
I. BACKGROUND
The Georgia Supreme Court made the following factual
determinations:
* Honorable Edward S. Smith, Senior U.S. Circuit Judge for the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation. Appellant and Hong Binh Thai accompanied Sam Van Ngo to his apartment in Gainesville, Georgia. The victim, C.A. Nguyen, lived with Sam Van Ngo and was watching television in the apartment. Soon after their arrival, Sam Van Ngo shot the victim with a .25 caliber automatic weapon of the same model and caliber as one owned by appellant. Hong Binh Thai assisted him in putting the body into the car and in disposing of it in the woods. Appellant drove the car on the trip to dispose of the body. Over $12,000 which the victim had withdrawn from a savings account was taken from his body by Hong Binh Thai during the drive to the woods. After disposing of the body, they drove to a lake where Sam Van Ngo and Hong Binh Thai threw away the murder weapon and washed their hands. Then they returned to Gainesville where the appellant stayed in the apartment which he shared with Hong Binh Thai while Hong Binh Thai drove Sam Van Ngo to the Atlanta Airport. When Hong Binh Thai returned to Gainesville, he gave appellant two thousand dollars, half of what Sam Van Ngo had given him of the stolen money. Appellant was arrested in California some two weeks after the crimes. At the time of his arrest, he had thirteen one hundred dollar bills on his person.
Van Huynh v. State, 258 Ga. 663, 373 S.E.2d 502, 502-03 (1988).
Huynh initially was convicted of malice murder and armed
robbery on October 17, 1987. After a notice of appeal was filed,
the trial court granted Huynh a new trial.1 Huynh was retried and
convicted of felony murder, malice murder, and armed robbery on
November 20, 1987, and received consecutive life sentences solely
for malice murder and armed robbery. On direct appeal, the Georgia
Supreme Court reversed Huynh's felony murder conviction after
finding that he had been placed in double jeopardy by being retried
for an offense for which he had not been found guilty in the first
trial. See id. 373 S.E.2d at 503. The court affirmed the
remaining convictions as well as the sentences. Huynh filed a
petition for habeas corpus in state court alleging ineffective
assistance of counsel. The court denied the petition, and the
1 Prior to his retrial, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Huynh's original convictions. Van Huynh v. State, 257 Ga. 375, 359 S.E.2d 667 (1987). Georgia Supreme Court denied Huynh's application for probable cause
to appeal. Huynh next filed a petition for federal habeas corpus
relief. The district court found Huynh's claims to be either
procedurally barred or lacking in merit, and denied relief. In
addition, the court granted Huynh's motion for probable cause to
appeal.
II. DISCUSSION2 A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
On the eve of Huynh's retrial, his counsel filed a motion to
suppress the money found in Huynh's wallet at the time of his
arrest. Defense counsel argued that the warrantless pat-down
search resulting in the discovery of this money exceeded
constitutional boundaries. More specifically, counsel maintained
that although the police officer who initially frisked Huynh for
2 On April 24, 1996, while this case was pending on appeal, the President signed into law the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (the "Act"). Title I of the Act significantly curtails the scope of collateral review of convictions and sentences. Specifically, the amended version of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 provides, in pertinent part, that the writ of habeas corpus shall not be granted with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits in a state court proceeding unless the adjudication of the claim
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
We decline to apply this section retroactively in this case because neither party argues for such an application and because Huynh filed his petition on March 24, 1992, prior to the date on which the Act became effective. weapons3 found none, he then proceeded to conduct a second pat-down
search, found a wallet, looked inside, and removed the
incriminating evidence. The trial court dismissed the motion as
untimely filed. On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court noted that
Georgia's local rules mandate that all motions be filed by the
arraignment unless that time is extended by the trial judge. Van
Huynh, 373 S.E.2d at 503. In his federal habeas corpus petition,
Huynh alleged both that the trial court erred in denying his motion
to suppress and that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
file the suppression motion in a timely fashion. The district
court found that although Huynh had been deprived of a fair
opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claim, he had not
shown cause for his attorney's failure to file the motion in
accordance with the local rules. The court further resolved that
counsel's decision to file an untimely motion was strategic and
thus did not constitute ineffective assistance.
Huynh's ineffective assistance of counsel claim presents a
mixed question of law and fact and is subject to de novo review.
