Lehigh & Wilkes-Barre Coal Co.'s Assessment

148 A. 301, 298 Pa. 294, 1929 Pa. LEXIS 608
CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedApril 16, 1929
DocketAppeals, 107
StatusPublished
Cited by38 cases

This text of 148 A. 301 (Lehigh & Wilkes-Barre Coal Co.'s Assessment) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lehigh & Wilkes-Barre Coal Co.'s Assessment, 148 A. 301, 298 Pa. 294, 1929 Pa. LEXIS 608 (Pa. 1929).

Opinion

Opinion by

Mr. Justice Kephart,

Appellants, owning certain coal lands in Luzerne County, took appeals to the court below from the assessment thereof by the county officers. In this court, they complain that the modifications of the assessment made by the court below were insufficient. We will discuss in this opinion the general questions involved in all the appeals.

The records show considerable feeling between the contesting parties, which accounts to some extent for the wide differences, running into many millions, in the estimated value of the lands. This was particularly unfortunate in view of the fact that the court below was afforded little assistance in the determination of a very difficult problem, the effect of which is not confined to the present controversy. The parties should realize there is a necessary relation between the county government and the raising of revenue to maintain that government, and, unless the spirit of fairness and helpfulness is lost, the settlement of such questions as assessment should be accomplished without much difference of opinion.

Appellants contend the assessments in question are grossly unfair; the county, on the other hand, asserts that the mining companies are seeking to evade their share of taxes. The appeals, in their legal aspect, challenge the method by which market value was arrived at, and the competency of the testimony on which the final conclusion was based. Appellants also aver that the *300 assessments as modified and approved by the court below were against the clear weight of the evidence.

The proper method for making an assessment is governed by the Acts of April 15, 1834, P. L. 509, section 2; May 15, 1841, P. L. 393, sections 4, 6; July 27, 1842, P. L. 441, section 13, and has been fully discussed in Lehigh & Wilkes-Barre Coal Company’s Assessment, 225 Pa. 272; Reading Coal & Iron Company’s Assessment, 290 Pa. 187, 193, and many intervening cases. The Act of March 24, 1905, P. L. 47, makes no change in the basis of determining assessable value: D., L. & W. R. R. Co. v. Luzerne County Commissioners, 245 Pa. 515. The legislature has fixed the standard of measurement; “scientific formulas” predicated on theoretical uses, location and the like applied to property should have small consideration in fixing assessable or market value. So also, little weight should be given the testimony of experts who go into strange localities to estimate assessable values and frequently base their conclusions on a theory built on an impossible or impracticable conception of uses or possible uses, with their own idea of ratio of worth as between vacant and improved realty. This is not the legislative method for ascertaining assessments.

The law reads: “Being valued at a sum or price not less than the same would bring at public sale.” This is market value, a phrase well known to the ordinary citizen, and what the law requires cannot be disregarded no matter how desirable some other method might prove to be: Pennsylvania Stave Co.’s App., 236 Pa. 97; Delaware, L. & W. R. R. Co. v. Luzerne County Commissioners, supra. Ordinarily, by “fair market value” is meant the price which a purchaser, willing but not obliged to buy, would pay an owner, willing but not obliged to sell, taking into consideration all uses to which the property is adapted and might in reason be applied: Appeal of Penna. Co. for Insurances on Lives and Granting Annuities, 282 Pa. 69, 74.

*301 The market value of coal land, on which assessment is based, takes into consideration, in addition to what has been discussed, actual conditions existing on the ground such as locality, coal formation, number, thickness and depth of the veins; quantity, quality, stratification, nature of overlying strata and pitch of the seam, and the difficulty in mining; whether the coal is gaseous, outcrop, basin, and such other elements as shown by experience to be necessary in determining values. Important, of course, is availability and possible demand for the product of the land. An estimate is made of possible tonnage; due allowance being made for coal that would be lost. For the purposes of assessment all these considerations must be reduced to market value of the tract as a whole.

