OPINION OF THE COURT
Appellant was indicted September 19, 1986, on a charge of murder. At a pre-trial hearing, appellant attacked the constitutionality of KRS 532.055 and KRS 439.-3401, and filed proper motion to have these two statutes declared unconstitutional. After hearing, the motion was denied, whereupon appellant entered a plea of guilty to the charge. He advised the court that said plea was a conditional plea, entered pursuant to RCr 8.09, which reads:
With approval of the court and the consent of the Commonwealth, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, reserving in writing the right, on appeal from the judgment, to review the adverse determination of any specified trial or pre-trial motion. If the defendant prevails on appeal, he shall be allowed to withdraw his plea.
KRS 532.055
The appellant expends a great part of his argument regarding this statute on the issue of separation of powers. The arguments made herein are identical to the ones considered by this court in Commonwealth v. Reneer, Ky., 734 S.W.2d 794 (1987), in which case we declined to hold the statute unconstitutional on the grounds that it violated the separation of powers, and “accept[ed] its provisions for the time being under the principle of comity.” P. 798.
The new argument advanced by the appellant concerns KRS 532.055(2)(a). This section applies to the sentencing phase of the bifurcated trial procedure provided by this statute and specifies that, once a jury has determined the defendant to be guilty [107]*107of a crime in its verdict in the initial phase of the trial (after guilt or innocence is determined), it may introduce certain matters, including
(a) evidence may be offered by the Commonwealth relevant to sentencing, including:
1. Minimum parole eligibility, prior convictions of the defendant, both felony and misdemeanor;
The statute herein attacked is a portion of the “Truth-in-Sentencing” package adopted by the Kentucky General Assembly in 1986, the avowed purpose of which was to remove the veil of uncertainty and speculation from the jury and to provide each jury with more accurate information concerning the defendant on trial. As we have noted, this evidence is made known only after a predetermination of guilt.
The Supreme Court of the United States has examined in several cases the questions before us. In the case of California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 103 S.Ct. 3446, 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983). Justice O’Connor, in her majority opinion, cites ALI Model Penal Code § 210.6 (Prop. Off. Draft 1962), in which it is stated:
... the court at the sentencing state shall inform the jury of the nature of the sentence of imprisonment that may be imposed, including its implication with respect to possible release upon parole, if the jury sentence is against sentence of death. (Emphasis ours).
In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976), the court stated:
We think it advisable for the jury to have as much information before it as possible when it makes the sentencing decision.
Gregg further held:
It is certainly not a novel proposition that discretion in the area of sentencing be exercised in an informed manner. We have long recognized that [f]or the determination of sentences, justice generally requires ... that there be taken into account the circumstances of the offense, together with the character and propensities of the offender. (Citing cases.)
KRS 439.3401
This statute reads as follows:
439.3401. Parole for violent offenders.—(1) As used in this section, “violent offender” means any person who has been convicted of or pled guilty to the commission of a capital offense, Class A felony, or Class B felony involving the death of the victim, or rape in the first degree or sodomy in the first degree of the victim, or serious physical injury to a victim.
(2) A violent offender who has been convicted of a capital offense (and has not been sentenced to twenty-five (25) years without parole), or a Class A felony and receives a life sentence, or to death and his sentence is commuted to a life sentence shall not be released on parole until he has served at least twelve (12) years in the penitentiary.
(3) A violent offender who has been convicted of a Class A felony with a sentence of a term of years or Class B felony who is a violent offender shall not be released on parole until he has served at least fifty percent (50%) of the sentence imposed.
(4) This section shall apply only to those persons who commit offenses after July 15, 1986.
Appellant challenges the constitutionality of this statute on three grounds. First, he contends that it violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Section 2 of the Kentucky Constitution. Second, he argues that it denies equal protection guaranteed by both constitutions; and, third, he argues that it is unconstitutionally vague in its application.
All three arguments are predicated upon the possibility of the results emanating from the difference between one who has been sentenced to life imprisonment and who has a minimum eligibility for parole of 12 years, and one who has been sentenced to a term of years and who has a minimum eligibility for parole of at least [108]*10850% of the sentence imposed. This means, of course, that one who receives a sentence of 25 years or more has a minimum parole eligibility in excess of one who receives a life sentence — a sentence which the layman considers a longer sentence. We do not find this a matter of constitutional violation but a matter to be considered by juries in affixing sentences.
Appellant does not argue that the classification of crimes and length of stay in the penitentiary is other than a prerogative of the legislature, and indeed could not. See Rummell v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980); Rudolph v. Corrections Cabinet of Kentucky, Ky., 710 S.W.2d 235, 236 (1986). The entire attack on KRS 439.3401 is predicated on the possible disparity in sentencing which may exist in the minimum for parole eligibility.
A life sentence in Kentucky is a parola-ble offense.
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OPINION OF THE COURT
Appellant was indicted September 19, 1986, on a charge of murder. At a pre-trial hearing, appellant attacked the constitutionality of KRS 532.055 and KRS 439.-3401, and filed proper motion to have these two statutes declared unconstitutional. After hearing, the motion was denied, whereupon appellant entered a plea of guilty to the charge. He advised the court that said plea was a conditional plea, entered pursuant to RCr 8.09, which reads:
With approval of the court and the consent of the Commonwealth, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, reserving in writing the right, on appeal from the judgment, to review the adverse determination of any specified trial or pre-trial motion. If the defendant prevails on appeal, he shall be allowed to withdraw his plea.
