Huaman Alamas v. Blanche

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 18 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BETTY MARLENY HUAMAN No. 25-3788 ALAMAS; M. N. C. H., Agency Nos.

A249-305-189

Petitioners, A249-305-190 v.

MEMORANDUM * 0F

TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General, Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted August 14, 2026 ** 1F

San Francisco, California

Before: LEE, MENDOZA, JR., and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges.

Betty Marleny Huaman Alamas and her minor son petition this court to review the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) order affirming an immigration judge’s (IJ) denial of Huaman Alamas’s application for asylum, withholding of

*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we affirm.

Huaman Alamas, a native and citizen of Peru, entered the United States without inspection in December 2023. She alleges that two incidents precipitated her flight from Peru to the United States. First, in July 2023, two masked men stopped her on her way to work, groped her, made it difficult for her to breathe and move, asked her where her ex-partner was, and told her not to report anything or it would be “worse” for her. The men left after a few minutes when they “heard some noises like people were walking.” Then, on October 22, 2023, Huaman Alamas received WhatsApp messages threatening her and her family if she did not pay money. Huaman Alamas believes that both incidents were perpetrated by a Peruvian gang due to her ex-partner’s family connection to a rival gang.

The IJ identified various implausible statements in Huaman Alamas’s testimony but ultimately found that she was credible. Nevertheless, the IJ denied all requested relief. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision and dismissed Huaman Alamas’s appeal, finding that she had not shown that the incidents were motivated by a protected ground, or that the Peruvian government was unwilling or unable to prevent that harm.

“Where, as here, the BIA agrees with the IJ decision and also adds its own reasoning, we review the decision of the BIA and those parts of the IJ’s decision

3

upon which it relies.” Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1027–28 (9th Cir. 2019). “We review questions of law de novo and the agency’s factual findings for substantial evidence.” Ruiz-Colmenares v. Garland, 25 F.4th 742, 748 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation modified).

To show that she is eligible for asylum, Huaman Alamas must establish that the incidents she attested to rose “to the level of persecution” or that she has a well-founded fear of future persecution, that this persecution was or would be motivated by a protected ground, and that the government either committed the persecution or is “unwilling or unable” to prevent it. Rodriguez Tornes v. Garland, 993 F.3d 743, 750–51 (9th Cir. 2021). There are five protected grounds: “race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). Persecutors may have “mixed motives,” but a protected ground must be a “central reason” for the persecution. Manzano v. Garland, 104 F.4th 1202, 1206–07 (9th Cir. 2024) (citation modified).

Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Huaman Alamas has not established a nexus between the incidents and any protected ground. The record does not compel the conclusion that the perpetrators were primarily motivated by more than material gain. See Baballah v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1067, 1075 n.7 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining that a petitioner is not entitled to asylum where persecuted “on account of an economic motive”). Huaman Alamas herself

4

testified that she thought the perpetrators were motivated by their search for money and weapons.

Because lack of nexus is fatal to Huaman Alamas’s asylum eligibility, we do not consider whether the Peruvian government is unwilling or unable to protect her. Nor do we find that the BIA erred by denying humanitarian asylum. Huaman Alamas is not eligible for humanitarian asylum because she has not established that she suffered past persecution on account of a protected ground. Belishta v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 1078, 1080 (9th Cir. 2004). And because Huaman Alamas is ineligible for asylum, she is necessarily unable to meet the more stringent standard for withholding of removal. Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1029 (9th Cir. 2019); Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1190 (9th Cir. 2006).

Substantial evidence also supports denial of CAT protection. To be eligible for withholding of removal under CAT, Huaman Alamas must show that it is more likely than not that she would be tortured if she were removed to Peru. See Madrigal v. Holder, 716 F.3d 499, 508 (9th Cir. 2013); 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.18(a)(1), 1208.16(c)(2). Even assuming that the incidents constituted past torture, the record does not compel a finding that the perpetrators have a continuing interest in Huaman Alamas or her family. See Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 802 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he showing of past torture does not give rise to a regulatory presumption of fear of future torture.”). In fact, as the BIA noted, Petitioner

5

testified that she lived with her sister in Peru, unharmed, for about two months after receiving threats on WhatsApp and that none of her family, who continue to reside in the same homes, have been harmed despite the threats. Accordingly, the record does not compel the conclusion that it is more likely than not Huaman Alamas will be tortured if she returned to Peru. Dawson v. Garland, 998 F.3d 876, 883 (9th Cir. 2021); Lopez-Cardona v. Holder, 662 F.3d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 2011).

PETITION DENIED. 1 2F

1 Huaman Alamas’s motion to stay removal, Dkt. No. 9, is denied.