Oliver v. Wainwright, 782 F.2d 1521, 1524 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 914, 107 S.Ct. 313, 93 L.Ed.2d 287 (1986). A
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires a showing that
(1) counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness, and (2) a reasonable probability exists that but
for counsel's unprofessional conduct, the result of the proceeding
3 We assume for purposes of this opinion, without deciding, that this warrantless pat-down search for weapons would have been permissible under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The
reasonableness of counsel's performance is to be evaluated from
counsel's perspective at the time of the alleged error and in light
of all the circumstances, and the standard of review is highly
deferential. Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. The defendant bears
the burden of proving that counsel's performance was unreasonable
under prevailing professional norms and that the challenged action
was not sound strategy. Id. at 688-89, 104 S.Ct. at 2064-65. The
Supreme Court explicitly has extended the right to federal habeas
review of Sixth Amendment claims to instances in which the alleged
ineffective representation necessarily implicates a Fourth
Amendment claim. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 382-83,
106 S.Ct. 2574, 2587, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986). ("[W]e reject
petitioners' argument that [Stone v. Powell 's] restriction on
federal habeas review of Fourth Amendment claims should be extended
to Sixth Amendment ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims which
are founded primarily on incompetent representation with respect to
a Fourth Amendment issue.... We hold that federal courts may grant
habeas relief in appropriate cases, regardless of the nature of the
underlying attorney error.").
Huynh raised the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel
with respect to the untimely filing of the suppression motion
before the state habeas court. At an evidentiary hearing, Huynh's
trial counsel, Jim Whitmer, provided the following testimony:
WHITMER: I know that the general rule is that a Motion to Suppress is supposed to be filed at arraignment or later with permission of the court, but there are also some holdings that say that a lot of things are always discretionary with the trial judge. And so, it wasn't conclusive in my mind that the judge would automatically dismiss it for untimeliness, simply because of when it was filed. I had some expectation that he might consider it. But in my judgment, we would have an appellate issue either way. If he dismissed it, then we could argue that he should have heard it. And if he heard the motion and denied it, then we could argue that he heard it but should have granted it.
COURT: But you knew the motion was not timely when you filed it without regard to its merit? Is that correct?
WHITMER: Yes, sir.
COURT: And you could have filed it timely had you so chosen?
WHITMER: I could have.
Exh. 2 at 25. Whitmer testified that he felt certain that the
police officers who conducted the allegedly illegal search were
prepared to fabricate testimony at trial, that the trial court
likely would credit their testimony, and that the motion to
suppress would ultimately not succeed. A colloquy between Whitmer
and Huynh's new counsel, however, also revealed the following
testimony:
QUESTION: Mr. Whitmer, you felt that as a matter of truth and facts that the motion was a good one, didn't you?
ANSWER: Yes, sir.
QUESTION: All right. Being the experienced trial lawyer that you are, it was your opinion that if the truth was laid out, that the search was illegal and violated the Fourth Amendment?
ANSWER: Yes, sir ...
QUESTION: The officer probably had the right to conduct the frisk, the Terry-type frisk, that when he extracted the pocketbook from this young man and got $3,100.004 that was allegedly taken from the dead man, that that was definitely illegal and improper?
4 This appears to have been an erroneous description of the amount of money recovered from Huynh's wallet. In actuality, the police found $1,300.00 in his wallet immediately before arresting him. ANSWER: That was my opinion?
QUESTION: That was your opinion.
ANSWER: Yes.
QUESTION: And that's the reason you filed the motion to suppress evidence?
Id. at 18-19. Whitmer also testified that he and his co-counsel
had surmised that "perhaps the Eleventh Circuit would view [the
motion to suppress] a little bit differently on whether it should
have been heard or whether it should have been filed earlier, and
so that was essentially the reasons why we filed it when we did."
Id. at 16.
The state court determined that Huynh's trial counsel had made
a "deliberate strategic and tactical decision to delay the filing
of the motion to suppress...." Exh. 3 at 2. The district court
reviewing Huynh's federal habeas corpus petition similarly
concluded that "the motion to suppress was filed simply to give
petitioner an additional issue on appeal." R1-12-14.
