Huawen Huang v. Loretta E. Lynch

Ninth Circuit

Huawen Huang v. Loretta E. Lynch

642 F. App'x 775

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedMarch 21, 2016

Docket13-73688

StatusUnpublished

This text of 642 F. App'x 775 (Huawen Huang v. Loretta E. Lynch) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Huawen Huang v. Loretta E. Lynch, 642 F. App'x 775 (9th Cir. 2016).

Pincite

Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Zhucheng Gao, a native and citizen of China, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s (“U”) decision denying his application for asylum and withholding of removal, and denying his motion to remand. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings, applying the standards governing adverse credibility determinations created by the REAL ID Act. Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1039-1040 (9th Cir.2010). We deny the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility finding based on Gao’s admitted lies and omissions about his residence and employment, and inconsistent account of his U.S. church attendance. See Singh v. Holder, 643 F.3d 1178, 1181 (9th Cir.2011) (“An asylum applicant who lies to immigration authorities casts doubt on his credibility and the rest of his story.”); Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1048 (adverse credibility determination reasonable under the totality of the circumstances). We reject Gao’s contentions that the IJ engaged in improper conjecture or was biased. In the absence of credible testimony, Gao’s asylum and withholding of removal claims fail. See Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir.2003).

As to the motion to remand, Gao does not challenge the BIA’s dispositive finding that he failed to present evidence that was previously unavailable. See Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 94 F.3d 1256, 1259-60 (9th Cir.1996) (“Issues raised in a brief that are not supported by argument are deemed abandoned.”).

The 60-day stay of proceedings granted on December 1, 2015, has expired. Respondent’s motion to lift the stay is denied as moot.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

MEMORANDUM **

Zhucheng Gao, a native and citizen of China, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s (“U”) decision denying his application for asylum and withholding of removal, and denying his motion to remand. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings, applying the standards governing adverse credibility determinations created by the REAL ID Act. Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1039-1040 (9th Cir.2010). We deny the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility finding based on Gao’s admitted lies and omissions about his residence and employment, and inconsistent account of his U.S. church attendance. See Singh v. Holder, 643 F.3d 1178, 1181 (9th Cir.2011) (“An asylum applicant who lies to immigration authorities casts doubt on his credibility and the rest of his story.”); Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1048 (adverse credibility determination reasonable under the totality of the circumstances). We reject Gao’s contentions that the IJ engaged in improper conjecture or was biased. In the absence of credible testimony, Gao’s asylum and withholding of removal claims fail. See Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir.2003).

As to the motion to remand, Gao does not challenge the BIA’s dispositive finding that he failed to present evidence that was previously unavailable. See Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 94 F.3d 1256, 1259-60 (9th Cir.1996) (“Issues raised in a brief that are not supported by argument are deemed abandoned.”).

The 60-day stay of proceedings granted on December 1, 2015, has expired. Respondent’s motion to lift the stay is denied as moot.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

642 F. App'x 775, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/huawen-huang-v-loretta-e-lynch-ca9-2016.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack