UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
H.R. et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v. Civil Action No. 21-1856 (TJK)
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiffs H.R. and his parents sue the District of Columbia, alleging that the District has
failed to provide him with a free appropriate education in violation of the Individuals with Disa-
bilities Education Act. Magistrate Judge Robin M. Meriweather recommended that the Court deny
Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and grant Defendant’s cross-motion for the same. Plain-
tiffs timely objected on several grounds. For the reasons explained below, the Court will overrule
the objections, adopt Judge Meriweather’s Report and Recommendation in full, grant Defendants’
motion, deny Plaintiffs’, and enter judgment for the District.
I. Background
A. Legal Background
Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), to receive federal educa-
tion funding, school districts must adopt procedures to ensure all children with disabilities receive
a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”). 20 U.S.C. § 1412. To that end, an individualized
education program (“IEP”) is developed annually for each disabled child in the school district. Id.
§§ 1412(a)(4), 1414(d). If any party disagrees with the “identification, evaluation, or educational
placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child,” the
party is entitled to an “impartial due process hearing.” Id. §§ 1415(b)(6), 1415(f). There, the parties may present evidence and expert testimony about the child’s educational and functional
needs to an independent hearing officer, who issues a “determination” about whether the child was
denied a FAPE and, if so, orders an appropriate remedy. Id. §§ 1415(f), 1415(h). That decision
may be challenged in state or federal court. Id. § 1415(i)(2). During the resolution of such a
proceeding, the IDEA’s “stay put” provision allows the child to “remain in the then-current edu-
cational placement.” Id. § 1415(j).
B. Factual and Procedural Background
The factual and procedural history of this case is, unfortunately, long and tortuous. In
January 2018, while H.R. was in first grade, he was diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity
Disorder, Specific Learning Disability with impairment in reading, and Developmental Coordina-
tion Disorder. ECF No. 33 at 4–5. The District then developed an IEP for H.R. for the 2018–19
school year, calling for, among other things, ten hours of specialized instruction outside general
education every week. Id. at 5. But Plaintiffs, unconvinced that H.R.’s public school could ade-
quately support his needs, enrolled him in a private special education school, the Lab School of
Washington, where he remains. Id. at 5, 13. H.R.’s parents also filed an administrative complaint
against the District. Id. at 5. A hearing officer determined that the District had denied H.R. a
FAPE and ordered it to reimburse his private school tuition, though he found that H.R. did not
require a full-time special education setting going forward. Id. at 5–6.
Each year since then, the District has developed a new IEP for H.R., and in each, it has
proposed that H.R. receive 15 hours of specialized instruction each week and that he be placed in
his neighborhood public school. ECF No. 33 at 6–12. To begin, in 2019, the District developed
an IEP for H.R. for the 2019–20 school year. Id. at 6. Again, H.R.’s parents filed an administrative
complaint after deciding to keep H.R. at the Lab School, and the parties reached a settlement
providing that the District would pay H.R.’s tuition at the Lab School for that year. Id.
2 In April 2020, the District developed a new IEP for the 2020–21 school year, again calling
for 15 hours per week of specialized instruction and that H.R. be placed in public school. ECF
No. 33 at 6. This is the first of the two IEPs now the subject of this litigation. In August 2020,
Plaintiffs filed an administrative complaint challenging that IEP. Id. at 7. Plaintiffs also moved
for “stay put” relief based on the 2019 settlement agreement, which the hearing officer granted,
enabling H.R. to remain at the Lab School. Id. The “due process” hearing on Plaintiffs’ August
2020 complaint began in March 2021, but did not conclude until June 2021. Id. By that time, the
IEP for the 2020–21 school year had expired, and the District had already developed a new IEP
for the 2021–22 school year. Id. That is the second IEP challenged in this suit.