Our independent review of the record and the applicable
decisional law, however, convinces us that the district court erred
in its disposition of Huynh's ineffective assistance of counsel
claim. In Kimmelman, the Supreme Court explicitly denominated as
"unreasonable" the precise trial strategy invoked by Huynh's
counsel in this case:
No reasonable lawyer would forgo competent litigation of meritorious, possibly decisive claims on the remote chance that his deliberate dereliction might ultimately result in federal habeas review. Furthermore, when an attorney chooses to default a Fourth Amendment claim, he also loses the opportunity to obtain direct review under the harmless-error standard of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), which requires the State to prove that the defendant was not prejudiced by the error. By defaulting, counsel shifts the burden to the defendant to prove that there exists a reasonable probability that, absent his attorney's incompetence, he would not have been convicted.
477 U.S. at 383 n. 7, 106 S.Ct. at 2587 n. 7.
Placing this discussion in context, we conclude that Huynh's
counsel's tactical decision to delay the filing of a potentially
meritorious suppression motion in order to later obtain more
favorable federal habeas review was objectively unreasonable for
several reasons. First, under Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97
S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977), the state court's determination
that Huynh had failed to abide by a state procedural rule in filing
his motion would serve as an adequate and independent state ground
to deny relief independent of the merits of the federal claim. See
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2554,
115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). Huynh therefore would have procedurally
defaulted his Fourth Amendment claim, barring our review of the
claim unless he could demonstrate cause for the default and
prejudice arising therefrom, or that failure to consider the claim
would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Id. at 750,
111 S.Ct. at 2565. Cause to overcome the procedural default bar
would be established in this instance if Huynh could show
ineffective assistance of counsel. As the Supreme Court expressly
articulated, however, no competent lawyer would choose deliberately
to "set up" an ineffective assistance of counsel claim whereby that
lawyer's own incompetence would serve as cause for defaulting a
claim. See Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 383 n. 7, 106 S.Ct. at 2587 n.
7. Second, Huynh would have the extraordinarily weighty burden of showing prejudice arising from his counsel's ineffective
assistance. See id. Third, any consideration of Huynh's Fourth
Amendment claim, standing alone, necessarily would be barred by the
doctrine announced in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482, 96 S.Ct.
3037, 3052, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976) ("[W]here the state has provided
an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment
claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus
relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional
search or seizure was introduced at his trial.") In this circuit,
we have construed Stone v. Powell to bar consideration of a Fourth
Amendment claim if the state has provided an opportunity for full
and fair litigation of the claim "whether or not the defendant
employs those processes."5 Caver v. State of Ala., 577 F.2d 1188,
1192 (5th Cir.1978). Again, our precedent would preclude
consideration of Huynh's Fourth Amendment claim unless he were able
to overcome the bar of procedural default. Trial counsel's
purposeful strategy to erect such hurdles to consideration of a
claim on federal collateral review can only be characterized as
unreasonable.
5 In the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation, adopted by the district court, the magistrate judge erroneously concludes that Stone v. Powell is not applicable to Huynh's Fourth Amendment claim and cites Agee v. White, 809 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir.1987) in support of this determination. R1-12-7. In Agee, however, we found that the petitioner had been denied full and fair consideration of one of his Fourth Amendment claims both at trial and on direct review. There are no allegations in this case that there were no avenues available to Huynh to review his Fourth Amendment claim at the state level, or that the procedural mechanism through which Huynh's claim was reviewed was inadequate. Contrary to the magistrate judge's analysis, Stone v. Powell would preclude consideration of Huynh's Fourth Amendment claim in this circuit. Although our examination of the record permits us to evaluate
counsel's performance with respect to competency in this case, we
decline to apply the prejudice prong of the Strickland analysis
without the benefit of a district court's factual findings on the
merits of the underlying Fourth Amendment claim. While we readily
conclude that the record indicates that a motion to suppress, had
it been filed, would not have been frivolous, no court has issued
findings regarding the legitimacy of the claim. Furthermore,
although a meritorious Fourth Amendment issue is necessary to the
success of a Sixth Amendment claim such as the one raised by Huynh,
a good Fourth Amendment claim alone will not earn a prisoner
federal habeas relief. Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 382, 106 S.Ct. at
2586. Only those habeas petitioners who can prove under Strickland
that they have been denied a fair trial by the gross incompetence
of their attorneys will be granted the writ and will be entitled to
retrial without the challenged evidence. Id., 477 U.S. at 382, 106
S.Ct. at 2586-87. Because the merit of Huynh's Fourth Amendment
claim is dispositive to a finding of prejudice, we remand to the
district court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the
search in question violated Huynh's Fourth Amendment right.6 Cave
v. Singletary, 971 F.2d 1513, 1516 (11th Cir.1992) ("A petitioner
6 If the district court finds that Huynh's Fourth Amendment right was violated and as a result that, had counsel filed a motion to exclude this evidence, it would have been granted, the court need not conduct any further analysis regarding whether there exists a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different had the evidence seized from Huynh's wallet not been admitted. As we discuss in detail in the next section of this opinion, we conclude as a matter of law that, had the evidence in question been excluded, the outcome would have been different under the standards applicable to both Strickland and our review of the sufficiency of the evidence. is entitled to an evidentiary hearing in federal court if he
alleges facts which, if proven, would entitle him to relief.").
