Hussey v. Beth Israel Medical Center

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided August 7, 2023·No. 1:23-cv-04377·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK YESSUH SUHYES HUSSEY, Plaintiff, -against- BETH ISRAEL MEDICAL CENTER; NYPD 23-CV-4377 (LTS) OFFICER JANE DOE/JOHN DOE; NYPD OFFICER JANE DOE/JOHN DOE; HOSPITAL ORDER OF DISMISSAL PHYSICIAN JANE DOE/JOHN DOE; AMBULANCE DRIVER JANE DOE/JOHN DOE, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is currently detained in the Eric M. Taylor Center on Rikers Island, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 Named as Defendants are Beth Israel Medical Center; two John/Jane Doe New York City Police Department (“NYPD”) officers; a John/Jane Doe physician; and a John/Jane Doe ambulance driver. Plaintiff originally filed this action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. See Hussey v. Beth Israel Med. Ctr., No. 23-CV-2181 (PKC) (LB) (E.D.N.Y. May 16, 2023). This case is one of 60 cases Plaintiff filed in the Eastern District in recent months, including 43 cases filed on the same day. On May 16, 2023, the Eastern District transferred this action to this court. (ECF 5.) By order dated July 11, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees.2

1 Plaintiff was detained in the Anna M. Kross Center on Rikers Island at the time he filed this action. 2 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Plaintiff did not submit a prisoner authorization with the complaint. By order dated June 5, 2023, the Court directed STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must

Plaintiff to either pay the $402.00 in fees or submit a prisoner authorization. (ECF 7.) The Court received Plaintiff’s prisoner authorization on June 26, 2023. accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.

BACKGROUND The following allegations are taken from the complaint. On June 12, 2019, Plaintiff was “falsely arrested then sent to Beth Israel Medical Center then diagnosed with bipolar disorder because [he] expressed that [he] was constantly being harmed by the officer[s] then sent to hospitals.” (ECF 1, at 2.) Plaintiff describes his injuries as “medical cruelty, mental cruelty due to several involuntary visits, that cost [him] another customer, and affected [his] relationship with [his] woman . . . because she started thinking [he] was cheating on her.” (Id.) As relief, Plaintiff seeks “a new arrangement and a court order to the stated NYPD & hospitals . . . to leave me out of their settings[.]” (Id.)

DISCUSSION To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). A. Timeliness It appears that Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred. The statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims is found in the “general or residual [state] statute [of limitations] for personal injury actions.” Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989)). In New York, that period is three years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5). Section 1983 claims generally accrue when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of the claim. Hogan v. Fischer, 738 F.3d 509, 518 (2d Cir. 2013). Here, Plaintiff alleges that he was arrested and taken to the hospital on June 12, 2019. He did not file the complaint in this action until February 16, 2023, more than three years and eight months

after his claims accrued. The doctrine of equitable tolling permits a court, “under compelling circumstances, [to] make narrow exceptions to the statute of limitations in order ‘to prevent inequity.’” In re U.S. Lines, Inc., 318 F.3d 432, 436 (2d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). The statute of limitations may be equitably tolled, for example, when a defendant fraudulently conceals from a plaintiff the fact that the plaintiff has a cause of action, or when the plaintiff is induced by the defendant to forego a lawsuit until the statute of limitations has expired. See Pearl, 296 F.3d at 82-83. In addition, New York law provides that where a person “is under a disability because of . . . insanity at the time the cause of action accrues,” the applicable statute of limitations will be tolled. N.Y.

C.P.L.R. § 208; Gardner v. Wansart, No. 05-CV-3351, 2006 WL 2742043, at *5 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.

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