Hussey v. Torres

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided August 28, 2023·No. 1:23-cv-04337·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK YESSUH SUHYES HUSSEY, Plaintiff, 23-CV-4337 (LTS) -against- ORLANDO TORRES; KING III; JOHN DOE ORDER OF DISMISSAL HOSPITAL SECURITY; MARIAN SCOTT, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is currently detained in the Otis Bantum Correctional Center on Rikers Island, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 Named as Defendants are Saint Luke’s Roosevelt Hospital Center (“St. Luke’s”) Security Guards Orlando Torres, “King III,” and John Doe, and Saint Luke’s Director Marian Scott. Plaintiff originally filed this action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. See Hussey v. Torres, No. 23-CV- 2163 (PKC) (LB) (E.D.N.Y. May 16, 2023). This case is one of 60 cases Plaintiff filed in the Eastern District in recent months, including 43 cases filed on the same day. On May 16, 2023, the Eastern District transferred this action to this court. (ECF 5.) By order dated August 16, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees.2 For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses the complaint, but grants Plaintiff 60 days’ leave to replead his claims in an amended complaint.

1 Plaintiff was detained in the Anna M. Kross Center on Rikers Island at the time he filed this action. 2 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fees even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Plaintiff did not submit a prisoner authorization with the complaint. By order dated May 31, 2023, the Court directed Plaintiff to either pay the $402.00 in fees or submit a prisoner authorization. (ECF 7.) The Court received Plaintiff’s prisoner authorization on July 18, 2023. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND The following allegations are taken from the complaint. Between January 11 and January 19, 2021, Plaintiff was at Saint Luke’s Roosevelt Hospital Center for treatment following a heart

attack. On an unspecified date during his stay, St. Luke’s security guards Torres, King, and Doe “attacked [Plaintiff] in the hallway because [he] was making use of the tablet [he] was given and asked for it when it was [his] turn.” (ECF 1, at 4.)3 The guards “sexually har[]assed [Plaintiff] & forcefully pulled [his] patient pants down then took [him] to seclusion room off of the camera & started to punch [his] face repeatedly” before threatening him and returning him to his room. (Id.) Plaintiff was “coughing up blood” and experienced severe headaches due to the assault. (Id.) Plaintiff seeks money damages.

DISCUSSION Plaintiff brings his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988).

3 Plaintiff writes using irregular capitalization. For readability, the Court uses standard capitalization when quoting from the complaint. All other grammar, spelling, and punctuation are as in the original unless otherwise indicated. A. State Action A claim for relief under Section 1983 must allege facts showing that each defendant acted under the color of a state “statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Private parties therefore generally are not liable under the statute. Sykes v. Bank of America, 723 F.3d 399, 406 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n,

531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001)); see also Ciambriello v. Cnty. of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 323 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[T]he United States Constitution regulates only the Government, not private parties.”). Saint Luke’s is a private hospital, and its director, Defendant Marian Scott, is a private individual and she therefore cannot be held liable under Section 1983.4 The remaining defendants – Torres, King, and Doe – appear to be private security guards working for Saint Luke’s.

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