Hrouska v. Janke

28 N.W. 166, 66 Wis. 252, 1886 Wisc. LEXIS 25
CourtWisconsin Supreme Court
DecidedMay 15, 1886
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 28 N.W. 166 (Hrouska v. Janke) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Wisconsin Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hrouska v. Janke, 28 N.W. 166, 66 Wis. 252, 1886 Wisc. LEXIS 25 (Wis. 1886).

Opinion

Cole; 0. J.

We do not think there was any error in admitting in evidence the record of the deed dated October 10, 1871. This deed was admitted as a good conveyance from seven of the eight children of Abraham Blaser. One objection to this deed is that two of the persons who signed and acknowledged it are not named in the body of the deed as grantors. The learned counsel for the defendant says [254]*254that, in order to convey by grant, the party possessing the right to convey must be the grantor and use apt and. proper words to convey to the grantee, and that merely signing, sealing, and acknowledging an instrument in which another person is grantor is not sufficient. Counsel relies upon Agricultural Bank v. Rice, 4 How. 241; Catlin v. Ware, 9 Mass. 218; Lufkin v. Curtis, 13 Mass. 223; and Peabody v. Hewett, 52 Me. 33,— to sustain his position. The deed in the case in Howard was by the respective husbands in right of their wives of the one part, and of the grantees of the other part, the husbands and the grantees being specifically named; and the parties of the first part granted to the parties of the second part. Taney, C. J., says: The lessors of the plaintiff are not described as gi-antors, and they use no words to convey their interest. It is altogether the act of the husbands, and they alone convey. . . . The deed in question conveyed the marital interest of the husbands in these lands, but nothing more.” In Catlin v. Ware, where the deed was executed by her husband, the wife affixed her signature and seal, but her name was not otherwise mentioned in the deed, nor were there any words therein purporting or implying a release of her right of dower. The deed was acknowledged by the husband and recorded, but there was no acknowledgment by the wife. The court held that she did.not release her dower. The same ruling was made in Lufkin v. Curtis. In Peabody v. Hewett it appeared that there were nine children of Solomon Peabody, who were the only heirs; that the demandants had the title of eight of them without dispute. It was supposed by both parties at the time of the trial that the interests of all the heirs were united in the- demandants, and the verdict was rendered accordingly. Among the heirs was the son of the ancestor, ’William Peabody, who appears to have signed and sealed an instrument, supposed to be a perfect deed, to ■Sarah N. Patten, one of the demandants, but his name did [255]*255not appear in an}*- other part thereof. No evidence was introduced to show the death of William Peabody, and he was therefore supposed to be still living. It was held that the instrument did not operate as a deed to convey the interest of William Peabody.

These cases, so far as we can ascertain the facts upon which they were decided, are distinguishable from the one at bar, and do not rule it. We are disposed to hold that the deed in question was effective as a conveyance of the interest of Henriette Hover and Martha Hansen, though their names were not mentioned.in the body of the instrument. Prof. Washburn says: “It was once thought that the grantor should be named in the deed; but this does not seem to be necessary, if the grantor signs it.” 3 Washb. on Real Prop. ch. 4, § 1, subd. 31.

Another objection to the record evidence is that the deed was not executed in the presence of two witnesses. It is certainly attested by two witnesses, and we must presume, under the circumstances, that it was duly witnessed. Counsel says the deed purports to be acknowledged by some of the grantors on different days, in different counties, and before different officers, while there are only two witnesses. But non constat the grantors were not all together when they executed the deed. It would be a most “violent and unreasonable presumption,” in the absence of all proof to sustain it, to assume that they were not together.

The question involved in this case is as to the true section line between sections 28 and 29. Both are fractional sections, bordering on Lake Michigan. The plaintiff owns the N. E. of the S. E. of section 29; the defendant owns fractional section 28. The trend of the lake in that vicinity is about N. N. E., and the west sjiore cuts the section line at a point 60 to 65 chains south of the northeast corner of section 29. The meander posts on the south and east lines of section 29 are both lost. The east quarter post on [256]*256section 29 is lost, or in dispute. The parties agree upon the location of the south section line, of the west section line, of the north section line, of 29, and both start from the same northeast corner of this section. The controversy is as to the location of the section line which runs southerly from said northeast corner. As bearing upon that question, considerable testimony was introduced of surveyors who had attempted to establish the east section line; also of persons who claimed to know the location of that line from marked and bearing trees, and the position of the original quarter -post. A certified copy of the field-notes of the original survey was offered in evidence. Two surveyors who surveyed the line at different times for the plaintiff started from the northeast corner of section 29, and ran due south, and with the aid of the field-notes claimed to have established the correct line. They describe fully the method of their respective surveys, and how they verified the accuracy of their work. But adopting the course and distance of these surveys,; — ■ which very nearly agreed,— and the meander distance of the line from the meander post on the south end of the east section line and the meander post at the east end of the south section line as stated in the field-notes, and the lines would not close. The plats and field-notes of the government survey show that this section 29 closed by a meander line 12.58 chains from meander post No. 2, at the intersection of the south line with the bank of Lake Michigan, to the meander post No. 3, at the intersection of Lake Michigan by the east line of the section. A third survey was made by another surveyor for the defendant. lie started from the same northeast corner of section 29, and, instead of running due south, ran on a course 48 min. west of south, so as to close upon a point, as he determined, corresponding with the location of meander post No. 3, as given in the field-notes, and 12.58 chains in the proper direction from meander post No. 2, as above de[257]*257scribed. But, even according to his survey, the lines of the section did not close. There was also much testimony as to where marked and bearing trees stood along the east line, and as to the location of the original quarter post.

The learned circuit judge gave a very full charge, stating, as we think, the law correctly which was applicable to the case. Portions of the charge were excepted to, and such exceptions were relied on here for a reversal of the judgment. It is said that the whole charge, taken together, was equivalent to a direction to find for the plaintiff; that the circuit judge in the charge seemed to be laboring under the impression that there were only two species of evidence to be considered in boundary cases: (1) Direct evidence as to the location of the original posts; (2) evidence of a certain formula of surveying, which, if followed, conclusively established a line wherever the original posts were lost. Perhaps the best answer which can be given to these criticisms, and some others of a like nature, would' be to give the charge itself as found in the bill of exceptions. It is too long, however, to be quoted in extenso.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Strong v. Strong
140 P.2d 386 (California Supreme Court, 1943)
Hind v. Thomas
187 N.W. 192 (Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1922)
Guild v. More
155 N.W. 44 (North Dakota Supreme Court, 1915)
Agar v. Streeter
150 N.W. 160 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1914)
Driskill v. Ashley
167 S.W. 1026 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 1914)
Sterling v. Park
58 S.E. 828 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 1907)
Kleven v. Gunderson
104 N.W. 4 (Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1905)
Peter v. Byrne
75 S.W. 433 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 1903)
Paulus v. O'Neill
131 Wis. 69 (Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1901)
City of Madison v. Mayers
40 L.R.A. 635 (Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1897)
Harrass v. Edwards
69 N.W. 69 (Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1896)
Continental National Bank of Chicago v. McGeoch
66 N.W. 606 (Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1896)
City of Racine v. Emerson
55 N.W. 177 (Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1893)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
28 N.W. 166, 66 Wis. 252, 1886 Wisc. LEXIS 25, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hrouska-v-janke-wis-1886.