Hurst v. Standard Oil Co.

215 S.W.2d 962, 308 Ky. 779, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 1049
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976)
DecidedDecember 14, 1948
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 215 S.W.2d 962 (Hurst v. Standard Oil Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976) primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hurst v. Standard Oil Co., 215 S.W.2d 962, 308 Ky. 779, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 1049 (Ky. 1948).

Opinion

Opinion of the Court by

Judge Cammack

-Affirming.

This action was instituted originally by the appellants, W. D. Hurst and his brother, John Colson Hurst, as one in ejectment, but was later transferred by agreement of parties to equity. They set up claim to a tract of land in Bell County under the will of their grandfather, John C. Colson, Sr., through their mother, Udoxie Colson Hurst. The appellee, Standard Oil Company of Kentucky, answered and asserted ownership of a part of the land. The appeal is from a judgment denying the claim of the appellants against the Standard Oil Company.

A brief summary of the facts and circumstances pertaining to the case will enable us to understand better the contentions of the parties. John C. Colson, Sr., died testate in Bell County in 1882. He left surviving him his widow, Mrs. Catherine Colson, and several children. Mr. Colson was the owner of a number of pieces of real estate. He made specific devises to one of his children and to a daughter-in-law, and in the fourth clause of his will he directed that the residue of his real estate be divided among certain named children other than those to whom specific bequests were made.

A construction of the second clause of Mr. Colson’s will is required. This clause follows:

“Second: I give and devise to my daughter, Udoxie Olivia Colson, all that piece and parcel of land, known as the land deeded to me by Clark Hunter and wife the deed of which land from them to me-is of record in Knox County, Ky., said land is described as follows, viz: the deed aforesaid is hereby adopted as the boundary and description.
“TO HAYE AND TO HOLD the said premises aforementioned and described during her natural life then to her lawful heirs and assigns forever.”

Udoxie Colson was 12 years of age when her father *781 died. In 1891, Udoxie married W. D. Hurst, the father of the appellants.

In 1886, two of the children of John C. Colson, Sr., who were acting as executors of his will and one of whom drafted it, executed a deed in which they made a partition of certain of their father’s. lands. The tract conveyed to Udoxie under that deed and that to her sister, Laura Bingham, were both included in the description given in the deed referred to in the second paragraph of Mr. Colson’s will. The land now in controversy is a part of the land conveyed to Laura Bingham under that deed. In 1893, Mrs. Colson and her children, including Udoxie Hurst and her husband, joined in a deed to Laura. Bingham confirming the transfer made to her in the deed executed by the executors in 1886. In October, 1893, a suit was filed by Laura Bingham and others to whom she had transferred parts of the land in dispute as plaintiffs against Udoxie Hurst and her husband and others, including the executors of Mr. Colson’s will,'wherein it was claimed that the second clause of the will was ambiguous. It was asserted that by the will’s express language it could not be ascertained which land the testator had intended to devise to Udoxie Hurst, but that in fact he had intended to devise the tract conveyed to her by the executors in their deed of 1886. An answer and counterclaim were filed in that action, but were withdrawn before the case was submitted. Considerable proof was taken in support of the claim of the plaintiffs in that action. In the final judgment, from which no appeal was ever prosecuted, it was held that the second clause-of the will of John C. Colson, Sr., was ambiguous; that the meaning and intent of Mr. Colson was to devise to Udoxie Hurst the land which had been conveyed to her by the executors in 1886; and, further, that this was all of the land he intended to devise to her under the words, ‘ ‘ all that piece and parcel of land deeded to me by Clark Hunter and wife.” ‘ It recited also that the executors were authorized under the will to convey to Laura Bingham the land which they conveyed to her in the deed of 1886.

Mrs. Udoxie Hurst died in 1943. Shortly thereafter her surviving sons and only heirs instituted this action wherein they claimed title to a part of the land conveyed to Laura Bingham by the executors in their deed of 1886. *782 It was held that there was a latent ambiguity in the-second paragraph in the will of John C. Colson, Sr.;, that the land referred to therein was in two tracts, one known as the Hunter tract, which was conveyed toUdoxie Hurst by the executors in 1886, and the other, the Pemberton tract, which was conveyed to Laura Bingham by the executors in 1886. The judgment set forth, further that the ruling was based on the evidence and-not the decision of the court in the suit filed in 1893, and that the judgment in that action was not binding on the appellants in this case. The entire record in the 1893-suit was incorporated in the record now before us. This-was the only evidence considered by the court, aside from one deposition which had no bearing upon the construction of Mr. Colson’s will.

Counsel for the appellants have ably briefed several', questions of law which they urge in support of their claim. On the other hand, counsel for the appellee set forth with' equal vigor their contentions. As we view the case, the principal questions involved are (1) was-there latent ambiguity in the second clause of Mr. Col-son’s will; and (2) if there was, does the evidence support the finding of the chancellor? If both questions-should be answered in the affirmative, as we think they should, then a discussion of other legal questions raised', by the appellants becomes unnecessary.

Some question is raised as to whether Udoxie Hurst took a life estate under the second clause of her father’s-will, or whether she took a fee simple title. While we-think it is clear that she took only a-life estate and this-' Court so held in the case of Hurst v. Russell, 257 Ky. 78, 77 S. W. 2d 355, we deem it unnecessary to discuss-this question because our concern relates primarily to the specific property in which Mrs. Hurst was given an interest, rather than the character of interest given-her.

It is at once apparent from even a casual reading of the second clause of Mr. Colson’s will that an examination of a deed on record in Knox County is required wherein Clark Hunter and his wife were grantors and" Mr. Colson was a grantee. That deed was executed in 1860. Clark Hunter and his wife were parties of the-first part. J. R. Campbell, attorney in fact for Eliza *783 heth Pemberton and her husband, was the party of the second part, and J. C. Colson was the party of the third part. The first two parties were grantors and the third the grantee. The consideration paid to the Hunters was $2550 and that to Campbell was $900. Obviously, both of these parties conveyed some interest in the land which was described as a single boundary. It is at once apparent, therefore, when the clear and unequivocal wording of the will is considered in the light of existing facts, an uncertainty arises as to what land was “known as the land deeded” by Clark Hunter and his wife to Mr. Colson. Such an uncertainty is termed a latent ambiguity as distinguished from a patent ambiguity, which is one apparent on the face of an instrument. Extrinsic evidence is admissible to explain the uncertainty in the case of a latent ambiguity. Williams v. Williams, 182 Ky. 738, 207 S. W. 468; and Jennings v.

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Bluebook (online)
215 S.W.2d 962, 308 Ky. 779, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 1049, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hurst-v-standard-oil-co-kyctapphigh-1948.