A flurry of activity flowed from that procedural posture. Plaintiffs filed a motion arguing
that the August 2020 complaint over the IEP for the 2020–21 school year was moot, which a
hearing officer denied on June 4, 2021. ECF No. 33 at 7–8. A few days later, on June 8, 2021,
Plaintiffs filed a new administrative complaint challenging the IEP for the 2021–22 school year
and invoked H.R.’s stay-put rights for that year. Id. at 8. On June 21, 2021, the hearing officer
issued a decision on the August 2020 complaint over the IEP for the 2020–21 school year, con-
cluding again that the case was not moot and upholding H.R.’s IEP for that year. Id. at 8–9.
On July 12, 2021, Plaintiffs appealed that decision by suing in this Court. ECF No. 1. And
the next day, the Court referred it to Judge Meriweather for full case management. Minute Order
of July 13, 2021. A few months later, in December 2021, Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary in-
junction to enforce H.R.’s stay-put rights at the Lab School, which Judge Meriweather recom-
mended be granted. ECF Nos. 4, 8. The Court adopted that recommendation, so H.R.’s placement
at the Lab School remains funded by the District while this suit is pending. ECF No. 9.
Still, administrative proceedings continued below while the case was pending before Judge
Meriweather. After the Court resolved the preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs—having filed suit
3 over the hearing officer’s decision on the IEP for the 2020–21 school year—withdrew their com-
plaint about the 2021–22 one. ECF No. 33 at 10. But in December 2021, the District filed its own
administrative complaint about the 2021–22 IEP, asserting that it was appropriate and seeking an
order confirming that the Lab School was not a proper placement. Id. And while that complaint
was pending, in March 2022, the District issued a new IEP for the 2022–23 school year, and Plain-
tiffs moved to dismiss the District’s December complaint on mootness grounds. Id. at 10–11. A
new hearing officer (assigned to this second due process proceeding) denied that motion and de-
termined that the 2021–22 IEP provided H.R. a FAPE. Id. at 11. Thus, in July 2022, Plaintiffs
amended their complaint before this Court to add a challenge to the District’s proposed IEP and
placement for the 2021–22 school year. ECF No. 15. Thus, the operative complaint now includes
challenges to both H.R.’s IEPs for both the 2020–21 and 2021–22 school years.
In December 2022, Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment before Judge Meriweather,
and in April 2023, the District cross-moved. ECF Nos. 21, 26. Since then, the District developed
a new IEP for the 2023–24 school year. See ECF No. 33 at 12–13. The District again proposed
15 hours per week of specialized instruction outside the general education classroom and that H.R.
enroll in public school, among other things. Id. H.R.’s proposed placement is now the local middle
school, rather than elementary school, given his age and grade level. Id.; see also ECF Nos. 31,
32. Under the hearing officer’s stay-put order, H.R. has remained at the Lab School. ECF No. 33
at 13.
In March 2024, Judge Meriweather issued a Report and Recommendation recommending
that the Court deny Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and grant Defendant’s cross-motion.
ECF No. 33. Plaintiffs timely objected, ECF No. 35, and Defendant opposes, ECF No. 36.
4 II. Legal Standard
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), a party may file specific written objections
to a magistrate judge’s proposed findings and recommendations. The Court must then “determine
de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that has been properly objected to.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b)(3); see also LCvR 72.3(b). The Court may then “accept, reject, or modify the rec-
ommended disposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); see also LCvR 72.3(c). The Court reviews
those portions of the report and recommendation without specific objections for “clear error.”
Tsige v. Fac. Prac. Plan, No. 13-cv-7148, 2014 WL 1378310, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 25, 2014).
III. Analysis
Plaintiffs object to Judge Meriweather’s Report and Recommendation on three grounds:
that (1) because the challenged IEPs are no longer in effect, the case is moot; (2) Judge Meri-
weather failed to appropriately consider witness testimony and evidence; and (3) she erred in find-
ing that the District’s proposed IEPs were appropriate. For the reasons explained below, the Court
disagrees, and overrules each objection.