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Huynh is entitled to habeas corpus relief if, upon the record
evidence adduced at the trial, viewed in the light most favorable
to the prosecution, no rational trier of fact could have found
proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307, 324, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 22791-92, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
Under Georgia law, when a conviction is based solely on
circumstantial evidence, "the proved facts shall not only be
consistent with the hypothesis of guilt but shall exclude every
other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused."
O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (1995). The findings of fact by a state court of
competent jurisdiction evidenced by reliable indicia are presumed 7 to be correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994). The conclusions of
the state court and district court as to whether the evidence was
sufficient to satisfy federal due process standards is a mixed
question of fact and law subject to plenary review. Wilcox v.
Ford, 813 F.2d 1140, 1143 n. 3 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
925, 108 S.Ct. 287, 98 L.Ed.2d 247 (1987).
Huynh was convicted of having intentionally aided and abetted
Hong Binh Thai and Sam Van Ngo in the murder of C.A. Nguyen
7 There are eight exceptions to this presumption set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Because Huynh does not challenge directly the accuracy of the factual findings made by the state court, these exceptions are not relevant for purposes of this discussion. ("Nguyen").8 At trial, Huynh contended that he was coerced to
participate in events subsequent to Nguyen's murder; in essence,
Huynh claimed (and continues to claim) that his participation was
exclusively after-the-fact. Huynh correctly notes that under
Georgia law, a defendant must be an accessory before-the-fact to be
found guilty as an aider or abettor to a crime. Purvis v. State,
208 Ga.App. 653, 433 S.E.2d 58, 59, cert. denied, 208 Ga.App. 910
(1993). The following facts presented at trial are undisputed:
the police found a .25 caliber bullet casing in the apartment of
the victim, and Huynh owned a .25 caliber weapon. Huynh drove Hong
Binh Thai and Sam Van Ngo, with the victim's body in the back seat,
to a wooded area where they disposed of the dead body. Hong Binh
Thai subsequently gave Huynh $2,000.00, representing half of the
money Sam Van Ngo gave to Hong Binh Thai after robbing Nguyen.
Huynh and Hong Binh Thai were apprehended shortly thereafter in
California. In a search conducted prior to his arrest, Huynh was
found carrying thirteen one hundred dollar bills. Viewed in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that this
evidence was sufficient to support Huynh's conviction.
We further conclude, however, that the evidence presented at
8 O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20 provides, in relevant part:
(a) Every person concerned in the commission of a crime is a party thereto and may be charged with and convicted of commission of the crime.
(b) A person is concerned in the commission of a crime only if he:
....
