Hussey v. Bellevue Hospital Center

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided August 28, 2023·No. 1:23-cv-04374·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK YESSUH SUHYES HUSSEY, Plaintiff, -against- BELLEVUE HOSPITAL CENTER; NYPD 23-CV-4374 (LTS) OFFICER JANE DOE/JOHN DOE; NYPD OFFICER JANE DOE/JOHN DOE; HOSPITAL ORDER OF DISMISSAL PHYSICIAN JANE DOE/JOHN DOE; AMBULANCE DRIVE JANE DOE/JOHN DOE, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is currently detained in the Otis Bantum Correctional Center on Rikers Island, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 Named as Defendants are Bellevue Hospital Center; two John/Jane Doe New York City Police Department (“NYPD”) officers; a John/Jane Doe physician at Bellevue Hospital; and a John/Jane Doe ambulance driver. Plaintiff originally filed this action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. See Hussey v. Bellevue Hosp. Ctr., No. 23-CV-2178 (PKC) (LB) (E.D.N.Y. May 16, 2023). This case is one of 60 cases Plaintiff filed in the Eastern District in recent months, including 43 cases filed on the same day. On May 16, 2023, the Eastern District transferred this action to this court. (ECF 5.) By order dated August 15, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees.2

1 Plaintiff was detained in the Anna M. Kross Center on Rikers Island at the time he filed this action. 2 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Plaintiff did not submit a prisoner authorization with the complaint. By order dated May 31, 2023, the Court directed STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and

plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept

Plaintiff to either pay the $402.00 in fees or submit a prisoner authorization. (ECF 7.) The Court received Plaintiff’s prisoner authorization on July 18, 2023. as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.

BACKGROUND On February 17, 2020, NYPD officers “forced [Plaintiff] to Bellevue Hospital Center.” (ECF 1, at 1.)3 While at Bellevue Hospital, Plaintiff was diagnosed with “unspecified psychosis,” a diagnosis with which he disagrees. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff alleges, “I am a real person whom do real things, and real things only => being at the hospital against my will resulted in lost wages.” (Id.) Plaintiff describes his injuries as “[m]ental cruelty due to being at the hospital against my will, costed me several clients with time sensitive orders. Cost me over $10,000.00 in business.” (Id.) As relief, Plaintiff seeks “monetary reimbursement of my $10,000.00 debt fee” as well as “to be permanently restricted from all New York hospitals because they cannot help me like I

can help myself => they only make matters worse.” (Id.) DISCUSSION Plaintiff brings his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988).

3 Plaintiff writes using irregular capitalization. For readability, the Court uses standard capitalization when quoting from the complaint. All other grammar, spelling, and punctuation are as in the original unless otherwise indicated. A. Claims against Bellevue Hospital The Court construes Plaintiff’s claims against Bellevue Hospital as against the New York City Health + Hospitals Corporation (“H+H”) because Bellevue Hospital is part of the H+H network of hospitals.4 H+H is a public benefit corporation that is created by state law and may be sued. See N.Y. Unconsol. Laws §§ 7384(1), 7385(1). When a plaintiff sues H+H under

Section 1983, it is not enough for the plaintiff to allege that H+H’s employees or agents engaged in some wrongdoing. The plaintiff must show that H+H itself caused the violation of the plaintiff’s rights. See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011). In other words, to state a claim against H+H under Section 1983, the plaintiff must allege facts showing (1) the existence of an H+H policy, custom, or practice, and (2) that the policy, custom, or practice caused the violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Jones v. Town of East Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2012); Rookard v. Health & Hosp. Corp., 710 F.2d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 1983) (applying standard for Section 1983 municipal liability to H+H).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Hussey v. Bellevue Hospital Center, (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

Hussey v. Bellevue Hospital Center (Hussey v. Bellevue Hospital Center) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Bell v. Wolfish
441 U.S. 520 (Supreme Court, 1979)
Youngberg v. Romeo Ex Rel. Romeo
457 U.S. 307 (Supreme Court, 1982)
Daniels v. Williams
474 U.S. 327 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Davidson v. Cannon
474 U.S. 344 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill
484 U.S. 343 (Supreme Court, 1988)
West v. Atkins
487 U.S. 42 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Devenpeck v. Alford
543 U.S. 146 (Supreme Court, 2004)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Salahuddin v. Cuomo
861 F.2d 40 (Second Circuit, 1988)
Hill v. Curcione
657 F.3d 116 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Weyant v. Okst
101 F.3d 845 (Second Circuit, 1996)
Chance v. Armstrong
143 F.3d 698 (Second Circuit, 1998)
Abbas v. Dixon
480 F.3d 636 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Ackerson v. City of White Plains
702 F.3d 15 (Second Circuit, 2012)