EDMONDSON,-J.
¶1 Petitioners filed applications for the Court to ■ assume ■ original jurisdiction' and grant extraordinary declaratory and injunc-tive relief. Petitioners have four constitutional claims. Two claims attack the constitutionality of Oklahoma Senate Bill No. 643, the Impaired Driving Elimination' Act 2 (IDEA2). Two claims attack the constitutionality of the Governor’s Executive Order 2017-19, promulgated on June 8, 2017, and designed to implement a portion of S.B. No. 643.
¶ 2 We hold the Impaired Driving Elimination Act 2 is unconstitutional in its entirety due to violating the single subject rule in Okla. Const. Art. 5 § 57. We hold one provision of the Act, section 13, violates the Due Process Clause in Okla. Const. Art. 2 § 7. Because we conclude the provisions of the Act are not severable and the Act is unconstitutional in'its entirety, we. need not adjudicate petitioners’ additional claims challenging the Act and the Governor’s Executive Order. We hold these, petitioners possess standing. We further hold respondents Schulz and McCall are not proper parties, and their motion to be dismissed as parties is granted.
I. Petitioners’ Standing
¶ 3 The new Impaired Driving Elimination Act 2 (IDEA2) contains seventeen numbered sections and according to its title includes, but is not limited to, provisions which relate to revocation, modification, and reinstatement of driver licenses, ignition interlock devices installed in vehicles, making certain acts unlawful, clarifying and deleting procedures relating to blood and breath tests for the presence of alcohol, surrender of driver licenses, and authorization to the Department of Public Safety to create the Impaired Driver Accountability Program by June 30, 2018. Petitioners, four Oklahoma lawyers and licensed drivers raise two constitutional claims on' behalf of themselves and their clients and argue they will be adversely affected when the Act is scheduled to become effective on November 1, 2017. Respondents challenge the standing of the petitioners to bring an action challenging a new Act which has not yet been made effective.1 Standing is a preliminary or threshold issue adjudicated prior to an examination of the merits.2
¶ 4 Petitioners allege they possess standing based upon one or more of five criteria: 1. They are subject to potential criminal prosecution pursuant to the new legislation; 2. They are subject to potential civil drivers’ revocation in the future; 3. They represent the interests of future clients subject to civil and criminal proceedings within the scope of the, new. Act; (4) The new Act will have an adverse economic impact on their businesses which represent many Oklahomans in erimi-nal and civil proceedings related to the subject matter of the new Act; and (5) They possess “public interest” standing. We need not analyze the issues raised by petitioners and respondents relating to petitioners’ standing based upon potential criminal proceedings,3 potential and hypothetical civil proceedings, their representation of hypothetical future clients, or any potential adverse business impact to them practice of law.4 We find petitioners possess a public interest standing in this matter as we now explain.
¶ 5 This Court possesses discretion to grant standing to private parties to vindicate the public interest in eases presenting issues of great public importance.5 This discretion is properly exercised to grant standing where there are “competing policy considerations” and “lively conflict between antagonistic demands.”6
¶ 6 A matter that affects the rights of the citizens of the State is publici juris.7 During oral argument before the Court all parties commented on publici juris attributes of this controversy, including the great number of Oklahoma citizens in all counties of the State subject to the provisions in the new Act related to impaired driving and other provisions;8 and additionally certain administrative procedures authorized for Department of Public Safety creation to supplement the Act, but which have not yet been created or approved for the effective date of November 1, 2017; and other administrative procedures which the Department has legislative approval to delay creation until June 30, 2018.
