HTC v. Telefonaktiebolaget

12 F.4th 476
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedAugust 31, 2021
Docket19-40643
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 12 F.4th 476 (HTC v. Telefonaktiebolaget) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
HTC v. Telefonaktiebolaget, 12 F.4th 476 (5th Cir. 2021).

Opinion

Case: 19-40566 Document: 00515999668 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/31/2021

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit

FILED August 31, 2021 No. 19-40566 Consolidated with Lyle W. Cayce Clerk No. 19-40643

HTC Corporation; HTC America, Incorporated,

Plaintiffs—Appellants,

versus

Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson; Ericsson, Incorporated,

Defendants—Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas USDC No. 6:18-CV-243

Before Jones, Elrod, and Higginson, Circuit Judges. Jennifer Walker Elrod, Circuit Judge: After negotiations for a patent licensing agreement soured, the plaintiffs sued the defendants and alleged that they had breached their contractual obligation to offer a license on fair, reasonable, and non- discriminatory terms. The jury found in the defendants’ favor, and the district court entered a separate declaratory judgment holding that the defendants had affirmatively complied with their contractual obligations. Case: 19-40566 Document: 00515999668 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/31/2021

No. 19-40566

c/w No. 19-40643

Now, the plaintiffs appeal, challenging the district court’s declaratory judgment in the defendants’ favor (which relies on the facts found by the jury) and certain of the district court’s jury instructions and evidentiary rulings. Finding no error in any of the district court’s decisions, we AFFIRM. I. With the small cell phones we carry in our pockets, instant access to communication, information, and entertainment are never more than a few simple taps away. Devices communicate seamlessly with one another to bring us the data we need in seconds, regardless of which company developed those devices or what network they are on. To make all of this possible, industry standard setting organizations have settled on technical standards that permit interoperability between devices. These standards dictate how cell phones and cellular towers communicate with one another, and they promote fast, reliable, and secure connections between devices. This is why a person with an iPhone on AT&T’s network can call or text someone with a Samsung phone on Verizon’s network without any trouble. Mobile device manufacturers and network providers all use the same set of standards when designing their devices and networks to ensure compatibility between various devices and networks. Standards may be generally beneficial for both consumers and industry participants. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 Calif. L. Rev. 1889, 1896–98 (2002). However, industry standards also pose a risk of anticompetitive behavior. See, e.g., Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1209 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (explaining two “potential concerns” with standardization).

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Standards frequently incorporate patented technology, known as standard- essential patents. See id. When a patent becomes essential to an industry standard, other companies face a choice if they want to have a standard- compliant device: They can either attempt to license the patented technology in order to develop their own product, or they can risk a patent infringement action against them. This puts the holder of a standard-essential patent in a powerful position to extract as much money as they want from potential licensees. To combat the potential for anticompetitive behavior, standard setting organizations require standard-essential patent holders to commit to licensing their patents on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms (FRAND terms). See id. Companies seeking to license under these terms become third-party beneficiaries of the contract between the standard- essential patent holder and the standard setting organization. They are thus enabled to enforce the terms of that contract. See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 885 (9th Cir. 2012). This case involves such an attempt to license a standard-essential patent. The European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) is a preeminent standard setting organization in the mobile telecommunications field. The France-based organization established many of the global standards for 3G, 4G, and 5G cellular communications technology. ETSI asks its members that own standard-essential patents to provide “an irrevocable undertaking in writing that [they are] prepared to grant irrevocable licences on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory” terms. If a patent owner is not prepared to grant such licenses, ETSI may exclude the patented technology from the standard. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson and Ericsson, Inc. (collectively Ericsson) hold numerous patents that are considered essential to the

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standards for 2G, 3G, and 4G technology. Ericsson has agreed with ETSI to grant licenses to other companies to use its standard-essential patents on FRAND terms. HTC Corp. and HTC America, Inc. (collectively HTC) produce mobile devices that implement the 2G, 3G, and 4G standards. HTC also owns several standard-essential patents related to 2G, 3G, and 4G technology. But to manufacture standard-compliant mobile devices, HTC has to obtain a license to use Ericsson’s patents. Ericsson and HTC have previously entered into three cross-license agreements for their respective patents—one in 2003, one in 2008, and one in 2014. In the 2014 licensing agreement, HTC agreed to pay Ericsson a lump sum of $75 million to license Ericsson’s patents regardless of HTC’s phone sales. Based on HTC’s sales, the company paid Ericsson approximately $2.50 per mobile device. In 2016, a short time before the 2014 license was about to expire, HTC and Ericsson began negotiating to renew the license. Ericsson offered a rate of $2.50 per 4G device. HTC did not accept this offer. Instead, it independently examined the value of Ericsson’s patents and reasoned that the royalty rate should be based on the smallest salable patent-practicing unit rather than the net sales price of the entire end-user device. HTC concluded that the relevant unit was the baseband processor, the hardware component of a cellular device that allows it to connect to cellular networks. Based on this conclusion, HTC met with Ericsson in late March 2017 and counteroffered a rate of $0.10 per 4G device. Ericsson considered HTC’s offer to be “so far off of the norm” that it “chilled” the negotiations. Ericsson left the meeting intending to justify its initial $2.50 per 4G device offer. A few days after that meeting, on April 6, 2017, HTC filed the present lawsuit, alleging that Ericsson had breached its commitment to provide a license on FRAND terms. In June, while the

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lawsuit was pending, Ericsson proposed a new licensing agreement whereby HTC would pay 1% of each 4G device sold, subject to a $1 floor and a $4 cap. HTC did not accept this second offer either. Instead, it filed an amended complaint seeking declaratory relief that Ericsson had breached its contractual obligations to ETSI by insisting on non-FRAND terms and had failed to negotiate in good faith. 1 Ericsson counterclaimed for a declaration that its offers were FRAND and alleged that HTC had failed to negotiate in good faith. At trial, the parties debated how to determine the value of Ericsson’s patents, which would affect whether Ericsson had offered FRAND terms to HTC. For its part, HTC sought to prove that Ericsson had not offered FRAND terms. It advocated apportioning the value of Ericsson’s patents using the profit margin on the baseband processor, rather than the net sales prices of the finished mobile device, as the royalty base.

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12 F.4th 476, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/htc-v-telefonaktiebolaget-ca5-2021.