Huston v. Unknown Parties

• Court: District Court, W.D. Michigan
• Decided: July 23, 2024
• Docket: 1:24-cv-00716
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION ______

CECIL DE HUSTON, SR.,

Plaintiff, Case No. 1:24-cv-716

v. Honorable Sally J. Berens

UNKNOWN PARTIES et al.,

Defendants. ____________________________/ OPINION This is a civil rights action brought by a pretrial detainee under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis in a separate order. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff consented to proceed in all matters in this action under the jurisdiction of a United States magistrate judge. (ECF No. 1, PageID.4.) This case is presently before the Court for preliminary review under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court is required to conduct this initial review prior to the service of the complaint. See In re Prison Litig. Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131, 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604–05 (6th Cir. 1997). Service of the complaint on the named defendants is of particular significance in defining a putative defendant’s relationship to the proceedings. “An individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a court’s authority, by formal process.” Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 347 (1999). “Service of process, under longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant.” Id. at 350. “[O]ne becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service of a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the party served must appear and defend.” Id. (citations omitted). That is, “[u]nless a named defendant agrees to waive service, the

summons continues to function as the sine qua non directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil action or forgo procedural or substantive rights.” Id. at 351. Therefore, the PLRA, by requiring courts to review and even resolve a plaintiff’s claims before service, creates a circumstance where there may only be one party to the proceeding—the plaintiff—at the district court level and on appeal. See, e.g., Conway v. Fayette Cnty. Gov’t, 212 F. App’x 418 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court screened the complaint and dismissed it without prejudice before service was made upon any of the defendants . . . [such that] . . . only [the plaintiff] [wa]s a party to this appeal.”). Here, Plaintiff has consented to a United States magistrate judge conducting all

proceedings in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). That statute provides that “[u]pon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all proceedings . . . and order the entry of judgment in the case . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Because the named Defendants have not yet been served, the undersigned concludes that they are not presently parties whose consent is required to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review under the PLRA, in the same way they are not parties who will be served with or given notice of this opinion. See Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The record does not contain a consent from the defendants[; h]owever, because they had not been served, they were not parties to this action at the time the magistrate entered judgment.”).1 Under the PLRA, the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2),

1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim. Discussion Factual Allegations Plaintiff Cecil De Huston, Sr., is currently incarcerated at the Berrien County Jail in St. Joseph, Michigan. The events about which he complains occurred at that facility. Plaintiff sues Captain Unknown Herbert and Lieutenant Unknown Hoult in their official capacities. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) He also sues Unknown Parties, referred to as “Berrien County Jail Staff.” (Id., PageID.1.)

Plaintiff claims that on May 3, 2024, he wrote to jail staff stating that an inmate named Jesse Kelems “is picking fights in this medical cell.” (Id., PageID.3.) Plaintiff did not want to fight

1 But see Coleman v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n of Wis., 860 F.3d 461, 471 (7th Cir. 2017) (concluding that, when determining which parties are required to consent to proceed before a United States magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), “context matters” and the context the United States Supreme Court considered in Murphy Bros. was nothing like the context of a screening dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)); Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500, 503–04 (9th Cir. 2017) (relying on Black’s Law Dictionary for the definition of “parties” and not addressing Murphy Bros.); Burton v. Schamp, 25 F.4th 198, 207 n.26 (3d Cir. 2022) (premising its discussion of “the term ‘parties’ solely in relation to its meaning in Section 636(c)(1), and . . . not tak[ing] an opinion on the meaning of ‘parties’ in other contexts”). “and get in more trouble.” (Id.) On May 5, 2024, inmate Kelems told Plaintiff that “his son was a big guy in the white pride gang” and spit on Plaintiff. (Id.) Plaintiff said, “I know you didn’t spit on me.” (Id.) Inmate Kelems then pushed the help button, and officers moved him to another cell. (Id.) Plaintiff requested to press charges against inmate Kelems to no avail. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he wrote grievances to Defendant Herbert as well as other staff members after the incident.

(Id.) Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff suggests that Defendants have violated his rights by not allowing him to press charges against inmate Kelems. Plaintiff’s complaint can also be liberally construed to assert a Fourteenth Amendment2 failure to protect claim against Defendants. As relief, Plaintiff states that he “want[s] to sue Berrien County for monies.” (Id., PageID.4.) Failure to State a Claim A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels

and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility

2 Because Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee, any failure to protect claim arises under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. See Helphenstine v. Lewis Cnty., Ky., 60 F.4th 305, 316–17 (6th Cir. 2023); Westmoreland v. Butler Cnty., 29 F.4th 721, 727 (6th Cir. 2022). standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71

(6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because Section 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under Section 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).

A. Defendants Unknown Parties and Hoult As an initial matter, Plaintiff fails to mention Defendant Hoult in the body of his complaint, much less allege that Defendant Hoult took any action against him. Where a person is named as a defendant without an allegation of specific conduct, the complaint is subject to dismissal, even under the liberal construction afforded to pro se complaints. See Gilmore v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 92 F. App’x 188, 190 (6th Cir. 2004) (dismissing complaint where plaintiff failed to allege how any named defendant was involved in the violation of his rights); Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (dismissing plaintiff’s claims where the complaint did not allege with any degree of specificity which of the named defendants were personally involved in or responsible for each alleged violation of rights). Moreover, although Plaintiff has named “Berrien County Jail Staff” as a Defendant and refers to “officers” throughout his complaint, “[s]ummary reference to a single, five-headed ‘Defendants’ [or staff] does not support a reasonable inference that each Defendant is liable.” Boxill v. O’Grady, 935 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted) (“This Court has consistently held that . . . claims against government officials arising from alleged violations of constitutional rights must allege, with particularity, facts that demonstrate what each