(3) Intentionally aids or abets in the commission of the crime[.] trial concerning the money seized from Huynh immediately prior to
his arrest was, at the very least, critical in pointing to his
culpability as an accomplice to murder before-the-fact. Sam Van
Ngo testified that he had taken Huynh's weapon from his apartment
and used it to murder Nguyen. He also testified that he had
committed the murder and robbery alone, and had ordered Huynh and
Hong Binh Thai to assist him in disposing of the body. Huynh
consistently has maintained that he had no knowledge that Sam Van
Ngo intended to rob and kill Nguyen and that his participation
after the murder took place under duress. The admission at trial
of the money obtained from Huynh's wallet as a result of the
allegedly illegal search was extraordinarily important in
sustaining the prosecution's theory that Huynh intentionally had
participated in a plan to murder Nguyen from the outset. Moreover,
without the evidence of the money, the evidence presented at trial
would not have been sufficient to exclude every other reasonable
hypothesis save that of Huynh's guilt. We therefore resolve that
if the district court finds, following the evidentiary hearing on
the prejudice prong of Huynh's ineffective assistance of counsel
claim, that the second pat-down search of Huynh leading to the
discovery of the thirteen one hundred dollar bills violated his
Fourth Amendment right and that, consequently, this evidence should
have been suppressed at trial, then the evidence in this case was
legally insufficient to convict Huynh of malice murder. 9 Stated
differently, we conclude that if all evidence of the money had been
9 Because we vacate Huynh's armed robbery conviction, see infra p. 27, we need not reach the question of sufficiency of the evidence with respect to this offense. excluded at trial, no rational trier of fact could have found Huynh
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of malice murder.10 C. Double Jeopardy
Finally, Huynh asserts that he received multiple punishments
for the same offense, thereby subjecting him to double jeopardy,
when he was convicted and sentenced to consecutive life sentences
for the greater offense of malice murder and the lesser included
offense of armed robbery. He asks that we reverse his conviction
and sentence for armed robbery. The State avers that (1) Huynh has
never raised this particular double jeopardy claim in either state
or federal court, (2) his state pleadings and original federal
habeas petition stated only that he had been subjected to double
jeopardy by being retried for felony murder, and (3) the claim
presented in this appeal therefore is unexhausted. The State does
not argue the merits of Huynh's double jeopardy challenge, but asks
that we decline to entertain the claim. We review Huynh's double
10 For the sake of clarity, we emphasize that under the particular circumstances of this case, the claims that counsel was ineffective and that the evidence was insufficient to convict Huynh of malice murder are inextricably intertwined; in fact, the court's determination with respect to the prejudice prong of Huynh's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim is dispositive of the sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim as a matter of law. The court necessarily must determine that Huynh's Fourth Amendment rights were violated and that the thirteen one hundred dollar bills should have been excluded from evidence in order to find that counsel's failure to file a motion to exclude this money prejudiced Huynh under Strickland. If the court finds that the money was improperly admitted and that Huynh therefore was prejudiced by his lawyer's failure to seek to have it excluded, then we conclude as a matter of law that the balance of the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for malice murder. Theoretically speaking, if Huynh's counsel had filed the suppression motion (as he should have) and the trial court had granted the motion, then no rational trier of fact could have found Huynh guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of malice murder. jeopardy claim de novo. Mars v. Mount, 895 F.2d 1348, 1351 (11th
Cir.1990).
The State correctly notes that in his pro se petition before
the district court, Huynh stated that "since he was not found
guilty of felony murder in his first trial, he has been subjected
to double jeopardy." R1-1. Huynh also stated that he "would like
to use the brief filed in Georgia Supreme Court by trial attorney
on this issue." Id. That brief contained as one ground for appeal
a request that the conviction for felony murder be reversed based
on double jeopardy.11 Exh. 6B at 22. In its answer to Huynh's
petition, however, the State argued:
To the extent the Petitioner argues that his conviction for felony murder and malice murder in the second trial constitutes double jeopardy, that argument is moot because the Georgia Supreme Court reversed and vacated the felony murder conviction ... The remaining offenses for which Petitioner stands convicted, the offenses of malice murder and armed robbery, do not merge as a matter of law or fact in this case. Thus, the prohibition against double jeopardy is not implicated.
