Hukman v. Ed's Stations, Inc.

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: May 14, 2025
• Docket: 2:24-cv-01738
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 Case No.: 2:24-cv-01738-JAD-EJY Sheida Hukman, 4 Plaintiff Order Denying Defendant’s Motion for 5 v. Attorney’s Fees and Plaintiff’s Motions for Clarification and Reconsideration 6 Ed’s Stations, Inc., [ECF Nos. 24, 32, 32-1] 7 Defendant

9 Soon after I dismissed Sheida Hukman’s employment-discrimination suit against Ed’s 10 Stations, Inc. with prejudice, Ed’s Stations moved for attorney’s fees.1 It argues that Hukman 11 should be ordered to pay $20,757.50 plus interest because her suit was “meritless from the 12 outset.”2 Hukman opposes that motion and asks this court to reconsider its dismissal of her suit 13 under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e).3 She also moves for “clarification” concerning a 14 minute order that extended the deadline for her to respond to Ed’s Stations’ motion for attorney’s 15 fees.4 Because Ed’s Stations hasn’t established the exceptional circumstances required to justify 16 ordering a pro se civil-rights plaintiff to pay attorney’s fees, its motion is denied. And because 17 Hukman missed Rule 59(e)’s non-extendable 28-day deadline, her motion for reconsideration 18 and accompanying motion for clarification are also denied. 19 20 21 1 ECF No. 24. 22 2 Id. at 5. 23 3 ECF Nos. 30, 32-1. 4 ECF No. 32. 1 A. Ed’s Stations’ motion for attorney’s fees is denied. 2 Ed’s Stations moves for an award of attorney’s fees under Federal Rule of Civil 3 Procedure (FRCP) 54, arguing that Hukman’s choice to pursue this suit despite failing to timely 4 exhaust her available administrative remedies justifies such an award under Title VII.5 Hukman

5 insists that awarding attorney’s fees to Ed’s Stations would be improper because she brought her 6 claim in good faith.6 But while bad faith certainly helps justify awarding fees, it isn’t required.7 7 Courts have discretion to award reasonable attorney’s fees to prevailing parties in Title 8 VII cases.8 But a defendant can “recover fees and costs from a plaintiff in a civil rights case only 9 ‘in exceptional circumstances’ in which the plaintiff’s claims are ‘frivolous, unreasonable[,] or 10 without foundation.’”9 This standard is a strict one due to “the need to avoid undercutting 11 Congress’ policy of promoting vigorous prosecution of civil rights violations under Title VII and 12 § 1983.”10 And it “is applied with particular strictness in cases where the plaintiff proceeds pro 13 se.”11 14 Miller v. Los Angeles County Board of Education is instructive. In that case, the Ninth

15 Circuit reviewed a district court’s decision to award a defendant attorney’s fees because the pro 16 se plaintiff “knew or should have known that his case was without foundation.”12 The panel 17

18 5 ECF No. 24. 19 6 ECF No. 30 at 14. 7 See Christianburg Garment Co. v. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, 434 U.S. 412, 419, 422 20 (1978). 21 8 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). 9 Harris v. Maricopa Cnty. Superior Ct., 631 F.3d 963, 968 (9th Cir. 2011). 22 10 Miller v. L.A. Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 617, 619 (9th Cir. 1987). 23 11 Id. at 620. 12 Id. at 619. 1 found that a lower court had erred by failing to consider the plaintiff’s pro se status in its 2 decision to award attorney’s fees.13 It reasoned that pro se plaintiffs “cannot simply be assumed 3 to have the same ability as a plaintiff represented by counsel to recognize the objective merit (or 4 lack of merit) of a claim.”14 But it also noted that awarding fees would be “entirely appropriate”

5 if a pro se plaintiff repeatedly attempted to bring a claim that was “previously found to be 6 frivolous.”15 7 The exceptional circumstances necessary to justify shifting Ed’s Stations’ attorney-fees 8 bill to Hukman, a pro se plaintiff, are not present. Ed’s Stations tries to diminish Hukman’s pro 9 se status by asserting that she’s litigious enough to be familiar with the requirements to bring a 10 successful employment-discrimination suit.16 But applying the particularly strict standard for 11 pro se plaintiffs, Hukman did not necessarily understand that her claims against Ed’s Stations 12 were time-barred by an EEOC filing deadline and a Nevada statute of limitations. Having some 13 past litigation experience does not mean that Hukman had the same ability to understand these 14 requirements as a counseled plaintiff. So I deny Ed’s Stations’ motion for attorney’s fees.

15 B. Hukman’s motions for reconsideration and clarification also fail. 16 Hukman moves for reconsideration under FRCP 59(e) and submits 400 pages of exhibits, 17 ostensibly to support that motion.17 She also submits a “motion for clarification,” in which she 18 argues that I should entertain her motion for reconsideration even though it was filed after the 19 20

21 13 Id. at 620. 14 Id. 22 15 Id. 23 16 ECF No. 24 at 5–6. 17 ECF Nos. 32-1, 33. 1 January 30, 2025, deadline for her to respond to the motion for attorney’s fees.18 Ed’s Stations 2 responds that her motions fail for myriad reasons, not least of which is that Hukman filed them 3 almost a month after the extended deadline set by this court had already passed.19 Both parties’ 4 focus on the January 30, 2025, deadline set by a minute order is misguided. That minute order

5 instructed Hukman to file her response to Ed’s Stations’ motion for attorney’s fees by that date;20 6 it had nothing to do with a motion for reconsideration. 7 But Hukman moves for reconsideration under Rule 59(e), and motions brought under that 8 rule must be filed no more than 28 days after judgment is entered.21 I dismissed Hukman’s suit 9 on December 2, 2024, and Hukman didn’t file her motion for reconsideration until February 23, 10 2025—well after the rule’s 28-day limitation had passed. FRCP 6(b)(2) lists Rule 59(e) as one 11 of the rules under which courts “must not extend the time to act.”22 As the United States 12 Supreme Court has stated, there is “no possibility of an extension.”23 So applying this 13 immutable deadline, I deny Hukman’s motion for reconsideration and the accompanying motion 14 for clarification.

15 16 17 18 19

18 ECF No. 32. 20 19 ECF No. 34. 21 20 See ECF No. 28. 22 21 Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) (“A motion to alter or amend a judgment must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment.”). 23 22 Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2). 23 Banister v. Davis, 590 U.S. 504, 507–08 (2020). Conclusion 2 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant Ed’s Stations’ motion for attorney’s fees [ECF No. 24] is DENIED. 4 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff Sheida Hukman’s motions for clarification and reconsideration [ECF Nos. 32, 32-1] are DENIED. 6

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