Hubbard v. Owens

CourtSupreme Court of South Carolina
DecidedJune 11, 2007
Docket2007-MO-034
StatusUnpublished

This text of Hubbard v. Owens (Hubbard v. Owens) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hubbard v. Owens, (S.C. 2007).

Opinion

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS
PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court


Kimberly H. Hubbard and John Hubbard, Respondents,

v.

Jack R. Owens, Marlboro County Farm Bureau, Ace Property and Casualty Insurance Company, Defendants,

Of Whom Jack R. Owens is the Appellant.


Appeal from Marlboro County
 John M. Milling, Circuit Court Judge


Memorandum Opinion No.  2007-MO-034
Submitted May 23, 2007 – Filed June 11, 2007 


AFFIRMED


Ronald J. Tryon and Michael E. Kozlarek, both of Parker Poe Adams & Bernstein, of Columbia, for Appellant.

James C. Rushton, III, of the Hyman Law Firm, of Florence, for Respondents.


PER CURIAM:  Respondents Kimberly H. and John Hubbard (“the Hubbards”) filed a lawsuit against Appellant Jack R. Owens (“Owens”) and two insurance companies.  On appeal, Owens argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the complaint, his motion for judgment on the pleadings, and his motion to compel arbitration of the Hubbards’ claims.

We affirm the trial court’s decision pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authority:  Johnson v. South Carolina Dep’t of Probation, Parole, and Pardon Services, __ S.C. __, 641 S.E.2d 895, 897 (2007) (providing that this Court will not entertain the merits of an issue on appeal where the record on appeal is inadequate for review); Woodard v. Westvaco Corp., 319 S.C. 240, 242-43, 460 S.E.2d 392, 393-94 (1995) (providing that the denial of a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which is not immediately appealable); Ballenger v. Bowen, 313 S.C. 476, 477-78, 443 S.E.2d 379, 380 (1994) (providing that an order denying a motion for summary judgment is not appealable); Moyd v. Johnson, 289 S.C. 482, 482, 347 S.E.2d 97, 98 (1986) (holding that the denial of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which, ordinarily, is not immediately appealable); and South Carolina Dept. of Soc. Services v. Thompson, 273 S.C. 569, 571, 257 S.E.2d 747, 748 (1979) (providing that res judicata is an affirmative defense that must be pled to be established).

TOAL, C.J., MOORE, BURNETT and PLEICONES, JJ., concur. WALLER, J., not participating.

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Related

Moyd v. Johnson
347 S.E.2d 97 (Supreme Court of South Carolina, 1986)
Johnson v. South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole, & Pardon Services
641 S.E.2d 895 (Supreme Court of South Carolina, 2007)
South Carolina Department of Social Services v. Thompson
257 S.E.2d 747 (Supreme Court of South Carolina, 1979)
Ballenger v. Bowen
443 S.E.2d 379 (Supreme Court of South Carolina, 1994)
Woodard v. Westvaco Corp.
460 S.E.2d 392 (Supreme Court of South Carolina, 1995)

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Hubbard v. Owens, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hubbard-v-owens-sc-2007.