Kotterman v. Killian

972 P.2d 606, 193 Ariz. 273, 288 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 5, 1999 Ariz. LEXIS 8

• Court: Arizona Supreme Court
• Decided: January 26, 1999
• Docket: CV-97-0412-SA
• Status: Published

Opinions

OPINION

ZLAKET, C.J.

¶ 1 Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of A.R.S. § 43-1089 (1997), which allows a state tax credit of up to $500 for those who donate to school tuition organizations (STOs). The statute reads as follows:

A. For taxable years beginning from and after December 31, 1997, a credit is allowed against the taxes imposed by this title for the amount of voluntary cash contributions made by the taxpayer during the taxable year to a school tuition organization, but not exceeding five hundred dollars in any taxable year. The five hundred dollar limitation also applies to taxpayers who elect to file a joint return for the taxable year. A husband and wife who file separate returns for a taxable year in which they could have filed a joint return may each claim only one-half of the tax credit that would have been allowed for a joint return.

B. If the allowable tax credit exceeds the taxes otherwise due under this title on the claimant’s income, or if there are no taxes due under this title, the taxpayer may carry the amount of the claim not used to offset the taxes under this title forward for not more than five consecutive taxable years’ income tax liability.

C. The credit allowed by this section is in lieu of any deduction pursuant to § 170 of the internal revenue code and taken for state tax purposes.

D. The tax credit is not allowed if the taxpayer designates the taxpayer’s donation to the school tuition organization for the direct benefit of any dependent of the taxpayer.

E. For purposes of this section:

1. “Qualified school” means a nongovernmental primary or secondary school in this state that does not discriminate on the basis of race, color, sex, handicap, familial status or national origin and. that satisfies the requirements prescribed by law for private schools in this state on January 1, 1997.

2. “School tuition organization” means a charitable organization in this state that is exempt from federal taxation under § 501(c)(3) of the internal revenue code and that allocates at least ninety percent of its ainnual revenue for educational scholarships or tuition grants to children to allow them to attend any qualified school of their parents’ choice. In addition, to qualify as a school tuition organization the charitable organization shall provide educational scholarships or tuition grants to students without limiting availability to only students of one school.

A.R.S. § 43-1089 (footnotes omitted). Petitioners claim that this law violates the Federal Establishment Clause and three provisions of the Arizona Constitution. We have original jurisdiction pursuant to Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 5(1) and Ariz. R. Spec. Act. 1(a) and 3(b).

FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

¶2 The Establishment Clause, applicable to the states by authority of the Fourteenth Amendment, proclaims that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.” U.S. Const. amend. I; see also Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15, 67 S.Ct. 504, 511, 91 L.Ed. 711 (1947). The simplicity of this language belies its complex and continually evolving interpretation by the United States Supreme Court. See generally Kristin M. Engstrom, Comment, Establishment Clause Jurisprudence: The Souring of Lemon and the Search for a New Test, 27 Pac. L.J. 121 (1995); see also Andrew A. Adams, Note, Cleveland, School Choice, and “Laws Respecting an Establishment of Religion,” 2 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 165, 171-75 (1997). That Court’s decisions reflect an effort to steer a course of “constitutional neutrality,” Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 669, 90 S.Ct. 1409, 1411, 25 L.Ed.2d 697 (1970), aimed “between avoidance of religious establishment on the one hand, and noninterference with religious exercise on the other.” Leonard J. Henzke, Jr., The Constitutionality of Federal Tuition Tax Credits, 56 Temp. L.Q. 911, 924 (1983). “The clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.” Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244, 102 S.Ct. 1673, 1683, 72 L.Ed.2d 33 (1982). Similarly, religion may not be preferred over nonreligion. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 18, 67 S.Ct. at 513.

¶ 3 This emphasis on neutrality is apparent in a recent line of Supreme Court cases upholding a variety of educational assistance programs. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203,-, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 2016, 138 L.Ed.2d 391 (1997), overruling Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 105 S.Ct. 3232, 87 L.Ed.2d 290 (1985) (public school teachers providing remedial education to disadvantaged children in parochial schools); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 845 — 46, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 2524-25, 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995) (state university funds used to pay printing costs of student newspaper espousing religious viewpoint); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 3, 113 S.Ct. 2462, 2464, 125 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993) (sign-language interpreter provided for deaf student in sectarian high school); Witters v. Washington Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. , 106 S.Ct. 748, 749, 88 L.Ed.2d 846 (1986) (state financial assistance to blind student attending private Christian college); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 390-91, 103 S.Ct. 3062, 3064-65, 77 L.Ed.2d 721 (1983) (state income tax deduction for educational expenses, including those incurred at sectarian schools).

¶ 4 Other courts in recent years have also found state educational aid programs to be in compliance with the First Amendment. See Jackson v. Benson, 218 Wis.2d 835, 578 N.W.2d 602, 619 (1998), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 119 S.Ct. 466, 142 L.Ed.2d 419 (1998) (distribution of tuition vouchers for use in private, including sectarian, schools); Matthew J. v. Massachusetts Dep’t of Educ., 989 F.Supp. 380, 391-92 (D.Mass.1998) (reimbursement of special education tuition costs at private sectarian school).

¶ 5 In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 2111, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971), the Supreme Court adopted a three-pronged test for evaluating compliance with the Establishment Clause. Simply stated, a statute does not violate the First Amendment if (1) it serves a secular purpose; (2) its principal or primary effect neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) it does not “foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.” Id. (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 674, 90 S.Ct. at 1414). While other approaches have been considered by the Court,¹ we believe that the “well settled” Lemon standard provides an appropriate framework for our review. See Mueller, 463 U.S. at 394, 103 S.Ct. at 3066.

Secular Purpose

¶ 6 The Supreme Court rarely attributes an unconstitutional motive to a legislative act such as this, “particularly when a plausible secular purpose for the state’s program may be discerned from the face of the statute.” Mueller, 463 U.S. at 394-95, 103 S.Ct. at 3067. The Minnesota law at issue in Mueller permitted a tax deduction for tuition, textbook, and transportation expenses of children attending elementary or secondary schools. Id. at 391, 103 S.Ct. at 3065. In upholding it, the Court said:

A state’s decision to defray the cost of educational expenses incurred by parents — regardless of the type of schools their children, attend — evidences a purpose that is both secular and understandable. An educated populace is essential to the political and economic health of any community, and a state’s efforts to assist parents in meeting the rising cost of educational expenses plainly serves this’secular purpose of ensuring that the state’s citizenry is well-educated.

Id. at 395,103 S.Ct. at 3067.

¶ 7 The Arizona Legislature has, in recent years, expanded the options available in public education. See, e.g., A.R.S. § 15-181 (1994) (establishing charter schools in order to “provide additional academic choices for parents and pupils”); A.R.S. § 15-816.01(A) (1995) (requiring all public school districts to “implement an open enrollment program without charging tuition”). It now seeks to bring private institutions into the mix of educational alternatives open to the people of this state.

¶ 8 The encouragement of private schools, in itself, is not unconstitutional. Such a policy can properly be used to facilitate a state’s overall educational goals. As the Mueller majority noted, private schools frequently serve to stimulate public schools by relieving tax burdens and producing healthy competition. 463 U.S. at 395, 103 S.Ct. at 3067 (quoting Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 262, 97 S.Ct. 2593, 2613, 53 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). They also farther the objective of making quality education available to all children within a state. Thus, the legislature may “conclude that there is a strong public interest in assuring the continued financial health of private schools, both sectarian and non-sectarian.” Id. at 395, 103 S.Ct. at 3067. In our view, the secular purpose prong of Lemon is satisfied here.

