[145]*145GILLETTE, J.
In this wrongful death action, the personal representative of a deceased person challenges the trial court’s application of the statutory damages cap set out at ORS 31.710 to the jury’s award of damages. Plaintiff argues that, as applied in her case, ORS 31.710 violates two provisions of the Oregon Constitution — the “remedy’ guarantee set out in Article I, section 10, and the right to a jury trial set out in Article I, section 17. The Court of Appeals rejected those arguments, along with an additional argument that the trial court had erred in ordering defendant to pay interest on plaintiffs damages award at a lower rate than ordinarily would apply. We allowed the personal representative’s petition for review and, for the reasons that follow, affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Plaintiff brought this action against PeaceHealth Medical Group for wrongful death after her daughter died while under the care of certain PeaceHealth medical providers.1 Plaintiff initially alleged two separate wrongful death claims — one under the common law and one under Oregon’s wrongful death statute, ORS 30.020. She later amended her complaint to allege a single wrongful death claim that did not specify a source of law.2
After a trial, the jury returned a verdict for plaintiff that included an award of $1 million in noneconomic damages. In the ensuing judgment, the trial court applied ORS 31.710 to reduce the noneconomic damages award to $500,000.3 In the judgment, the trial court also held that [146]*146interest payable on the damages award was to be calculated using a special lower rate, set out in ORS 82.010(2)(f), for judgments against medical providers in medical malpractice actions.
Plaintiff appealed. She argued that application of the statutory cap on noneconomic damages violated her right to a jury trial under Article I, section 17, of the Oregon Constitution, as well as the Remedy Clause of Article I, section 10. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s application of the damages cap, relying on the fact that, in Greist v. Phillips, 322 Or 281, 906 P2d 789 (1995), this court had rejected constitutional challenges to the statutory damages cap that were almost identical to the ones that plaintiff raised. Hughes v. PeaceHealth, 204 Or App 614, 617-22, 131 P3d 798 (2006).4 Plaintiff then sought review by this court, asserting in her petition for review that Greist was wrongly decided and that later decisions by this court have placed its continued relevance in doubt. We allowed her petition to consider those arguments, as well as to consider plaintiffs contention that the special interest rate set out at ORS 82.010(2)(f) should not be applied to her award.
ARTICLE I, SECTION 10
We first consider plaintiffs claim that application of the statutory cap to her wrongful death claim violates the right to a remedy provision of Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution, which provides:
“No court shall be secret, but justice shall be administered, openly and without purchase, completely and without delay, and every man shall have remedy by due course [147]*147of law for injury done him in his person, property or reputation.”
The Remedy Clause is the last clause of that provision.
In Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 332 Or 83, 23 P3d 333 (2001), this court set out a methodology for analyzing Remedy Clause claims under Article I, section 10. The court announced that a claim under the Remedy Clause should be resolved in terms of two questions:
“[First,] when the drafters wrote the Oregon Constitution in 1857, did the common law of Oregon recognize a cause of action for the alleged injury? If the answer to that question is yes, and if the legislature has abolished the common-law cause of action for injury to rights that are protected by the remedy clause, then the second question is whether it has provided a constitutionally adequate substitute remedy for the common-law cause of action for that injury.”
Id. at 124.
Plaintiffs first challenge under the foregoing analysis is to establish that the action at issue — an action for the wrongful death of her daughter, seeking damages for, among other things, the deceased’s physical and mental suffering before her death and the loss of the deceased’s “society, services, love and companionship” — is one that was recognized by the common law of Oregon in 1857. Plaintiff acknowledges that this court has stated on numerous occasions that, in Oregon, wrongful death is an entirely statutory cause of action and has no basis in the common law. See, e.g., Storm v. McClung, 334 Or 210, 222 n 4, 47 P3d 476 (2002) (stating proposition); Kilminster v. Day Management Corp., 323 Or 618, 627, 919 P2d 474 (1996) (same); Goheen v. General Motors Corp., 263 Or 145, 151-52, 502 P2d 223 (1972) (same); Putnam v. Southern Pacific Co., 21 Or 230, 231-32, 27 P 1033 (1891) (same). Plaintiff also acknowledges that, in Juarez v. Windsor Rock Products, Inc., 341 Or 160, 169-73, 144 P3d 211 (2006), this court held that, whatever the status of a claim for wrongful death was in 1857, it was clear that the kinds of injuries for which the plaintiffs sought damages in [148]*148their action were not an injury done to the plaintiffs’ “property” within the meaning of Article I, section 10. Plaintiff contends, however, that Juarez is wrong about the scope of the right that Article I, section 10, protects and should be reconsidered. Plaintiff also contends that this court’s various statements about the status of wrongful death actions under the common law are contrary to the historical evidence respecting that question and therefore should not be considered binding.
