Hubbard v. Department of Ecology

936 P.2d 27, 86 Wash. App. 119, 1997 Wash. App. LEXIS 667
CourtCourt of Appeals of Washington
DecidedMay 1, 1997
Docket15227-8-III
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 936 P.2d 27 (Hubbard v. Department of Ecology) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hubbard v. Department of Ecology, 936 P.2d 27, 86 Wash. App. 119, 1997 Wash. App. LEXIS 667 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).

Opinion

Schultheis, J.

Permits to draw water from wells in the Okanogan River Basin must be conditioned on maintenance of the Okanogan River’s minimum flow rates if the Department of Ecology decides the local groundwater source is significantly connected with the river. WAC 173--549-027; 173-549-060. Brothers John and James Hubbard 1 were granted permits that indicated they would have to cease irrigating from their wells whenever the Okanogan River was below minimum instream flows. Their appeals to the Pollution Control Hearings Board and the superior court were unsuccessful. On appeal here, they contend the Board erred in finding there is significant continuity between their underground water source and the river. We affirm.

In 1987, James Hubbard bought 180 acres on the south end of the Wagonroad Coulee, a valley near the Okanogan *122 River. He drilled and capped a test well about 4,000 feet from the river in 1988 or 1989 and then applied for a water rights permit in 1990. Assured he would probably receive a permit within a year, he began planting a fruit orchard in 1992 and obtained a temporary permit for irrigation and frost protection. John Hubbard owned land south of his brother’s. In 1979, John obtained an unconditional permit to draw water from a well he dug about 5,700 feet from the river, and he began planting an orchard in 1980. After he determined he needed more water for irrigation and frost protection, he applied to Ecology for an increase. Like his brother, he drew water from his well pursuant to a temporary permit while he awaited the outcome of his application.

Ecology began an investigation into the Hubbards’ applications in 1992. After examining the hydrogeology of the Wagonroad Coulee and the adjacent Okanogan River, the logs of local well levels, and the schematics of the aquifers underlying Wagonroad Coulee and the river, Ecology concluded there was significant continuity (i.e., a significant connection) between the coulee’s groundwater and the river. Groundwater use must be conditioned on maintenance of minimum instream flows of local rivers whenever Ecology determines there is "significant hydraulic continuity” between the groundwater source and surface water. WAC 173-549-060. Accordingly, Ecology issued reports approving a specified amount of withdrawal for irrigation and frost protection, but conditioning the use on the maintenance of minimum river instream flow levels. The Hubbards would be required to cease pumping whenever the river fell below minimum flow.

The Hubbards consolidated their appeals to the Pollution Control Hearings Board. Their key contention was that there is no significant hydraulic continuity between their wells and the river. After hearing the testimony of witnesses and examining the data, the Board found significant continuity and denied their appeals in April 1994. Pursuant to RCW 34.05.570, the Hubbards appealed the *123 Board’s decision to the Okanogan County Superior Court. The court remanded for more detailed findings and conclusions. In April 1995, the Board issued revised findings and conclusions and the Hubbards again appealed. This time, the trial court affirmed the Board and denied the Hub-bards’ petition for review. This appeal followed.

The Hubbards contend the Board erred in concluding that the Okanogan River’s minimum instream flow is senior to their rights, and that a significant continuity exists between the underground water source of their wells and the river. At issue is the scope of the Board’s authority and the meaning of the term "significant” in relation to WAC 173-549-060 and the Water Resources Act of 1971, RCW 90.54.

We review Board adjudicative decisions pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, RCW 34.05. Department of Ecology v. PUD No. 1, 121 Wn.2d 179, 200-01, 849 P.2d 646 (1993), aff’d, 511 U.S. 700, 114 S. Ct. 1900, 128 L. Ed. 2d 716 (1994). Our review is confined to the record before the Board. RCW 34.05.558; Waste Management of Seattle, Inc. v. Utilities & Transp. Comm’n, 123 Wn.2d 621, 632, 869 P.2d 1034 (1994). On factual matters, the Board’s decision may be reversed only if we find it to be arbitrary or capricious, or if the order is not supported by substantial evidence. RCW 34.05.570(3)(e), (i); Batchelder v. City of Seattle, 77 Wn. App. 154, 158, 890 P.2d 25, review denied, 127 Wn.2d 1022 (1995). A finding is arbitrary or capricious if there is no support for it in the record. Stempel v. Department of Water Resources, 82 Wn.2d 109, 114, 508 P.2d 166 (1973). Legal determinations may be overturned only if the Board engaged in unlawful procedure, failed to follow a prescribed procedure or erroneously interpreted or applied the law. RCW 34.05.570(3)(c), (d); Batchelder, 77 Wn. App. at 158. Ecology’s conclusions, while not controlling, are entitled to great weight due to its expertise. PUD No. 1, 121 Wn.2d at 201; Neubert v. Yakima-Tieton Irrigation Dist., 117 Wn.2d 232, 240, 814 P.2d 199 (1991).

*124 Under the Water Resources Act of 1971, Ecology was directed to develop a comprehensive statewide water resources program. RCW 90.54.040. Pursuant to this directive, Ecology is required to investigate, process and rule on all applications to divert public water. RCW 90.03.110. Ecology must reject an application and refuse to issue a permit if there is no unappropriated water available, withdrawal will conflict with existing rights, or withdrawal will detrimentally affect public welfare. RCW 90.03.290; Jensen v. Department of Ecology, 102 Wn.2d 109, 112-13, 685 P.2d 1068 (1984); Stempel, 82 Wn.2d at 115.

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936 P.2d 27, 86 Wash. App. 119, 1997 Wash. App. LEXIS 667, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hubbard-v-department-of-ecology-washctapp-1997.