Huguenin v. Commissioner of Correction

Supreme Court of Connecticut

Huguenin v. Commissioner of Correction

861 A.2d 472, 271 Conn. 806, 2004 Conn. LEXIS 506

CourtSupreme Court of Connecticut

DecidedNovember 30, 2004

DocketSC 17103

StatusPublished

This text of 861 A.2d 472 (Huguenin v. Commissioner of Correction) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Connecticut primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Huguenin v. Commissioner of Correction, 861 A.2d 472, 271 Conn. 806, 2004 Conn. LEXIS 506 (Colo. 2004).

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Opinion

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

The petitioner, Marcel Huguenin, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus claiming, inter alia, that the application of General Statutes § 18-100d¹ [807]*807to the sentences imposed on him in six criminal cases violated the ex post facto clause of the United States constitution. In response to the petition, the respondent commissioner of correction argued that § 18-100d had not been applied to the petitioner’s sentences for offenses committed prior to the effective date of the statute. Therefore, the respondent argued, the statute had not been applied retroactively and could not violate the ex post facto clause. The habeas court agreed with the respondent and, on June 13, 2002, denied the petition. The petitioner appealed from that decision to the Appellate Court.

On October 29, 2002, this court issued its decision in Tyson v. Commissioner of Correction, 261 Conn. 806, 808 A. 2d 653 (2002), cert. denied sub nom. Tyson v. Armstrong, 538 U.S. 1005, 123 S. Ct. 1914, 155 L. Ed. 2d 836 (2003), in which we concluded that the application of § 18-100d to sentences for offenses committed after the effective date of the statute was not retroactive and, therefore, did not violate the ex post facto clause. Id., 828 n.24. Subsequently, the respondent in the present case filed a motion to dismiss the petitioner’s appeal, arguing that the matter was governed by Tyson. The Appellate Court treated the motion to dismiss as a motion for summary affirmance and granted it. We thereafter granted the petitioner’s petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following issue: “Did the Appellate Court properly dismiss the petitioner’s appeal on the ground that the ex post facto issue raised by the petitioner was not debatable among jurists of reason?” Huguenin v. Commissioner of Correction, 267 Conn. 904, 838 A.2d 209 (2003).

After examining the entire record on appeal and considering the briefs and oral arguments of the parties, we have determined that the appeal in this case should be dismissed on the ground that certification was improvidently granted.

The appeal is dismissed.

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

The petitioner, Marcel Huguenin, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus claiming, inter alia, that the application of General Statutes § 18-100d¹ [807]*807to the sentences imposed on him in six criminal cases violated the ex post facto clause of the United States constitution. In response to the petition, the respondent commissioner of correction argued that § 18-100d had not been applied to the petitioner’s sentences for offenses committed prior to the effective date of the statute. Therefore, the respondent argued, the statute had not been applied retroactively and could not violate the ex post facto clause. The habeas court agreed with the respondent and, on June 13, 2002, denied the petition. The petitioner appealed from that decision to the Appellate Court.

On October 29, 2002, this court issued its decision in Tyson v. Commissioner of Correction, 261 Conn. 806, 808 A. 2d 653 (2002), cert. denied sub nom. Tyson v. Armstrong, 538 U.S. 1005, 123 S. Ct. 1914, 155 L. Ed. 2d 836 (2003), in which we concluded that the application of § 18-100d to sentences for offenses committed after the effective date of the statute was not retroactive and, therefore, did not violate the ex post facto clause. Id., 828 n.24. Subsequently, the respondent in the present case filed a motion to dismiss the petitioner’s appeal, arguing that the matter was governed by Tyson. The Appellate Court treated the motion to dismiss as a motion for summary affirmance and granted it. We thereafter granted the petitioner’s petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following issue: “Did the Appellate Court properly dismiss the petitioner’s appeal on the ground that the ex post facto issue raised by the petitioner was not debatable among jurists of reason?” Huguenin v. Commissioner of Correction, 267 Conn. 904, 838 A.2d 209 (2003).

After examining the entire record on appeal and considering the briefs and oral arguments of the parties, we have determined that the appeal in this case should be dismissed on the ground that certification was improvidently granted.

The appeal is dismissed.

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861 A.2d 472, 271 Conn. 806, 2004 Conn. LEXIS 506, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/huguenin-v-commissioner-of-correction-conn-2004.

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