defendant did to violate the asserted constitutional right.” (quoting Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673, 684 (6th Cir. 2008))). Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Unknown Parties and Hoult, therefore, fall short of the minimal pleading standards under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and are subject to dismissal for that reason alone. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”). B. Official Capacity Claims Plaintiff has named Defendants Herbert and Hoult in their official capacities only. Official capacity lawsuits “generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985) (citing Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n. 55 (1978)). An official capacity suit is

to be treated as a suit against the entity itself. Id. at 166 (citing Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471–72 (1985)); see also Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994). “Individuals sued in their official capacities stand in the shoes of the entity they represent,” and the suit is not against the official personally. See Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 810 (6th Cir. 2003); see also Graham, 473 U.S. at 165–66. Here, Plaintiff’s suit against Defendants Herbert and Hoult—both of whom work at the Berrien County Jail—in their official capacities necessarily intends to impose liability on the county. Berrien County, however, may not be held vicariously liable for the actions of its employees under Section 1983. See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011); City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 392 (1989); Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. Instead, a county is liable only when its official policy or custom causes the injury. Connick, 563 U.S. at 60. This policy or custom must be the moving force behind the alleged constitutional injury, and the plaintiff must identify the policy or custom, connect it to the governmental entity, and show that his injury was incurred because of the policy or custom. See Turner v. City of Taylor, 412 F.3d 629, 639 (6th Cir. 2005);

Alkire, 330 F.3d at 815 (6th Cir. 2003). “Governmental entities cannot be held responsible for a constitutional deprivation unless there is a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged violation of constitutional rights.” Watson v. Gill, 40 F. App’x 88, 89 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 692). A policy includes a “policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated” by the sheriff’s department. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. Moreover, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has explained that a custom “for purposes of Monell liability must ‘be so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.’” Doe v. Claiborne Cnty., 103 F.3d 495, 507 (6th Cir. 1996). “In short, a ‘custom’ is a

‘legal institution’ not memorialized by written law.” Id. at 508. Here, Plaintiff fails to allege the existence of a custom or policy, let alone that any policy or custom was the moving force behind his alleged constitutional injuries. Cf. Rayford v. City of Toledo, No. 86-3260, 1987 WL 36283, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 1987); see also Bilder v. City of Akron, No. 92-4310, 1993 WL 394595, at *2 (6th Cir. Oct. 6, 1993) (affirming dismissal of Section 1983 action when plaintiff allegation of policy or custom was conclusory, and plaintiff failed to allege facts tending to support the allegation). Accordingly, because Plaintiff fails to allege the existence of a policy or custom, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against Defendants. Because Plaintiff sues Defendants in their official capacities only, for this reason alone, his claims against Defendants will be dismissed. Even setting aside the deficiencies noted above and addressing the merits of Plaintiff’s claims, as explained below, Plaintiff’s claims are subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim. C. Inability to Press Charges

Plaintiff contends that Defendants have violated his rights by not allowing him to press charges against inmate Kelems after inmate Kelems spit on him. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) However, “a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.” Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973); cf. Inmates of Attica Corr. Fac. v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 382–83 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding that a federal court cannot compel state prosecutors to commence a prosecution). Plaintiff, therefore, cannot maintain any constitutional claims premised upon his allegation that Defendants have not allowed him to press charges against inmate Kelems. D. Failure to Protect The Court has very liberally construed Plaintiff’s complaint to assert Fourteenth Amendment failure to protect claims based upon the incident during which inmate Kelems spit on

Plaintiff. “[T]o establish deliberate indifference for failure to protect, ‘a defendant . . . must [1] act intentionally in a manner that [2] puts the plaintiff at a substantial risk of harm, [3] without taking reasonable steps to abate that risk, [4] and by failing to do so actually cause the plaintiff’s injuries.” Stein v. Gunkel, 43 F.4th 633, 639 (6th Cir. 2022) (quoting Westmoreland v. Butler Cnty., 29 F.4th 721, 729 (6th Cir. 2022)). Here, Plaintiff appears to suggest that Defendants failed to protect him from the incident during which inmate Kelems spit on Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s complaint, however, is devoid of facts from which the Court could infer that Defendants were aware that Plaintiff faced any substantial risk of harm and failed to take steps to abate that risk. Plaintiff states only that on May 3, 2024, two days before the spitting incident, he wrote to staff indicating that inmate Kelems was “picking fights in this medical cell with people.” (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) Plaintiff provides no information regarding which staff members he wrote to and what details he gave them regarding inmate Kelems’s behavior. Plaintiff’s sparse allegations fail to allege more than a mere possibility

of misconduct and fail to suggest that any Defendant intentionally placed Plaintiff at a substantial risk of harm. See Stein, 43 F.4th at 639. “To infer otherwise, the Court would be forced to speculate wildly, drawing inference upon inference from Plaintiff’s sparse allegations.” See Hamblin v. Loudon Cnty. Jail, No. 3:17-cv-126-TAV-CCS, 2018 WL 493794, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 19, 2018). Accordingly, any intended Fourteenth Amendment failure to protect claims will also be dismissed. Conclusion Having conducted the review required by the PLRA, the Court determines that Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).

The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997). Although the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claims are properly dismissed, the Court does not conclude that any issue Plaintiff might raise on appeal would be frivolous. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). Accordingly, the Court does not certify that an appeal would not be taken in good faith. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the $605.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610–11, unless Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of Section 1915(g). If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $605.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum. This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). A judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered.

Dated: July 23, 2024 /s/ Sally J. Berens SALLY J. BERENS United States Magistrate Judge