Huckleby v. Dart

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: June 8, 2026
• Docket: 1-25-0414
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2026 IL App (1st) 250414-U No. 1-25-0414 Order filed June 8, 2026 First Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ KAMERON of the FAMILY HUCKLEBY, ) Appeal from the UCC 1-308, All Rights Reserved, ) Circuit Court of ) Cook County. Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) v. ) No. 23 L 12469 ) THOMAS J. DART, KIMBERLY FOXX, THE ) HONORABLE WILLIAM GAMBONEY, and the ) COOK COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, ) ) Defendants ) ) Honorable (The Honorable William Gamboney, ) Barbara N. Flores, Defendant-Appellee). ) Judge, presiding.

PRESIDING JUSTICE FITZGERALD SMITH delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Howse and Cobbs concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: We dismiss this appeal when our jurisdiction is not apparent from the record. No. 1-25-0414

¶2 Plaintiff Kameron of the Family Huckleby, UCC 1-308, All Rights Reserved, appeals pro

se from the trial court’s order striking his motion to “Reinstate [the] Case.” On appeal, plaintiff

contends that he was denied his constitutional, human, and civil rights, and suffered false arrest

and imprisonment. He further contends that the trial court erred by “not granting [his] motions due

to lack of evidence and not proper protocol.” For the following reasons, we dismiss.

¶3 The record on appeal does not contain a report of proceedings. The following facts are

gleaned from the common law record.

¶4 On December 12, 2023, plaintiff filed a pro se complaint against defendants Thomas H.

Dart, Kimberly Foxx, the Honorable William Gamboney (Judge Gamboney), and the Cook County

Department of Corrections, alleging that he was incarcerated during the “COVID-19 era,” placed

in “condemned divisions,” and subsequently “exonerated.” The complaint alleged that plaintiff

experienced “inhumane living situations,” wrongful arrest, mental anguish, “punitive damage,”

unfairness, corruption, malicious prosecution, “qualitive damage,” lost wages, civil rights

violations, “threat of physical danger,” “prejudice profiling,” mental depression and stress, and

pain and suffering. Plaintiff sought $1,100,000 in “compensation,” in addition to “commissarry

[sic]” and $162 per day of “incarceration.”

¶5 Judge Gamboney filed a motion and amended motion to dismiss pursuant to the Code of

Civil Procedure (Code) raising theories of judicial immunity, sovereign immunity, and public

official immunity. See 735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2024). In the alternative, Judge Gamboney argued

that defendant failed to state a claim. See 735 ILCS 2-615 (West 2024).

¶6 On June 11, 2024, following a hearing, the trial court entered an order stating that Judge

Gamboney’s amended motion to dismiss was heard without plaintiff present in court.

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¶7 On July 10, 2024, the trial court granted Judge Gamboney’s amended motion to dismiss as

to section 2-619 of the Code with prejudice in a written order. The court also granted Judge

Gamboney’s amended motion to dismiss as to section 2-615 of the Code. The order did not

reference a disposition as to the remaining defendants and did not contain language pursuant to

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016).

¶8 A November 12, 2024, trial court order stated that the cause came before the court for

administrative status. A checked box on the order specified that the “Case [was] previously

disposed of on July 10, 2024.”

¶9 On February 4, 2025, plaintiff filed a motion to “Reinstate [the] Case,” alleging that he did

not receive a “fair hearing.” Subsequently, Judge Gamboney filed a response alleging that the

motion should be stricken for lack of jurisdiction because it was filed more than 30 days after the

complained-of order.

¶ 10 On March 5, 2025, the trial court held a hearing on the motion. Plaintiff and counsel for

Judge Gamboney appeared. The trial court found the motion untimely and struck it. That same

day, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s March 5, 2025, order.

¶ 11 On appeal, plaintiff contends that he was denied constitutional, human, and civil rights,

and suffered false arrest and imprisonment. He further contends that the trial court erred by “not

granting [his] motions due to lack of evidence and not proper protocol.”

¶ 12 Initially, our review of plaintiff’s appeal is hindered by his failure to fully comply with

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341 (eff. Oct. 1, 2020), which governs the form and content of

appellate briefs. Although plaintiff used a preprinted form, his brief contains no citations to the

record and lacks cohesive legal arguments and reasoned bases for those arguments in violation of

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Rule 341(h). See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(6), (7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). “Arguments that do not comply

with Rule 341(h)(7) do not merit consideration on appeal and may be rejected by this court for that

reason alone.” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Sanders, 2015 IL App (1st) 141272, ¶ 43. Accordingly,

to the extent that plaintiff’s brief fails to comply with Rule 341(h)(7), it would be within our

discretion to dismiss this appeal on that basis. Zale v. Moraine Valley Community College, 2019

IL App (1st) 190197, ¶ 32. However, we decline to do so, as plaintiff’s notice of appeal identifies

the trial court’s March 5, 2025, order, as the order appealed from and we have the benefit of a

cogent appellee’s brief. See Twardowski v. Holiday Hospitality Franchising, Inc., 321 Ill. App. 3d

509, 511 (2001).