KRS 532.055
The appellant expends a great part of his argument regarding this statute on the issue of separation of powers. The arguments made herein are identical to the ones considered by this court in Commonwealth v. Reneer, Ky., 734 S.W.2d 794 (1987), in which case we declined to hold the statute unconstitutional on the grounds that it violated the separation of powers, and “accept[ed] its provisions for the time being under the principle of comity.” P. 798.
The new argument advanced by the appellant concerns KRS 532.055(2)(a). This section applies to the sentencing phase of the bifurcated trial procedure provided by this statute and specifies that, once a jury has determined the defendant to be guilty [107]*107of a crime in its verdict in the initial phase of the trial (after guilt or innocence is determined), it may introduce certain matters, including
(a) evidence may be offered by the Commonwealth relevant to sentencing, including:
1. Minimum parole eligibility, prior convictions of the defendant, both felony and misdemeanor;
The statute herein attacked is a portion of the “Truth-in-Sentencing” package adopted by the Kentucky General Assembly in 1986, the avowed purpose of which was to remove the veil of uncertainty and speculation from the jury and to provide each jury with more accurate information concerning the defendant on trial. As we have noted, this evidence is made known only after a predetermination of guilt.
The Supreme Court of the United States has examined in several cases the questions before us. In the case of California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 103 S.Ct. 3446, 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983). Justice O’Connor, in her majority opinion, cites ALI Model Penal Code § 210.6 (Prop. Off. Draft 1962), in which it is stated:
... the court at the sentencing state shall inform the jury of the nature of the sentence of imprisonment that may be imposed, including its implication with respect to possible release upon parole, if the jury sentence is against sentence of death. (Emphasis ours).
In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976), the court stated:
We think it advisable for the jury to have as much information before it as possible when it makes the sentencing decision.
Gregg further held:
It is certainly not a novel proposition that discretion in the area of sentencing be exercised in an informed manner. We have long recognized that [f]or the determination of sentences, justice generally requires ... that there be taken into account the circumstances of the offense, together with the character and propensities of the offender. (Citing cases.)
KRS 439.3401
This statute reads as follows:
439.3401. Parole for violent offenders.—(1) As used in this section, “violent offender” means any person who has been convicted of or pled guilty to the commission of a capital offense, Class A felony, or Class B felony involving the death of the victim, or rape in the first degree or sodomy in the first degree of the victim, or serious physical injury to a victim.
(2) A violent offender who has been convicted of a capital offense (and has not been sentenced to twenty-five (25) years without parole), or a Class A felony and receives a life sentence, or to death and his sentence is commuted to a life sentence shall not be released on parole until he has served at least twelve (12) years in the penitentiary.
(3) A violent offender who has been convicted of a Class A felony with a sentence of a term of years or Class B felony who is a violent offender shall not be released on parole until he has served at least fifty percent (50%) of the sentence imposed.
(4) This section shall apply only to those persons who commit offenses after July 15, 1986.
Appellant challenges the constitutionality of this statute on three grounds. First, he contends that it violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Section 2 of the Kentucky Constitution. Second, he argues that it denies equal protection guaranteed by both constitutions; and, third, he argues that it is unconstitutionally vague in its application.
All three arguments are predicated upon the possibility of the results emanating from the difference between one who has been sentenced to life imprisonment and who has a minimum eligibility for parole of 12 years, and one who has been sentenced to a term of years and who has a minimum eligibility for parole of at least [108]*10850% of the sentence imposed. This means, of course, that one who receives a sentence of 25 years or more has a minimum parole eligibility in excess of one who receives a life sentence — a sentence which the layman considers a longer sentence. We do not find this a matter of constitutional violation but a matter to be considered by juries in affixing sentences.
Appellant does not argue that the classification of crimes and length of stay in the penitentiary is other than a prerogative of the legislature, and indeed could not. See Rummell v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980); Rudolph v. Corrections Cabinet of Kentucky, Ky., 710 S.W.2d 235, 236 (1986). The entire attack on KRS 439.3401 is predicated on the possible disparity in sentencing which may exist in the minimum for parole eligibility.
A life sentence in Kentucky is a parola-ble offense. Life without parole was abolished as a possible sentence many years ago. The history of parole eligibility for life sentences is a varying one. It has ranged from a six-year minimum, then to seven, then eight, and now to its present minimum eligibility for violent offenders of 12 years. The argument could be made that any minimum period of years affixed by the legislature is arbitrary, but we do not agree.
We do not find the minimum imposed by the legislature to be arbitrary or capricious in any way. It is the uncertainty of life itself, not a declaration of a minimum eligibility, which creates a possible disparity. For example, a life sentence imposed on a 60-year-old defendant is not the same as a life sentence imposed upon a 20-year-old defendant.
We would again call to the attention of the appellant the fact that this is a minimum period of parole eligibility and is thus only one of the factors to be considered in the granting of parole.
Under all the circumstances, we do not find this statute unconstitutional in its treatment of violent offenders.
The ruling of the lower court on the constitutionality of KRS 532.055 and KRS 439.3401 is affirmed.
STEPHENS, C.J., and GANT, STEPHENSON, VANCE and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., concur.
LAMBERT and LEIBSON, JJ., dissent.
GANT, J., files a separate concurring opinion in which STEPHENSON, J., joins.
LEIBSON, J., files a dissenting opinion in which LAMBERT, J., joins, except that portion which discusses whether judicial or jury sentencing is preferable.