A. Mootness
“Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution permits federal courts to adjudicate only actual,
ongoing controversies.” United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am. v. Operative Plasterers’ &
Cement Masons’ Int’l Ass’n of the U.S. & Can., 721 F.3d 678, 687 (D.C. Cir. 2013). “Simply
stated, a case is moot when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally
cognizable interest in the outcome.” Cnty. of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979)
(quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969)). A case may be rendered moot if
“events have so transpired that the decision will neither presently affect the parties’ rights nor have
a more-than-speculative chance of affecting them in the future.” Sec’y of Lab., Mine Safety &
Health Admin. v. M-Class Mining, LLC, 1 F.4th 16, 21–22 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (quoting Clarke v.
5 United States, 915 F.2d 699, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). In the IDEA context, “in appropriate circum-
stances, the development of a new IEP may render a challenge to a prior IEP moot, for example,
when the new IEP resolves the previous subject of dispute.” N.W. v. District of Columbia, 253 F.
Supp. 3d 5, 14 (D.D.C. 2017).
Both hearing officers considering the 2020–21 and 2021–22 IEPs concluded that the dis-
putes before them were not moot. ECF No. 16-1 at 22–25; ECF No. 20-1 at 153–54. Judge Mer-
iweather agreed that Plaintiffs’ August 2020 administrative complaint challenging the IEP for the
2020–21 school year was not moot, and neither was this suit. ECF No. 33 at 16–34. And while
Judge Meriweather determined that the District’s December 2021 administrative complaint about
the IEP for the 2021–22 school year was technically moot, 1 she still concluded that both the chal-
lenges to the 2020–21 and 2021–22 IEPs, as well as this case, were subject to the “capable of
repetition yet evading review exception” to mootness. Id.
Plaintiffs argue that their challenges to H.R.’s IEPs for the 2020–21 and 2021–22 school
years (and thus this case) are moot because “[i]n both cases, the IEP on appeal had been reviewed
and replaced with an updated IEP and a placement proposal.” ECF No. 21 at 12. Moreover, they
say, H.R. has a new proposed placement at a neighborhood middle school, so a ruling here would
have no more than a speculative chance of affecting H.R.’s education moving forward, because
the challenged 2020–21 and 2021–22 IEPs were specific to elementary education. ECF No. 35 at
2–3.
1 Unlike the August 2020 administrative complaint, the December 2021 complaint about the IEP for the 2021–22 school year was brought by the District. The hearing officer had reasoned that it was not moot because a finding on the appropriateness of the 2021–22 IEP would determine the District’s obligation to fund H.R.’s placement for the 2021–22 school year. ECF No. 20-1 at 153–54. Judge Meriweather disagreed, but neither party objects to her Report and Recommenda- tion on that point. ECF No. 33 at 31–32.
6 The Court agrees with Judge Meriweather that this case is not moot. While this appeal has
been pending, Plaintiffs continue to seek the same relief they sought in the 2020–21 and 2021–22
IEPs, and which is the subject of this dispute. They assert that H.R. requires placement in a full-
time specialized education program, while the District continues to propose only 15 hours per
week of specialized instruction. ECF No. 31 at 2; ECF No. 32 at 5. And more specifically, Plain-
tiffs continue to demand placement at the Lab School. ECF No. 35 at 1. Because the dispute
remains ongoing, the development of a new IEP does not render the case moot. See N.W., 253 F.
Supp. 3d at 14 (reasoning that the development of a new IEP moots a case only if it resolves the
subject of the dispute); Turner v. District of Columbia, 952 F. Supp. 2d 31, 39–40 (D.D.C. 2013)
(similar). Moreover, that the District is now proposing placement at a middle school rather than
an elementary school does not, itself, moot the dispute, given that Plaintiffs continue to seek place-
ment at the Lab School, and thus “any single claim for relief remain[s] viable.” Morris v. District
of Columbia, 38 F. Supp. 3d 57, 66 (D.D.C. 2014) (internal quotation omitted). And Plaintiffs
have not explained in a more than “cursory fashion” why “a new IEP and a new location of ser-
vices. . . resolves or avoids the issues of dispute here.” See N.W., 253 F. Supp. 3d at 14 n.9.