¶ 7 The adjective-law9 component to standing in an Oklahoma state court, while creating a bander in a private-law original jurisdiction action, does not hinder this Court from giving adequate relief in a publici juris original jurisdiction proceeding.10 Any potential Okla. Const. Art. 7 § 1 jurisdictional/“judicial power” or justiciability components to standing11 which may act as potential barriers to petitioners’ standing to obtain declaratory relief are resolved by our findings: (1) Petitioners possess interests in challenging this specific Act which are opposed to those of respondents and the controversy presents a “lively conflict between antagonistic demands;” (2) The controversy is publici juris due to the negative consequences attendant to enforcing alleged unconstitutional provisions statewide which relate to both criminal and civil adjective and substantive law involving operating a motor vehicle; (3) The controversy has an exigent nature due to the effective date for the Act which is linked to an allegation of delayed or untimely administrative regulations affecting substantive rights granted under the Act;12 and (4) Petitioners’ standing to enforce public officials’ compliance with constitutional requirements by means of declaratory relief is not a prohibited advisory opinion, but has a common-law prototype “in both the historic prerogative writ of mandamus and the bill in equity for an injunction which tested the legality of public officials’ conduct.”13 We conclude these petitioners possess standing to vindicate the public interest in a case presenting issues of great public importance.
II. Motion to Dismiss Filed by Respondents Schulz and McCall
¶ 8 Oklahoma Senate President Pro Tempore, Senator Mike Schulz, and Speaker of the Oklahoma House of Representatives, Representative Charles McCall, were named as respondents by petitioners. These two respondents filed a response and motion to dismiss the action against them. They assert they are immune from petitioner’s action, and they are correct.
¶ 9 Petitioners allege these two respondents “in their official capacities violated the Oklahoma Constitution’s single subject provision in passing SB 643.”14 In their response to the motion to dismiss, petitioners argue respondents’ legislative immunity applies “only to certain criminal charges and lawsuits seeking damages.” They further argue without citation of authority: “Because the legislators aré the ones who passed the bill, it is only appropriate that they be made a party to the suit that seeks to have the bill voided.”15 We disagree with petitioners’ interpretation of respondents’ constitutionally granted legislative immunity. . , ,
¶ 10 The language of Oklahoma Constitution, Article 5 § 22 states: “Senators and Representatives shall, except for treason, felony, or breach of the'peace, be privileged from arrest during the session of the Legislature, and in going to and returning from the same, and, for any speech or. debate in either House, shall not be questioned in any other place,” We have explained this language: The Speech or Debate Clause of the Oklahoma Constitution, Art. 5, § 22, absolutely protects legislators from suit calling for judicial inquiry into their performance “within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity.”16 We added:
Legislators may not be haled into court, either to account for acts that occurred in the course of legislative process or for judicial inquiry into their motivation for those acts. The legislative privilege has never been limited to words spoken in debate. The constitution’s immunity shields all enactment-related conduct, whether a ■legislator be sued (1) personally, (2) in an official capacity, or (3) as the Legislature’s leader. The line separating protected from unprotected legislative activity lies in the distinction between “purely legislative activities” and those that are nongermane “political matters”.
Brook v. Thompson, 1997 OK 127, ¶ 14, 948 P.2d 279, 287-288 (notes omitted).
¶ 11 Petitioners have haled into this Court these two legislators for the purpose of giving an account and defense for their participation in enacting a piece of legislation while serving in the Oklahoma Legislature. The petitioners’ claim against these respondents does not fall within a listed exception in Okla. Const. Art. 5 § 22, but is based solely on petitioners’- claim the legislation violates a provision of the State Constitution.
¶ 12 Senator Mike Schulz and Representative Charles McCall clearly possess immunity from the legal liability sought to be imposed by petitioners and they are dismissed asparties.
Ill, Okla. Const Art. 2 § 7 Due Process Clause and Senate Bill No. 643
¶ 13 Section. 13 of the new Act amends 47 O.S. 2011 § 754, and provides upon arrest by an officer for a prohibited alcohol concentration in a breath test the evidence of driving privilege shall be seized by the officer who shall deliver it to the Department of Public Safety and the “Department shall destroy the evidence of driving privilege upon receipt thereof.” The officer provides the driver with a paper receipt which serves .as a driver’s license for no longer than forty-five (days). No Department of Public Safety administrative hearing is allowed for challenging the seizure of the license. Petitioners argue this provision violates the Due Process Clause in our State Constitution because no opportunity for a hearing takes place (procedural due process), and “there is no need to take an individual’s property and certainly no reason to destroy it” (substantive due process claim — taking of property, ie., the driver’s license).