¶ 13 Before reaching the merits of plaintiff’s appeal, we must ascertain our jurisdiction. See

Secura Insurance Co. v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 232 Ill. 2d 209, 213 (2009) (a reviewing

court has an independent duty to consider its jurisdiction). It is plaintiff’s burden, as the appellant,

to demonstrate this court’s jurisdiction. See U.S. Bank National Ass’n v. In Retail Fund Algonquin

Commons, LLC, 2013 IL App (2d) 130213, ¶ 24 (“[a]s the appellants, defendants have the burden

to establish our jurisdiction” (citing Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(4) (eff. July 1, 2008))). Our jurisdiction

must be apparent on the appellate record (Tunca v. Painter, 2012 IL App (1st) 093384, ¶ 25),

which plaintiff, as the appellant, bears the burden of providing (People v. Resendiz, 2020 IL App

(1st) 180821, ¶ 35). Whether appellate jurisdiction exists is a question of law, which we review de

novo. Gardner v. Mullins, 234 Ill. 2d 503, 508 (2009).

¶ 14 This court’s “jurisdiction is limited to the review of appeals from final judgments, unless

otherwise permitted under the Illinois Supreme Court Rules or by statute.” In re Estate of Cerami,

2018 IL App (1st) 172073, ¶ 31. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303 requires that a notice of appeal

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be filed with the clerk of the circuit court within 30 days of the entry of a final judgment, or, if a

timely postjudgment motion directed against the judgment is filed, within 30 days after the entry

of the order disposing of the last postjudgment motion directed against that judgment or order. Ill.

S. Ct. R. 303(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 2017). Section 2-1203(a) of the Code, in turn, requires that a

postjudgment motion in a non-jury case be filed within 30 days of the judgment. 735 ILCS 5/2-

1203(a) (West 2024).

¶ 15 “A judgment or order is ‘final’ if it disposes of the rights of the parties, either on the entire

case or on some definite and separate part of the controversy.” Dubina v. Mesirow Realty

Development, Inc., 178 Ill. 2d 496, 502 (1997). A dismissal with prejudice is usually considered a

final judgment, although such an order is not always immediately appealable. Id. Relevant, here,

Supreme Court Rule 304(a) provides that, if multiple parties or claims are involved in an action, a

Rule 304(a) finding is required before a final order disposing of fewer than all claims in the action

is immediately appealable. Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016); Dubina, 178 Ill. 2d at 502.

Without a Rule 304(a) finding, such a final order does not become appealable until all claims in

the multiclaim litigation have been resolved; once the action is terminated in its entirety, all final

orders then become appealable under Rule 301. Dubina, 178 Ill. 2d at 502-03.

¶ 16 Here, plaintiff filed a complaint against Judge Gamboney and three other defendants.

Subsequently, Judge Gamboney filed a motion and amended motion to dismiss. On July 10, 2024,

the trial court granted the amended motion to dismiss as to Judge Gamboney. On February 4, 2025,

more than 30 days later, plaintiff filed an untimely motion to “[r]einstate.” On March 5, 2025, the

trial court struck that motion. Plaintiff then filed a timely appeal from the trial court’s order striking

the untimely motion to “Reinstate [the] Case.” See Ill S. Ct R. 303(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 2017).

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¶ 17 Had the trial court’s July 10, 2024, order been a final judgment, this court would have had

jurisdiction over plaintiff’s present appeal from the striking of his untimely postjudgment motion,

albeit limited to reviewing the trial court’s jurisdiction. See, e.g., People v. Bailey, 2014 IL 115459,

¶¶ 8, 29 (circuit court loses jurisdiction 30 days after the entry of a final judgment and on appeal,

this court is “limited to considering the issue of jurisdiction below”). The record before us,

however, does not establish that the July 10, 2024, order was final.

¶ 18 That order, as noted, granted Judge Gamboney’s amended motion to dismiss only as to

Judge Gamboney, without reference to the other defendants and without including language

pursuant to Rule 304(a). See Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016) (if multiple parties or claims

are involved in an action, a Rule 304(a) finding is required before a final order disposing of fewer

than all parties or claims in the action is immediately appealable). Indeed, the record on appeal

does not contain an order disposing of the case as to defendants Dart, Foxx, and the Department

of Corrections. While the trial court’s administrative status order of November 12, 2024, checked

the box stating that the “Case [was] previously disposed of on July 10, 2024,” the July 10, 2024,

order only disposed the case as to Judge Gamboney. Plaintiff does not address this court’s

jurisdiction. See U.S. Bank National Ass’n, 2013 IL App (2d) 130213, ¶ 24 (it is the appellant’s

burden to establish the reviewing court’s jurisdiction). Under these circumstances, where plaintiff

appeals from an order dismissing an untimely motion to reconsider a non-final judgment, the

record does not reveal a basis for appellate jurisdiction. See McCorry v. Gooneratne, 332 Ill. App.

3d 935, 941 (2002) (this court “cannot presume that we have authority to decide an appeal on the

basis of a record insufficient to show our jurisdiction”).

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¶ 19 As this court is unable to determine its jurisdiction on the record before us, we must dismiss

this appeal. See id. (we “cannot presume that we have authority to decide an appeal on the basis

of a record insufficient to show our jurisdiction”).

¶ 20 Appeal dismissed.

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