Because it also relates to plaintiffs challenge under Article I, section 17, discussed below — and because plaintiff must win it to prevail — we choose to focus first on plaintiffs argument respecting the status of wrongful death actions in Oregon in 1857. With regard to that issue, plaintiff attempts to show that, contrary to the numerous statements to the contrary in Oregon cases, a common-law action for wrongful death did, exist in 1857 when Article I, section 10, was adopted.5
Plaintiff first suggests that the common law of Oregon in 1857 incorporated Lord Campbell’s Act, 9 & 10 Viet, ch 93 (1846), an 1846 English statute that provided that a decedent’s administrator had a right of action for the benefit of certain relatives in cases of wrongful death. Plaintiff notes that the 1844 provisional legislature adopted “the statute laws of the Iowa Territory’ as well as
“the common law of England and principles of equity, not modified by the statutes of Iowa or of this government, and not incompatible with its principles.”
Laws of a General and Local Nature Passed by the Legislative Committee and Legislative Assembly [of the Oregon Provisional Legislature], p 100 (1853). Plaintiff further notes that, when Congress established the Oregon Territory in 1848, the laws of the provisional government were carried forward6 and that the territorial laws were carried forward, in turn, in 1859, under Article XVIII, section 7, of the Oregon [149]*149Constitution. Plaintiff contends that, given that succession of enactments and the fact that the Oregon Territory was governed jointly by Great Britain and the United States until 1848, it is clear that the organic laws of Great Britain up to that date — including Lord Campbell’s Act — were incorporated into this state’s common law at the time of statehood.
The difficulty with the foregoing argument is that this court has taken a different view of those enactments with respect to the relationship between this state’s common law and the historical organic law of England. The court has stated that, when “our territorial legislature and the framers of our Constitution and our courts recognized the existence [in Oregon] of the common law, they must have had reference to that law as it existed, modified and amended by the English statutes passed prior to the [American] Revolution.” Peery v. Fletcher, 93 Or 43, 53, 182 P 143 (1919) (emphasis added). See also In re Estate of Moore, 190 Or 63, 70, 223 P2d 393 (1950) (citing Peery for same proposition); United States F. & G. Co. v. Bramwell, 108 Or 261, 264, 217 P 332 (1923) (same). And it necessarily follows that English statutes enacted after the American Revolution (as was Lord Campbell’s Act), were not in 1857 and are not now part of Oregon’s common law.
Plaintiff also argues that the common-law status of wrongful death in Oregon is evident from a more general examination of English and American legal history. She begins by examining the origins of the aforementioned “rule” followed in Oregon and most other American jurisdictions that there was no common-law action for wrongful death. She notes that there is wide agreement, at least modemly, that the rule arose out of a single judge’s ill-considered dictum in a minor 1808 English decision, Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp 493, 170 Eng Rep 1033 (1808). She further notes that that dictum apparently was based on the so-called “felony merger” doctrine, a peculiar feature of eighteenth and nineteenth century English law.7 Plaintiff then observes that the felony [150]*150merger doctrine has been widely criticized and that, in Moragne v. State Marine Lines, 398 US 375, 90 S Ct 1772, 26 L Ed 2d 339 (1970), the United States Supreme Court expressly rejected it in the context of a maritime forfeiture proceeding.
