Humphrey v. Doe 1

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. California
DecidedApril 11, 2025
Docket3:25-cv-00813
StatusUnknown

This text of Humphrey v. Doe 1 (Humphrey v. Doe 1) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Humphrey v. Doe 1, (S.D. Cal. 2025).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 Case No.: 25-cv-00813-DMS-KSC CHRISTIAN JULIAN HUMPHREY,

11 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 12 v. MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 13 CITY OF SAN DIEGO; OFFICER DOE

1; et al., 14 Defendants. 15 16 17 On April 4, 2025, Plaintiff Christian Julian Humphrey, proceeding pro se, filed a 18 Complaint against the City of San Diego; Jajuan Henderson, a private individual; and 19 various police officers (collectively, “Defendants”). (Plaintiff’s Complaint (“Compl.”), 20 ECF No. 1). Plaintiff concurrently filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) 21 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). (ECF No. 2). 22 I. MOTION TO PROCEED IFP 23 All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the 24 United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee. See 25 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); Civil Local Rule 4.5. The action may proceed despite a failure to 26 prepay the entire fee only if leave to proceed IFP is granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 27 See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007). The plaintiff must submit 28 an affidavit demonstrating his inability to pay the filing fee, and the affidavit must include 1 a complete statement of the plaintiff’s assets. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). “To satisfy the 2 requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, applicants must demonstrate that because of poverty, 3 they cannot meet court costs and still provide themselves, and any dependents, with the 4 necessities of life.” Soldani v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2019 WL 2160380, at *1 (E.D. Cal. 5 Jan. 31, 2019). 6 Plaintiff’s affidavit of assets is sufficient to show he is unable to pay the filing fee. 7 Accordingly, this Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP and declines to 8 impose an initial partial filing fee pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). See Beasley v. San 9 Diego Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 2023 WL 4918306, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2023) (declining 10 to impose partial filing fee due to defendant’s inability to pay). 11 II. SUA SPONTE SCREENING 12 A complaint filed by any person proceeding IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) is 13 subject to mandatory sua sponte review and dismissal by the Court. “[T]he court shall 14 dismiss” a case filed IFP “at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . (i) is 15 frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) 16 seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 17 1915(e)(2). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous or 18 malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 19 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 20 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)). 21 A. Plaintiff’s Allegations 22 Plaintiff’s allegations are based on two incidents. (See generally Compl.). On 23 December 18, 2023, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Henderson, a private individual, 24 sexually assaulted Plaintiff by inserting his fingers into Plaintiff’s rectum without 25 Plaintiff’s consent. (Id. at 5, 11). After the police arrived at the scene, Plaintiff contends 26 that Defendants Officer Doe 1 and Officer Doe 2 failed to offer medical assistance or hear 27 Plaintiff out. (Id. at 5). Instead, Defendants allegedly arrested Plaintiff “without providing 28 any explanation . . . of the specific charges.” (Id.); (see also id.) (“Plaintiff’s Miranda rights 1 were never read, and they were not informed of the reason for arrest at the time.”). Plaintiff 2 alleges he learned of the charge—assault with a deadly weapon—only after he was 3 “handcuffed, detained, and transported to the station.” (Id. at 12). According to Plaintiff, 4 his sexual assault went undocumented and unacknowledged. (Id.). 5 Months later, on August 17–18, 2024, Defendant Henderson allegedly “appeared at 6 [P]laintiff’s home, trespassed, attempted to slash . . . [P]laintiff’s tires, damaged property, 7 and physically assaulted . . . [P]laintiff.” (Id. at 5). When Defendants Officer Doe 3 and 8 Officer Doe 4 came to Plaintiff’s home in response to the incident, Plaintiff alleges that 9 they failed to document or collect evidence. (Id.). 10 B. Legal Standard 11 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 12 which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 13 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 14 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the 15 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint 16 fails to state a claim for relief under Rule 8 if the factual assertions in it, taken as true, are 17 insufficient for the reviewing court plausibly “to draw the reasonable inference that the 18 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 19 (2009). When a judge assesses plausibility, he must draw on “judicial experience and 20 common sense.” Id. at 664. 21 Rule 8 may be violated when a pleading “says too little,” or when it “says too much.” 22 Knapp v. Hogan, 738 F.3d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 2013). “[T]he pleading standard . . . does 23 not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the- 24 defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. 25 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A complaint that is too verbose, long, 26 confusing, redundant, irrelevant, or conclusory may be dismissed for failure to comply with 27 Rule 8. See Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., 637 F.3d 1047, 1058–59 (9th Cir. 2011) 28 (collecting cases upholding dismissals for those reasons). 1 C. Analysis 2 At this stage in the litigation, the Court is satisfied that Plaintiff's Complaint does 3 || not fall within the ambit of § 1915(e)(2)(B). On a liberal reading of the Complaint alone, 4 ||the Court finds that Plaintiff's allegations are “sufficient to warrant .. . an answer”. 5 || Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 2012); see also id. at 1121 (“We construe 6 || pro se complaints liberally and may only dismiss a pro se complaint for failure to state a 7 claim if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his 8 claim which would entitle him to relief.) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

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Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
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680 F.3d 1113 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
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Andrews v. Cervantes
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Humphrey v. Doe 1, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/humphrey-v-doe-1-casd-2025.