For this same reasons, Plaintiffs’ August 2020 administrative complaint challenging the
IEP for the 2020–21 school year is not moot. The hearing on that complaint did not take place
until March 2021, and the motion was not resolved until June of that year, by which time, after
new testing, the District proposed a new IEP for the 2021–22 school year. ECF No. 33 at 7–9.
Plaintiffs complain that “the delays in completing that hearing before the expiration of the April
2020 IEP [for the 2020–21 school year] were clearly not the fault of plaintiffs.” ECF No. 35 at 3.
But Judge Meriweather did not ascribe any fault to them, and regardless, fault for the delay is not
relevant to whether the dispute is moot. Plaintiffs make no effort to explain why the new testing
caused the case to be moot, either.
7 The Court also agrees with Judge Meriweather that the case, and Plaintiffs’ 2020 adminis-
trative complaint challenging the IEP for the 2020–21 school year, are not moot because resolving
them would have a more-than-speculative chance of affecting H.R.’s stay-put rights. ECF No. 33
at 20. As is, H.R.’s parents invoke the 2019 agreement to establish his stay-put rights at the Lab
School. Judge Meriweather reasoned that if she were to affirm the hearing officer’s determination
about the 2020–21 IEP—which places H.R. in his neighborhood public school—then that IEP
would govern H.R.’s stay-put placement in any later proceedings. Id. And because Plaintiffs
“have consistently challenged H.R.’s IEP for the last five years and used the stay-put provision
and the 2019 [hearing officer determination] to maintain [District of Columbia Public Schools]
funding of H.R.’s enrollment at Lab, and are likely to continue to do so if their demands are not
met,” this is yet another reason this case presents a live controversy. Id. Plaintiffs object, arguing
that any decision on H.R.’s stay-put placement would be merely an “advisory opinion.” ECF No.
35 at 3. But both parties have a legally cognizable interest in the outcome: H.R. in his stay-put
right, and the District in any legal defense to stay-put funding.
In sum, to seek dismissal of the case as moot, Plaintiffs “must show not only that a new
IEP has been developed but that it resolves or avoids the issues of dispute here.” N.W., 253 F.
Supp. 3d at 14 n.9. They have not made that showing, and so this case is not moot.
In any event, once again the Court agrees with Judge Meriweather that, even if this case
and both underlying administrative disputes are technically moot, the “capable of repetition yet
evading review exception” to mootness applies to them. That exception applies “where (1) the
challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration,
and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subject to the
same action again.” Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 735 (2008) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). The first prong is satisfied given that “there can be no doubt that a one-year placement
8 order under the IDEA is, by its nature, ‘too short [in duration] to be fully litigated prior to its . . .
expiration.’” J.T. v. District of Columbia, 983 F.3d 516, 524 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).
Plaintiffs challenge only the second prong, arguing that Judge Meriweather overlooked differences
in H.R.’s IEPs, “most importantly that he is now a middle school student.” ECF No. 35 at 4. But
as Judge Meriweather reasoned, every one of H.R.’s IEPs since 2018 has called for 15 hours per
week of specialized instruction. ECF No. 33 at 22. And H.R.’s parents continue to object to his
IEPs on those grounds, that he requires full-time specialized education services. See ECF No. 31
at 2. What that specialized instruction looks like may change in a middle school environment. But
Plaintiffs point to no legal authority or anything in the record to support their assertion that the
change in location of services means this case or either of the parties’ administrative complaints is
not capable of repetition.
B. Witness Credibility and Testimony
Plaintiffs next object to Judge Meriweather’s adoption of the hearing officer’s factual de-
terminations, arguing that she failed to appropriately consider witness testimony and evidence.