On the affirmative side, plaintiff points to the ancient Germanic practice, employed in early England, of requiring monetary reparation to the victim’s family for a wrongful killing. Plaintiff acknowledges that, at least for a while in England, the emergence of felony merger doctrine stifled that early practice. She argues, however, that the felony merger doctrine ultimately was rejected in England and that it never was followed in the American states — never, at least, until 1848, when the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts adopted it rather suddenly in Carey v. Berkshire R. Co., 55 Mass (1 Cush) 475 (1848). After Carey, plaintiff asserts, courts in other American jurisdictions “blindly” followed Carey, pronouncing as an article of faith that wrongful death actions had no basis in the common law.
Plaintiff contends, however, that there is a significant body of evidence showing that, before Carey, American courts did recognize common-law wrongful death claims. In support of that argument, plaintiff commends to this court a list of cases that, in her view, exemplify that characterization of earlier American law. Plaintiffs list of cases, however, is not persuasive. Most of them involve actions by slaveowners in Southern states seeking damages for the negligently caused death of a slave. Those cases did not involve actions for wrongful death in the present sense but, instead, were actions asserting tortious conversion of, or damage to, “property.” See, e.g., Brunson v. Martin, 17 Ark 270 (Ark 1856) (master of slave was entitled to bring action against overseer to recoup damages for value of slave who died as a result of overseer’s “negligent” handling of slave rebellion), Western v. Pollard, 55 Ky 315 (Ky App 1855) (master of slave who drowned while employed by contractor could pursue common-law negligence action for value of slave’s services). [151]*151Many of the remaining cases — cases from the Massachusetts Court of Assistance in the late seventeenth century — suggest only that some death cases of an unspecified nature ended with the defendant being ordered to pay some amount to the victim’s survivors.8 And, while a few of the cases on which plaintiff relies show that some courts were willing to entertain a man’s action for the loss of the services of his son or wife,9 those cases provide an insufficient basis for a conclusion that a parent’s action seeking damages for mental suffering, loss of society, and similar injuries caused by the wrongful death of a child was or would have been recognized under the common law of early nineteenth century America.
What the evidence does suggest is that the colonial, state, and local courts in early America often did manage to arrange for some kind of compensation by persons or entities responsible for a wrongful death to the decedent’s survivors. But, before those somewhat haphazard arrangements had coalesced into a clearly defined common-law civil action for wrongful death, various state legislatures stepped into the breach and began to enact legislation explicitly providing for wrongful death actions. With those statutory enactments, efforts to develop a common law of wrongful death came to a halt. As one commentator has suggested, the sudden and almost universal conversion of American courts in the mid-nineteenth century to the rule of Baker v. Bolton was in direct response to the nearly contemporaneous trend toward providing a statutory wrongful death remedy: Quite simply, courts were reluctant to recognize a common-law remedy that might compete with their states’ newly adopted wrongful death statutes. See Wex S. Malone, The Genesis of Wrongful Death, 17 Stan L Rev 1043, 1068-73 (1965). The same commentator goes on to speculate that, “|h]ad the several state legislatures remained insensitive to the death [152]*152problem, thus obliging the courts to face it in an open field, it can be surmised that a common-law death action of some kind would have unfolded on the American scene.” Id. at 1073.
