Hubbard v. AP3 INVESTMENTS, LLC

997 So. 2d 882, 2008 WL 4925799
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedNovember 19, 2008
Docket43,673-CA
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 997 So. 2d 882 (Hubbard v. AP3 INVESTMENTS, LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hubbard v. AP3 INVESTMENTS, LLC, 997 So. 2d 882, 2008 WL 4925799 (La. Ct. App. 2008).

Opinion

997 So.2d 882 (2008)

Angela HUBBARD, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
AP3 INVESTMENTS, LLC d/b/a Quiznos Sub, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 43,673-CA.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.

November 19, 2008.

*883 Richard L. Fewell, Jr., for Appellant.

Perkins & Associates, L.L.C. by Mark A. Perkins, Shreveport, Trent P. Roddy, for Appellee.

Before WILLIAMS, PEATROSS and DREW, JJ.

DREW, J.

In the early evening on June 22, 2005, Angela Hubbard and a friend, Lakesia Goldsberry, entered a Quiznos restaurant located in Monroe. Hubbard alleged that as she walked into the restaurant, she tripped on a wrinkled rug located at the entrance, and was injured when she fell.

Hubbard filed suit on June 19, 2006, against the restaurant's owner, AP3 Investments, LLC d/b/a Quiznos Sub ("Quiznos"). Quiznos filed a motion for summary judgment in which it argued that Hubbard was unable to prove with positive evidence that the alleged wrinkle existed before the fall, and that she could not prove that the alleged wrinkle existed for such a period time that a Quiznos employee would have seen it if exercising reasonable care. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment, and Hubbard has appealed. The judgment is affirmed.

DISCUSSION

A motion for summary judgment shall be granted if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact, and that mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." La. C.C.P. art. 966(B). Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo under the same criteria that govern the district court's consideration of whether summary judgment is appropriate. NAB Natural Resources, L.L.C. v. Willamette Industries, Inc., 28,555 (La.App.2d Cir.8/21/96), 679 So.2d 477.

Hubbard's claim for damages is governed by La. R.S. 9:2800.6, which provides, in part:

A. A merchant owes a duty to persons who use his premises to exercise reasonable care to keep his aisles, passageways, and floors in a reasonably safe condition. This duty includes a reasonable effort to keep the premises free of any hazardous conditions which reasonably might give rise to damage.
B. In a negligence claim brought against a merchant by a person lawfully on the merchant's premises for damages as a result of an injury, death, or loss sustained because of a fall due to a condition existing in or on a merchant's premises, the claimant shall have the burden of proving, in addition to all other elements of his cause of action, all of the following:
*884 (1) The condition presented an unreasonable risk of harm to the claimant and that risk of harm was reasonably foreseeable.
(2) The merchant either created or had actual or constructive notice of the condition which caused the damage, prior to the occurrence.
(3) The merchant failed to exercise reasonable care. In determining reasonable care, the absence of a written or verbal uniform cleanup or safety procedure is insufficient, alone, to prove failure to exercise reasonable care.
C. Definitions:
(1) "Constructive notice" means the claimant has proven that the condition existed for such a period of time that it would have been discovered if the merchant had exercised reasonable care. The presence of an employee of the merchant in the vicinity in which the condition exists does not, alone, constitute constructive notice, unless it is shown that the employee knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, of the condition.

When a claimant is relying upon constructive notice under La. R.S. 9:2800.6(B)(2), the claimant must come forward with positive evidence showing that the damage-causing condition existed for some period of time, and that such time was sufficient to place the merchant defendant on notice of its existence. White v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 97-0393 (La.9/9/97), 699 So.2d 1081. Mere speculation or suggestion is not enough to meet the stringent burden imposed upon a plaintiff by La. R.S. 9:2800.6. Robinson v. Brookshires #26, 33,713 (La.App.2d Cir.8/25/00), 769 So.2d 639.

The court in White explained the requirement for proving constructive notice as follows:

Though there is no bright line time period, a claimant must show that "the condition existed for such a period of time..." Whether the period of time is sufficiently lengthy that a merchant should have discovered the condition is necessarily a fact question; however, there remains the prerequisite showing of some time period. A claimant who simply shows that the condition existed without an additional showing that the condition existed for some time before the fall has not carried the burden of proving constructive notice as mandated by the statute. Though the time period need not be specific in minutes or hours, constructive notice requires that the claimant prove the condition existed for some time period prior to the fall. This is not an impossible burden.

Id., 699 So.2d at 1084-85.

A plaintiff is not required to prove by eyewitness testimony that the hazardous condition existed for a certain number of minutes prior to the fall. Instead, the factfinder can reasonably infer from circumstantial evidence that it is more probable than not that the condition existed for such time prior to the accident that it should have been discovered and corrected. Bassett v. Toys "R" Us Delaware, Inc., 36,434 (La.App.2d Cir. 12/30/02), 836 So.2d 465, writ denied, XXXX-XXXX (La.4/25/03), 842 So.2d 408.

Goldsberry held the door for Hubbard as she entered the restaurant, and Goldsberry followed Hubbard into the restaurant. Hubbard, who was wearing flip-flops at the time, fell forward and landed on her right knee and hands, sustaining injuries. Hubbard guessed that her foot got tangled up in the rug.

Hubbard recalled that after she fell, Goldsberry pointed out to her that the rug was not lying flat on the floor. Goldsberry was unable to straighten out the rug. *885 According to Hubbard, the corners of the rug closest to the entrance were flipped over, and she could see the bottom of the rug. Hubbard noticed a medium-sized wrinkle in the middle of the rug that she believed caught her shoe. She could not be more descriptive when asked to explain what she meant by medium-sized. Hubbard also noticed wrinkles along the rug's rubber edges, which she thought may have been caused by the rug being placed in a dryer.

Hubbard did not see the wrinkles as she tripped, and she did not know if the rug was wrinkled before she entered the restaurant. She conceded that if the rug had been wrinkled before her fall, she did not know for how long. Hubbard believed that the wrinkles were present before she fell because Goldsberry later was unable to straighten out the rug. Hubbard guessed that the corners were flipped over before she walked in, but she could not say that she tripped on an area that was flipped over. Like Hubbard, Goldsberry did not see what Hubbard tripped over, and she could not say that the wrinkles were present before Hubbard fell.

While she was helping Hubbard up, Goldsberry saw that the rug was "puckered up" along the sides. Goldsberry could not recall if these wrinkles were along the side closest to the entrance. She also saw wrinkles in the middle of the rug.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
997 So. 2d 882, 2008 WL 4925799, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hubbard-v-ap3-investments-llc-lactapp-2008.