Hurwitz v. Hurwitz

D.C. Circuit

Hurwitz v. Hurwitz

136 F.2d 800, 78 U.S. App. D.C. 70, 1943 U.S. App. LEXIS 3138

CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit

DecidedJune 22, 1943

DocketNo. 8156

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 136 F.2d 800 (Hurwitz v. Hurwitz) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Hurwitz v. Hurwitz, 136 F.2d 800, 78 U.S. App. D.C. 70, 1943 U.S. App. LEXIS 3138 (D.C. Cir. 1943).

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Opinion

ARNOLD, Associate Justice.

This is an appeal from an interlocutory order granting a motion for the appointment of a receiver pendente lite. The nature of the main controversy is set forth in App.D.C., 136 F.2d 796, decided this day, in which we affirm the final judgment of the trial court. Plaintiff's prima facie case disclosed that the defendant was fraudently withholding assets of the estate. In addition there was evidence that the defendant had agreed to set aside the property and money during the pendency of the suit, but that he had been using the money in his business. On this record we cannot say that the lower court abused its discretion in appointing a receiver pendente lite as a conservation measure. See Wood v. Grayson, 1900, 16 App.D.C. 174, 185; Provident Relief Ass’n v. Vernon, 1927, 57 App.D.C. 235, 236, 19 F.2d 709, 710.

The order of the trial court is, therefore, affirmed.

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ARNOLD, Associate Justice.

This is an appeal from an interlocutory order granting a motion for the appointment of a receiver pendente lite. The nature of the main controversy is set forth in App.D.C., 136 F.2d 796, decided this day, in which we affirm the final judgment of the trial court. Plaintiff's prima facie case disclosed that the defendant was fraudently withholding assets of the estate. In addition there was evidence that the defendant had agreed to set aside the property and money during the pendency of the suit, but that he had been using the money in his business. On this record we cannot say that the lower court abused its discretion in appointing a receiver pendente lite as a conservation measure. See Wood v. Grayson, 1900, 16 App.D.C. 174, 185; Provident Relief Ass’n v. Vernon, 1927, 57 App.D.C. 235, 236, 19 F.2d 709, 710.

The order of the trial court is, therefore, affirmed.

United States v. Estelle Pendergrast, United States of America v. James Burton, Jr., United States of America v. Mary Burton, United States of America v. Willie Gibbs, as Administrator of the Estate of Elex Gibbs, Deceased, United States of America v. Willie Gibbs, as Administrator of the Estate of Inez Gibbs, Deceased, United States of America v. Isiah Thompson, United States of America v. Azailie Thompson

241 F.2d 687 (Fourth Circuit, 1957)

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136 F.2d 800, 78 U.S. App. D.C. 70, 1943 U.S. App. LEXIS 3138, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hurwitz-v-hurwitz-cadc-1943.

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