Primary Effect

¶ 9 We next examine whether the principal effect of the law is to further “sectarian aims of the nonpublic schools.” Id. at 396, 103 S.Ct. at 3067 (quoting Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662, 100 S.Ct. 840, 851, 63 L.Ed.2d 94 (1980)). We begin by noting that the legislature’s taxing authority is very broad. See Kelly v. Allen, 49 F.2d 876, 877 (9th Cir.1931) (“The power of the state to tax is unlimited.”); Tanque Verde Enters. v. City of Tucson, 142 Ariz. 536, 542, 691 P.2d 302, 308 (1984) (“[SJetting tax rates is a legislative function.”). Therefore, courts extend considerable deference and great latitude to the legislative creation of “classifications and distinctions in tax statutes.” Mueller, 463 U.S. at 396, 103 S.Ct. at 3067 (quoting Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 547, 103 S.Ct. 1997, 2002, 76 L.Ed.2d 129 (1983)).

¶ 10 The Mueller Court identified certain significant features of the Minnesota statute in upholding its constitutionality, namely: (1) the deduction in question was one of many allowed by the state; (2) it was open to all parents incurring educational expenses; and (3) funds were available “only as a result of numerous, private choices of individual parents.” 463 U.S. at 396-400, 103 S.Ct. at 3067-70. In other words, aid was provided on a neutral basis with any financial benefit to private schools sufficiently attenuated.

One of Many

¶ 11 Petitioners contend that credits are constitutionally different from deductions, which they concede to be perfectly proper. At oral argument they asserted that a tax credit is the “functional equivalent of depleting the state treasury by a direct grant,” while a tax deduction merely serves as “seed money” to encourage philanthropy. We disagree.

¶ 12 It is true, of course, that there are mechanical differences between deductions and credits. The former are subtracted from gross income, reducing the net amount on which a tax is assessed according to the taxpayer’s marginal rate, while the latter are taken directly from the tax as tentatively calculated. Elizabeth A. Baergen, Note, Tuition Tax Deductions and Credits in Light of Mueller v. Allen, 31 Wayne L.Rev. 157, 172-73 (1984); see James J. Freeland et al., Fundamentals of Federal Income Taxation 969 (7th ed.1991). Moreover, limits placed on these benefits may be sharply divergent. We do not believe, however, that such distinctions are constitutionally significant. Though amounts may vary, both credits and deductions ultimately reduce state revenues, are intended to serve policy goals, and clearly act to induce “socially beneficial behavior” by taxpayers. Baergen, supra, at 173.

¶ 13 In Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, a case heavily relied upon by the petitioners, the Supreme Court said that the constitutionality of a tax benefit “does not turn in any event on the label we accord it.” 413 U.S. 756, 789, 93 S.Ct. 2955, 2974, 37 L.Ed.2d 948 (1973). This statement is consistent with the Court’s earlier observation in Lemon that the form of any tax measure must be examined “for the light that it casts on the substance.” 403 U.S. at 614, 91 S.Ct. at 2112. In Nyquist, a New York statute provided state funds for the maintenance and repair of private schools. It also contained a tax deduction for parents of children attending such schools. 413 U.S. at 762-64, 93 S.Ct. at 2960-61. The Supreme Court struck down these provisions, holding that they amounted to direct stipends having the primary effect of impermissibly advancing religion. Id. at 779-80, 791, 93 S.Ct. at 2969, 2975. It is important to note, however, that the New York “deduction,” based on a statutory formula, was plainly designed to achieve a net per-family gain. Id. at 790, 93 S.Ct. at 2974. This preset benefit was offered to parents without regard for the amount of expense they actually incurred. Id.

¶ 14 As the Mueller Court described a decade later, Nyquist involved “thinly disguised ‘tax benefits,’ actually amounting to tuition grants, to the parents of children attending private schools.” 463 U.S. at 394, 103 S.Ct. at 3066. The Court also observed that the New York deduction had been totally inconsistent with others allowed under the laws of that state. Id. at 396 n. 6, 103 S.Ct. at 3068 n. 6. In contrast, the Minnesota deduction for actual school expenses was “only one among many” available under the state’s tax code, including those for medical expenses and charitable contributions. Id. at 396, 103 S.Ct. at 3067. Unlike the measure in Nyquist, which was likened to an outright grant, the Minnesota statute embodied a “genuine tax deduction.” Id. at 396 n. 6, 103 S.Ct. at 3068 n. 6.

¶ 15 Deductions and credits are legitimate tools by which government can ameliorate the tax burden while implementing social and economic goals. See Baergen, supra, at 172-76. We conclude that the Arizona school tuition tax credit is one of an extensive assortment of tax-saving mechanisms available as part of a “genuine system of tax laws.” Mueller at 396 n. 6, 103 S.Ct. at 3068 n. 6. For instance, the state permits its taxpayers to take the full “amount of itemized deductions allowable” under the Internal Revenue Code. A.R.S. § 43-1042(A). This, of course, includes charitable contributions made directly to churches, religious schools, and other § 501(c)(3) organizations.² See 26 U.S.C. § 170(c)(2)(D). Arizona’s tax code also provides for numerous credits beyond those permitted at the federal level, each operating in the same general way. See A.R.S. §§ 43-1071 through 43-1090.01. Among them is a credit for voluntary cash contributions made to qualifying organizations that provide assistance to the working poor. See A.R.S. § 43-1088. Such organizations clearly count among their number churches, synagogues, missions, and other sectarian institutions. Also noteworthy in the context of the present discussion is a $200 tax credit for public school extracurricular activity fees, covering items such as band uniforms, athletic gear, and scientific laboratory equipment. A.R.S. § 43-1089.01. Thus, as in Minnesota, the Arizona tax benefit now under consideration is “only one among many.” Mueller, 463 U.S. at 396, 103 S.Ct. at 3067.

Availability

¶ 16 The Mueller Court placed particular emphasis on the fact that the benefits of Minnesota’s tax deduction extended to a broad class of recipients, not just to the parents of private school children as in Nyquist. 463 U.S. at 397-98, 103 S.Ct. at 3068. By way of comparison, the Arizona tuition credit is available to all taxpayers who are willing to contribute to an STO. Any individual, not just a parent, may donate to the scholarship program. Thus, Arizona’s class of beneficiaries is even broader than that found acceptable in Mueller, and clearly achieves a greater level of neutrality.

Private Choices

¶ 17 The Supreme Court also stressed the means by which funds reach sectarian schools and the importance of “numerous, private choices” in contrast to direct state financial aid. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 399, 103 S.Ct. at 3069. Where assistance to religious institutions is indirect and attenuated, i.e., private individuals choose where the funds will go, the Justices have generally been reluctant to find a constitutional impediment. See Witters, 474 U.S. at 488, 106 S.Ct. at 752 (aid flowing to religious institutions does so “only as a result of the genuinely independent and private choices of aid recipients”); Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 10, 113 S.Ct. at 2467 (presence of government-paid interpreter in sectarian school was result of the “private decision of individual parents”).

