Hunt v. Callaghan

257 P. 648, 32 Ariz. 235, 1927 Ariz. LEXIS 168
CourtArizona Supreme Court
DecidedJune 22, 1927
DocketCivil No. 2653.
StatusPublished
Cited by41 cases

This text of 257 P. 648 (Hunt v. Callaghan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Arizona Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hunt v. Callaghan, 257 P. 648, 32 Ariz. 235, 1927 Ariz. LEXIS 168 (Ark. 1927).

Opinions

This is an original proceeding in this court against J.C. Callaghan as treasurer of the state of Arizona, hereinafter called defendant, by George W.P. Hunt, J.C. Callaghan, and C.M. Zander, as the board of directors of state institutions of the state of Arizona, and W.C. LeFebvre, state engineer, hereinafter called plaintiffs, to compel defendant to credit to what are known as the "25 per cent apportionment account" and the "75 per cent apportionment account" within the general fund of the state of Arizona certain moneys realized from the gasoline tax imposed by chapter 76, Session Laws of 1923.

Technically speaking, we might limit our decision to the formal question raised by the pleadings, which is as to the crediting of certain moneys paid the treasurer. The matter, however, was treated both by plaintiffs and defendant on the oral argument as an attempt to determine, not merely the crediting of the money, but the status of the taxes imposed by chapter 76, supra, which raised such funds, and it was agreed that the ultimate determination of the matter would require our decision on two questions: First, are the various taxes imposed by chapter 76,supra, still in force, or have they ceased by operation of law; and, second, if they are still in force, are they now available in any part for the use of the state highway department without further legislation? In view of the vital importance to the state of a prompt settlement of the whole matter, while it may be we could dispose of the case on technical *Page 238 grounds, we have determined to consider it rather on the merits of the two questions last stated.

In order to arrive at a correct understanding of the situation, it is necessary that we discuss the history of highway legislation in Arizona since statehood, so far as funds raised by state, as distinct from county, taxation are concerned. We will consider first the property tax. It appears that, when the first state legislature met, there was a sharp difference of opinion as to the fundamental principle which should apply to the construction of roads and highways in the new state. One part of the legislature believed that the entire control of funds raised by state-wide taxation for road purposes should be placed in the hands of the state authorities, to be expended by them in such manner as they should think proper. The other portion claimed this would mean the counties which paid the bulk of the taxes and maintained their roads to a great extent out of county funds would be compelled to build highways for the benefit of the less wealthy counties, and insisted the money should be spent where it was raised. After considerable argument, a compromise was reached, which appeared in our statutes originally as chapter 66, Session Laws of 1912, and which was carried into the 1913 Code almost verbatim. The part of this chapter necessary for us to consider is paragraph 5123, Revised Statutes of Arizona of 1913, Civil Code, which reads, so far as material, as follows:

"5123. There shall be annually levied and collected in the manner in which other state taxes are levied and collected, by a levy by the officials provided by law, a sufficient tax to raise the sum of two hundred and fifty thousand dollars annually, said levy to be made upon the taxable property within the state, for the purpose of raising a fund to be known as the state road tax fund, to be expended for the construction, reconstruction, repairing, improving *Page 239 and maintaining public highways, roads and bridges as follows:

"Twenty-five per cent. of the `state road tax fund,' herein provided for, shall be subject to be paid out upon the authority and under the direction of the state board of control and state engineer, who are hereby charged with such responsibility. . . .

"Seventy-five per cent. of such state road tax fund herein provided for, shall be apportioned to the several counties in the amount to each county of seventy-five per cent. of the taxes collected under this act, by said county, and such amount shall be subject to be paid out for the construction, reconstruction, repair, improvement and maintenance of public highways, roads, and bridges in the manner as in this act provided, for the work in this act provided for within such county, upon the authority and under the direction of the county board of supervisors of such county and the state engineer, who are hereby charged with such responsibility. . . ."

It will be seen upon examination of this section that it contains three things: A tax levied; an apportionment of the proceeds thereof; and an appropriation. It may be well to define these three terms, for a confusion in regard to their meaning is apparently the cause of many of the errors into which those concerned with the question have fallen. A tax is "the enforced . . . contribution of persons and property, levied by authority of the state for the support of the government and for all public needs." Vol. 8, Words and Phrases, p. 6868. An apportionment is "the act of dividing and assigning in just proportion." Webster's New International Dictionary (1925 ed.). While an appropriation is "the setting aside from the public revenue of a certain sum of money for a specified object, in such manner that the executive officers of the government are authorized to use that money, and no more, for that object, and no other." State v. Moore,50 Neb. 88, *Page 240 61 Am. St. Rep. 538, 69 N.W. 373; Clayton v. Berry,27 Ark. 129; Stratton v. Green, 45 Cal. 149.

It will therefore be seen that the difference between an "apportionment" and an "appropriation" is that, to make the "appropriation," there must be added to the dividing and assigning of funds which constitutes the "apportionment" the specific authority to spend. This difference is of vital importance in the consideration of this case.

The state road tax, then, was at first a continuing one, and was divided into two portions, twenty-five per cent being subject to the sole control of the state authorities and seventy-five per cent to be expended in accordance with the amount paid by each particular county, within its own boundaries, under the joint control of the supervisors and the state engineer.

In 1917 (Laws 1917, chap. 69), paragraph 5123, supra, was amended by fixing the tax at ten cents on the hundred dollars valuation of property, and by striking out certain portions of the original paragraph, the purposes of which were merely temporary. In 1921 it was repealed in toto, but chapter 157, Session Laws of that year, in section 2 contained provisions almost identical in their nature with the repealed paragraph, except that the tax rate was made five cents instead of ten. Each legislature to 1922, then, which dealt with the subject, made a specific and continuing tax, apportionment and appropriation of a definite amount, which continued in force without further legislation until it was repealed by the act of a subsequent legislature, and the tax, the apportionment and the appropriation were all contained in the same act.

It will also be seen that for ten years the legislature had provided for a division of highway funds of various kinds on the basis of twenty-five per cent to be expended under the authority of the state alone *Page 241 and seventy-five per cent requiring the joint action of the counties and the state authorities. So firmly had this custom become imbedded in our statutes that it was considered sufficient in other legislation aside from paragraph 5123, supra

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Bluebook (online)
257 P. 648, 32 Ariz. 235, 1927 Ariz. LEXIS 168, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hunt-v-callaghan-ariz-1927.