Huffman v. Moore County

CourtNorth Carolina Industrial Commission
DecidedApril 20, 2009
DocketI.C. NO. 480967.
StatusPublished

This text of Huffman v. Moore County (Huffman v. Moore County) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering North Carolina Industrial Commission primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Huffman v. Moore County, (N.C. Super. Ct. 2009).

Opinion

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In accordance with the directives of the North Carolina Court of Appeals, the Full Commission has clarified its findings of fact and issues the following Opinion Award.

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The Full Commission finds as fact and concludes as matters of law the following, which were entered into by the parties in a pre-trial agreement and at the hearing before the Deputy Commissioner as:

STIPULATIONS *Page 2
1. Plaintiffs' alleged dates of injury are shown on the Forms 33.

2. On those dates, the parties were subject to and bound by the provisions of the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act.

3. On those dates, an employer-employee relationship existed between the parties.

4. Sedgwick of the Carolinas, Inc. was the compensation carrier on the risk.

5. Judicial notice may be taken of all Industrial Commission forms on file.

6. Documents stipulated into evidence include the following:

a. Stipulated Exhibit#1 — Medical records of the plaintiffs; and

b. Stipulated Exhibit #2 — Industrial Commission Forms.

7. Plaintiffs' average weekly wages were to be determined by the Form 22's, which were prepared by defendants and included in the packets of Industrial Commission forms.

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EVIDENTIARY RULINGS
1. The objections raised by Defendants at the depositions taken in this matter and at the hearing before the Deputy Commissioner are hereby OVERRULED.

2. Defendants' Motion in Limine on the admissibility of plaintiffs' proffered witness testimony and defendants' objections to the testimony of plaintiffs' treating physicians under the United State's Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrill Dow Industries, 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), and its progeny are hereby DENIED and OVERRULED. North Carolina law on the admissibility of expert testimony under Rule 702 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence has coalesced in State v. Goode, 341 N.C. 513, 461 S.E.2d 631 (1995). Goode established a workable framework for ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony. Under North Carolina law, trial courts are vested with broad discretion to limit the *Page 3 admissibility of expert testimony as necessitated by the demands of each case. Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 358 N.C. 440, 597 S.E.2d 674 (2004). The Deputy Commissioner, having considered North Carolina case law, Rules of Evidence and the reliability of the witnesses' proffered testimony, allowed the introduction of this testimony. The Full Commission concurs, recognizing that the weight to be attributed to such testimony is a separate determination.

3. On June 28, 2005, the day of the hearing before the Full Commission, Defendants submitted a Motion for Additional Evidence to introduce correspondence dated July 7, 1994, from Power Vac Service, Inc. to Moore County Property management. Although Defendants stated that upon information and belief, they had supplied the correspondence to plaintiffs prior to the hearing before the Deputy Commissioner, it appears that the document was never included in the evidentiary record. Plaintiffs have objected to the late introduction of this document, which had not been authenticated or otherwise formally admitted into the record. Since plaintiffs were not afforded an opportunity to rebut this document, the Full Commission sustains plaintiffs' objections and the correspondence dated July 7, 1994, from Power Vac Service, Inc. to Moore County Property management is hereby excluded from the evidentiary record.

4. The testimony of Dr. Albert Robbins, D.O., and the opinions reflected therein are excluded from evidence, as they were not stipulated into the record. Further, Dr. Robbins did not submit to a deposition in which his opinions could be cross-examined or his records authenticated.

5. On February 20, 2009, Plaintiffs submitted a Motion to Take Judicial Notice of a portion of a report authored by one of their experts, Dr. William J. Meggs, together with certain colleagues. On February 25, 2009, Defendants submitted their Response and Objections to Plaintiffs' Motion. The materials submitted by Plaintiffs are the subject of dispute in the medical *Page 4 and scientific communities as well as between the parties to this case. The Full Commission finds that the portion of the report submitted by Plaintiffs is not the sort of evidence of which the Industrial Commission should take judicial notice. Hayes v. Tractor SupplyCo., 170 N.C. App. 405, 612 S.E.2d 399, fn 1 (2005). See also N.C. Rule of Evidence 201. The Full Commission, in the exercise of its discretion, declines to take judicial notice of the materials submitted by the Plaintiffs and denies Plaintiffs' Motion.

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Based on the competent evidence of record, and in accordance with the directives of the North Carolina Court of Appeals, the Full Commission makes the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
General Findings
1. All of the Plaintiffs in this case were employed by Moore County and each worked for some time in the Moore County Community Services Building (hereinafter "CSB").

2. Moore County purchased the CSB from Ren Electronics in the late 1980s and converted it into offices for county employees. It is a one-story structure constructed on a concrete slab. A septic system, which included three septic tanks, was buried under the building. Eventually the septic system was disconnected when the building was connected to the City of Carthage water and sewer system.

3. Budd Hill Shirer, a former employee of Ren Electronics worked in the subject-building from approximately 1980 to 1982. Mr. Shirer witnessed substances being poured down the drain in the CSB. Mr. Shirer was unable to identify every chemical improperly disposed of in this manner; however, he did specifically recall several, including trichlorethylene, toluene, methyl ethyl ketone [MEK] and other chemical solvent degreasing agents. Mr. Shirer did not *Page 5 take part in the disposal of the chemicals nor could he give an opinion as to whether or not the chemicals persisted in the septic system up to the time Plaintiffs began working in the CSB. Mr. Shirer had no further knowledge of the business practices of Ren Electronics once he left his employment other than knowing that Ren Electronics ceased business completely at that location within two years of his departure.

4. On June 2, 1994, the Department of Health of Moore County received a telephone call regarding the air quality in the CSB.

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Related

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
509 U.S. 579 (Supreme Court, 1993)
Hardin v. Motor Panels, Inc.
524 S.E.2d 368 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 2000)
Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd.
597 S.E.2d 674 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 2004)
Gay-Hayes v. Tractor Supply Co.
612 S.E.2d 399 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 2005)
Wilkins v. J.P. Stevens & Co.
426 S.E.2d 675 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1993)
Rutledge v. Tultex Corp./Kings Yarn
301 S.E.2d 359 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1983)
State v. Goode
461 S.E.2d 631 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1995)

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Bluebook (online)
Huffman v. Moore County, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/huffman-v-moore-county-ncworkcompcom-2009.