¶ 18 A recent decision by the Wisconsin Supreme Court upholding the constitutionality of school vouchers provides further support. Jackson v. Benson, 218 Wis.2d 835, 578 N.W.2d 602 (1998), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 119 S.Ct. 466, 142 L.Ed.2d 419 (1998). In 1995, the Wisconsin Legislature amended a statute requiring the state to pay the educational costs of low-income Milwaukee parents who desired to send their children to private schools. Id. at 607-08. Under the amended Milwaukee Parent Choice Program (MPCP), parents were permitted to select a private school, which could be sectarian or secular, and received a payment from the state to cover expenses. Id. at 608-09. The check was sent directly to the school but was made out to the parents, who endorsed it over to the educational institution. Id. at 609. No restrictions were placed on the use to which the school could put the money.³ Id. The Wisconsin court held that the program was permissible under both the federal and state constitutions, id. at 607, stating in part:

In our assessment, the importance of our inquiry here is not to ascertain the path upon which public funds travel under the amended program, but rather to determine who ultimately chooses that path. As with the programs in Mueller and Witters, not one cent flows from the State to a sectarian private school under the amended MPCP except as a result of the necessary and intervening choices of individual parents.

Id. at 618.

¶ 19 Arizona’s statute provides multiple layers of private choice. Important decisions are made by two distinct sets of beneficiaries — taxpayers taking the credit and parents applying for scholarship aid in sending their children to tuition-charging institutions. The donor/taxpayer determines whether to make a contribution, its amount, and .the recipient STO. The taxpayer cannot restrict the gift for the benefit of his or her own child. A.R.S. § 43-1089(D). Parents independently select a school and apply to an STO of their choice for a scholarship. Every STO must allow its scholarship recipients to “attend any qualified school of their parents’ choice,” and may not limit grants to students of only one such institution. A.R.S. § 43-1089(E)(2) (emphasis added). Thus, schools are no more than indirect recipients of taxpayer contributions, with the final destination of these funds being determined by individual parents.

¶ 20 The decision-making process is completely devoid of state intervention or direction and protects against the government “sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement” that so concerned the framers of the Establishment Clause. Walz, 397 U.S. at 668, 90 S.Ct. at 1411. As the Mueller Court noted, “[t]he historic purposes of the clause simply do not encompass the sort of attenuated financial benefit, ultimately controlled by the private choices of individual parents, that eventually flows to parochial schools from the neutrally available tax benefit.” 463 U.S. at 400, 103 S.Ct. at 3070. Under the circumstances, we believe that “[n]o reasonable observer is likely to draw from [these facts] an inference that the State itself is endorsing a religious practice or belief.” Witters, 474 U.S. at 493, 106 S.Ct. at (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 10, 113 S.Ct. at 2467.

¶ 21 The dissent essentially characterizes the option offered to taxpayers as a sham because “there is no real choice — one may contribute up to $500 to support private schools or pay the same amount to the Arizona Department of Revenue.”⁴ Infra at ¶ 90. Such an argument plainly ignores the many other credits and deductions available in Arizona. It also assumes that maximum tax avoidance is the inescapable motive of taxpayers in every decision they make. We know, however, that people frequently donate to causes or organizations offering limited or no tax benefits. Moreover, while it seems a part of human nature to bemoan taxes, their importance to society is generally recognized. This tax credit may provide incentive to donate, but there is no arm twisting here. Those who do not wish to support the school tuition program are not obligated to do so. They are free to take advantage of a variety of other tax benefits, or none at all.

¶ 22 We see little difference in the levels of choice available to parents under the Minnesota and Arizona plans. In both, parents are free to participate or not, to choose the schools their children will attend, and to take advantage of all other available benefits under the state tax scheme. Moreover, these programs will undoubtedly bring new options to many parents. Basic education is compulsory for children in Arizona, A.R.S. § 15-802(A), but until now low-income parents may have been coerced into accepting public education. These citizens have had few choices and little control over the nature and quality of their children’s schooling because they have been unable to afford a private education that may be more compatible with their own values and beliefs. Arizona’s tax credit achieves a higher degree of parity by making private schools more accessible and providing alternatives to public education. See Mueller, 463 U.S. at 402, 103 S.Ct. at 3070-71 (educational expense deduction worked as set-off against added financial burden faced by parents of private school students); Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 619 (school voucher program “place[d] on equal footing options of public and private school choice, and vest[ed] power in the hands of parents to choose where to direct the funds allocated for their children’s benefit”).

¶ 23 Petitioners argue that this law is fatally deficient because religious schools are the practical beneficiaries of the tax credit. They contend that the “pervasively sectarian” composition of private schools in this state presumes an inevitable constitutional breach. Like the appellants in Mueller, petitioners purport to rely on a statistical analysis of private school populations. See 463 U.S. at 400-01, 103 S.Ct. at 3070. The Supreme Court dismissed this approach as follows:

We would be loath to adopt a rule grounding the constitutionality of a facially neutral law on annual reports reciting the extent to which various classes of private citizens claimed benefits under the law. Such an approach would scarcely provide the certainty that this field stands in need of, nor can we perceive principled standards by which such statistical evidence might be evaluated. Moreover, the fact that private persons fail in a particular year to claim the tax relief to which they are entitled — under a facially neutral statute — should be of little importance in determining the constitutionality of the statute permitting such relief.

Id. at 401, 103 S.Ct. at 3070. According to the statistics offered in Mueller, ninety-five percent of Minnesota’s private school students attended sectarian schools. Id. at 391, 103 S.Ct. at 3065. Petitioners’ numbers reflect a lower rate of religious school attendance in Arizona. Like the Mueller Court, however, we refuse to hinge constitutional scrutiny on such ephemeral numbers. School populations change, as does the quality of education. No one yet knows how many taxpayers will take the credit, what dollar amounts will be generated, or how many students will receive tuition scholarships, let alone their statistical distribution among schools. We also cannot predict how this tax credit may affect the ratio of secular to sectarian private institutions in the state.

¶ 24 Both Minnesota and Arizona provide by statute for free public education. See Minn.Stat. § 120.06 (1959); A.R.S. § 15-816.01 (1995). Consequently, parents of children seeking to attend tuition-charging schools are those most in need of financial assistance. This does not mean, however, that the statute unconstitutionally benefits a narrow segment of the population. As we have seen, the Arizona tax credit allows all taxpayers to give their funds voluntarily in support of a multi-dimensional educational system for the state, and its benefits flow in virtually every direction.

¶ 25 It is argued that A.R.S. § 43-1089 is unconstitutional because it does not provide a credit for those who wish to support public education. We disagree. A contemporaneous and related statute, A.R.S. § 43-1089.01, allows a tax credit of up to $200 for fees paid by taxpayers in support of public school extracurricular activities. The fact that this benefit is capped at $200 does not render the $500 credit for STO donations unconstitutional. The tuition expense of a private education is usually greater than the fees associated with extracurricular activities in a public school. The legislature’s decision to set a lower amount for the latter is likely an acknowledgment of that disparity. Moreover, it strikes us as meaningless to offer a tax credit for tuition scholarships to schools that charge no tuition. The taxpayers in this state already pay for the establishment and operation of a public school system. Even parents who send their children to private schools must pay taxes in support of public education. Finally, because the ultimate goal of educational assistance programs is to reimburse parents for expenses incurred in schooling their children, a credit for contributions to the “educational mission of the public school system,” infra at ¶ 76, is both distinguishable and unnecessary for purposes of our constitutional analysis.