¶ 14 More than forty years ago the U. S. Supreme Court explained that revocation of a driver’s license must conform to the Due Process Clause.17 The Due Process protection of the licenses was viewed not as a mere state-created interest, right, or privilege, but when drivers’ licenses are issued “their continued possession may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood ... [and] [suspension of issued licenses thus involves state action that adjudicates important interests of the licensees. In such eases the licenses are not to be taken away without that procedural due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment.”18 In addressing whether a license suspension hearing complied with procedural due process, the Court obseived: “It is a proposition which hardly seems to need explication that a hearing which excludes consideration of an element essential to the decision whether licenses of the nature here involved shall be suspended does not meet this standard.”19
¶ 15 In 1986, we explained: “One’s claim to a driver’s license is indeed a protec-tible property interest that may not be terminated without due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.”20 The Due Process Clause in the Oklahoma Constitution,' Okla. Const. Art. 2 § 7,21 does not provide any less protection for those rights which are also protected by its federal counterpart in the 14th Amendment.22 An Oklahoma driver’s license is an interest protected by both State and Federal Due Process Clauses.
¶ 16 Respondents argue that the seizure and destruction of a driver’s license upon arrest without the opportunity for an administrative hearing does not violate the State Due Process Clause because no driving privilege is revoked when the license is seized and destroyed and an additional license may be obtained by the driver. At oral argument, counsel for the Commissioner for the Department of Public Safety stated that the new Act and new administrative rules expected to be promulgated allow a person whose license is seized and destroyed under the new Act to appear at the Department of Public Safety and; replace the-seized license with “a new plastic driver’s license” for twenty-five dollars ($25.00), or a new temporary paper license valid for an additional forty-five days. Again, contrary to petitioners’ claim that 47 O.S. § 6-303(G)23, would prohibit a person from obtaining a new license after seizure and destruction of a license under the new Act, counsel for the Commissioner of Public Safety argued such is not the case and further argued on this basis there is no due process violation when the “piece of plastic” is seized and destroyed.
¶ 17 The new Act provides for revocation of driving privileges upon a person’s criminal conviction of certain crimes (when final), receipt of a deferred criminal sentence, and receipt of a deferred prosecution agreement for these statutorily specified crimes.24 Counsel for the Department of Public Safety agreed during questioning from the Court that a person arrested whose license is seized upon arrest could theoretically thereafter obtain an unrestricted number of new serial plastic driver’s licenses for $25.00 each when obtained after each new and additional arrest for impaired driving (with seizure and destruction of each new serial driver’s license) if the serial arrests occurred during the time his or her first criminal case was being adjudicated in the District Court. When questioned what the purpose was for seizing a license and destroying it upon arrest when no new or additional requirement would be imposed on obtaining a new license while the criminal case was being adjudicated, counsel responded that revocation of driving privileges in the new Act, with one exception, was based upon what happened in the District Court with the criminal case. He further stated that the license is not seized to commence an administrative revocation of driving privileges.25
¶ 18 The one exception to revocation of driving privileges based upon District Court criminal adjudications (conviction, deferred sentence and deferred prosecution) occurs where the Department is given discretion to revoke driving privileges in certain other circumstances. For example, when the Department receives “a report of a verified ignition interlock violation” it may revoke a driving privilege.26 The Governor’s Executive Order 2017-19 states in part:
I am requiring the DPS to follow directions consistent with the recent Oklahoma Supreme Court Order in Nichols v. State, ex rel. Dept, of Public Safety, 2017 OK 20 [392 P.3d 692]. I also direct and order the DPS to grant a hearing on revocation of license in conformity with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and within the time limits imposed by our Supreme Court. DPS may create an exception to these hearings for any individual that receives a deferred adjudication, a suspended sentence, or a formal conviction under the criminal code.
