Huffman v. Tiberio

2021 IL App (3d) 180418-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: February 17, 2021
• Docket: 3-18-0418
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

2021 IL App (3d) 180418-U

Order filed February 17, 2021 ____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

SEAN P. HUFFMAN, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of the 14th Judicial Circuit, Petitioner-Appellant, ) Rock Island County, Illinois, ) v. ) Appeal No. 3-18-0418 ) Circuit No. 12-F-275 ) ALEXES TIBERIO, ) Honorable ) Walter D. Braud, Respondent-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE O’BRIEN delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice McDade and Justice Wright concurred in the judgment. ____________________________________________________________________________

ORDER

¶1 Held: The evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for direct criminal contempt.

¶2 Petitioner, Sean P. Huffman, filed a complaint to establish paternity of a minor child.

During the proceedings, Huffman, made several posts to his Facebook account that disparaged the

circuit court, the child’s guardian ad litem, and counsel for respondent, Alexes Tiberio. The posts

violated a prior court order. As a result of the posts, the court initiated criminal contempt

proceedings and found Huffman in direct criminal contempt. On appeal, Huffman argues the court’s direct criminal contempt finding violated Huffman’s right to due process because the

evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We reverse Huffman’s

direct criminal contempt conviction.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On May 2, 2012, Huffman filed a petition to establish paternity, custody, visitation, and

support against respondent. During a July 26, 2017, hearing, the court verbally ordered Huffman

“not to use the internet or any other media to criticize public officials, court personnel, or the

respondent.” Huffman indicated that he understood the order.

¶5 On June 20, 2018, counsel for respondent filed a motion for rule to show cause. The motion

alleged that Huffman violated the July 26, 2017, court order when he authored several derogatory

Facebook posts that criticized the court, the child’s guardian ad litem, and counsel for respondent.

Counsel asked the court to find Huffman in contempt of court and impose financial sanctions.

¶6 On June 28, 2018, the court conducted a hearing on the motion for rule to show cause.

Counsel for respondent entered printed copies of Huffman’s Facebook posts into evidence. In the

posts, Huffman suggested the court, the guardian ad litem, and counsel for respondent were “child

predators” and “pedophiles” who “kidnapped” Huffman’s child and committed fraud, extortion,

and various other crimes. The posts also referred to the court as “unevolved monkeys” and accused

it of acting dishonestly and flagrantly violating Huffman’s rights and his child’s rights.

¶7 Counsel for respondent called Huffman to testify. Huffman acknowledged the prior court

order and admitted to authoring the posts. However, Huffman believed that the court’s prior order

violated “due process.” In response to a question from the court, Huffman said he had a

constitutional right to make the posts.

2 ¶8 The court waived closing arguments and found Huffman in contempt of court. The court

specifically found that Huffman had “used social media” to make “defamatory remarks in violation

of the court’s order; to wit, calling parties pedophiles, frauds, et cetera.” To purge the contempt,

the court ordered Huffman to pay $300 in attorneys fees within 90 days.

¶9 The court ended the proceedings on the rule to show cause and began a criminal contempt

proceeding. The court directed counsel for respondent, who was writing up the prior order, to

“leave a space, because I have to decide whether there’s any further punishment on the contempt

based on what happens in this *** direct criminal contempt proceedings.”

¶ 10 During the criminal contempt proceeding, the court explained

“[E]ven though these posts were made outside of court, they are actually now a part

of the court proceeding. ***

*** And so if you had, say, written these letters to her, or yelled it out the

window, probably it would be outside of the court, and even putting it on social

media, it still is pretty much out—I didn’t know about it. It’s kind of outside the

court, but because you’re in court and they’ve been introduced into the record, now

they’re in court and they’re in my face. When they’re in my face, it’s called ‘direct

criminal contempt.’ The other kind, if you—if you did all this and it never got into

this courtroom, that would be ‘indirect,’ and we have a whole lot of steps. But this

is in my face, so there are no steps. I’m going to decide within the next half an hour

whether you directly insulted me, the court, and the court system, whether you did

it with malice *** and if I *** make those findings, then I’m going to do something

about it ***.”

¶ 11 The court recalled Huffman to testify. Without admonishing Huffman, the court asked,

3 “[E]xplain to me, if you can, how—maybe why you did it, or if you didn’t do it,

tell me which ones you didn’t do, or maybe explain how you could come about in

your mind that you would think that this would be all right, or if you think that I’m

not reading it right, explain it.”

Huffman responded, “[Y]ou know, when you’re sitting in your house at night and you’re pissed

off and you want to vent.” Huffman also said that he believed that he had a constitutional right to

make the post. Huffman also thought that the post was shared only with his friends. In an unsworn

statement, counsel for respondent indicated that he was able to access the post without having a

social media connection to Huffman. Huffman apologized for the post and asked the court to

impose a sentence of community service.