Their objections on this point are threefold: (1) that Judge Meriweather misconstrued the im-
portance of witnesses’ personal knowledge of H.R., (2) that she failed to consider the lack of ex-
planation by the District for its proposed IEP, and (3) that she misapplied the burden of proof. The
Court considers each in turn.
First, Plaintiffs argue that the hearing officers and Judge Meriweather gave undue weight
to the District’s witnesses who had not personally observed H.R. in an educational setting or who
had not done so for many years, while their own witness had conducted a psychological evaluation
of H.R. in 2021. ECF No. 35 at 4–6. They criticize, in particular, Judge Meriweather’s reasoning
that Plaintiffs’ “focus on the lack of recent [District] witness observations of H.R. has no bearing
9 on the credibility of the testimony considered by [a hearing officer] or the weight afforded to each
witness.” ECF No. 33 at 36; ECF No. 35 at 4.
But Judge Meriweather correctly noted that “a hearing officer is entitled to make reasona-
ble credibility determinations and, in the absence of extrinsic evidence to the contrary, those de-
terminations are entitled to deference from the Court,” ECF No. 33 at 34 (quoting Wimbish v.
District of Columbia, 381 F. Supp. 3d 22, 29 n.5 (D.D.C. 2019)), so long as they do not “lack[]
reasoned and specific findings,” id. at 35 (quoting McNeil v. District of Columbia, 217 F. Supp.
3d 107, 114 (D.D.C. 2016)). And she recognized that courts should “not substitute their assess-
ment of the evidence for that of hearing officers.” Id. (quoting Options Pub. Charter Sch. v. Howe
ex rel. A.H., 512 F. Supp. 2d 55, 57 (D.D.C. 2007). The Court finds that she applied the appropriate
deference by not substituting any personal assessment of the evidence she may have had.
As for the two District witnesses who are the focus of Plaintiffs’ objection, Judge Meri-
weather recounted how the hearing officer considering H.R.’s IEP for the 2020–21 school year
“addressed this very credibility objection,” “specifying that [the officer] credited the testimony of
these witnesses regarding their opinions on whether H.R. could manage the general education set-
ting for part of the school day because they were the only witnesses to ever observe H.R. in the
general education setting, which necessarily was in the past because H.R. [had] remained in a
special education setting at Lab since the 2018–19 school year.” ECF No. 33 at 36–37. 2 And to
2 Plaintiffs respond by pointing out that those witnesses observed H.R. in 2018 while H.R. was in a general education setting in a small private school, and so have limited relevance to the District’s proposed public middle school placement. ECF No. 35 at 5. But the hearing officer specifically acknowledged that the witnesses’ observations of H.R. in a general education setting “necessarily” were somewhat dated, given that H.R. had been at the Lab School for years, but that they were the best evidence available of how H.R. might do in a general education setting. See ECF No. 33 at 36–37. The hearing officer had a right to make his own reasonable credibility determinations, and with no extrinsic evidence to the contrary, the Court also defers to his judg- ment.
10 the extent Plaintiffs maintain their challenges to the rest of the District’s witnesses, their testimony
required no direct observation or personal knowledge of H.R.—to the contrary, they offered testi-
mony on topics such as the purpose and uses of certain educational programs. Id. at 37. Likewise,
as Judge Meriweather further explained, the hearing officer considering the IEP for the 2021–22
school year “incorporate[d] testimony of [District] witnesses . . . regarding their first-hand class-
room observations of H.R.,” and found Plaintiffs’ witness testimony “predicting how H.R. would
behave in a general education classroom ‘purely speculative,’ for neither had observed H.R. in that
setting and their prediction was contrary to past observations of H.R. in the general education
classroom.” Id. at 38–39 (quoting ECF No. 18-1 at 27–28). Plaintiffs do not explain why that was
error, and the Court is not persuaded that Judge Meriweather erred in adopting the hearing officers’
credibility determinations on these points.