Executive Order, 2017-19, (June 8, 2017).
At oral argument, counsel for the Governor explained that Executive Order 2017-19 was intended to apply only when the Department revokes driving privileges unrelated to revocation as a direct consequence from convictions or deferred sentences prosecutions. He again explained that under the new Act revocations are either a consequence of (1) a criminal conviction (including deferred sen-tenee/proseeution) or (2) specific statutory violations where the Department is given the power to revoke the driving privilege. He explained it is only in the latter circumstances where a driver may have an opportunity for an administrative hearing before the Department of Public Safety.
¶ 19 The parties agree the new Act provides for mandatory seizure of the license, its transmittal to the Department, and its immediate destruction upon receipt. The parties agree this action is not reviewable by an opportunity for any administrative proceeding. This Court determines (1) if there is a legitimate government interest (a) articulated in the legislation or (b) championed by the parties or (c) expressed by a recognized public policy in support of the legislation, and (2) if that interest is reasonably advanced by the legislation.27 The seizure and destruction of “the piece of plastic” resulting in a circumstance where a driver must pay an additional fee to the Department for its replacement is not a nominal economic harm for the citizens of the State. The seizure takes place as part of a law enforcement procedure, but this procedure is entirely divorced from any law enforcement substantive goal, when the driver whose license is seized may obtain another identical replacement license upon payment of the standard mandatory fee.
¶ 20 A law enforcement seizure and immediate destruction of a driver's license constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of property when no legitimate State purpose is shown for seizure and destruction. No opportunity to challenge this seizure and destruction is given to the driver. Respondents rely upon Price v. Reed, supra, and the constitutionality of an immediate seizure of a license. However, the license seizure in Price was part of an administrative/regulatory scheme combining seizure with loss of driving privileges and with an opportunity for a driver to challenge the regulatory actions of the State. Price gives no support to respondents’ due process argument on petitioners’ substantive due process property claim. No State purpose, regulatory goal, or law enforcement goal for the seizure and destruction was articulated during oral argument by respondents, or is revealed in their filings, or is revealed by our review of S.B. No. 643 when construed consistent with the respondents’ arguments.28 We must conclude S.B. No. 643 amending 47 O.S. 2011 § 764 and requiring seizure and destruction of a driver’s license violates the Due Process Clause of the State Constitution, Okla. Const. Art. 2 § 7.
IV. Okla. Const Art. 5 § 57 Single Subject Rule and Senate Bill No. 643
¶ 21 The Oklahoma Constitution, Art 5 § 57,29 states that every act of the Legislature, apart from specified exceptions, shall embrace but one subject. Petitioners assert S.B. No. 643 violates this constitutionally, required single subject rule for legislated acts. Petitioners argue the Act includes more than one subject because it enacts law concerning; (1) revocation and modification of a driver’s license for non-impaired driving offences; (2) license destruction; (3) creation of an impaired driver diversion program; (4) bond requirements; (5) criminal-liability for refusing a breath - test; (6) notice requirements for prosecutors in cases including those not involving impaired driving; and (7) an admission of evidence in criminal trials. This constitutional challenge requires an analysis of the.provisions of the Act.
