Howard v. Secretary of Health and Human Services

United States Court of Federal Claims·Decided October 3, 2017·No. 16-894·Unpublished

Opinion

In the United States Court of Federal Claims OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS No. 16-894V Filed: September 8, 2017

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * SAM HOWARD, * UNPUBLISHED * Petitioner, * v. * Decision on Attorneys’ Fees and Costs; * Respondent Does Not Object. SECRETARY OF HEALTH * AND HUMAN SERVICES, * * Respondent. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Leah Durant, Esq., Law Offices of Leah V. Durant, PLLC, Washington, D.C., for petitioner. Mallori Openchowski, Esq., U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent.

DECISION ON ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS1

Roth, Special Master:

On July 27, 2016, Sam Howard (“Mr. Howard or “petitioner”) filed a petition for compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program.2 Petitioner alleges that he developed Guillain-Barre Syndrome (“GBS”) as a result of receiving a tetanus-diptheria- acellular pertussis (“TDaP”) vaccination on or about July 23, 2015. See Petition (“Pet.”), ECF No. 1. On March 27, 2017 the undersigned issued a Decision awarding compensation to petitioner based on the parties’ stipulations. See Decision, ECF No. 17.

1 Because this unpublished decision contains a reasoned explanation for the action in this case, I intend to post this decision on the United States Court of Federal Claims’ website, in accordance with the E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 205, 116 Stat. 2899, 2913 (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2012)). In accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), a party has 14 days to identify and move to delete medical or other information, that satisfies the criteria in 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(d)(4)(B). Further, consistent with the rule requirement, a motion for redaction must include a proposed redacted decision. If, upon review, I agree that the identified material fits within the requirements of that provision, I will delete such material from public access. 2 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for ease of citation, all “§” references to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. § 300aa (2012). On August 25, 2017, petitioner filed a Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs. Motion for Fees, ECF No. 22. Petitioner requests attorneys’ fees in the amount of $23,482.00, and attorneys’ costs in the amount of $3,756.54, for a total amount of $27,238.54. Id. at 1. In accordance with General Order #9, petitioner’s counsel represents that petitioner did not incur any out-of-pocket expenses. Id. Petitioner filed a supplement to his application for fees on August 28, 2017.3 Supplemental Motion, ECF No. 23.

On August 30, 2017, respondent filed a response to petitioners’ Motion for Fees. Response, ECF No. 24. Respondent provided no specific objection to the amount requested or hours worked, but instead, “respectfully recommend[ed] that the Special Master exercise her discretion and determine a reasonable award for attorneys’ fees and costs.” Id. at 3. Petitioner did not file a reply. This matter is now ripe for decision.

I. Legal Framework

The Vaccine Act permits an award of “reasonable attorneys’ fees” and “other costs.” § 15(e)(1). If a petitioner succeeds on the merits of his or her claim, the award of attorneys’ fees is automatic. Id.; see Sebelius v. Cloer, 133 S. Ct. 1886, 1891 (2013). However, a petitioner need not prevail on entitlement to receive a fee award as long as the petition was brought in “good faith” and there was a “reasonable basis” for the claim to proceed. § 15(e)(1).

The Federal Circuit has endorsed the use of the lodestar approach to determine what constitutes “reasonable attorneys’ fees” and “other costs” under the Vaccine Act. Avera v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 515 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Under this approach, “an initial estimate of a reasonable attorneys’ fees” is calculated by “multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate.” Id. at 1347-48 (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984)). That product is then adjusted upward or downward based on other specific findings. Id.

Special masters have substantial discretion in awarding fees and may adjust a fee request sua sponte, apart from objections raised by respondent and without providing petitioners with notice and opportunity to respond. See Sabella v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 86 Fed. Cl. 201, 209 (2009). Special masters need not engage in a line-by-line analysis of petitioner’s fee application when reducing fees. See Broekelschen v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 102 Fed. Cl. 719, 729 (2011).

II. Discussion

A. Reasonable Hourly Rate

A “reasonable hourly rate” is defined as the rate “prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.” Avera, 515 F.3d at 1348 (quoting Blum, 465 U.S. at 896 n.11). In general, this rate is based on “the forum rate for the District of Columbia” rather than “the rate in the geographic area of the practice of petitioner’s

3 Petitioner provided the credentials for Dr. Shaer, who was used as a consultant in this matter.

2 attorney.” Rodriguez v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 632 F.3d 1381, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Avera, 515 F. 3d at 1349). There is a “limited exception” that provides for attorney’s fees to be awarded at local hourly rates when “the bulk of the attorney’s work is done outside the forum jurisdiction” and “there is a very significant difference” between the local hourly rate and forum hourly rate. Id. This is known as the Davis County exception. See Hall v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 640 F.3d 1351, 1353 (2011) (citing Davis Cty. Solid Waste Mgmt. & Energy Recovery Special Serv. Dist. v. U.S. EPA, 169 F.3d 755, 758 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).

For cases in which forum rates apply, McCulloch provides the framework for determining the appropriate hourly rate range for attorneys’ fees based upon the attorneys’ experience. See McCulloch v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 09-293V, 2015 WL 5634323 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Sept. 1, 2015). The Office of Special Masters has accepted the decision in McCulloch and has issued a Fee Schedule for subsequent years.4

In this case, petitioner has requested hourly rates for Ms. Durant of $350 for work performed in 2015 and 2016, and $365 for work performed in 2017. The undersigned has reviewed the fee application and finds the hourly rates for 2015 and 2016 to be reasonable and consistent with the rates at which Ms. Durant and her paralegal, Ms. Raina, have been compensated in past cases. See e.g., Terrell v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 13-334V, 2017 WL 1130947, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 2, 2017); Dipietro v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 15-742V, 2016 WL 7384131, at *4 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Oct. 6, 2016); McCloud v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 16-719V, 2016 WL 8077964, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Dec.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Howard v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, (uscfc 2017).

Howard v. Secretary of Health and Human Services (Howard v. Secretary of Health and Human Services) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related