¶ 26 The primary beneficiaries of this credit are taxpayers who contribute to the STOs, parents who might otherwise be deprived of an opportunity to make meaningful decisions about their children’s educations, and the students themselves. We realize, of course, that the benefits do not end there. The ripple effects can, when viewed through a wide-angle lens, radiate to infinity. But while direct subsidies to sectarian schools may affront the Constitution, “the Establishment Clause is not violated every time money previously in the possession of a State is conveyed to a religious institution.” Witters, 474 U.S. at 486, 106 S.Ct. at 751. Private and sectarian schools are at best only incidental beneficiaries of this tax credit, a neutral result that we believe is attenuated enough to satisfy Mueller and the most recent Establishment Clause decisions. See 463 U.S. at 399, 103 S.Ct. at 3069; Agostini, 521 U.S. at-, 117 S.Ct. at 2014; Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 8, 113 S.Ct. at 2466; Witters, 474 U.S. at 488-89, 106 S.Ct. at 752; Matthew J., 989 F.Supp. at 392.

¶27 In summary, we conclude that the tuition tax credit does not prefer one religion over another, or religion over nonreligion. It aids a “broad spectrum of citizens,” Mueller, 463 U.S. at 399, 103 S.Ct. at 3069, allows a wide range of private choices, and does not have the primary effect of either advancing or inhibiting religion.

Excessive Entanglement

¶ 28 Finally, we find no “excessive government entanglement with religion.” Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613, 91 S.Ct. 2105 (citation omitted). The state does not involve itself in the distribution of funds or in monitoring their application. Its role is entirely passive. Taxpayers who choose to participate may deduct the amount of an STO contribution on their tax returns. The STO operates free of government interference beyond ensuring that it qualifies for § 501(e)(3) tax exempt status and complies with state requirements. Any perceived state connection to private religious schools is indirect and attenuated.

¶29 We are persuaded that § 43-1089 falls within the parameters of the Establishment Clause.

ARIZONA CONSTITUTION

¶ 30 Petitioners argue that this tax credit channels public money to private and seetarian schools in violation of the state constitution. Specifically, they charge that the law offends article II, § 12 and article IX, § 10 (the “religion clauses”), as well as article IX, § 7 (the “anti-gift clause”).

¶ 31 Legislative enactments are presumptively constitutional. Hall v. A.N.R. Freight Sys., 149 Ariz. 130, 133, 717 P.2d 434, 437 (1986). The party challenging a statute bears the burden of demonstrating its invalidity, State v. Arnett, 119 Ariz. 38, 48, 579 P.2d 542, 552 (1978), and we resolve all uncertainties in favor of constitutionality. Arizona Downs v. Arizona Horsemen’s Found., 130 Ariz. 550, 554, 637 P.2d 1053, 1057 (1981).

Religion Clauses

¶ 32 Article II, § 12 states in part: “No public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise, or instruction, or to the support of any religious establishment.” Article IX, § 10 says, “No tax shall be laid or appropriation of public money made in aid of any church, or private or sectarian school, or any public service corporation.”

“Public Money or Property ”

¶ 33 The parties are in considerable disagreement over the meaning of “public money or property.” No definition of ,these words appears in the Arizona Constitution or in our statutes. We must therefore look to their “natural, obvious and ordinary meaning.” County of Apache v. Southwest Lumber Mills, 92 Ariz. 323, 327, 376 P.2d 854, 856 (1962); see also McElhaney Cattle Co. v. Smith, 132 Ariz. 286, 290, 645 P.2d 801, 805 (1982) (“When the words of a constitutional provision are not defined within it, the meaning to be ascribed to the words is that which is generally understood and used by the people.”); Dunn v. Industrial Comm’n, 177 Ariz. 190, 194, 866 P.2d 858, 862 (1994) (requiring court to give clear and unambiguous statutory language its plain meaning unless doing so would lead to absurd results).

¶ 34 In McClead v. Pima County, our court of appeals observed that “state funds” are those “raised by the operation of some general law and therefore belonging to the state.” 174 Ariz. 348, 356, 849 P.2d 1378, 1386 (App.1992). A decade earlier we identified “state money” as “money in the state treasury credited to a particular fund therein.” Grant v. Board of Regents, 133 Ariz. 527, 529, 652 P.2d 1374, 1376 (1982). State title to funds, however, does not always vest when money enters the state treasury. For example, when the government is a mere custodian or conduit, funds so held do not constitute “state monies.” Navajo Tribe v. Arizona Dep’t of Admin., 111 Ariz. 279, 280-81, 528 P.2d 623, 624-25 (1974).

¶ 35 Other courts have reached similar conclusions. See Philip Morris Inc. v. Glendening, 349 Md. 660, 709 A.2d 1230, 1241 (1998) (“gross recovery from the tobacco litigation is not ‘State’ or ‘public’ money” until deposited into state treasury); State Bd. of Accounts v. Indiana Univ. Found., 647 N.E.2d 342, 348 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (private donations received by corporation for use or benefit of state university were not public funds because they did not come into the possession of, and were not entrusted to, a public officer); Sherard v. State, 244 Neb. 743, 509 N.W.2d 194, 199-200 (1993) (money in workers’ compensation Second Injury Fund is not state property because it is not raised by taxation and is held in trust by custodian, State Treasurer); Parsons v. South Dakota Lottery Comm’n, 504 N.W.2d 593, 596 (S.D.1993) (state lottery prize proceeds not public funds because money does not revert to state’s general fund); McIntosh v. Aubry, 14 Cal.App.4th 1576, 18 Cal. Rptr.2d 680, 688-89 (1993) (rent forbearance and inspection cost waivers are not public funds because they involve no payment of .funds out of county coffers); Wells v. Kentucky Local Correctional Facilities Constr. Auth., 730 S.W.2d 951, 955 (Ky.Ct.App.1987) (construction bond proceeds do not constitute state monies because they are trust funds not in control of any state organization); State ex rel Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 86 N.M. 359, 524 P.2d 975, 986 (1974) (private donations to state university under control of Board of Regents are not subject to appropriation, therefore legislature has no power to limit use or disbursement of these funds).

¶ 36 According to Black’s Law Dictionary, “public money” is “[r]evenue received from federal, state, and local governments from taxes, fees, fines, etc.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1005 (6th ed.1990). As respondents note, however, no money ever enters the state’s control as a result of this tax credit. Nothing is deposited in the state treasury or other accounts under the management or possession of governmental agencies or public officials. Thus, under any common understanding of the words, we are not here dealing with “public money.”

¶ 37 Petitioners suggest, however, that because taxpayer money could enter the treasury if it were not excluded by way of the tax credit, the state effectively controls and exerts quasi-ownership over it. This expansive interpretation is fraught with problems. Indeed, under such reasoning all taxpayer income could be viewed as belonging to the state because it is subject to taxation by the legislature. That body has plenary power to set tax rates, categorize taxable income, and determine the type and amount of adjustments including deductions, exemptions, and credits. See Tanque Verde Enters., 142 Ariz. at 539-40, 691 P.2d at 305-06 (recognizing the virtually unlimited authority of taxing bodies to set rates of taxation).

¶ 38 Equally problematic is the fact that petitioners’ contention directly contradicts the decades-long acceptance of tax deductions for charitable contributions, including donations made directly to churches, religiously-affiliated schools and institutions. If credits constitute public funds, then so must other established tax policy equivalents like deductions and exemptions. Indeed, it seems to us that unless a constitutionally significant difference between credits and deductions can be demonstrated, petitioners’ argument must fail. The dissent, recognizing this dilemma, attempts to construct a distinction based on an alleged disparity in the amount of benefits flowing from credits and deductions. That, however, would appear to be a matter of form rather than substance. In our judgment, neither the dissent nor petitioners have offered a principled way in which to address this contradiction.