¶ 22 Section 1 of the Act provides the name “Impaired Driving Elimination'Act 2,” and is not codified. Section 2 states a purpose of Act to include “effective and meaningful administrative monitoring by the Department of Public Safety of impaired driving offenders” and is not codified. Section 3 has no reference to impaired driving, but provides for notice given by the Department to those to whom notice is authorized or required.30 Section 4 provides a court and prosecutor shall provide' notice to the Department when a person receives a deferred sentence or deferred prosecution for “any offense” which Title 47 “makes mandatory the revocation of a driving privilege.”31
¶ 23 Section 5 requires revoking driving privileges when a person receives a deferred sentence, conviction, or deferred prosecution for the eleven enumerated offenses listed in the statute.32 One of the eleven enumerated statutory offenses involves driving, operating, or being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, any other intoxicating substance, or the combined influence of alcohol and any other intoxicating substance.33 The language in S.B, No. 643, § 5, relating to deferred prosecutions and deferred sentences was not limited by the legislature to the offenses involving impaired driving relating to intoxicating substances, but placed the language in the statute so as to include other types of offenses.
¶ 24 Section 6 .provides for revocations based upon conviction, deferred sentence, or deferred prosecution unless the person has successfully completed, or is currently participating in, the Impaired Driver Accountability Program.”34 .This program is authorized by the new Act and which also provides the Department shall create this program by June 30, 2018. Section 6 requires the issuance of a modified driver’s license and a mandatory continuous ignition interlock device. Section 6 provides for increasing time periods (one year to 4 years) for modified licenses corresponding to longer time periods for mandatory continuous ignition interlock devices based upon a driver’s repeat offenses. Section 6 as amended states that the period of modification “shall be mandatory and neither the Department nor any court may grant driving privileges for the duration of that period.”
¶ 26 Section 7 of the Act states the Department “is authorized” to make an agreement with a person whose license is revoked or suspended “for issuance of a provisional license that allows a person to drive between statutorily specific places,35 Section 7 also includes a requirement the Department shall establish the Impaired Driver Accountability Program by June 30, 2018, approximately eight months after the Act’s effective date of November 1, 2017.36 This section provides for driver participation fees for the program and length of required participation by the driver. A driver must request participation in the program within fifteen calendar days of his or her license being seized.37
¶26 Section 8 of the Act includes provisions relating to ignition interlock devices and restricting driving privileges based upon receipt of a report' of a “verified ignition interlock violation as defined by the Board of Tests for Alcohol and Drug Influence.”38 This section provides for issuance of a “restricted driver license” and fees to be paid to the Department, and the fees collected shall be remitted to the State Treasury for use by the Department of Public Safety for administering this section of law,.’
¶ 27 Section 9 forbids a person to “knowingly authorize or permit” another person to operate a motor vehicle without an ignition interlock device, when the person is required to use such a device; and a violation of this section is defined as a misdemeanor punishable by fine or imprisonment.39 The section also prohibits a person interfering with the operation of the ignition interlock device or driving a vehicle without the device, The ignition interlock device is made a mandatory condition of any bond, unless the person has successfully completed the Impaired Driver Accountability Program prior to a plea or verdict in the person’s criminal case.
¶ 28 Section 10 provides that breath shall be tested unless the officer requests a blood test.40 Section 11 provides that blood may drawn by an “Intermediate Emergency Medical Technician,” and additionally “Advanced Emergency Medical Technicians or Paramedics” when requested by a law enforcement officer.41 Section 12 states it shall be a misdemeanor for a conscious person to refuse to submit to a breath test when under arrest for driving while impaired, driving under the influence or while'under the influence being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon public roads, or other public place, or any private road which provides access to one or more dwellings.42 Section 13 provides for seizure and destruction of a driver’s license' upon arrest of an individual.43 Section 14 states that a person whose license revocation is modified “may only operate a motor vehicle. equipped with an approved ignition interlock device.44
¶ 29 Section 16 contains provisions for admission of test results in -any criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have been committed by any person while driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.”45 The section specifies “the following may be considered as evidence that the test of the breath of the person was validly administered in accordance with the rules of the Board of tests for Alcohol and Drug Influence” and then lists four criteria. Section 15 states a person’s refusal to a test or tests is admissible, and further provides that in some circumstances the results of “the test of a [sic] the breath or blood of the person, if admissible, shall be admitted without reference to measurement uncertainty.”