Next, Plaintiffs argue that the hearing officers and Judge Meriweather failed to consider
what they perceive as lack of evidence for the District’s proposed amount of only 15 hours of
specialized instruction, particularly given the evidence that H.R. had done well at the Lab School
in a full-time specialized setting. 3 ECF No. 35 at 7.
They are right that “[a] reviewing court may fairly expect [the hearing officer and school
officials] to be able to offer a cogent and responsive explanation for their decisions.” Endrew F.
ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 580 U.S. 386, 404 (2017). But as Judge
3 In addition, that the District’s proposed number of hours of specialized instruction re- mained the same year after year, despite H.R.’s progress, does not in itself cast doubt on the cred- ibility of the District’s position that “the supports provided in the IEP were sufficient.” And with- out “non-testimonial, extrinsic evidence in the record [that] would justify a contrary conclusion,” the Court “must accept the state agency’s credibility determinations.” J.N. v. District of Columbia, 677 F. Supp. 2d 314, 322 (D.D.C. 2010) (citation omitted); see ECF No. 33 at 50, 56. Plaintiffs point to nothing to the contrary.
11 Meriweather explained, here—on the issue of how much specialized instruction H.R required—
they did just that. The hearing officer who considered the IEP for the 2020–21 school year rea-
soned that H.R. “had mastered many of [his] reading goals, suggesting that [he] could now under-
stand the reading materials in a general education classroom.” ECF No. 16-1 at 27. And he noted
that, while in a general education setting, H.R. had “participated in classroom activities and les-
sons, required minimal verbal prompting and redirection, and interacted appropriately with peers.”
Id. at 28. One witness “agreed with the recommendation for fifteen hours of specialized instruction
outside general education in the IEP,” and another “explained [fifteen hours] were enough special-
ized instructional hours to implement the IEP goals.” Id.; see also ECF No. 33 at 37–38, 51–52.
And the hearing officer considering the IEP for the 2021–22 school year, likewise, found that
H.R.’s “perform[ance] on grade level for two years and his . . . recent evaluations do not support
the contention that he needs intensive intervention in an academic cocoon to succeed.” ECF No.
33 at 52 (quoting ECF No. 18-1 at 28).
True, Plaintiffs proffered experts and other evidence supporting the contrary view that H.R.
needs all-day specialized instruction in a small group setting. But Judge Meriweather appropri-
ately found that “[a]ll of this testimony is based on conjecture based on the unsupported assump-
tion that because H.R. had progressed in smaller class sizes, he could not progress in larger ones,”
and much of the expert testimony “is conclusory and not based on concrete evidence, like an eval-
uation or testing.” ECF No. 33 at 54–55. In fact, she reasoned, Plaintiffs “failed to identify eval-
uations or studies providing concrete evidence that H.R. required full-time special education to
progress . . . as opposed to the proposed fifteen hours.” Id. at 53–54. To be sure, one of Plaintiffs’
experts had conducted a psychological evaluation of H.R. in 2021, but Judge Meriweather cor-
rectly noted that her testimony that H.R. needed full-time specialized care because he “has such
complicated learning needs” and “is succeeding [at the Lab School] because of the features of that
12 environment, that it’s [a] small group, everything is intensely structured,” was based on conjecture
about how he would do outside that specific setting. Id. (quoting ECF No. 20-1 at 553–54). And
much of the “witnesses’ rationales for full-time special education were already addressed in the
IEPs,” which account for 15 hours of specialized instruction outside of general education and ex-
ecutive functions supports. Id. at 55.