¶ 39 The calculation of personal income tax can be broken into several stages. First comes a determination of adjusted gross income, achieved by combining all sources of income and subtracting certain expenditures, such as contributions to individual retirement and medical savings accounts. See I.R.S. Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, Lines 7 through 32 (1997); Arizona Form 140, Resident Personal Income Tax Return, Lines 11 through 14 (1997). Next, taxpayers may take certain deductions and exemptions. The resulting subtotal is taxable income. See Arizona Form 140, Lines 15 through 26. This figure is then referenced to the tables for a determination of preliminary tax liability. Id. at Line 27. But the process does not end there. In fact, this point occurs about midway through the tax calculation and is, at most, a determination of tentative, not actual, tax liability. See Freeland, supra, at 969. The tax preparer may continue to reduce this amount by subtracting credits and other payments. Only after exhausting all of these opportunities does the taxpayer arrive at the bottom of the tax form and the inevitable — amount owed.

¶ 40 We do not accept the proposition, implicit in petitioners’ argument, that the tax return’s purpose is to return state money to taxpayers. For us to agree that a tax credit constitutes public money would require a finding that state ownership springs into existence at the point where taxable income is first determined,⁵ if not before. The tax on that amount would then instantly become public money. We believe that such a conclusion is both artificial and premature. It is far more reasonable to say that funds remain in the taxpayer’s ownership at least until final calculation of the amount actually owed to the government, and upon which the state has a legal claim.⁶

¶ 41 We realize that this view may conflict with the “tax expenditure” approach advanced by the petitioners. Nevertheless, it is consistent with the traditional method of constitutional construction that accords to words them plain and simple meaning. The tax expenditure theory is of recent origin, having been first advanced by Professor Stanley Surrey during the late 1960s and early ’70s. See Richard P. Davies, A Flat Tax Without Bumpy Philanthropy: Decreasing the Impact of a “Low, Single Rate” on Individual Charitable Contributions, 70 S. Cal. L.Rev. 1749,1767 (1997). Proponents of the concept argue that deductions, credits, exemptions, and exclusions “constitute a form of hidden spending in the tax code and ought accordingly to be compared with equivalent nontax spending programs.” Michael A. Livingston, Reinventing Tax Scholarship: Lawyers, Economists, and the Role of the ‘ Legal Academy, 83 Cornell L.Rev. 365, 377 n. 30 (1998). This theory has been used by government as a tool for analyzing budgetary policy.⁷ See Jean Harris, Tax Expenditures: Concept and Oversight, in Public Budgeting and Finance 385, 397 (Robert T. Golembiewski & Jack Rabin, eds., 4th rev. ed.1997). It has not, however, been universally accepted as a doctrine of judicial decision-making.⁸ Even the Supreme Court’s treatment of the concept “changes depending on the substantive area of law being considered.” Donna D. Adler, The Internal Revenue Code, the Constitution, and the Courts: The Use of Tax Expenditure Analysis in Judicial Decision Making, 28 Wake Forest L.Rev. 855, 857 (1993). As the author notes:

[T]he Court has fully accepted the equivalence of direct spending programs and tax expenditures in the area of Free Speech rights, but it has not fully applied this concept in the context of Establishment Clause analysis.... [Djifferent constitutional standards have been applied to direct spending programs and to tax expenditures that have the same economic effect. For example, the refusal to treat tax expenditures and direct spending programs in a consistent manner allows benefits to flow to religious institutions through the Internal Revenue Code when the same benefits would be struck down if distributed in a direct spending program.

Id. (citation omitted). In the same term of Court, now Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote both Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 103 S.Ct. 1997, 76 L.Ed.2d 129 (1983), a “Free Speech” case, and Mueller, an “Establishment Clause” decision. We assume it is no accident that the tax expenditure thesis appears in the former opinion, but not in the latter. The Court has generally refused to recognize the tax expenditure concept where religion is involved.⁹ See Joseph M. Kuznicki, Comment, Section 170, Tax Expenditures, and the First Amendment: The Failure of Charitable Religious Contributions for the Return of a Religious Benefit, 61 Temp. L.Rev. 443, 473 (1988).

¶42 Modern economic theory, under some circumstances, may be helpful to our understanding. As has been shown, however, it does not necessarily govern constitutional interpretation. But see Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 401 Mass. 1201, 514 N.E.2d 353, 355 (1987) (advisory opinion stating that “tax expenditures ... are the practical equivalent of direct government grants”). Moreover, while the plain language of the provisions now under consideration indicates that the framers opposed direct public funding of religion, including sectarian schools, we see no evidence of a similar concern for indirect benefits. One court has noted a similar distinction in the context of a state Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Sebastian County Chapter of the Am. Red Cross v. Weatherford, 311 , 846 S.W.2d 641 (1993). That court said:

Refusal to read indirect government benefits or subsidies into the term “public funds” is not at odds with a liberal construction of FOIA. Were we to construe “public funds” to include an entirely separate and new category of government support, we would be amending the FOIA to expand its application significantly.

Id. at 644.

¶ 43 We also note with interest that Arizona’s framers did not hesitate to extend tax-exempt status to churches. See Ariz. Const. art. IX § 2(2). In fact, they uniformly supported property tax exemptions for all “religious associations or institutions not used or held for profit.” Id.; see also The Records of the Arizona Constitutional Convention of 1910 469-76, 850, 861, 891, 931, 933-34 (John S. Goff, ed.1991) (hereinafter “Records”). Clearly, these exemptions constitute benefits to religious organizations, suggesting either that the framers did not regard such tax-saving measures as direct grants of “public money,” or that their intent in prohibiting aid to religious institutions was not as all-encompassing as petitioners would have us hold.

“Appropriated For or Applied To ”

¶ 44 An appropriation “set[s] aside from the public revenue ... a certain sum of money for a specified object, in such a manner that the executive officers of the government are authorized to use that money.” Rios v. Symington, 172 Ariz. 3, 6-7, 833 P.2d 20, 23-24 (1992) (quoting Hunt v. Callaghan, 32 Ariz. 235, 239, 257 P. 648, 649 (1927)). The power of appropriation belongs only to the legislature. Prideaux v. Frohmiller, 47 Ariz. 347, 357, 56 P.2d 628, 632 (1936).

¶45 Petitioners argue that the STO tax credit diverts to private schools funds that would otherwise be state revenue. This, they claim, has the same effect as an appropriation. We agree that Community Council v. Jordan, 102 Ariz. 448, 455, 432 P.2d 460, 467 (1967), rejected a narrow interpretation of “appropriations,” finding the word to encompass executive and administrative contracts as well as disbursements. It does not follow, however, that reducing a taxpayer’s liability is the equivalent of spending a certain sum of money. An appropriation earmarks funds from “the general revenue of the state” for an identified purpose or destination. Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 25 Ariz. 381, 399, 218 P. 139, 145 (1923). Furthermore, we disagree with petitioners’ characterization of this credit as public money or property within the meaning of the Arizona Constitution. Therefore, we are unwilling to hold that a proscribed appropriation or application occurs by operation of this statute.

Religious worship, exercise, aid, or establishment

¶ 46 Section 12 prohibits the use of public money for religious worship, exercise, instruction, or to support any religious establishment. Even if we were to agree that an appropriation of public funds was implicated here, we would fail to see how the tax credit for donations to a student tuition organization violates this clause. The way in which an STO is limited, the range of choices reserved to taxpayers, parents, and children, the neutrality built into the system — all lead us to conclude that benefits to religious schools are sufficiently attenuated to foreclose a constitutional breach.