¶ 30 Section 16 of the Act repeals 47 O.S. 2011 § 755, and section 17 makes November 1, 2017, the effective date of the Act.
¶31 Legislation with multiple sections or provisions must be germane, relative, and cognate to a common theme and purpose.46 Compliance with this test allows those voting on the law in question to avoid making an otherwise constitutionally prohibited forced decision to accept an all or nothing choice between two or more unrelated provisions contained in one measure.47 The public is entitled to a clear picture of how their elected officials have voted on a particular issue,48 the public is entitled to be adequately notified of the potential effect of legislation,49 and these constitutionally protected public policies have been recognized since statehood.50 Respondents argue the Act is necessary as “a common purpose” for Department of Public Safety administrative enforcement of statutes prohibiting impaired driving, and further “administrative monitoring” is a stated purpose in the Act. Respondents also invoke the highly generalized subject of “impaired driving.”
¶32 Section 13’s license seizure and destruction upon arrest does not advance an articulated goal related to administrative monitoring of an impaired driving. New criminal liability for a breath test refusal is created by section 12, and while this subject relates generally to “impaired driving” its function -within the legislatively stated purpose of the Act, “administrative monitoring by the Department of Public Safety” is not present on the face of the Act. Section ll’s expanded scope in authorizing additional medical personnel to draw blood for a test upon request by an officer is related to “impaired drivers” in a general sense. However, the individual legislator’s calculus in deciding whether to vote for or against such language involves the legislator’s discretion concerning the professional expertise of the classes of individuals named for the statutory task and not the Department’s administrative monitoring of impaired drivers. Sections 13, 12, and 11 violate the single subject rule in Okla. Const. Art. 5 § 57 when measured against the other provisions of the Act.
¶ 33 Section 15’s creation of an evidentiary standard for admission of breath tests states it applies to “a proceeding arising out of of acts alleged to have been committed by a person ... under the influence of alcohol,” and this is sufficiently broad to include DPS administrative enforcement of the impaired driving statutes and administratively monitoring impaired drivers. However, the language is expressly made applicable to “the trial of any criminal action,” a forum outside the purview of the Department of Public Safety’s “administrative monitoring” of impaired driving. Section 16’s reach into District Court criminal proceedings is beyond administrative monitoring and violates the single subject rule in Okla. Const. Art. 5 § 57 when measured against the other provisions of the Act. ■
¶ 34 Section 4 of the Act clearly provides for notices to the Department when a person receives a deferred sentence or deferred prosecution for offenses other than those related to impaired driving. Section 4’s reach to include non-impaired offenses is beyond the stated purpose of administrative monitoring for impaired drivers and violates the single subject rule in Okla. Const. Art. 5 § 57 when measured against the other provisions of the Act. Section 4⅛ invalidity impacts both sections 5 and 6. Section 5 requires revocation upon receipt of a notice of a deferred sentence or a deferred prosecution. This provision appears to involve “administrative monitoring by the Department of Public Safety,” but enforcement is based upon notices required by section 4, and section 4 violates the single subject rule. Similarly, section 6 also relies upon these section 4 notices of deferred sentences and prosecution agreements.
¶35 Again, requiring notice of deferred sentences and prosecutions for crimes other than impaired driving clearly goes beyond the scope of an Act seeking to administratively monitor impaired driving offenders. The Act does not contain a severability clause, but 75 O.S.2011 § 11a51 requires a severability analysis. We are required to ask whether §§ 5 & 6 (assuming they also do not violate Art. 5 § 57) are capable of statewide equal enforcement in the absence of the statutory mandatory procedure in 4 for providing the notices of deferred sentences or deferred prosecutions upon which sections 5 and 6 expressly rely.52 Fundamental fairness cannot be afforded except within a framework of orderly procedure, and an orderly procedure is required when procedure is used to deprive a person of a constitutionally protected right, such as a driver’s license with its driving privileges.53 We hold 5 and 6 are not severable, and must fall with section 4.
