Hovhannes Margaryan v. Warden of California City Detention Facility

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 HOVHANNES MARGARYAN, No. 1:25-cv-01582-EFB 10 Petitioner, 11 v. ORDER 12 WARDEN OF CALIFORNIA CITY DETENTION FACILITY, 13 Respondent. 14

15 Petitioner is a person detained in an immigration detention facility who has brought a 16 petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For the reasons set forth below, the 17 writ is granted. 18 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 19 Petitioner initiated this action on November 18, 2025, seeking a writ of habeas corpus 20 under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 1. Petitioner alleges that he is currently detained pending 21 immigration removal proceedings, and has been detained since October 25, 2024, ECF No. 1 at 5, 22 9, which respondent does not dispute. ECF No. 7 at 2. During this time, petitioner alleges, he has 23 not received a bond hearing and he has not received a final hearing on his request for political 24 asylum. ECF No. 1 at 3, 9. He raises one claim for relief, that his detention violates his rights to 25 due process under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. Id. at 7. 26 On December 8, 2025, respondent filed an Opposition to the petition. ECF No. 7. On 27 December 15, 2025, the district judge reassigned the matter to the undersigned for all 28 1 proceedings, including final judgment, on the consent of the parties. ECF No. 10. Petitioner 2 moved for appointment of counsel on December 18, 2025, ECF No. 12, which the undersigned 3 granted on December 29, 2025. ECF No. 13. 4 On January 8, 2026, petitioner filed a motion for temporary restraining order pro se. ECF 5 No. 16. By minute order the same day, the undersigned directed respondent to file a responsive 6 pleading, specifically:

7 Respondents shall file a written opposition to the pending motion for temporary restraining order (ECF No. 16) by 5:00 PM on January 13, 2026. In that 8 opposition, respondents shall substantively address whether any provision of law or fact in this case would distinguish it from this courts decision in Morales- 9 Flores v. Lyons, et al., No. 1:25-cv-01640-TLN-EFB (HC), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 256842, 2025 WL 3514495 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2025), and other similar 10 cases previously decided by this court, or otherwise indicate that the matter is not substantively distinguishable. Respondents should also state whether they oppose 11 this Court converting the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order to a Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Petitioner may file a reply brief on or before January 12 15, 2026. If the parties were to jointly agree upon a less demanding briefing schedule, the court will consider the parties proposal. The matter is not set for a 13 hearing though the Court may set one should it later be determined that a hearing is necessary. 14 15 ECF No. 17. Respondent filed an Opposition on January 13, 2026, in which respondent raised no 16 objection to the court resolving the motion for temporary restraining order and merits of the 17 petition on the briefing pending before the court. ECF No. 18 at 1-2. On January 15, 2026, 18 petitioner filed a Reply, through counsel, in which he also indicated no objection to that approach. 19 ECF No. 19 at 3. 20 LEGAL STANDARD 21 The federal court should grant a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 when the 22 petitioner is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. See, e.g., Dominguez v. 23 Kernan, 906 F.3d 1127, 1134 (9th Cir. 2018). The petitioner bears the burden to prove the 24 unlawfulness of his detention by a preponderance of evidence. Sepulveda Ayala v. Bondi, 794 F. 25 Supp. 3d 901, 911 (W.D. Wash. 2025). 26 DISCUSSION 27 As noted, petitioner raises a single claim for relief: that his ongoing detention without a 28 bond hearing violates his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. ECF No. 1 at 7. 1 Preliminarily, the court has jurisdiction over petitioner’s claim. In their Opposition to the 2 petition, respondent argue that this court is barred from entertaining petitioner’s claim under 8 3 U.S.C. § 1252(g), which bars federal courts’ jurisdiction over “any cause or claim by or on behalf 4 of any alien arising from the decision or action by the [Department of Homeland Security] to 5 commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien.” The 6 Supreme Court, however, has rejected the expansive interpretation of § 1252(g) urged by 7 respondent. In Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 294 (2018), the Court held that section 8 1252(g) only applies “to just those three specific actions themselves” that are listed in the statute, 9 and does not “sweep in any claim that can technically be said to ‘arise from’ the three listed 10 actions of the Attorney General.” Here, petitioner’s claim for relief does not challenge the DHS’s 11 decision to commence proceedings, adjudicate his cause, or execute a removal order; rather, he 12 finds constitutional error in respondent’s apparently groundless decision to detain him apparently 13 indefinitely while it effectuates—or not, given the facts on the record—the commencement of 14 petitioner’s proceedings, adjudication of his asylum application, or execution of a removal order. 15 This due process challenge falls squarely in the federal courts’ jurisdictional authority which has 16 not been abrogated by the limitations of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). See Jennings, 583 U.S. at 294; see 17 also Walters v. Reno, 145 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) does not deprive 18 federal court of jurisdiction to consider whether the process by which removal was effectuated 19 violated petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due process rights); see, e.g., Lopez Hernandez v. Leanna 20 Lundy, et al., No. 1:25-CV-02007-SKO (HC), 2026 WL 102292, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2026). 21 Similarly unavailing is respondent’s argument that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) forecloses this 22 court’s jurisdiction over petitioner’s habeas corpus petition. That subsection provides,