¶ 47 As discussed earlier, safeguards built into the statute ensure that the benefits accruing from this tax credit fall generally to taxpayers making the donation, to families receiving assistance in sending children to schools of their choice, and to the students themselves. See A.R.S. § 43-1089(E)(2). Moreover, to qualify for § 501(c)(3) tax treatment, the STO must supply the Internal Revenue Service with copies of the scholarship application and program brochures, rules of eligibility, selection criteria and scholarship processing procedures. I.R.S. Publication 557, at 19 (Rev. May 1997).

¶48 The dissent expresses concern over the prospect that an Arizona taxpayer might be able to make a profit by taking both the state tuition credit and a charitable deduction on the federal return. Infra at ¶ 148 n. 17. Whether or not such a maneuver would be possible or allowable is a policy matter for the legislature and the taxing authorities to address, rather than this court. It in no way changes our constitutional analysis. Similarly, our role is not to make judgments about the overall wisdom of the tax credit before us. That obligation falls to the other branches of government. We hold that the school tax credit does not violate article II, § 12 of the Arizona Constitution.

¶ 49 As previously indicated, article IX, § 10 states that “[n]o tax shall be laid or appropriation of any public money made in aid of any church, or private or sectarian school, or any public service corporation.” It applies to all private schools, whether sectarian or not.

¶ 50 We have already concluded that this tax credit is not an appropriation of public money. Likewise, no tax has been laid here. To the contrary, this measure reduces the tax liability of those choosing to donate to STOs. We cannot say that the legislature has somehow imposed a tax by declining to collect potential revenue from its citizens. Nor does this credit amount to the laying of a tax by causing an increase in the tax liability of those not taking advantage of it. Such a construction tortures the plain meaning of the constitutional text. In addition, if we were to conclude that this credit amounts to the laying of a tax, we would be hard pressed to identify the citizens on whom it is assessed. Because we see no constitutional difference between a credit and a deduction, we would also be forced to rule that deductions for charitable contributions to private schools were unconstitutional because they too, would amount to the laying of a tax. This we decline to do. We find no violation of article IX, § 10 of the Arizona Constitution.

Anti-Gift Clause

¶ 51 Under article IX, § 7, the state shall not “give or loan its credit in the aid of, or make any donation or grant, by subsidy or otherwise, to any individual, association, or corporation.” We have upheld giving when the state action served a public purpose and adequate consideration was provided for the public benefit conferred. See Wistuber v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 141 Ariz. 346, 348-49, 687 P.2d 354, 356-57 (1984) (holding that state payment of portion of teacher association president’s salary did not violate anti-gift clause).

¶ 52 This constitutional provision was historically intended to protect against the “extravagant dissipation of public funds” by government in subsidizing private enterprises such as railroad and canal building in the guise of “public interest.” State v. Northwestern Mutual Ins. Co., 86 Ariz. 50, 53, 340 P.2d 200, 201 (1959) (citation omitted). Such “evils” do not exist here. Neither do we agree with petitioners that a tax credit amounts to a “gift.” One cannot make a gift of something that one does not own'.

Framers ’ Intent

¶ 53 Petitioners claim that Arizona’s founders intended to implement a much more stringent prohibition against aid to religion than did their federal counterparts. They offer an historical analysis in support of this position. The dissent, despite acknowledging the “explicit text” of the constitution, infra at ¶ 73, advances a similar argument. We are persuaded, however, that our textual analysis is sufficient to decide the issues presented here.

¶ 54 ‘We interpret constitutional provisions by examining the text and, where necessary, history in an attempt to determine the framers’ intent.” Boswell v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 152 Ariz. 9, 12, 730 P.2d 186, 189 (1986) (emphasis added). Even if we agreed that an historical search for the framers’ intent was appropriate, we would not conclude that the statute in question violates the Arizona Constitution. There is sparse recorded evidence respecting the clauses at issue here, and any historical analysis is necessarily filled with speculation. See Thomas E. Sheridan, Arizona: A History 385 (1995) (“There is also no comprehensive history of the Arizona constitutional convention or the political milieu out of which it arose.”). The verbatim transcript of the 1910 constitutional convention reveals little discussion on the convention floor about the religion clauses. See Records, supra, at 660, 894, 940. “In reading through the proceedings one is impressed by the fact that major issues were often glossed over with no debate or discussion.” Records, supra, at iv. Our dissenting colleague has himself noted that “[tjhis court has properly been skeptical of some approaches to divining legislative intent.” Business Realty v. Maricopa County, 181 Ariz. 551, 558, 892 P.2d 1340, 1347 (1995). We believe even greater skepticism is called for in “divining” the intent of language drafted almost 90 years ago and about which so little has been recorded or preserved. Thus, we cannot subscribe with any confidence to the “framers’ indisputable desire to exceed the federal requirements” of the Establishment Clause. Infra at ¶ 130.

¶ 55 Moreover, the boundaries limiting judicial interpretation of framers’ intent are amorphous and “subject to continuous adjustment.” Terrance Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 Mich. L.Rev. 1033, 1033 (1981). A provision’s meaning is necessarily conditioned by contemporary understandings of the drafters’ intentions. Id. at 1065. In practice, courts engaging in the search for original intent often look for the “larger purposes” to which the constitution gives expression, id. at 1037, mediating differences between the historical document and the need to accommodate changing circumstances and the passage of time. See id. at 1036. Further, “historical analysis does not suggest that the original intent of the drafters — an uncertain concept at best — governs or controls the interpretation of those clauses today; it merely recognizes that the history of a constitutional provision influences future interpretations to some degree.” Robert F. Utter & Edward J. Larson, Church and State on the Frontier: The History of the Establishment Clauses in the Washington State Constitution, 15 Hastings Const. L.Q. 451, 451 (1988).

¶ 56 For example, in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954), the Supreme Court considered the framers’ intent in adopting the Fourteenth Amendment, including the political climate of the time and long-standing practices of racial segregation. Id. at 489-90, 74 S.Ct. at 688-89. The Court stated:

In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider public education in the light of its full development and its present place in American life throughout the Nation. Only in this way can it be determined if segregation in public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws.

Id. at 492-93, 74 S.Ct. at 691.

¶ 57 We have said as much ourselves in the very context of Arizona’s religion clauses:

The state constitutional provisions must be viewed in light of contemporaneous assumptions concerning the appropriate sphere of action for each institution. History is clear that as a state evolves from one decade to another the role of the state “transcends traditional boundaries and assumes new dimensions” necessitating a revision of the idiomatic meaning of “separation” to align it with “the new realities if original purposes and expectations are to be realized.”

Community Council, 102 Ariz. at 451-52, 432 P.2d at 463-64 (quoting Donald A. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development, 80 Harv. L.Rev. 1381, 1383 (1967)) (emphasis added).

¶58 This court long ago rejected “the strict view that in essence no public monies may be channeled through a religious organization for any purpose whatsoever without, in fact, aiding that church contrary to constitutional mandate.” Community Council, 102 Ariz. at 451, 432 P.2d at 463. Instead, we said:

The prohibitions against the use of public assets for religious purposes were included in the Arizona Constitution to provide for the historical doctrine of separation of church and state, the thrust of which was to insure that there would be no state supported religious institutions thus precluding governmental preference and favoritism of one or more churches.

