Howard v. Secretary of Health and Human Services

United States Court of Federal Claims·Decided September 26, 2024·No. 22-1329V·Unpublished

Opinion

In the United States Court of Federal Claims OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS No. 22-1329V

MARCUS HOWARD, Chief Special Master Corcoran

Petitioner, Filed: August 5, 2024 v.

SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,

Respondent.

Jessica Ann Wallace, Siri & Glimstad, LLP, Aventura, FL, for Petitioner.

Benjamin Patrick Warder, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

DECISION (A) DENYING MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS, AND (B) DISMISSING PETITION1

On September 19, 2022, Marcus Howard filed a petition for compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §300aa-10, et seq.2 (the “Vaccine Act”). Petitioner alleges that he suffered a shoulder injury related to vaccine administration (“SIRVA”) resulting from a tetanus diphtheria acellular pertussis (“Tdap”) vaccine received on September 20, 2019. Petition at 1. The case was assigned to the Special Processing Unit (“SPU”) of the Office of Special Masters. The case was activated on February 23, 2023 (ECF No. 16). On December 11, 2023, Respondent filed his Rule 4(c) Report and a motion to dismiss (ECF Nos. 28, 29).

1 Because this Decision contains a reasoned explanation for the action taken in this case, it must be made

publicly accessible and will be posted on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website, and/or at https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/uscourts/national/cofc, in accordance with the E-Government Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2018) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government Services). This means the Decision will be available to anyone with access to the internet. In accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), Petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to redact medical or other information, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. If, upon review, I agree that the identified material fits within this definition, I will redact such material from public access.

2 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for ease

of citation, all section references to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. § 300aa (2018). Respondent argued that Petitioner had failed to establish by preponderant evidence that he suffered the residual effects of his injury for more than six months, as required by the Vaccine Act. Respondent’s Report at *9. Instead, the record revealed Petitioner was treated for a brief period of time well short of the severity cut-off, and then delayed addressing the shoulder issues for several years thereafter. Id. at *9-10. Petitioner was directed to respond to Respondent’s dismissal motion by February 12, 2024. Scheduling Order (NON PDF), issued Dec. 11, 2023. Petitioner twice sought, and received, additional time to respond (ECF Nos. 30, 31). Then, on April 18, 2024, Petitioner’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw from the matter, along with the present motion for interim attorney’s fees and costs, and a statement of Petitioner’s personal costs (ECF Nos. 32-34). On April 30, 2024, Respondent responded to the motion for interim fees and costs (ECF No. 35). The matter is now ripe for resolution. I. Applicable Legal Standards Motivated by a desire to ensure that petitioners have adequate assistance from counsel when pursuing their claims, Congress determined that attorney’s fees and costs may be awarded even in some unsuccessful claims. H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 22 reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6363; see also Sebelius v. Cloer, 133 S. Ct. 1886, 1895 (2013) (discussing this goal when determining that attorneys’ fees and costs may be awarded even when the petition was untimely filed). This is consistent with the fact that “the Vaccine Program employs a liberal fee-shifting scheme.” Davis v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 105 Fed. Cl. 627, 634 (2012). Indeed, it may be the only federal fee- shifting statute that permits unsuccessful litigants to recover fees and costs. However, Congress did not intend that every losing petition be automatically entitled to attorney’s fees. Perreira v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 33 F.3d 1375, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1994). The special master or court may award attorney’s fees and costs to an unsuccessful claimant only if “the petition was brought in good faith and there was a reasonable basis for the claim for which the petition was brought.” Section 15(e)(1). Reasonable basis is a prerequisite to a fee award for unsuccessful cases – but establishing it does not automatically require an award, as special masters are still empowered by the Act to deny or limit fees. James-Cornelius on behalf of E. J. v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 984 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“even when these two requirements are satisfied, a special master retains discretion to grant or deny attorneys’ fees”). As the Federal Circuit has explained, whether a discretionary fees award is appropriate involves two distinct inquiries, but only reasonable basis is at issue herein.3

3 Claimants must also establish that the petition was brought in good faith. Simmons v. Sec’y of Health &

Human Servs., 875 F.3d 632, 635 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Chuisano v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 116 Fed. Cl. 276, 289 (2014)). “[T]he ‘good faith’ requirement . . . focuses upon whether petitioner honestly believed he had a legitimate claim for compensation.” Turner v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 99-

2 Reasonable basis is deemed “an objective test, satisfied through objective evidence.” Cottingham v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 971 F.3d 1337, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“Cottingham I”). The reasonable basis requirement looks “not at the likelihood of success [of a claim] but more to the feasibility of the claim.” Turner, 2007 WL 4410030, at *6 (quoting Di Roma v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 90-3277V, 1993 WL 496981, at *1 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 18, 1993)). The Federal Circuit recently explained “that a reasonable basis analysis is limited to objective evidence, and that subjective considerations, such as counsel’s subjective views on the adequacy of a complaint, do not factor into a reasonable basis determination.” James-Cornelius, 984 F.3d at 1379. Although easier to meet than the preponderant standard required for compensation, “courts have struggled with the nature and quantum of evidence necessary to establish a reasonable basis.” Wirtshafter v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 155 Fed. Cl. 665, 671 (Fed. Cl. 2021). “[I]t is generally accepted that ‘a petitioner must furnish some evidence in support of the claim.’” Id. Citing the prima facie elements of a successful claim described in Section 11(c)(1), the Federal Circuit recently instructed that the level of objective evidence sufficient for a special master to find reasonable basis should be “more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance of proof.” Cottingham I, 971 F.3d at 1345-46. “This formulation does not appear to define reasonable basis so much as set its outer bounds.” Cottingham v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 159 Fed. Cl. 328, 333, (Fed. Cl. 2022), aff’d without op., slip op., 2023 WL 754047 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 14, 2023) (“Cottingham II”).

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