Hudson Coal Company's Appeal

193 A. 8, 327 Pa. 247, 1937 Pa. LEXIS 560
CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedMay 25, 1937
DocketAppeals, 155; 4
StatusPublished
Cited by30 cases

This text of 193 A. 8 (Hudson Coal Company's Appeal) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hudson Coal Company's Appeal, 193 A. 8, 327 Pa. 247, 1937 Pa. LEXIS 560 (Pa. 1937).

Opinion

Opinion by

Mr. Justice Drew,

In this case our decision will determine the market value of all coal lands and the prevailing ratio between market and assessed values of all realty in Lackawanna County. The appeals are from the action of the court below in modifying the triennial assessment for the period 1934-1937 upon the coal lands of the Hudson Coal Company in the Borough of Dunmore. The County *249 Board of Assessment fixed tlieir market value at $400 per foot-acre and, by applying thereto a 75 per cent ratio between market and assessed value, obtained an assessed value of $300 per foot-acre. The court below found the market value to be $370 per foot-acre and the ratio to be 70 per cent, making an assessed value of $259 per foot-acre — a reduction in assessed valuation of $41 per foot-acre, $22.50 of which resulted from the $30 decrease in market value and $18.50 from the 5 per cent decrease in the ratio. From this action both the county and the company have appealed.

All owners and operators of coal lands in Lackawanna County severally appealed from the action of the Board of Assessment to the Court of Common Pleas. They, have agreed that the testimony and decision in this case shall determine their appeals. Because of this the parties hereto stipulated that testimony concerning the value of coal lands should not be limited to Dunmore, but should include all coal properties in the county; that the findings of the court as to market value and ratio should govern all the appeals; and that the only question left open in the other cases is the quantity of taxable property. This stipulation applied solely to appeals from the county assessment. The court below approved this agreement, similar to that adopted in Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Company’s Tax Assessment (No. 1), 224 Pa. 240. Inasmuch as it appears that the foot-acre method of valuation was used and that market values as well as the ratio between market and assessed values in Dunmore were typical of the situation prevailing throughout the county in 1934, we approve the arrangement for the purposes of this case.

The so-called foot-acre method of determining market value was employed. A foot-acre is one acre of coal one foot thick. If the vein is six feet thick and its area is an acre, there are six foot-acres of coal. The foot-acre method does not include, for assessment purposes, ex *250 hausted areas, barrier pillars, or coal areas entirely unminable because of physical conditions. Also excluded are all areas of unproved minability. But if development and exploration discloses these to contain minable coal, they are included. The foot-acre method, as consistently employed in Lackawanna County for many years, has not been adopted in any other anthracite producing county. This may be because it is an average unit of value without classification. It has been condemned even where classified because in many instances its application would work hardship and do injustice: Lehigh & Wilkes-Barre Coal Co.’s Assessment, 298 Pa. 294; Kemble’s Estate, 280 Pa. 441; Lehigh & Wilkes-Barre Coal Co.’s Assessment, 225 Pa. 272. However, it has been approved in special cases: see Lehigh & Wilkes-Barre Coal Co.’s Assessment, 298 Pa. supra; Lehigh Valley Coal Company v. Luzerne Co., 255 Pa. 17. It was used by the court below with the consent of counsel on both sides who conceded that it worked an equitable result in Lackawanna County. It has been the only standard for measurement of value of coal lands in that county for more than thirty years. Classification of property which is the object of taxation is extremely desirable. It effects a much more equitable result than the application of an average measure. However, in this case, we feel bound to accept the foot-acre method of assessment as adopted by the Board of Assessment, the parties, and the court below.

These appeals come before us under the General County Assessment Law, the Act of May 22, 1933, P. L. 853, section 519, which is substantially a reenactment of the Act of June 26, 1901, P. L. 601, as amended by the Act of June 12, 1931, P. L. 547. Cases arising under these earlier statutes are authority here. Among them are decisions that while the question of the weight of the evidence is before us (Lehigh & Wilkes-Barre Coal Co.’s Assessment, 298 Pa. supra; Rockhill Iron & Coal Co. v. Fulton County, 204 Pa. 44) and it is our duty to *251 pass upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the court below, such findings will not be disturbed unless there is error in the ultimate determination: Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron Co. v. Commissioners of Northumberland County, 323 Pa. 185.

The correctness of the assessment as made by the Board of Assessment, and modified by the court below, is to be measured by the standard established by the legislature. The General County Assessment Law, section 402 provides, “It shall be the duty of the several elected and appointed assessors ... to assess, rate and value all objects of taxation, whether for county, city, township, town, school, poor or borough purposes, according to the actual value thereof, and at such rates and prices for which the same would separately bona fide sell.” And section 505 of the act imposes upon the Board of Revision the duty of determining whether property “has been valued at a sum or price not less than the same would bring after full public notice at a public sale. ...” This means nothing more or less than market value. We have defined market value as the price which a purchaser willing but not obliged to buy, would pay an owner, willing but not obliged to sell, taking into consideration all uses to which the property is adapted and might in reason be applied: Lehigh & Wilkes-Barre Coal Co.’s Assessment, 298 Pa. supra.

Two questions confront us — were these coal lands valued at their true market value, and did the court below apply the proper ratio between market and assessed value?

Our eases have clearly set forth the essential factors to be taken into consideration in determining the market value of coal lands. Where it is possible to do so such value should be established by showing recent sales of land of like quality and quantity similarly situated or recent sales of the lands being assessed: Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co. v. Northumberland County Commissioners, 229 Pa. 460. The testimony offered in *252 this case to show prices at which other lands sold fell far short of establishing the market value of appellant’s property as of 1934. The few sales shown occurred long prior to this assessment. Two took place in 1919, when the coal industry was much more prosperous. A more recent sale of a coal property in Luzerne County was of no help. It did not furnish a sound basis for comparison because of differences in mining conditions. Other sales were of small properties, which could be mined immediately, and were in no sense comparable with the property under review. The statutory method of determining market value failed entirely in this case; there was no demand for coal properties and consequently there were no sales; the market was stagnant.

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Bluebook (online)
193 A. 8, 327 Pa. 247, 1937 Pa. LEXIS 560, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hudson-coal-companys-appeal-pa-1937.