Id. In fact, as we review Arizona history and scan the present day horizon, it is apparent that religion has never been hermetically sealed off from other institutions in this state, or the nation. See, e.g., Bauchman v. West High Sch., 132 F.3d 542, 554 (10th Cir.1997) (“Courts have long recognized the historical, social and cultural significance of religion in our lives and in the world, generally.”). Arizona’s motto, Ditat Deus, means “God enriches.” See Ariz. Const. art. XXII, § 20. And even though, as we have noted, the transcripts of our constitutional convention reveal almost nothing about the clauses in question, they clearly reflect religion as part of the proceedings. Each day’s session was opened by a prayer from the convention chaplain, Rev. Seaborn Crutchfield. Indeed, to this day Arizona legislative sessions begin with a prayer delivered by the Chaplain of the Day. The constitutional delegates also negotiated over whether the preamble should refer to “Almighty God,” the “Supreme Being,” or “Almighty God for Liberty.” Records, supra, at 41, 77, 82-83. They ultimately agreed that the preamble should read, “We, the people of the State of Arizona, grateful to Almighty God for our liberties, do ordain this Constitution.” Id. at 1399.

¶59 In a more contemporary vein, tax codes, both state and federal, permit churches and other religious institutions to acquire tax-free status and allow deductions for contributions made directly to such entities. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 501(a), (c)(3), 170(a), (c)(2)(B); AR.S. §§ 43-1201, 43-1042. “[T]he doctrine of separation of church and state does not include the doctrine of total nonrecognition of the church by the state and of the state by the church.” Community Council, 102 Ariz. at 451, 432 P.2d at 463.

¶ 60 Clearly, the state constitution forbids the creation of a state church or religion. It also guarantees freedom of worship and belief by demanding absolute neutrality in the treatment of religious groups. “The State is mandated by [article II, § 12] to be absolutely impartial when it comes to the question of religious preference, and public money or property may not be used to promote or favor any particular religious sect or denomination or religion generally.” Pratt v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 110 Ariz. 466, 468, 520 P.2d 514, 516 (1974). There is no evidence, however, that the framers intended to divorce completely any hint of religion from all conceivably state-related functions, nor would such a goal be realistically attainable in today’s world.

¶ 61 We do know that the framers “took education seriously,” as evidenced by their creation of a separate constitutional article on the subject. John D. Leshy, The Making of the Arizona Constitution, 20 Ariz. St. L.J. 1, 96 (1988). They expressed the belief that educated citizens are vital to a free and united society. See Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 179 Ariz. 233, 239, 877 P.2d 806, 812 (1994). Thus, Arizona compels its children to attend school — public, private, or home school. See A.R.S. § 15-802(A). We must respect the framers’ intent in this area as we decide the present issue.

¶ 62 One of the most enviable attributes of our constitutional form of government is its adaptability to change and innovation. As stated in Community Council, we must view constitutional provisions “in light of contemporaneous assumptions.” 102 Ariz. at 451, 432 P.2d at 463. Today’s reality is that primary and secondary education systems are facing nationwide reform. Many states are exploring alternatives to traditional public education' — from charter schools to private school vouchers. See Jo Ann Bodemer, Note, School Choice Through Vouchers: Drawing Constitutional Lemovr-Aid from the Lemon Test, 70 St. John’s L.Rev. 273, 275-77 (1996). In 1994, Arizona authorized the creation of charter schools supported by public funds. See A.R.S. §§ 15-181 through 15-189.02. In doing so, the legislature hoped to encourage the development of educational settings that would invigorate learning, improve academic achievement, and provide additional choices for parents and children. See A.R.S. § 15-181(A). It has now adopted a tax policy presumptively intended to further the same or similar goals. The pursuit of such a strategy falls squarely within the legislature’s prerogative.

¶ 63 Some might argue that the statute in question runs counter to these goals by encouraging more students to attend private schools, thereby weakening the state's public school system. But that is a matter for the legislature, as policy maker, to debate and decide. It is not for us to pass on the wisdom of this or any other social policy. Concerning ourselves only with matters of constitutionality, we have concluded that the religion clauses of the Arizona Constitution do not invalidate this attempt to keep pace with changing economic conditions and societal goals.

Blaine Amendment and Washington State Constitution

¶ 64 The dissent relies to a great extent on external, peripheral sources such as the Blaine amendment, introduced in Congress more than 100 years ago, and the Washington State Constitution. These do not control our decision today.

¶ 65 In 1875, Maine Congressman James Blaine introduced a Constitutional amendment prohibiting the states from granting public funds or taxes for the benefit of any religious sect or denomination. Joseph P. Viteritti, Choosing Equality: Religious Freedom and Educational Opportunity Under Constitutional Federalism, 15 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 113, 144 (1996). The bill failed to muster enough votes for passage, but was later resurrected in a number of state constitutions. Id. at 146-47.

¶ 66 The Blaine amendment was a clear manifestation of religious bigotry, part of a crusade manufactured by the contemporary Protestant establishment to counter what was perceived as a growing “Catholic menace.” Viteritti, supra, at 146; see also Stephen K. Green, The Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, 36 Am. J. Legal Hist. 38, 54 (1992). Its supporters were neither shy nor secretive about their motives. As one national publication which supported the measure wrote:

Mr. Blaine did, indeed bring forward ... a Constitutional amendment directed against the Catholics, but the anti-Catholic excitement was, as every one knows now, a mere flurry; and all that Mr. Blaine means to do or can do with his amendment is, not to pass it but to use it in the campaign to catch anti-Catholic votes.

Green, supra, at 54 (quoting The Nation, Mar. 16, 1876, at 173). Other contemporary sources labeled the amendment part of a plan to “institute a general war against the Catholic Church.” Green, supra, at 44 (quoting The New York Tribune, July 8, 1875, at 4). While such efforts were unsuccessful at the federal level, the jingoist banner persisted in some states. By 1890, twenty-nine states had incorporated at least some language reminiscent of the Blaine amendment in their own constitutions. Viteritti, supra, at 147. There is, however, no recorded history directly linking the amendment with Arizona’s constitutional convention. In our judgment, it requires significant speculation to discern such a connection. In any event, we would be hard pressed to divorce the amendment’s language from the insidious discriminatory intent that prompted it.

¶ 67 The Arizona constitutional convention consumed a mere two months from beginning to end. Leshy, supra, at 40-41. As one of the last states admitted to the Union, Arizona borrowed much from those that preceded it. See Leshy, supra, at 5. Language was lifted from the constitutions of Washington, Oregon, Texas, and Oklahoma, to name a few. See, e.g., Records, supra, at 167, 179, 182, 660.

¶ 68 On several occasions we have acknowledged similarities between provisions of the Washington Constitution and our own. See Schultz v. City of Phoenix, 18 Ariz. 35, 42, 156 P. 75, 77 (1916); Faires v. Frohmiller, 49 Ariz. 366, 372, 67 P.2d 470, 472 (1937). Nevertheless, while Washington’s judicial decisions may prove useful, they certainly do not control Arizona law. We alone must decide how persuasive the legal opinions of other jurisdictions will be to our holdings. See Desert Waters, Inc. v. Superior Court, 91 Ariz. 163, 167-68, 370 P.2d 652, 655 (1962) (noting that while a certain provision of Washington’s constitution was “identical” to Arizona’s, “it becomes apparent that the same meaning and effect was not intended by its adoption”). At least thirty states have constitutions that contain provisions similar to one or both of our religion clauses.¹⁰ To our knowledge, none of these jurisdictions has faced the precise issue before us today.