What, then, can we conclude about the status of an action for wrongful death under the common law as it existed in 1857, when the drafters of the Oregon Constitution included the Remedy Clause in the Oregon Constitution? Can we conclude that the evidence of scattered efforts by courts in other jurisdictions to provide some compensation in cases of negligently caused death is sufficient to meet the first requirement under the Smothers test, 332 Or at 124, for a Remedy Clause violation — i.e., that, “when the drafters wrote the Oregon Constitution in 1857, * * * the common law of Oregon recognize [d] a cause of action for the alleged injury[.]”? In the end, we do not think that we can. In that regard, we note that plaintiff actually is asking for two things: First, she asks us to conclude that a cause of action for wrongful death existed in 1857; then, however, she immediately seeks to avoid a statutory limitation on her claim on the ground that the limitation is contrary to the common law, as it existed before 1857, that pertained to her injury. History will not stand that strain. Even if we were to accept the notion that there was some general movement in the common law of the early nineteenth century that might, had it been left alone, eventually have grown into a common-law recognition of a wrongful death action, there is no basis for us further to conclude that the common law would have recognized the particular cause of action that plaintiff now asserts — -an action seeking damages for all injuries occasioned by the wrongful death of a family member, including mental suffering and loss of society and care, without limitation of any kind. In the end, plaintiff has failed to persuade us that the statutory damages cap at ORS 31.710 abolishes a remedy that was available at common law when Article I, section 10, was drafted. It follows that, under Smothers, plaintiff does not have a right to the “remedy” that she seeks under Article I, section 10.
ARTICLE I, SECTION 17
We turn to plaintiff’s contention that, as applied to her wrongful death action, ORS 31.710 violates the right to [153]*153jury trial guaranteed by Article I, section 17, of the Oregon Constitution. As noted, this court considered — and rejected— an almost identical argument in Greist. Plaintiff contends, however, that, in light of certain more recent cases, Greist no longer is good law.
In Greist, as in the present case, the trial court applied the damages cap at ORS 31.71010 to reduce a jury’s noneconomic damages award in a wrongful death action brought under ORS 30.020. The plaintiff challenged the reduction as a violation of both Article I, section 17, and Article VII (Amended), section 3,11 of the Oregon Constitution, on the theory that the cap interfered with the jury’s assessment of an issue of fact that, under the foregoing provisions, was reserved to the jury. This court held that the right to a jury trial guaranteed by Article I, section 17, did not pertain to wrongful death actions. The court noted, first, that, under a long line of cases, Article I, section 17, applied “ ‘only in those classes of cases in which the right was customary at the time the constitution was adopted or in cases of like nature.’ ” Greist, 322 Or at 293 (quoting Molodyh v. Truck Insurance Exchange, 304 Or 290, 295-96, 774 P2d 992 (1987)). The court cited authority to the effect that wrongful death actions in Oregon are purely statutory, and then observed that Oregon’s first wrongful death statute was adopted in 1862— five years after the Oregon Constitution was written. The court concluded that, because there was no wrongful death action — common law or statutory — when the constitution [154]*154was drafted and adopted, no right to a jury trial of such an action could have existed at that time. Greist, 322 Or at 294.
This court also concluded in Greist that, even if Article I, section 17, did apply to the wrongful death action at issue, it would not affect the noneconomic damages cap because Article I, section 17, had never included a right to unfettered determination of damages by a jury. That was so, we reasoned, because, when Article I, section 17, was adopted, “a jury’s determination of the amount of damages to be awarded in tort actions was not protected from judicial alteration.” Id.
As plaintiff in the present case is quick to point out, however, this court disavowed the latter statement from Greist in Lakin v. Senco Products, Inc., 329 Or 62, 987 P2d 463 (1999). The court noted in Lakin that:
“Oregon trial courts never have had the power to reduce a jury’s verdict or to enter judgment for a lesser amount of damages over the objection of the prevailing party, who always could reject a judicial remittitur and demand a new jury trial.”
Id. at 76 (emphasis in original). In fact, this court concluded in Lakin that, as applied in an ordinary common-law negligence action, the damages cap at issue violated Article I, section 17, because it interfered with a plaintiffs right to have a jury assess damages — including noneconomic damages — in such actions. Notably, the court suggested that Greist was “distinguishable” from Lakin because, unlike the common-law negligence action at issue in the latter case, the wrongful death action at issue in Greist “was not one recognized at common law or under the Oregon Territorial Law when Article I, section 17, was adopted.” Id. at 77.
