Hussey v. Gracie Square Hospital Psychologist David Rosen

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided August 28, 2023·No. 1:23-cv-04378·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK YESSUH SUHYES HUSSEY, Plaintiff, -against- 23-CV-4378 (LTS) GRACIE SQUARE HOSPITAL PSYCHOLOGIST DAVID ROSEN; FIRE ORDER OF DISMISSAL DEPARTMENT OF NEW YORK AMBULANCE DRIVER JOHN/JANE DOE; NYPD ARRESTING OFFICER JOHN DOE, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is currently detained in the Otis Bantum Correctional Center on Rikers Island, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 Named as Defendants are Gracie Square Hospital Psychologist David Rosen; Fire Department of New York ambulance driver John/Jane Doe; and New York City Police Department (“NYPD”) arresting officer John Doe. Plaintiff originally filed this action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. See Hussey v. Gracie Square Hosp. Psychologist David Rosen, No. 23-CV-2183 (PKC) (LB) (E.D.N.Y. May 16, 2023). This case is one of 60 cases Plaintiff filed in the Eastern District in recent months, including 43 cases filed on the same day. On May 16, 2023, the Eastern District transferred this action to this court. (ECF 5.) By order dated August 16, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of

1 Plaintiff was detained in the Anna M. Kross Center on Rikers Island at the time he filed this action. fees.2 For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses the complaint, but grants Plaintiff 60 days’ leave to replead his claims in an amended complaint. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a

governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in

original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

2 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Plaintiff did not submit a prisoner authorization with the complaint. By order dated May 31, 2023, the Court directed Plaintiff to either pay the $402.00 in fees or submit a prisoner authorization. (ECF 7.) The Court received Plaintiff’s prisoner authorization on July 18, 2023. Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must

accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff alleges that, on August 31, 2019, he was “physically abused by NYPD officers” and “unlawfully arrested for nothing.” (ECF 1, at 2.)3 The officers “had [Plaintiff] transported to Gracie Square Hospital where for the 1st time in [his] lifetime . . . [he] was wrongfully hospitalized & diagnosed . . . with psychosis” by Defendant Rosen. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that he does “not have a mental illness or impaired abilities.” (Id.)

Plaintiff seeks money damages. DISCUSSION Plaintiff brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988).

3 Plaintiff writes using irregular capitalization. For readability, the Court uses standard capitalization when quoting from the complaint. All other grammar, spelling, and punctuation are as in the original unless otherwise indicated. A. Timeliness It appears that Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred. The statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims is found in the “general or residual [state] statute [of limitations] for personal injury actions.” Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989)). In New York, that period is three years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R.

§ 214(5). Section 1983 claims generally accrue when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of the claim. Hogan v. Fischer, 738 F.3d 509, 518 (2d Cir. 2013). Here, Plaintiff alleges that he was arrested and taken to the hospital on August 31, 2019. He did not file the complaint in this action until January 21, 2023, more than three years and four months after his claims accrued. The doctrine of equitable tolling permits a court, “under compelling circumstances, [to] make narrow exceptions to the statute of limitations in order ‘to prevent inequity.’” In re U.S. Lines, Inc., 318 F.3d 432, 436 (2d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). The statute of limitations may be equitably tolled, for example, when a defendant fraudulently conceals from a plaintiff the fact that the plaintiff has a cause of action, or when the plaintiff is induced by the defendant to forego

a lawsuit until the statute of limitations has expired.

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