¶ 69 The dissent points to three Washington State cases holding that state money could not be used to provide financial assistance to students. See Witters v. Washington Comm’n for the Blind, 112 Wash.2d 363, 771 P.2d 1119 (1989) (direct financial aid for visually impaired student to pursue religious studies at private bible college); Washington State Higher Educ. Assistance Auth. v. Graham, 84 Wash.2d 813, 529 P.2d 1051 (1974) (state agency purchasing and making loans to students in post-secondary educational institutions); Weiss v. Bruno, 82 Wash.2d 199, 509 P.2d 973 (1973) (direct financial assistance to students attending both public and private elementary and high schools, as well as private colleges and universities). In each instánee, the Washington Supreme Court found that the program violated the state’s constitutional prohibitions against using public money to benefit sectarian schools. While these cases are informative, they are also distinguishable on their facts. In each instance, direct appropriations of state monies were involved.

¶70 It is also important to recall that Arizona and Washington were founded under markedly different historical circumstances, and their subsequent development reflects those differences. It is difficult, if not impossible, to apply the intent of one group of constitutional framers to another operating at a different time and place. Thus, we must cautiously view the constitutional decisions of other state courts as we attempt to place our own founding document in historical perspective. As the now Chief Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court has so aptly said in describing her approach to constitutional interpretation: “I look at the peculiarities of my state — its land, its industry, its.people, its history.” Shirley S. Abrahamson, Reincarnation of State Courts, 36 Sw. L.J. 951, 965 (1982).

¶ 71 Washington State was carved from the British Northwest Territories, controlled by the large fur trading companies. Climate, geography and the abundance of natural resources — timber, fish, and water — are reflected in myriad ways in that state’s governmental institutions and sources of economic power. The trans-Pacific influences are readily apparent to anyone who walks Seattle’s waterfront or Chinatown. Arizona, in contrast, emerged from an entirely different orientation reaching from Spain and Mexico. Our founding documents are the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and the Gadsden Purchase. Our first settlers came looking for gold, silver, and copper, or range land for cattle. The economic, political, and social ramifications of the lack of a resource such as water can hardly be overestimated. In such vastly dissimilar milieus, even identical words can carry with them a freight of startlingly different meanings.

CONCLUSION

¶ 72 We hold that the tuition tax credit is a neutral adjustment mechanism for equalizing tax burdens and encouraging educational expenditures. Petitioners have failed to demonstrate that it violates either the Federal or the Arizona Constitution. We find it a valid exercise of legislative prerogative. Relief denied.

JONES, V.C.J., and MARTONE, J., concur.

1 . See Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 705, 114 S.Ct. 2481, 2492, 129 L.Ed.2d 546 (1994) (finding creation of special school district for religious enclave violated "the requirement of government neutrality”); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586-87, 112 S.Ct. 2649, 2655, 120 L.Ed.2d 467 (1992) (holding that graduation benedictions in public schools coerce support for religion); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69-70, 105 S.Ct. 2479, 2496-97, 86 L.Ed.2d 29 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (setting forth the “endorsement test”).

2 . To qualify for § 501(c)(3) status an entity must be "organized and operated exclusively” for certain statutorily defined purposes. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3). These include "religious, charitable [and] scientific” as well as “literary, or educational purposes.” Id. The Supreme Court has determined that "Congress sought to provide tax benefits to charitable organizations, to encourage the development of'private institutions that serve a useful public purpose or supplement or take the place of public institutions of the same kind.” Davis v. United States, 495 U.S. 472, 482-83, 110 S.Ct. 2014, 2021, 109 L.Ed.2d 457 (1990) (quoting Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 588, 103 S.Ct. 2017, 2026, 76 L.Ed.2d 157 (1983)). Consequently, under both federal and state law, organizations unabashedly devoted to promoting religion — churches and other religious institutions — enjoy a number of direct economic tax benefits. These organizations escape income taxes, see A.R.S. § 43-1201(4), (11), and are not required to file returns, see A.R.S. § 43-1242. Taxpayers who donate to them can deduct the contributions from their federal and state income taxes. See 26 U.S.C. § 170; A.R.S. § 43-1042(A). Additionally, many of these organizations are exempt from property taxes, see Ariz. Const. art. IX, § 2(2), a direct government benefit which has long been held nonviolative of the Establishment Clause.. See Walz, 397 U.S. at 672-73, 90 S.Ct. at 1413-14.

3 . The dissent believes that limits must be placed on the uses to which schools may put tuition money coming from STOs. Infra at ¶ 94. But Mueller itself, while disallowing a tax deduction for the cost of textbooks used for religious instruction, placed no restriction on the uses to which the schools could put tuition payments qualifying for the deduction. See 463 U.S. at 390 n. 1, 103 S.Ct. at 3064 n. 1. In addition, the statute in Mueller contained no “opt out” provision or requirement that schools admit students without regard to religion, features that our dissenting colleague finds so critical in Jackson. Infra at ¶ 99. Our tax credit statute is more like the tax deduction in Mueller than the voucher program in Jackson. Even in Jackson, however, no limits were placed on the uses to which the recipient schools could put the state aid. 578 N.W.2d at 609.

4 . This statement, like so many others in the dissent, wrongly gives the impression that private schools, rather than scholarship recipients, are the primary beneficiaries of contributions.

5 . This occurs at Line 26, Arizona Form 140, Resident Personal Income Tax 1997. But we note that the amount finally owed by the taxpayer does not appear until Line 55.

6 . As previously noted, it can be argued that state ownership does not arise until funds actually enter the state’s possession. However, we need not make that determination here.

7 . Of course, as is true in any area of intellectual discourse, many other competing theories exist. In economics these days, three of the most prominent are the comprehensive tax base approach, optimal tax theory, and fiscal exchange or public choice theory. See Livingston, supra, at 381-83.

8 . Or even legislative decision-making, for that matter. "The grant of dollars through the tax system is not widely perceived in Congress as a disbursement of public funds.” Allen Schick, Congress and Money: Budgeting, Spending and Taxing 550 (1980).

9 . The dissent relies on a one-justice concurring opinion in arguing that a contrary view has been adopted by the Supreme Court. Infra at ¶ 143.

10 . See Alaska Const. art. VII, § 1; Cal. Const. art. XVI, § 5; Colo. Const. art. IX, § 7; Del. Const. art. X, § 3; Fla. Const. art. I, § 3; Ga. Const. art. I, § 2, para. 7; Haw. Const. art. X, § 1; Idaho Const. art. IX, § 5; Ill. Const. art. X, § 3; Ind. Const. art. I, § 6; Mass. Const. amend, art. XVIII, § 2; Mich. Const. art. I, § 4; Minn. Const. art. I, § 16; Miss. Const. art. VIII, § 208; Mo. Const. art. IX, § 8; Mont. Const. art. X, § 6; Neb. Const. art. VII, § 11; N.H. Const. Pt. II, art. 83; N.Y. Const. art. XI, § 3; Okla. Const. art. II, § 5; Or. Const. art. I, § 5; Pa. Const. art. III, § 29; S.C. Const. art. XI, § 4; S.D. Const. art. VI, § 3; Tex. Const. art. I, § 7; Utah Const. arts. I, § 4 and X, § 9; Va. Const. art. IV, § 16; Wash. Const. art. I, § 11; Wis. Const. art. I, § 18; Wyo. Const. art. I, § 19.