We continue to adhere to that view: Lakin and Greist are distinguishable from each other precisely because, as is true here, Greist was a wrongful death case, the parameters of which are subject to legislative adjustment from time to time. Plaintiff contends, however, that Greist does not confront the idea, expressed in some of this court’s earlier cases, that the jury trial right that Article I, section 17, guarantees is not confined to the class of cases in which it was customary [155]*155in 1857, but also applies to cases “of like nature.” See State v. 1920 Studebaker Touring Car et al, 120 Or 254, 251 P 701 (1927) (using that standard).
Based on 1920 Studebaker and later cases that describe Article I, section 17, in similar terms, plaintiff argues that her wrongful death action is “of like nature” to an ordinary common-law personal injury action. In that regard, she argues:
“This is a medical negligence action and, in terms of liability, the same proof is required as would have been necessary had [the deceased] survived but been permanently injured by the defendant’s failure to diagnose and treat her appropriately. The only distinction between this wrongful death action and a personal injury action based on the same liability facts is the nature of some of the damages, i.e., the parents’ loss of their daughter’s ‘society, services, love and companionship’.”
And, plaintiff argues, because her wrongful death action is like a personal injury action, she has the same right to a jury determination of damages, unfettered by legislative or judicial interference, that a plaintiff in an ordinary personal injury action enjoys under this court’s Article I, section 17, decision in Lakin.
We disagree. Plaintiffs expansive claim clearly conflicts with a principle that this court often has invoked in the context of recent cases arising under Article I, section 17— that “Article I, section 17, is not a source of law that creates or retains a substantive claim or a theory of recovery in favor of any party.” Jensen v. Whitlow, 334 Or 412, 422, 51 P3d 599 (2002); see also Lawson v. Hoke, 339 Or 253, 267, 119 P3d 210 (2005) (quoting Jensen); DeMendoza v. Huffman, 334 Or 425, 446, 51 P3d 1232 (2002) (same). Under that rule, plaintiff is entitled to a jury’s determination of her damages, both in type and amount, only to the extent that the substantive law, i.e., the statute, pertaining to her claim so provides.
We need not further discuss the holding in Lakin to conclude that the state of affairs with respect to wrongful death actions is — and always has been — quite different from the common-law claim at issue in that case. As discussed above, the view expressed by this court in previous cases— [156]*156that wrongful death in Oregon is purely statutory and has no secure basis in the common law as it existed in 1857 — is correct. Stated differently, in 1857, there was no clear common-law tradition with respect to the necessary elements of a wrongful death action, or who might bring such an action, or what sorts of damages would be recoverable, should such a cause of action be recognized. That is, in Lakin terms, there was no common-law rule defining the damages for wrongful death at all, much less one that identified the amount that would compensate a plaintiff for injuries resulting from the wrongful act. The legislature therefore retained the authority to define the right to recover for wrongful death, the authority to decide who could recover, and the authority to establish the nature of the damages that were recoverable. The legislature did no more.
When the Oregon legislature enacted a law in 1862 providing that the wrongful death action belonged to the deceased person’s personal representative, and that the cause of action was for “injury done by the same act or omission that would have supported an action by the deceased, had he or she lived,” and that “damages therein shall not exceed five thousand dollars,” General Laws of Oregon, Civ Code, ch IV, title VI, § 367, p 187 (Deady & Lane 1843-1872), it was defining the action — including the measure of damages — on a clean slate. No issue arose respecting trial by jury, because that has always been, as a matter of practice, the way such cases had been tried.12 That fact notwithstanding, it should not be surprising that no one challenged the $5,000 limitation in the statute as inconsistent with Article I, section 17: Because wrongful death plaintiffs had no preexisting substantive common-law right to compensation for any injuries resulting from the wrongful act, they could not argue that the $5,000 limitation interfered with the jury’s unfettered determination of their damages.
For precisely the same reason, plaintiff cannot today argue that the noneconomic damages cap at ORS 31.710 violates her right to an unfettered jury determination of damages: Because the common law does not, and did not in 1857, [157]*157recognize a right to unlimited damages in wrongful death actions, the only relevant source of substantive law respecting damages is the statutory law, which expressly places a cap on noneconomic damages. Thus, any right to a jury trial that plaintiff might have under Article I, section 17, cannot confer a right to a jury award of a kind or amount of damages that is contrary to that statutory law.13 We conclude, in short, that the damages cap at ORS 31.710 does not violate Article I, section 17, of the Oregon Constitution.
