Huffman v. Moore County

669 S.E.2d 788, 194 N.C. App. 352, 2008 N.C. App. LEXIS 2269
CourtCourt of Appeals of North Carolina
DecidedDecember 16, 2008
DocketCOA08-128
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 669 S.E.2d 788 (Huffman v. Moore County) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Huffman v. Moore County, 669 S.E.2d 788, 194 N.C. App. 352, 2008 N.C. App. LEXIS 2269 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008).

Opinion

ARROWOOD, Judge.

The Plaintiffs in this case are Frances Huffman, Roger D. Kennedy, Marilyn Dawn Kidd, Thomas P. Marsh, Frankie McCaskill, Deborah K. Rogers, and Sharon P. Scott, former Moore County employees who worked in the Community Services Building owned by the County. The Defendants in this case are Moore County and its insurance carrier, Sedgwick of the Carolinas, Inc.

From February 1995 to April 1996, Plaintiffs filed workers’ compensation claims alleging multiple effects of toxin exposure that occurred while they occupied the Community Services Building owned by Moore County. Defendants denied all of the claims on the basis that no injury occurred and Plaintiffs’ complaints did not arise from causes and conditions characteristic of and peculiar to their respective employments to which members of the general public were not equally exposed.
Plaintiffs’ claims were consolidated for hearing and heard before Deputy Commissioner Crystal R. Stanback . . . [who] awarded Plaintiffs Scott, McCaskill, Kidd, Huffman, and Rogers permanent and total disability compensation at their respective compensation rates; and awarded Plaintiffs Marsh and Kennedy temporary total disability compensation at their respective compensation rates. Defendants’ appeal to the full Commission resulted in ah order denying Plaintiffs’ claims. From that denial, Plaintiffs appealed] to this Court.

Huffman v. Moore County, 184 N.C. App. 187, 645 S.E.2d 899 (2007) (unpublished) (hereinafter Huffman I).

In Huffman I, this Court “reach[ed] only the issue regarding the Commission’s failure to make proper findings of fact related to the issue of spoilation of relevant evidence.” The Court held that the Commission failed to make findings of fact resolving the conflicting evidence on the issue, and instead “merely recited what [the witnesses] testified to[.]” This Court reversed and remanded for proper findings of fact. On remand, the Commission issued a new opinion which stated that:

*354 In accordance with the directives of the North Carolina Court of Appeals, the Full Commission has added Findings of Fact numbers 29 and 30 and modified Finding of Fact number 32. In all other respects the October 25, 2005 Opinion and Award of the Full Commission remains the same.

The Commission’s Opinion and Award, filed 27 September 2007, again denied Plaintiffs’ claims for workers’ compensation benefits. Plaintiffs have appealed to this Court. We reverse and remand for “specific findings of fact as to each material fact upon which the rights of the parties . . . depend.” Hansel v. Sherman Textiles, 304 N.C. 44, 59, 283 S.E.2d 101, 109 (1981) (citations omitted).

“Findings of fact are statements of what happened in space and time.” State ex rel. Utilities Comm. v. Eddleman, 320 N.C. 344, 351, 358 S.E.2d 339, 346 (1987). For example in the present case, Finding No. 11 states in part that “Dr. Roy Fortmann and Russ Clayton of Acurex Environmental visited the CSB and met with Philip Boles, Sam Fields and Bobby Lake[.]” However, “[a] determination which requires the exercise of judgment or the application of legal principles is more appropriately a conclusion of law.” Guox v. Satterly, 164 N.C. App. 578, 582, 596 S.E.2d 452, 455 (2004) (citing In re Helms, 127 N.C. App. 505, 510, 491 S.E.2d 672, 675 (1997)). Thus, the statement in Finding No. 104 that “plaintiffs have not proven that their symptoms were caused by or significantly aggravated by their employment with defendant-employer” is more properly designated a conclusion of law.

“This Court has long recognized that the Industrial Commission is the sole fact finding agency in cases in which it has jurisdiction and that the finding of facts is one of the primary duties of the Commission.” Vieregge v. N.C. State University, 105 N.C. App. 633, 638, 414 S.E.2d 771, 774 (1992) (citations omitted). In Thomason v. Cab Co., 235 N.C. 602, 605-06, 70 S.E.2d 706, 709 (1952), the North Carolina Supreme Court stated that:

It is impossible to exaggerate how essential the proper exercise of the fact-finding authority of the Industrial Commission is to the due administration of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The findings of fact of the Industrial Commission should tell the full story of the event giving rise to the claim for compensation. They must be sufficiently positive and specific to enable the court on appeal to determine whether they are supported by the evidence and whether the law has been properly applied to them.... [T]he *355 court cannot decide whether the conclusions of law and the decision of the Industrial Commission rightly recognize and effectively enforce the rights of the parties upon the matters in controversy if the Industrial Commission fails to make specific findings as to each material fact upon which those rights depend.

Moreover, “findings of fact must be more than a mere summarization or recitation of the evidence and the Commission must resolve the conflicting testimony.” Lane v. American Nat’l Can Co., 181 N.C. App. 527, 531, 640 S.E.2d 732, 735 (2007) (citing Hansel v. Sherman Textiles, 304 N.C. 44, 59, 283 S.E.2d 101, 109 (1981)) (other citation omitted.).

In the instant case, the Commission filed an Opinion with more than 100 findings of fact. Many of these recited or summarized the witness testimony, but did not state the facts that the Commission found to exist based on that testimony. By way of example, we note the following excerpts from the findings of fact:

3. Budd Hill Shirer... testified... that he witnessed substances being poured down the drain in the CSB . . . including trichloroethylene, toluene, . . . and other chemical solvent degreasing agents....
6. On June 21, 1994, William Pate, an industrial hygiene consultant . . . inspected the CSB. ... [In his] testimony, Mr. Pate explained that carbon dioxide concentrations were well below the acceptable limit of 1000 parts per million. . . . Mr. Pate testified that he did not see anything during his inspection that would have caused him concern for the safety of the employees.
10. ... [William Pate] testified that on July 20, 1994, he . . . conducted] air sampling for residual pesticide concentration in the air and for volatile organic compounds. . . .

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Bluebook (online)
669 S.E.2d 788, 194 N.C. App. 352, 2008 N.C. App. LEXIS 2269, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/huffman-v-moore-county-ncctapp-2008.