Howard v. Southern Health Partners (INMATE 2)

CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Alabama
DecidedJuly 18, 2023
Docket2:20-cv-00724
StatusUnknown

This text of Howard v. Southern Health Partners (INMATE 2) (Howard v. Southern Health Partners (INMATE 2)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Howard v. Southern Health Partners (INMATE 2), (M.D. Ala. 2023).

Opinion

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA NORTHERN DIVISION

DARON DWANE HOWARD-BEY, ) ) Plaintiff, ) v. ) ) CASE NO. 2:20-CV-724-RAH-CSC ) ) SOUTHERN HEALTH PARTNERS et. al., ) ) Defendants.

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE I. INTRODUCTION Daron Dwane Howard-Bey, an indigent state inmate filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, alleging that while he was housed at Covington County Jail he was treated with deliberate indifference when beginning January 27, 2020, through July 9, 2020, he was given the “wrong medicine that has made me paralyze.” (Doc. 1 at p. 1). He later filed an Amended Complaint alleging that the CT scan taken the morning after his arrest on January 28, 2020, was “falsefiled {sic] in the medical exhibit to try to hide the stroke found” and that the alleged deliberate indifference to his medical needs continued through August 5, 2020. (Doc. 74 at p. 2). The named Defendants in this action include Southern Health Partners, (“SHP”); Kristen Terry, LPN and Medical Team Administrator for SHP at Covington County Jail; Jeff Edgington1, Certified Registered Nurse Practitioner and Medical Director for SHP at Covington County Jail; Officer Nicolas Ireland, and Officer Jonathan Pitts. (Docs. 1 and 74).

1 Jeff Edgington is incorrectly named in the complaint as Jeff Eddington. (Doc. 1). The Defendants filed special reports (Docs 59, 60, 69, 82, and 102), which included relevant evidentiary materials in support of these reports, including affidavits addressing the claims presented by Howard-Bey, and medical and prison records. In these documents, Defendants deny the claims against them. Specifically, Defendant Officers Ireland and Pitt admit that they participated in Plaintiff’s arrest, but deny that either interacted with Plaintiff in any manner while he was housed at the Covington County Jail and specifically deny ever providing any medicine to him. (Docs. 60-1 at p. 2; 82-1 at p. 3). Nurse Terry denies that she has authority to prescribe medication for inmates and states that Defendant Edgington bears this responsibility. She further

states that she, along with all SHP nursing staff, have provided Plaintiff with medical care as ordered by the Medical Director/Provider. (Doc. 69-1 at pp. 3-4). Defendant Edgington confirms that he, as a Certified Registered Nurse Practitioner and the SHP Medical Director, is alone authorized to prescribe medications to inmates and that all medications provided by nurses to the Plaintiff at the Covington County Jail were prescribed by him. (69-2 at p. 3). He further testifies based on his treatment of Plaintiff and a review of his medical records that, “all treatment provided to the Plaintiff by myself, Nurse Terry and the SHP nursing staff was prompt, appropriate and within the standard of care.” Id. at p. 4. After reviewing the special reports and exhibits, the court issued an order on August 20, 2021, requiring Howard-Bey to file a response to the Defendants’ special report, supported by

affidavits or statements made under penalty of perjury and other evidentiary materials. This order specifically cautioned that “unless within fifteen (15) days from the date of this order a party . . . presents sufficient legal cause why such action should not be undertaken . . . the court may at any time [after expiration of the time for the plaintiff filing a response to this order] and without further notice to the parties (1) treat the special reports and any supporting evidentiary materials as a motion for summary judgment and (2) after considering any response as allowed by this order, rule on the motion for summary judgment in accordance with the law.” (Doc. 105 at p. 4). Howard-Bey filed responses to this order. (Docs. 108. 109, 110). In his responses, he provides more detail to explain his deliberate indifference claim. He claims that Defendants Terry and Edgington treated him with deliberate indifference because they failed to get hospital records which showed he suffered from Polymiosidis, a chronic muscle inflammatory disease, which placed him at increased risk for paralysis, a common side effect of Atorvastatin, the statin he was taking due to his high cholesterol. He further claims that this side effect was not discussed with

him, and he was told to take the statin to control his high cholesterol. (Doc. 108 at pp. 12-15). Howard-Bey also attempts to bring new claims, which were not plead in his complaint, as amended. For example, he claims that the officers who arrested him, including Defendant Officers Pitts and Ireland, failed to determine his medical condition at the time and failed to provide necessary medical assistance to him. (Doc. 109 at pp. 11-15). He also alleges that he was assaulted during his arrest. (Doc. 110 at pp. 15-18). However, these claims are not properly before the court because claims may not be raised for the first time in a response to a motion for summary judgment. San Francisco Residence Club, Inc. v. Baswell-Guthrie, 897 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1214 (N.D. Ala. September 13, 2012). The complaint, as amended, is clear; Plaintiff claims that from January 27, 2020, until August 5, 20202, the Defendants treated him with deliberate indifference because they

gave him medication which caused him to be paralyzed. (Docs. 1, 74). Thus, this is the only claim properly before the court for consideration at this time.

2 However, the undisputed medical records demonstrate that July 9, 2020, was Plaintiff’s last day at Covington County Jail. (Doc. 69-2 at p. 15). Indeed, the records show that on that date, Plaintiff was transferred from Covington County Jail to the Emergency Room at Andalusia Health, where it was determined that he was having a heart attack and was then transferred to Baptist Hospital in Pensacola, Florida. He did not return to the Jail. Id. Pursuant to the directives of the order entered on August 20, 2021, the court now treats the Defendant’s special report and supplements thereto as a motion for summary judgment and concludes that summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the Defendants. II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a reviewing court must grant a motion for summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute “is ‘genuine’ if the record as a whole could lead a reasonable trier of fact to find

for the nonmoving party. . . . [A dispute] is ‘material’ if it might affect the outcome of the case under the governing law.” Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1496 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). The party asking for summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and alerting the court to portions of the record that support the motion. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). However, once the movant has satisfied this burden, the nonmovant is similarly required to cite portions of the record showing the existence of a material factual dispute. Id. at 324.

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Bluebook (online)
Howard v. Southern Health Partners (INMATE 2), Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/howard-v-southern-health-partners-inmate-2-almd-2023.