Howard v. 3,6 Mafia

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJuly 23, 2021
Docket1:20-cv-06116
StatusUnknown

This text of Howard v. 3,6 Mafia (Howard v. 3,6 Mafia) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Howard v. 3,6 Mafia, (S.D.N.Y. 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK JERMAINE JEVON HOWARD, Plaintiff, -against- 3, 6 MAFIA; PAUL DUANE BEAUREGARD 20-CV-6116 (LLS) (DJ PAUL); DARNELL CARLTON (CRUNCHY ORDER TO AMEND BLACK); JORDAN MICHAEL HOUSTON (JUICY J); SONY MUSIC/HYPNOTIZED MINDS; RAE SREMMURD; EAR DRUMA RECORDS/INTERSCOPE RECORDS, Defendants. LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, appearing pro se, brings this action alleging that Defendants violated his rights under the Copyright Act. By order dated December 22, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (IFP). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. The Supreme Court has held that, under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court

must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Jermaine Jevon Howard, who resides in Buffalo, New York, brings this action against Defendants, alleging that they violated his rights under the Copyright Act.1 Although Plaintiff asserts claims under the Copyright Act, using the Court’s form complaint for a civil

1 Plaintiff filed two other complaints asserting similar claims against different defendants. See Howard v. Pearl, No. 20-CV-4694 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2020) (order transferring action to the United States District Court for the Central District of California); Howard v. Pearl, No. 20-CV- 5880 (C.D.Ca. Aug. 21, 2020) (order dismissing complaint for failure to state a claim); Howard v. Carter, No. 20-CV-0417 (W.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 7, 2020) (pending). case, Plaintiff also checks the box indicating that the basis for jurisdiction is diversity of citizenship. (ECF No. 2 at 4.) Plaintiff alleges the following. In 1994, in a Buffalo, New York, home studio operated by Shawn J-Z Carter and Craig Sweat, Plaintiff wrote a chorus for a song. Defendant Paul Duane

Beauregard (DJ Paul) asked Plaintiff to write the chorus for him and his group but told Plaintiff that he probably would not use it. Plaintiff signed an agreement that if the group used the chorus, Plaintiff would be owed royalties. In the spring of 1994, all documents and recordings were turned over to Kevin Liles of Def Jam, who contacted Plaintiff and advised him that Liles would get all material properly registered with the U.S. Copyright Office. In the winter of 2000, DJ Paul paid Kevin Liles an undisclosed amount to release the recording that Plaintiff made in 1994, and DJ Paul agreed to pay royalties to Plaintiff. Plaintiff asserts that songs were released in 2005 and 2018, using the recording that Plaintiff made in 1994, and that he has not been paid any royalties. He seeks monetary damages for Defendants’ use of “my copright [sic] protected lyrics.”

DISCUSSION A. Claims Under the Copyright Act The Copyright Act provides that “no civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title.” 17 U.S.C. § 411(a).2 District courts within this

2 The Copyright Act includes the following provision for copyright infringement claims made with respect to “a work consisting of sounds, images, or both, the first fixation of which is made simultaneously with its transmission”: the copyright owner may, either before or after such fixation takes place, institute an action for infringement . . . if, in accordance with requirements that the Register of Copyrights shall prescribe by regulation, the copyright owner – Circuit require a plaintiff to allege the following to state a copyright infringement claim: “(1) which specific original works are the subject of the copyright claim, (2) that plaintiff owns the copyrights in those works, (3) that the copyrights have been [preregistered or] registered in accordance with the statute, and (4) by what acts and during what time the defendant infringed

the copyright.” Conan Props. Int’l LLC v. Sanchez, No. 1:17-CV-0162, 2018 WL 3869894, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2018) (citing, inter alia, Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991), which sets forth elements relevant to copyright claim on motion for summary judgment)).

(1) serves notice upon the infringer, not less than 48 hours before such fixation, identifying the work and the specific time and source of its first transmission, and declaring an intention to secure copyright in the work; and (2) makes registration for the work, if required by subsection (a), within three months after its first transmission. 17 U.S.C. § 411(c). The Supreme Court has recently stated that: [i]n limited circumstances, copyright owners may file an infringement suit before undertaking registration.

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Lipton v. the Nature Co.
781 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D. New York, 1992)
Harris v. Mills
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Howard v. 3,6 Mafia, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/howard-v-36-mafia-nysd-2021.