23 Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including interpretation and 24 application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States under this 25 subchapter shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under this section. Except as otherwise provided in this section, no court shall have 26 jurisdiction, by habeas corpus under section 2241 of Title 28 or any other habeas corpus provision, by section 1361 or 1651 of such title, or by any other provision 27 of law (statutory or nonstatutory), to review such an order or such questions of 28 law or fact. 1 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(b)(9). Respondent’s position, again, was rejected by the Supreme Court in 2 Jennings. There, the plurality of the justices concluded that § 1252(b)(9) cannot deprive a 3 federal court from considering the petitioners’ claims that prolonged detention pending a final 4 removal order violated the petitioners’ due process rights. 583 U.S. at 840-41 (plurality opinion 5 of Alito, J.); see also Cancino-Castellar v. Nielsen, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1107, 1113 (S.D. Cal. 2018), 6 aff’d sub nom. Castellar v. Mayorkas, No. 17-CV-00491-BAS-AHG, 2021 WL 3856488 (S.D. 7 Cal. Aug. 30, 2021). Respondent does not address this holding, which binds this court, but rather 8 urges the court to instead take the position urged by Justice Thomas in his concurrence in 9 Jennings. See ECF No. 7 at 8-9. The court declines the invitation. Rather, the court is bound by 10 Jennings to conclude that, as there, petitioner’s claim that his ongoing detention violates his due 11 process rights is “not asking for review of an order of removal; [is] not challenging the decision 12 to detain [petitioner] in the first place or to seek removal; and [is] not even challenging any part 13 of the process by which their removability will be determined,” thus, “[u]nder these 14 circumstances, § 1252(b)(9) does not present a jurisdictional bar.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 294-95. 15 On the merits of the petition, relief must be granted. In its January 8, 2026 order, the 16 court directed respondents to address whether any provision of law or fact in this case would 17 distinguish it from the court’s decision in Morales-Flores v. Lyons, et al., No. 1:25-cv-01640- 18 TLN-EFB (HC), 2025 WL 3552841 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2025),1 and other similar cases 19 previously decided by this court, or otherwise indicate that the matter is not substantively 20 distinguishable. ECF No. 17. In his opposition brief, respondent “agrees that this case is 21 substantially in the same procedural and factual posture, and poses the same questions of law, as 22 this Court’s decision in Morales-Flores v. Lyons, et al., No. 1:25-cv-01640-TLN-EFB (HC), 23 2025 WL 3552841 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2025).” ECF No. 18 at 1-2. As such, petitioner is 24 entitled to relief on the merits of his claim. 25