Finally, Plaintiffs argue that Judge Meriweather improperly shifted the burden to Plaintiffs
to show that H.R. needed full-time educational services. ECF No. 35 at 6. Not so. Ordinarily, the
“burden of proof in an administrative hearing challenging an IEP is properly placed upon the party
seeking relief.” Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 62 (2005). Under District law, in
special education due process hearings, the party who filed for the due process hearing bears the
burden of production and persuasion except, as here, “[w]here there is a dispute about the appro-
priateness of the child’s individual educational program or placement, . . . the public agency shall
hold the burden of persuasion on the appropriateness of the existing or proposed program or place-
ment.” D.C. Code § 38-2571.03(6)(A)(i). Even then, “the party requesting the due process hearing
shall retain the burden of production and shall establish a prima facie case before the burden of
persuasion falls on the public agency.” Id.
In her recommendation to deny Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and to grant De-
fendant’s cross-motion, and in adopting the hearing officers’ credibility determinations, Judge
Meriweather often pointed to the lack of evidence in support of Plaintiffs’ position. See, e.g., ECF
No. 33 at 54–55. But it was not inappropriate burden-shifting, in the hearing officers’ factfinding
role, for them to assess the evidence and conclude it did not support Plaintiffs’ case. See Edward
M.-R. by & through T.R.-M. v. District of Columbia, 660 F. Supp. 3d 82, 107 (D.D.C. 2023) (hear-
ing officer did not shift burden when providing “broader context of explaining why the evidence,
as a whole, did not support Plaintiffs’ arguments”); A.D. v. District of Columbia, No. 20-cv-2765
13 (BAH), 2022 WL 683570, at *9 (D.D.C. Mar. 8, 2022). Similarly, it was not inappropriate burden-
shifting for Judge Meriweather to conclude that Plaintiffs’ evidence was vague, conclusory, and
in the end, unpersuasive.
As one example, Judge Meriweather pointed to one witness’s testimony that “it’s so clear
that [H.R.] requires small group” and another who “didn’t think H.R. would do well,” neither of
which was supported by specific facts. ECF No. 33 at 54 (quoting ECF No. 20-1 at 495, 607–08)
(cleaned up). And as noted above, she concluded that the testimony was “conjecture based on the
unsupported assumption that because H.R. had progressed in smaller class sizes, he could not pro-
gress in larger ones.” Id. at 54–55. Her conclusions are based on record evidence and adequately
explained, and she did not erroneously shift the burden by suggesting that Plaintiffs’ witnesses had
not “adequately explained” why full-time placement was necessary. See id. at 54.
C. The Appropriateness of H.R.’s IEPs
Plaintiffs’ final objection is that Judge Meriweather erred in finding the District’s proposed
IEPs to be appropriate, as the hearing officers had also found. ECF No. 35 at 7–10. They say the
District should have been required to specify the reading program that would be provided to H.R.
as part of an IEP, and that neither the 2020–21 nor 2021–22 IEP adequately addressed his needs
in reading and executive functioning. Id. The Court disagrees.
As for reading, Judge Meriweather explained that the District “generally maintains discre-
tion in determining instructional methodology and the IDEA does not require IEPs to provide a
specific program or employee a specific methodology in educating a student.” ECF No. 33 at 44.
She noted that the hearing officers’ conclusions that “the District did not propose including the
Orton-Gillingham method primarily because of H.R.’s strong progress in reading since the imple-
mentation of the program and his ability to read on grade-level” were “well reasoned and supported
by the record.” Id. at 45. And she rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that the IEPs “did not adequately
14 specify how H.R.’s reading instruction would be provided” because they offer “the requisite level
of specificity,” namely, two reading goals and 15 hours per week of specialized instruction in a
“structured classroom setting with limited distractions, when being introduced to new skills.” Id.
at 46 (also considering detail provided by prior written notices).
Simply put, the District was not required to include more detail in the IEP or prior written
notices, so none of that was error. See Jones v. District of Columbia, No. 17-cv-1437
(RCL/RMM), 2018 WL 7286022, at *12 (D.D.C. Sept. 5, 2018), report and recommendation
adopted, 2019 WL 532671, at *1 n.1 (D.D.C. Feb. 11, 2019) (“[T]he IEP is required to include at
least a brief description of the [least restrictive environment].”); 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(V)
(an IEP must include “an explanation of the extent, if any, to which the child will not participate
with nondisabled children in the regular class and in the activities described in subclause
(IV)(cc)”). And as Judge Meriweather correctly explained, “questions of methodology are for
resolution by the States,” Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S.