¶ 36 Generally, a severability analysis requires us to ask whether constitutional sections of an Act are capable of being executed in accoi-dance with legislative intent.54 Stripping those sections from the Act which vfe have now determined are constitutionally invalid, §§ 4, 5, 6, 11, 12, 13, and 15, upon examination of' the remaining sections we must conclude they are not capable of being executed independently. These sections, although containing legislative subjects therein not germane to the invalid sections, they 'nevertheless contain internal references to, and rely upon, the invalid sections of S.B. No. 643, and they contain various provisions for repealing current procedures which would turn a selective enforcement of these sections55 into an unpalatable legislative choice by a legislator when faced with approving an all-or-nothing choice on these sections.56 We decline to give our opinion an effect which would have created an impermissible choice when originally presented to the legislators.
¶37 We conclude S.B. No. 643 violates Okla. Const. Art. 6 § 67 and Section 13 of S.B. No. 643 also violates Okla. Const. Art. 2 § 7. Because of these conclusions-we need not address petitioners’ additional claims that S. B. No. 643 impermissibly (1) revokes and modifies a driver’s license for non-impaired driving offences, or (2) creates an impaired driver diversion program, or (3) creates invalid bond requirements. The parties agree the Governor’s Executive Order 2017-19, was issued to administratively implement the new Act or a portion thereof. Due to our holding S.B. No. 643 violates Okla. Const. Art. 6 § 67 in its entirety, and leaving nothing for the Executive Order to enforce, we need not reach petitioners’ additional claims characterizing the Executive Order as a pocket veto,57 or challenging the order based upon the separation of powers provision in Okla. Const. Art. 4 § l.58 We presume public officials perform their public duties in good faith and we withhold equitable mandatory relief in anticipation of this performance.59 Petitioners’ request for injunctive relief is denied.
Y. Conclusión and Effective Date of Court’s Opinion
¶38 The Court concludes the petitioners have standing. Two members of the Oklahoma Legislature possess constitutional legislative immunity from the legal liability and their motion to dismiss them as parties is granted. Section 13 of the Impaired Driving Elimination Act 2 violates Okla. Const. Art 2 § 7. Several provisions of the Impaired Driving Elimination Act 2 violate Okla. Const. Art. 6 § 57 and non-offending sections are not capable of being severed for independent enforcement. We conclude the Impaired Driving Elimination Act 2 is unconstitutional in its entirety, and we need not adjudicate petitioners’ remaining claims challenging either-the Act or the Governor’s Executive Order, Petitioners’ request for an injunction is denied.
¶ 39 The Court previously issued an order staying the application of the 2017 Impaired Driving Elimination Act 2, (S.B. No. 643). Hunsucker v. Fallin, 2017 OK 84, — P.3d -(October 30, 2017). The Court noted its stay was for the purpose of granting temporary relief in order to protect the lights, of parties pending resolution of a judicial controversy.60 This Court’s opinion is an exercise of original jurisdiction, the opinion is immediately effective upon its filing with the Clerk of this Court, and no post-opinion mandate issues by this Court.61 The stay pending this litigation is dissolved upon the conclusion of the matter before this Court. The stay .shall be dissolved upon ■ denial of a petition for rehearing if rehearing is sought by any party and not granted, or upon final adjudication of any petition for rehearing granted by the Court, or upon expiration of the time to file a petition for rehearing if no rehearing is sought. The temporary stay of the Act pending litigation will be effectively replaced by a final opinion of this Court concluding the Act is unconstitutional and lacking legal enforceability.
¶ 40 COMBS, C.J.; WATT, EDMONDSON, COLBERT, and REIF, JJ., concur. ¶ 41 GURICH, V.C.J.; KAUGER, and WYRICK (by separate writing), JJ., concur in part and dissent in part. ¶ 42 WINCHESTER, J., (by separate writing), dissent.