Hunt Foods, Inc. v. Commissioner

17 T.C. 365, 1951 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 89
CourtUnited States Tax Court
DecidedSeptember 21, 1951
DocketDocket No. 20431
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 17 T.C. 365 (Hunt Foods, Inc. v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hunt Foods, Inc. v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 365, 1951 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 89 (tax 1951).

Opinion

OPINION.

Rice, Judge:

The first issue involves the reasonableness of amounts deducted by petitioner as compensation for personal services actually rendered by its president and vice president. Respondent determined that $3,712.94 of the $41,712.94 paid Lovegren is unreasonable, and that $5,312.94 of the $33,312.94 paid Eustis is unreasonable. Respondent contends that he has allowed as a deduction more than twice as much as Lovegren had ever received and nearly twice as much as Eustis had ever received. He contends further that the large increase in petitioner’s volume of business was due to the war, and that the additional compensation had no relationship whatever to additional services rendered by Lovegren and Eustis, if any.

Respondent’s contentions are not convincing. The facts show that 1942 was the biggest year in petitioner’s history. While its net sales exceeded its best previous year (1929) by about $300,000, its 1942 taxable.net income was approximately double the 1929 taxable net income of $371,397.93. This sales and earnings record of the petitioner was achieved largely through the constant efforts of Lovegren and Eustis. Each officer devoted his entire time to petitioner’s business and the ability of each was well known in the canning industry.

The basic salaries voted Lovegren and Eustis of $18,000 and $15,000, respectively, represented a slight increase over their salaries for the fiscal year 1941. The increased compensation ultimately paid them was earned under the resolutions adopted by petitioner’s board of directors on July 10,1941, and January 15,1942. The testimony details the consideration that moved the various directors and stockholders to vote additional compensation based upon percentage of profits realized. Actually the parties here are not too far apart in their determinations of what was reasonable compensation for the personal services rendered by the two principal officers. Since the question of reasonableness of the allowance is primarily factual, Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U. S. 365, 370 (1945), it is our opinion, and we have so found, that the compensation paid petitioner’s officers for the taxable year, was reasonable. On the first issue, therefore, we hold for petitioner.

Section 712 of the Internal Revenue Code provides for the allowance of an excess profits credit computed under either section 713 or section 714. The excess profits credit computed under section 714 is based upon the taxpayer’s invested capital, which includes borrowed invested capital as provided for in section 719. The pertinent portions of section 719 appear in the margin.1

We are not concerned here with the amounts of petitioner’s borrowed invested capital under section 719, as the amounts involved have been stipulated. Our question is whether the stipulated amounts qualify as borrowed invested capital under the statute. Application of the statute to the facts requires a determination of two principal questions: first, whether the stipulated amounts constitute an outstanding indebtedness of the taxpayer for the fiscal years 1941 and 1942; and second, whether the outstanding indebtedness was evidenced, in this instance, by a bill of exchange. If both questions are answered affirmatively, the stipulated amounts are to be included in petitioner’s invested capital for each year in determining its excess profits credit. If either question is answered in the negative, respondent properly excluded the stipulated amounts from petitioner’s borrowed invested capital.

On the first question petitioner contends that it borrowed money from the bank, deposited sight drafts drawn on its customers for goods sold as security therefor, and authorized.the bank to collect and apply the proceeds of the draft in satisfaction of the loan thereon. Petitioner contends that such arrangements are common in the food packing industries. Respondent contends that the bank purchased the drafts and loaned petitioner no money thereon. Petitioner replies that the bank was not a purchaser of the drafts but was petitioner’s agent for the collection thereof.

The use of drafts with bills of lading attached is a recognized medium of carrying on commerce, particularly in marketing the immense crops of the South and West.2 The handling of commercial paper by banks is a part of their banking business, and it is a normal and usual business practice for a firm marketing its products in various parts of the country to deposit its commercial paper with its local bank. When a business firm deposits commercial paper with its bank one of the important questions which arises is the precise relationship which results from the deposit of the paper. Does the bank become the owner of the paper, or does the depositor remain the owner and the bank act as agent for collection ? Obviously, the legal rights and the liabilities of an owner of negotiable paper are different from those of an agent for the owner of such paper. Exchange National Bank v. Third National Bank, 112 U. S. 276, 291 (1884).

No question of ownership of commercial paper will arise ordinarily where the relationship between the bank and its depositor is defined by written contract. It is the absence of such written agreements in the handling and negotiation of commercial paper that has been so productive of litigation. In the Exchange National Bank case, supra, the Supreme Court approved the so-called “New York rule” regarding the liability of a bank taking paper for collection from a depositor in the usual course of business. In the course of its opinion the Court stated, page 289:

* * * And, while the rule of law is thus general, the liability of the bank may be varied by consent, or the bank may refuse to undertake the collection. It may agree to receive the paper only for transmission to its correspondent, and thus make a different contract, and become responsible only for good faith and due discretion in the choice of an agent. If this is not done, or there is no implied understanding to that effect, the same responsibility is assumed in the undertaking to collect foreign paper and in that to collect paper payable at home. On any other rule, no principal contractor would be liable for the default of his own agent, where from the nature of the business, it was evident he must employ sub-agents. * * *

In Burton v. United States, 196 U. S. 283 (1904), the Supreme Court pointed out at pages 297 and 303 that there was no oral or special agreement between the depositor and the bank when checks were deposited and credit given for the amount thereof, and it was held that the bank became the owner of the check and was in no sense the agent of the depositor.

In Federal Reserve Bank v. Malloy, 264 U. S. 160

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Bluebook (online)
17 T.C. 365, 1951 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 89, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hunt-foods-inc-v-commissioner-tax-1951.