Hud Tenants Coalition v. United States Department of Housing & Urban Development

274 F. App'x 124
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit
DecidedApril 2, 2008
DocketNo. 07-1135
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 274 F. App'x 124 (Hud Tenants Coalition v. United States Department of Housing & Urban Development) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hud Tenants Coalition v. United States Department of Housing & Urban Development, 274 F. App'x 124 (3d Cir. 2008).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

RENDELL, Circuit Judge.

Appellants HUD Tenants Coalition and Samuel Rivers (collectively, “HTC”) appeal the final judgment of the United States District Court for District of New Jersey (Martini, J.), dismissing HTC’s complaint against the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) and several executives from both HUD and the New Jersey Housing and Mortgage Finance Agency (“HMFA”). The complaint alleged violations of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), the National Housing Act (“NHA”), procedural due process, and New Jersey state law in relation to several Section 236 rent-increase applications reviewed by HMFA and approved by HUD for the Zion Towers Apartments between 1999 and 2004. On appeal, HTC challenges HUD and HMFA’s approval of Zion Towers, Incorporated’s (“ZTI”) rent-increase requests despite alleged inadequacies in its rent-increase applications.1 Specifically, HTC argues that ZTI’s “narrative statement[s] of reasons for the requested increase[s] in maximum permissible rents” and “status report[s] on the project’s implementation of its current Energy Conservation Plan,” required under 24 C.F.R. § 245.315(a),2 were insufficient to permit tenants to meaningfully comment on the proposed increases. Further, HTC argues that it holds a property interest in the notice and comment opportunities outlined by relevant federal and state statutes and regulations and was denied constitutional due process when those opportunities were not meaningfully afforded. For the reasons stated below, we will affirm.

DISCUSSION3

I. Jurisdiction

First, as an initial matter, we must examine whether the District Court prop[126]*126erly exercised jurisdiction over HTC’s complaint, an issue raised by HUD. HUD contends that its decisions to approve ZTI’s rent-increase requests are not subject to judicial review under the APA, as those decisions are strictly committed to agency discretion. HTC responds that “it is well-settled that agencies do not possess the discretion to disregard specific legal obligations and, even assuming HUD possesses substantive discretion to make rent-increase determinations, it may not exercise that discretion in a matter that violates federal law.” (Appellants’ Reply Br. 14.) We agree that HUD’s actions are not immune from review.

HUD’s jurisdictional argument is based on a misreading of HTC’s claims. HTC does not challenge the substantive determinations underlying HUD’s decisions to approve ZTI’s rent-increase applications, but instead challenges “HUD’s compliance with the specific procedural protections prescribed by the Due Process Clause, the NHA, and federal regulations.” (Appellant’s Reply Br. 16 (emphasis in original).) There is no question that the APA provides the District Court with the authority to review this type of challenge; in fact, the APA explicitly requires a reviewing court to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be[, inter alia,] without observance of procedure required by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D). As we recognized in Hond-ros v. United States Civil Service Commission, 720 F.2d 278, 293 (3d Cir.1983), “even those actions ‘committed to agency discretion by law1 are renewable on grounds that ... the decision violates any constitutional, statutory, or regulatory command.” Accordingly, HUD’s jurisdictional argument is simply without merit.4

II. Procedural Challenge

In its Letter Opinion dismissing HTC’s complaint, the District Court asked, inter alia, “whether the tenants of Zion Towers were provided with statutorily sufficient information before [ZTI]’s rent-increase proposals were granted.” Dist. Ct. Op. at *4. After reviewing the relevant federal and state statutes, regulations, and case law, the District Court answered this question in the affirmative. We agree.

The NHA explicitly requires that Section 236 tenants be provided with “adequate notice of, reasonable access to relevant information about, and an opportunity to comment on [rent-increase requests,] and that such comments are taken into consideration by the Secretary.”5 12 [127]*127U.S.C. § 1715z-lb(b)(l). HTC contends that, due to insufficiencies in ZTI’s rent-increase applications, the tenants of Zion Towers were “not provided information sufficient to constitute ‘adequate notice’ of the reasons supporting the rent increase, and were not provided ‘reasonable access to relevant information about’ the request, nor a meaningful opportunity to comment” (Appellant’s Br. 21) as prescribed by 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-lb(b)(l). HTC specifically challenges the sufficiency of ZTI’s “narrative statements] of reasons for the requested increase^] in maximum permissible rents” and “status report[s] on the project’s implementation of its current Energy Conservation Plan,” as required by 24 C.F.R. § 245.315(a)(3), (a)(5). See also N.J.A.C. 5:80-9.4(a)(3), (a)(4).

The District Court recognized that although federal regulations require a Section 236 rent-increase application to include “[a] narrative statement of the reasons for the requested increase in maximum permissible rents” and “[a] status report on the project’s implementation of its current Energy Conservation Plan,” 24 C.F.R. § 245.315(a)(3), (a)(5), the regulations do not define “narrative statement” or “status report.” In considering what these terms might require, the Court inferred from HMFA’s letters to Mr. Rivers6 and from HUD’s approval of ZTI’s applications that the agencies found that ZTI’s materials satisfied the narrative statement and ECP status report requirements. After laying out the basic principle that an agency’s reasonable interpretation of its own i’egulations merits “substantial judicial deference,” Dist. Ct. Op. at *6 (citing Morrison v. Madison Dearborn Capital Partners III L.P., 463 F.3d 312, 315 (3d Cir.2006); Mutschler v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 337 N.J.Super. 1, 766 A.2d 285, 292 (2001)), the District Court concluded that “HMFA and HUD’s determination that the narrative statement and ECP were sufficient falls within their controlling interpretation of the relevant regulations,” id.

We find no error in the District Court’s reasoning. It is clear from the record that the tenants of Zion Towers, including Mr. Rivers, were in fact provided with an opportunity to review and comment on ZTI’s rent-increase requests, as required by 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-lb(b)(l). As the District Court recognized, HTC’s own complaint references the dialogue between Mr. Rivers and HMFA regarding the content of ZTI’s rent-increase applications. While Mr. Rivers may not have received the responses for which he had hoped,7

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274 F. App'x 124, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hud-tenants-coalition-v-united-states-department-of-housing-urban-ca3-2008.