R1-7-11. We acknowledge that it is neither clear nor obvious that
Huynh explicitly raised in his federal habeas petition the issue of
whether his malice murder and armed robbery convictions merge in
violation of double jeopardy; yet, the State apparently understood
that there were several possible distinct interpretations of
Huynh's double jeopardy claim. The answer indicates that the State
afforded the pro se petition a liberal construction and expressly
11 As previously mentioned, the Georgia Supreme Court had already reversed Huynh's felony-murder conviction after finding that the conviction constituted a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Van Huynh, 373 S.E.2d at 503. The court also determined that Huynh had been sentenced only for malice murder and armed robbery and affirmed both the sentences and remaining convictions. See id. responded to the claim argued by Huynh in this appeal. Although
the State now suggests that the brief discussion of the merger
issue was inadvertent and gratuitous, we decline to find a claim to
be unexhausted after the State has argued the merits of that same
claim in its answer brief. Pennington v. Spears, 779 F.2d 1505,
1506 (11th Cir.1986) (where State declined to raise exhaustion
defense, instead requesting the district court to deny petition on
the merits, court found State had waived exhaustion as a defense:
"Although it is not clear from the record whether [petitioner] has
in fact exhausted state remedies, it is clear that the state does
not assert a defense of lack of exhaustion.").
We also conclude that Huynh's malice murder and armed robbery
convictions merge under Georgia decisional law. The Georgia
Supreme Court has construed Georgia statutory law as mandating that
although a defendant may be prosecuted for each crime arising from
the same conduct, he may not be convicted of more than one crime if
one crime is included in the other. Addison v. State, 239 Ga. 622,
238 S.E.2d 411, 412-13 (1977). The court has further held that
armed robbery may be a lesser included offense of malice murder
where a defendant is a conspirator in an armed robbery scheme and
a murder occurs as a probable consequence of that armed robbery.
Id. Specifically, the court has vacated an armed robbery
conviction after finding that "[w]here the defendant is not the
killer, and where the only method by which malice may be imputed to
defendant is by showing his participation in the armed robbery, the
armed robbery is an included offense as a matter of fact[.]" Id.
238 S.E.2d at 413. Here, the State has never contended that Huynh was the
"triggerman," and he was never charged with this offense; rather,
it consistently has been the State's theory that Huynh was an
accomplice who aided Sam Van Ngo in committing murder. As we have
addressed in depth in the preceding discussion, the robbery of the
victim in this case was the critical evidence in allowing the jury
to impute the malice and intent of Sam Van Ngo to Huynh. Proof of
the robbery therefore was essential in supporting Huynh's
conviction for malice murder. Burke v. State, 234 Ga. 512, 216
S.E.2d 812, 814 (1975). Our precedent dictates that the Double
Jeopardy Clause prohibits the state from punishing a person twice
for the same offense, and a greater offense and lesser included
offense are considered the same offense for purposes of Double
Jeopardy Clause protection. United States v. Kaiser, 893 F.2d
1300, 1303 (11th Cir.1990). The specific facts of this case
dictate that, under Georgia law, the armed robbery for which Huynh
was convicted was a lesser included offense of the malice murder
for which he was convicted.12 Accordingly, we vacate the district
court's order and direct that the writ issue with respect to
Huynh's conviction and sentence for armed robbery.
III. CONCLUSION
In this appeal, Huynh asks that we grant the writ of habeas
corpus with respect to his convictions and sentences for malice
murder and armed robbery. As grounds for this request, he avers
12 The Georgia Supreme Court has observed that an armed robbery may be a lesser included offense "as a matter of fact, though not as a matter of law" based on the factual circumstances of each case. Addison, 239 Ga. at 622, 238 S.E.2d at 413. that his trial counsel was ineffective and that the evidence was
insufficient to support the convictions. In addition, Huynh asks
that we vacate his conviction and sentence for armed robbery based
on a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. We conclude that
Huynh has shown that counsel's performance at trial regarding the
decision to delay filing a potentially meritorious motion to
suppress was neither sound strategy nor reasonable in light of
prevailing professional norms. We therefore vacate the district
court's judgment regarding the ineffective assistance of counsel
claim and remand for an evidentiary hearing to resolve whether
Huynh was prejudiced by counsel's performance. We further conclude
that if the district court finds, pursuant to its examination of
the ineffective assistance of counsel issue, that Huynh established
a valid Fourth Amendment claim and that the money discovered as a
result of the relevant search should not have been introduced at
trial, then the evidence was legally insufficient to support his
conviction and the writ should issue forthwith. Finally, we
resolve that Huynh's conviction and sentence for armed robbery
subjected him to double jeopardy. We therefore reverse the
district court's order with respect to this claim and direct that
the writ issue on the armed robbery conviction and sentence.
VACATED, REVERSED, and REMANDED with instructions.