Hurtz v. United States

162 Ct. Cl. 855, 12 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5151, 1963 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 9, 1963 WL 8552
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedJuly 12, 1963
DocketNo. 324-60; No. 325-60
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 162 Ct. Cl. 855 (Hurtz v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hurtz v. United States, 162 Ct. Cl. 855, 12 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5151, 1963 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 9, 1963 WL 8552 (cc 1963).

Opinion

Per Curiam :

These cases were referred pursuant to Rule 45 to Marion T. Bennett, a trial commissioner of this court, with directions to make findings of fact and recommendation for conclusions of law. The commissioner has done so in a report filed April 9, 1963. On May 15,1963, plaintiffs filed a motion pursuant to Rule 46 that the court adopt the commissioner’s report as the basis for its judgment in the cases. On June 10,1963, defendant filed a reply to plaintiffs’ motion stating that it has no objection thereto. Since the court is in agreement with the findings and recommendation of the trial commissioner, as hereinafter set forth, it hereby adopts the same as the basis for its judgment in these cases and plaintiffs’ motion is allowed. Therefore, plaintiffs are entitled to recover taxes and interest paid for the year 1954, and judgment is entered to that effect. The amount of the judgment will be determined pursuant to Rule 38(c).

OPINION OE THE COMMISSIONER

These cases which involve similar issues and an identity of the parties were consolidated for trial and will be treated together here. This is an income tax refund problem. In 1954 plaintiffs Hurtz and Birchenough each received the sum of $13,850 from the Home Owners Building Supply Company as salary but did not report it as income on the theory it was constructively received in the years 1950,1951 and 1952. [857]*857The issue is whether this income is properly includible in the gross income of plaintiffs for 1954 since deficiencies therefor have been assessed and paid.

The stock of Home Owners Building Supply Company (hereinafter referred to as the corporation) was wholly owned by plaintiffs during the years 1949 through 1954. By resolution of December 7, 1949, it authorized salaries of $10,000 per annum to John J. Hurtz and Herbert Birche-nough and salaries of $250 to each of their wives. By resolution of December 6, 1950, the corporation increased the salaries of each of the wives to $500 per annum.

In the years 1950, 1951 and 1952 the amounts of $5,325, $5,450 and $5,200 were paid to John J. Hurtz and the amounts of $5,100, $5,450 and $5,200 to Herbert Birchenough. In the same years the amounts of $4,000, $4,800 and $4,800 were entered on the books of the corporation as accrued salaries of John J. Hurtz and Herbert Birchenough, respectively, and the amounts of $250 each were accrued on the corporation’s books for 1952 as accrued salaries of their wives. These amounts which accrued on the books of the corporation in 1950, 1951 and 1952 were paid to plaintiffs in 1954.

Plaintiffs report their personal income on a cash basis. They contend, however, that the $13,850 in salaries received in 1954 are not includible in their gross income for 1954 because those salaries were constructively received in 1950, 1951 and 1952. Although plaintiffs did not include these amounts in their gross income for 1950,1951 and 1952, nevertheless they are not includible in gross income for 1954 if the amounts were in fact constructively received in the former years. Ross v. Commissioner, 169 F. 2d 483.

Section 39.42-2 of Treasury Regulation 118 provides:

Income which is credited to the account of or set apart for a taxpayer and which may be drawn upon by him at any time is subject to tax for the year during which so credited or set apart, although not then actually reduced to possession. To constitute receipt in such a case the income must be credited or set apart to the taxpayer without any substantial limitation or restriction as to the time or manner of payment or condition upon which payment is to be made, and must be made available to him so that it may be drawn at any time and its [858]*858receipt brought within his own control and disposition. A book entry, if made, should indicate an absolute transfer from one account to another. If a corporation contingently credits its employees with bonus stock, but the stock is not available to such employees until some future date, the mere crediting on the books of the corporation does not constitute receipt.

The provisions of section 29.42-2 of Treasury Regulation 111, applicable to years prior to 1952, contain a similar provision. Plaintiffs contend that the salaries which accrued to them in the years 1950, 1951 and 1952 were constructively received within the meaning of the above regulations.

Defendant contends, however, that no income was “credited to the account of or set apart for” the plaintiffs within the meaning of Treasury Regulation 118, supra. In support of this contention, defendant cites the fact that the accrued salaries were carried in one general ledger account, and reflected as one total liability on the corporation’s balance sheet. In each of the cases cited by plaintiffs in rebuttal to this proposition the accrued salary was credited to a “personal” account of the taxpayer.1

In the instant cases all the accrued salaries were credited to an account entitled Accruals under the explanation Accrued Salary — J. J. Hurtz, etc., for each of the years involved. Nothing, however, in the regulations nor any case cited by defendant appears to warrant the conclusion that the instant cases should be distinguished because the corporation’s bookkeeper entered the accrued salaries in a single general ledger account entitled Accruals, followed by an explanation of the items in issue, rather than setting up four separate accounts entitled Accrued Salary — John J. Hurtz, etc.

Treasury Regulation 118, section 39.42-2, further provides, “A book entry, if made, should indicate an absolute transfer from one account to another.” Such an entry was made on the books of the corporation. A liability account, Accruals, was credited with the amount of the accrued salaries and a salary expense account was charged. Cf. James J. Cooney v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 883. The corporation reported the [859]*859accrued salaries for 1952 as an expense item in its Federal income tax return for that year.2

Defendant further contends the accrued salaries were not “available to plaintiffs” because the corporation did not have sufficient cash on hand to pay them on demand. Cash position alone, however, is not controlling on the question of the corporation’s ability to pay. Baker v. United States, 84 Ct. Cl. 428; Jacobus v. United States, 80 Ct. Cl. 357. The fact of dominant significance in determining the corporation’s ability to pay the accrued salaries is its over-all financial condition. W. W. Slaughter v. Commissioner, supra.

Home Owners Building Supply Company had over $70,-000 in working capital in each of the years 1950, 1951 and 1952. Its ratio of current assets to current liabilities was better than 2 to 1 in each of those years. A large portion of the accounts receivable in 1950 was due from related companies which in turn had sufficient cash balances to pay their obligations to Home Owners Building Supply Company. The corporation always discounted trade bills. A cash balance could have been built by taking the normal terms on such bills. The plaintiffs entirely controlled the corporation and the salaries in question could have been paid had the plaintiffs chosen to require it. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the entries on the corporation’s books concerning plaintiffs were limited or restricted as to manner, time or condition of payment. Cf. Baker v. United States, supra, and W. W.

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Related

Rosenberg v. United States
295 F. Supp. 820 (E.D. Missouri, 1969)
Hughes v. Commissioner
42 T.C. 1005 (U.S. Tax Court, 1964)
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42 T.C. 358 (U.S. Tax Court, 1964)

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162 Ct. Cl. 855, 12 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5151, 1963 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 9, 1963 WL 8552, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hurtz-v-united-states-cc-1963.