The county concedes that market value as a general rule must be used, but say this land is all owned by five large companies, and there have been no sales of large or fairly large tracts of coal land upon which market value may be based; that there is no market value. It insists, therefore, upon the right to use the so-called foot-acre unit and justifies the result by evidence of sales of small tracts, prior assessments, and other similar transactions. In effect, the county authorities may set up their own base value per acre and conclude that it should be called market value. The foot-acre is one acre of coal one foot thick. If a vein or veins have a 10 foot thickness, there are 10 foot-acres of coal. An ideal acre of coal is an acre of virgin coal with all of the veins in the particular region of normal thickness, aggregating 60 feet. We will discuss later, in detail, the application of the foot-acre rule, and how its value was reached in- this case.

The court below used, as one of its major elements in finding assessable value, the assessments of previous years made under the foot-acre rule. Another element was the fact coal was not sold on an acreage basis, but on a royalty basis of tons that could be mined and re *302 covered when coal was in normal use in former years, the court supplying its own royalty figure. These facts were supplemented by sales of fractional acreages. The court below, in using such factors, neglected to take into consideration economic factors which had a depressing influence on market value in its true sense, or on any value theretofore existing. Too much weight was given the county’s evidence and too little to that of the companies. Had all factors been given due weight a different result would have been reached. Because of the effect given previous assessments made when anthracite coal was flourishing, and because the court failed to consider other vital elements, we will state briefly the matters which influence market value.

One of the most potential elements of market value is the demand for the thing to be sold or valued. Any contingency which detrimentally influences demand will have a corresponding effect on market value. If you cannot sell anthracite coal, the land from which it is to come would be practically worthless. If the demand for the product decreases, the market value of the land suffers accordingly.

Anthracite coal from Pennsylvania has for many years been the chief heating fuel in the northeast, including the Lake States, the New England States and Canada. The first decisive inroad on that market came from the great strike in 1925-26; that was most serious. The effect of the strike was the introduction of active potential competitors of anthracite; this was, and still continues to be, a great menace to the whole industry. It cannot be shaken off and the complete picture of the loss to the anthracite industry is yet to come.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Koppel Steel Corp. v. Board of Assessment Appeals of Beaver County
849 A.2d 303 (Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 2004)
Mark Keshishian & Sons, Inc. v. Washington Square, Inc.
414 A.2d 834 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 1980)
Wentworth v. Air Line Pilots Association
336 A.2d 542 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 1975)
Development Co. of America, Inc. v. Board of Revision of Taxes
59 Pa. D. & C.2d 480 (Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, 1972)
Morris v. Board of Property Assessment
209 A.2d 407 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1965)
Nos. 13868, 13869
312 F.2d 360 (Third Circuit, 1963)
No. 13868
312 F.2d 360 (Third Circuit, 1963)
Dempsey v. Stauffer
312 F.2d 360 (Third Circuit, 1962)
Buerger v. Allegheny County Board of Property Assessment, Appeals & Review
149 A.2d 466 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1959)
Brooks Building Tax Assessment Case
137 A.2d 273 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1958)
Brone Estate
8 Pa. D. & C.2d 672 (Lehigh County Orphans' Court, 1956)
Dickinson v. Fire Ass'n
106 A.2d 607 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1954)
United States v. CERTAIN PARCELS OF LAND, ETC.
144 F.2d 626 (Third Circuit, 1944)
Vollmer v. Philadelphia
38 A.2d 266 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1944)
Miller v. United States
137 F.2d 592 (Third Circuit, 1943)
Matsons Appeal
33 A.2d 464 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1943)
Glen Alden Coal Co. v. Commissioners
27 A.2d 239 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1942)
Jursics' Appeal
27 A.2d 729 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1942)
Allentown's Appeals
24 A.2d 109 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1941)
Susquehanna Collieries Company's Appeal
12 A.2d 99 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1939)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
148 A. 301, 298 Pa. 294, 1929 Pa. LEXIS 608, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lehigh-wilkes-barre-coal-cos-assessment-pa-1929.