¶ 12 At the conclusion of Huffman’s testimony, the court found Huffman “in direct criminal

contempt.” The court also found “the Facebook posts were intended to embarrass and obstruct the

administration of justice and it directly smeared the reputations of the court and its officers. I find

that the conduct was willful and intentional. I find that the conduct is properly before the Court

because it’s in the exhibits.” The court then sentenced Huffman to one year of probation and “one

year in jail as a condition of the probation.” The court suspended 11 months of the jail term. The

court also imposed a $1000 fine. Huffman appeals.

¶ 13 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 14 Huffman argues the court’s direct criminal contempt proceedings violated his right to due

process, including: the right to be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the right to counsel,

the right to written notice of the criminal contempt charges, the privilege against self-

incrimination, and the right to a jury trial. Respondent did not file a brief. However, because “the

record is simple and the claimed errors are such that [we] can easily decide them without the aid

4 of an appellee’s brief,” we will decide the merits of the appeal without the need for an appellee’s

brief. First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133 (1976).

¶ 15 We note that Huffman failed to identify a standard of review for a direct criminal contempt

finding. On appeal, we consider “whether sufficient evidence exists to support a finding of

contempt and whether the judge considered facts outside the judge’s personal knowledge.” People

v. Hixson, 2012 IL App (4th) 100777, ¶ 11. If the evidence is insufficient to support the court’s

contempt finding, then a defendant’s conviction must be reversed. Id. ¶ 18.

¶ 16 In this case, the circuit court found that Huffman had committed direct criminal contempt.

Criminal contempt is “conduct that is calculated to impede, embarrass, or obstruct the court in its

administration of justice or derogate from the court’s authority or dignity, or to bring the

administration of the law into disrepute.” People v. Ernest, 141 Ill. 2d 412, 421 (1990). Criminal

contempt sanctions are imposed to punish past misconduct, not compel the contemnor to perform

a particular act. In re Marriage of Betts, 200 Ill. App. 3d 26, 43 (1990). Direct criminal contempt

is conduct that is (1) “personally observed by the judge,” or (2) “committed outside the immediate

physical presence of the judge but within an integral part of the court.” Hixson, 2012 IL App (4th)

100777, ¶ 12. Unlike indirect criminal contempt, where the court does not observe the

contemptuous act, “Neither a formal charge nor an evidentiary hearing must precede a hearing on

direct criminal contempt because the misconduct was actually observed by the court and the

relevant facts lie within the court’s personal knowledge.” People v. Perez, 2014 IL App (3d)

120978, ¶ 18.

¶ 17 In the present case, the evidence was insufficient to support the circuit court’s finding of

direct criminal contempt. First, the record is clear that the court did not personally observe

Huffman’s conduct. Cf. People v. Jashunsky, 51 Ill. 2d 220, 225 (1972) (affirming, in part, the

5 circuit court’s direct criminal contempt finding where the court personally observed the

contemptuous conduct). Huffman provided testimony that suggested he was in his home when he

authored the Facebook posts. There was no evidence that Huffman committed the conduct in court

or the courthouse. Thus, the court did not have personal knowledge of Huffman’s conduct. Second,

the conduct did not “take place in an integral or constituent part of the court” and was not in the

court’s constructive presence. People v. Javaras, 51 Ill. 2d 296, 299 (1972); cf. Perez, 2014 IL

App (3d) 120978, ¶ 22 (holding that where court personnel notified the court of respondent’s

conduct in the hallway outside of the courtroom, the conduct constituted indirect criminal

contempt); People v. Minor, 281 Ill. App. 3d 568 (1996) (finding the evidence sufficient to support

a direct criminal contempt finding where the contemnor sent the offending letters to the circuit

clerk’s office). Instead, Huffman’s Facebook posts occurred completely outside of the court’s

presence, and the court only learned of the posts when counsel for respondent introduced printed

copies of the posts into evidence. While the record establishes that the court was reasonably

frustrated with Huffman, it does not support a finding of direct criminal contempt because the

court did not have personal knowledge of Huffman’s derogatory Facebook posts.

¶ 18 We need not address Huffman’s other due process claims because the insufficiency of the

evidence requires reversal of the direct criminal contempt order. See Hixson, 2012 IL App (4th)

100777, ¶ 18. Finally, we note that our decision does not impact the civil contempt proceeding that

took place prior to the criminal contempt proceeding.

¶ 19 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 20 The judgment of the circuit court of Rock Island County is reversed.

¶ 21 Reversed.