26 1 The court’s order inadvertently contained an erroneous Westlaw citation and date of decision. See ECF No. 17. Despite this, in their briefing, both parties have addressed the 27 applicability of the correct order, Morales-Flores v. Lyons, et al., No. 1:25-cv-01640-TLN-EFB (HC), 2025 WL 3552841 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2025), to the instant case. ECF No. 18 at 2; ECF 28 No. 19 at 1-2. The court regrets the error. 1 In Morales-Flores, No. 1:25-cv-01640-TLN-EFB (HC), 2025 WL 3552841, petitioner 2 was detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement pending immigration removal 3 proceedings and sought habeas corpus relief in the district court, alleging that his ongoing 4 detention was unlawful under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and the due process 5 clause of the Fifth Amendment. Morales-Flores, No. 1:25-cv-01640-TLN-EFB (HC), 2025 WL 6 3552841, at *1. While his petition was pending, he moved for a temporary restraining order, 7 which the district court granted. Id. at *1, 7. The court concluded that petitioner had shown a 8 likelihood of success on the merits of his first claim, that the INA did not authorize his indefinite 9 detention without an individualized bond hearing, because petitioner was subject to 8 U.S.C. § 10 1226(a), not 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). Id. at *2-4. The court also concluded that petitioner had shown 11 a likelihood of success on his due process claim, because he had a cognizable liberty interest in 12 being free from detention; the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest was high; and the 13 government’s interest in detaining petitioner without a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker 14 was low. Id. at *5-6 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)). The court granted 15 petitioner’s request for immediate release, holding that “[d]ue process thus requires that 16 Petitioner receive a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker that complies with § 1226(a) and 17 related laws and regulations if he is re-detained.” Id. at *6. Numerous courts have reached the 18 same conclusion on similar due process claims. See, e.g., Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 19 963, 969 (N.D. Cal. 2019); E.A.P.C. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-01546-JLT-CDB (HC), 2026 WL 20 32833, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2026); R.D.T.M. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-01141-KES-SKO 21 (HC), 2025 WL 2617255, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2025); A.E. v. Andrews, No. 1:25-CV-00107- 22 KES-SKO, 2025 WL 1424382, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2025). 23 Here, petitioner’s procedural due process claim is governed, like the petitioner in 24 Morales-Flores, by Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).2 Under Mathews, the court

25 2 In his petition, petitioner did not specify whether he alleges that respondent’s conduct 26 violates his procedural or substantive due process rights, but in his Reply to respondent’s Opposition to his Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, petitioner represents that this case is 27 indistinguishable from Morales-Flores, which had analyzed a procedural due process claim. See ECF No. 19 at 2; Morales-Flores, No. 1:25-cv-01640-TLN-EFB (HC), 2025 WL 3552841, at *5- 28 6. 1 considers the petitioner’s claim that his Fifth Amendment procedural due process rights by 2 considering three factors: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2) 3 “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the 4 probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the 5 Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens 6 that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” 424 U.S. at 334-35; see 7 also Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989) (“We examine 8 procedural due process questions in two steps: the first asks whether there exists a liberty or 9 property interest which has been interfered with by the State, . . . the second examines whether 10 the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient”). In his 11 Opposition brief, respondent represents that “this case is substantially in the same procedural and 12 factual posture, and poses the same questions of law, as this Court’s decision in Morales-Flores 13 v. Lyons, et al., No. 1:25-cv-01640-TLN-EFB (HC), 2025 WL 3552841 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 14 2025).” Accordingly, the court finds that petitioner has shown that he possesses a cognizable 15 liberty interest is his non-detention; that the risk of the erroneous deprivation of his liberty is 16 substantial by respondent’s failure to hold an individualized bond hearing before a neutral 17 factfinder, compliant with the provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and that the probative value of 18 those additional safeguards is great; that the Government’s interest in detaining petitioner 19 without the protections set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1226 is low; and that the burden of the additional 20 procedures—namely, before detaining petitioner, respondent provide him “notice and a hearing 21 before a neutral fact-finder where respondent show: (a) there are material changed circumstances 22 which demonstrate that there is a significant likelihood of Petitioner's removal in the reasonably 23 foreseeable future, or (b) Respondents demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that 24 Petitioner poses a danger to the community or a flight risk,” see Morales-Flores v. Lyons, No. 25 1:25-CV-01640-TLN-EFB, 2025 WL 3552841, at *7—is low. See Morales-Flores v. Lyons, No. 26 1:25-CV-01640-TLN-EFB, 2025 WL 3552841, at *5-7. For these reasons, petitioner has shown 27 that his current detention violates his rights to procedural due process under the Fifth 28 Amendment. See Matthews, 424 U.S. 319. 1 CONCLUSION AND ORDER 2 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 3 1) Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus is GRANTED. 4 2) Respondents are ENJOINED AND RESTRAINED from re-detaining petitioner 5 without a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral adjudicator, who possesses 6 authority to order release, at which the Government must prove by clear and 7 convincing evidence that petitioner is a flight risk or danger to the community such 8 that his physical custody is required. 9 3) Within seven days of the date of this order, the parties shall file a joint status report 10 informing the court of petitioner’s custody status. 11 DATED: January 23, 2026 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28