THE INTEREST STATUTE
We come, finally, to plaintiffs argument that the trial court erred in ordering defendant to pay interest on plaintiffs damages award at a lower rate than ordinarily would apply.
In general, money judgments are subject to a nine percent per annum interest rate under ORS 82.010(2). However, there are some exceptions to that nine percent rate, including the one set out at ORS 82.010(2)(f):
“The rate of interest on a judgment rendered in favor of a plaintiff in a civil action to recover damages for injuries resulting from the professional negligence of a person licensed by the Board of Medical Examiners * * * is the lesser of five percent per annum or three percent in excess of the discount rate in effect at the Federal Reserve Bank in the Federal Reserve district where the injuries occurred.”
After the jury returned its verdict for plaintiff, defendant submitted a form of judgment specifying the interest rate set out in ORS 82.010(2)(f) as the applicable rate. Plaintiff objected and submitted her own form of judgment, specifying a nine percent interest rate. The trial court accepted and entered defendant’s form of judgment, implicitly rejecting plaintiffs objections to the reduced interest rate. On appeal, plaintiff assigned error to the trial court’s application of the reduced interest rate on statutory and constitutional [158]*158grounds, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. 204 Or App at 622-24.
Before this court, plaintiff argues, first, that ORS 82.010(2)(f) does not apply to her money judgment against defendant because her action was not one to “recover damages for injuries resulting from professional negligence” within the meaning of that statute. Plaintiff contends that the term “injuries” is used in the statute in the narrow sense of bodily injury, exclusive of death — the outcome in her daughter’s case. She notes that, in a variety of statutes, the legislature refers separately to damages for “injury” and damages for “death.” See, e.g., ORS 30.265(2) (public bodies immune from “claim for injury to or death of any person”); ORS 30.805(1) (no person may maintain “an action for damages for injury, death or loss” resulting from acts of person providing emergency medical assistance); ORS 31.600 (contributory negligence no bar to recovery in action to recovery damages “for death or injury to person or property”). She concludes that, in view of the legislature’s ordinary practice, it is significant that it did not specify in ORS 82.010(2)(f) that the special interest rate applies to actions for injuries or death resulting from professional negligence.
We agree with the Court of Appeals, however, that the legislature intended the term “injuries” in ORS 82.010(2)(f) in the broad legal sense of a violation — any violation — of the legal rights of another. In considering the issue, we can think of no rational explanation for the statute that would accommodate the meaning that plaintiff contends for: Why provide a limited interest rate on money judgments in medical malpractice actions, but only if the patient did not die? Moreover, we think that it is significant that ORS 82.010(2)(f) uses the plural form — “injuries”—while all of plaintiffs statutory examples refer to “injury” and “death” in the singular. In plaintiffs examples, the singular form is used because the legislature is identifying a category of harms — bodily “injury,” as opposed to “death” or “loss.” The fact that ORS 82.010(2)(f) uses the plural form — “injuries”— demonstrates that the legislature was not focusing on a category of harms but on “injuries” in a diverse, collective sense.
[159]*159In sum, we think that it is clear from text and context alone that the legislature used the term “injuries” in ORS 82.010(2)(f) to refer to any violation of a legal right. It follows that the money judgment at issue here — damages for injuries to plaintiff that resulted from medical negligence — is subject to the interest rate provided in ORS 82.010(2)(f).
Plaintiff argues, finally, that the trial court erred in applying ORS 82.010(2)(f) to her money judgment because that provision violates Article I, section 20, of the Oregon Constitution. Article I, section 20, provides:
“No law shall be passed granting to any citizen or class of citizens privileges, or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens.”
However, we are unpersuaded by plaintiffs arguments and do not think that they warrant an extensive discussion. The trial court did not err.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court are affirmed.