176, 208 (1982), and thus courts in this District have held that “questions about the methodology
of instruction cannot be decided by a court,” R.B. v. District of Columbia, No. 18-cv-662 (RMC),
2019 WL 4750410, at *13 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2019); see ECF No. 33 at 44–45.
Plaintiffs complain that the IEPs should have included the Orton-Gillingham reading pro-
gram and required small class sizes because they attribute H.R.’s success at the Lab School to
those two factors. ECF No. 35 at 8. But as Judge Meriweather explained, Plaintiffs did not provide
any evidence to support their position that H.R.’s progress was because of small class sizes or that
he still needed that particular reading methodology. ECF No. 33 at 41–45. Plaintiffs respond, as
above, that Judge Meriweather misapplied the burden of proof by requiring Plaintiffs to provide
evidence that H.R. required these two learning components, rather than placing the burden on the
District to prove the opposite. ECF No. 35 at 8. But for the same reasons already explained above,
15 Judge Meriweather did not impermissibly shift the burden merely by assessing the evidence and
concluding it did not support their arguments.
As for executive functioning, Judge Meriweather noted that courts “must give due weight
to the administrative proceeding and afford some deference to the expertise of the hearing officer
and school officials responsible for the child’s education,” and thus “[h]ow [the District] sought to
address the executive functioning supports within the IEP was its prerogative.” ECF No. 33 at 49
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). And she adopted the hearing officers’ determina-
tions that although the IEPs for the 2020–21 and 2021–22 school years did not include specific
goals and specialized instruction for H.R.’s executive functioning needs, those needs were ade-
quately addressed elsewhere in the proposed IEPs. ECF No. 33 at 47–50.
Plaintiffs mainly fault Judge Meriweather for relying on Z.B. v. District of Columbia, 888
F.3d 515 (D.C. Cir. 2018), in which the Circuit held that a child was not denied a FAPE for a lack
of executive functioning goals when executive functioning skills were addressed in other areas of
the child’s IEP. ECF No. 35 at 9–10; see ECF No. 33 at 49. In that case, the Court of Appeals
found that the challenged IEP “did not deny Z.B. an appropriate education for want of an executive
functioning goal, because [the District] addressed executive functioning skills within the IEP’s
treatment of other areas of concern.” 888 F.3d at 527. Plaintiffs object that H.R.’s IEP “only has
an executive functioning goal in the Motor Skills/Physical Development section of the IEP” and
“[t]hat goal contains objectives for H.R. to complete a daily organizational checklist, positioning
materials on his desk, and to optimize his attention to task.” ECF No. 35 at 10. But as in Z.B.,
Judge Meriweather found that H.R.’s executive functioning skills were adequately addressed in
the IEPs. She pointed to witness testimony that District staff “typically treat executive functioning
as a ‘cross-cutting’ factor, rather than in a separate section of the IEP” and that as a result, “ac-
commodations in the IEP relating to chunking, visual timers, checklists, alternative seating
16 options, paper adjustments, and the like were designed to address executive functioning issues.”
ECF No. 33 at 48 (quoting ECF No. 16-1 at 26). Plaintiffs identify nothing further that would
establish the inadequacy of the IEPs’ executive functioning components.
IV. Conclusion
For all the above reasons, and upon consideration of the entire record, including the Report
and Recommendation and Plaintiffs’ objections thereto, the Court will adopt in its entirety Judge
Meriweather’s Report and Recommendation, grant Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judg-
ment, and deny Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. A separate order will issue.
/s/ Timothy J. Kelly TIMOTHY J. KELLY United States District Judge Date: July 30, 2024