Hover v. State

1970 OK CR 64, 471 P.2d 950, 1970 Okla. Crim. App. LEXIS 256

• Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma
• Decided: May 13, 1970
• Docket: A-14476
• Status: Published

Opinions

BUSSEY, Judge.

Daniel Neal Hover, hereinafter referred to as defendant, was charged by Information in the Court of Common Pleas of Oklahoma County with Operating a Motor Vehicle While Under the Influence of Intoxicating Liquor. He was tried by a jury, found guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine of $100.00 and to serve 20 days in the county jail. From this judgment and sentence a timely appeal has been perfected to this Court.

The record reveals the testimony of three witnesses comprising the State’s case. Larry J. Litchford, a member of the Central Oklahoma Citizens Band Patrol (a radio club of Edmond, Oklahoma) testified that on the evening of April 8, 1967, he observed a white, late model Oldsmobile parked on the shoulder of Interstate-35; that he pulled up behind the car with his flashing emergency lights on; that the car abruptly pulled off accross several lanes of traffic and then drove for some distance with its wheels on the center median. Mr. Litch-ford observed the car for some distance and he gave the tag number of the car to Officer Johnson; that he did not see the driver of the vehicle nor any of its occupants and that the car passed Officer Johnson, who was parked alongside 1-35, but did not see or attempt to stop said vehicle. Mr. Litchford further testified that being a member of Oklahoma Citizens Band Patrol did not authorize him to patrol the streets of Oklahoma County.

Officer Johnson testified that he stopped the car that Litchford had identifed after it had run up on the center median; that defendant had a strong odor of alcohol about him and in his opinion, the defendant was under the influence of alcohol. Officer Johnson called Officer Tom LaValley to assist him in the arrest and these two officers were the only two present, and only Johnson saw the defendant drive the car.

The defendant testified, as did his date on the evening in question, that they had attended a fraternity function at Quail Creek Country Club; that he had had nothing to drink on that evening until after dinner. Both witnesses testified he had approximately six Scotch and waters; that his date consumed a Vodka Collins prior to leaving the country club at 11:00 or 11:30 on the night of his arrest. Both witnesses denied that the defendant had driven his automobile in an unusual manner or that he was under the influence of alcohol. Defendant then offered testimony of witnesses as to his truth and veracity and his reputation for the same. One of the witnesses, a fraternity brother, although not present at the fraternity party or at the scene of the arrest, testified that he had had difficulty in locating the automobile operated by the defendant which had been towed in. This witness was not permitted to testify that he had been advised by the attendants at the garage where the car was stored; that the difficulty in locating it was due to the fact that it had been registered in as a Buick when it was, in fact, an Oldsmobile.

Prior to trial the defendant filed a Motion to Quash the Information for the reason that:

“1. That said Information alleges the commission of a misdemeanor; and

2. That said misdemeanor Information is not verified as required by law and is void on its face.”

The record does not indicate that this Motion was ever called to the attention of the court or that a hearing was conducted thereon with a ruling made adverse to the defendant and exceptions taken thereto.

The parties announced ready for trial and at the conclusion of the evidence, the defendant renewed his objection to the Information by way of Demurrer for the reason that the evidence disclosed that Officer Johnson was the arresting officer and that A. M. Hamilton, who had verified the Information, had no personal knowledge of the events on the evening of the arrest, and at most, the verification was based on hearsay information. The Information and Verification appear in the record in the following language:

“In the name and by the authority of the State of Oklahoma, comes now CURTIS P. HARRIS the duly elected, qualified and acting District Attorney in and for Oklahoma County, District Attorney, District No. 7, State of Oklahoma, and on his official oath gives the COMMON PLEAS Court in and for said Oklahoma County, State of Oklahoma, to know and be informed that heretofore, to-wit: on or about the 9th day of April A.D., 1967, in Oklahoma County, State of Oklahoma DANIEL NEAL HOVER whose more full and correct name is to your informant unknown, then and there being, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and wrongfully commit the crime of OPERATING A MOTOR VEHICLE WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF INTOXICATING LIQUOR in the manner and form as follows, to-wit: That is to say, the said defendant, in the county and state aforesaid, and on the day and year aforesaid, then and there being, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and wrongfully run, drive and operate a 1966 Oldsmobile Motor Vehicle, bearing 1967 South Dakota License Tage Number 23-2807 at and upon a public street, from an unknown point to a point at S.E. 44th and Interstate Highway # 35, in Oklahoma City, in said county and state, while under the influence of intoxicating liquor; contrary to the form of the statutes in such cases made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the State of Oklahoma.

CURTIS P. HARRIS

District Attorney, District 7

Oklahoma County, Oklahoma

/s/ William C. Page_

WILLIAM C. PAGE

Assistant District Attorney

STATE OF OKLAHOMA, OKLAHOMA COUNTY, ss.

I, A. M. Hamilton, being duly sworn on my oath, declare that the statements set forth in the above information are true.

/s/ A. M. Hamilton_

A. M. HAMILTON

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 10th day of April, 1967.

DALE SMITH, Court Clerk

/s,/ Stella Price_

STELLA PRICE

Deputy.”

It is counsel’s present contention that since Officer Hamilton had no personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances giving rise to the charge, his verification of the Information was void and this conviction must be reversed for that reason.

In the early case of Salter v. State, 2 Okl. Cr. 464, 102 P. 719, wherein the verification was in the following form:

“State of Oklahoma, Carter County — ss:

J. H. Akers being duly sworn on oath declares that the statements set forth in the above information are true as he is informed and verily believes. [Signed.] J. H. Akers. Subscribed and sworn to before me this 26th day of December, 1907.1. R. Mason, County Judge.”

this Court, speaking through the Honorable Judge Doyle, after a lengthy discourse citing the decisions of many jurisdictions including decisions of the Supreme Court, concluded that:

“In the light of the opinions herein quoted, it must be conceded, as a settled principle of American law, that a complaint or information, verified only on information and belief, is insufficient to authorize the issuance of a warrant of arrest; and a warrant so issued is without authority of law, and is wholly void.

⅜ ⅜ ⅝ ⅜ ⅝ ⅜

We do not wish, however, to be understood as holding that the information must be sworn to by persons having actual knowledge of the offense charged.”

The opinion of Salter v. State, supra, delivered on the 26th day of June, 1909, was closely followed by Moss v. State, 4 Okl.Cr. 247, 111 P. 950, delivered by Honorable Judge Richardson and concurred in by Fur-man, P. J., and Doyle, J. The facts in this case were that an assistant county attorney sent two men to see if they could purchase beer from the defendant. They were able to make a purchase and an information was filed, verified by the assistant county attorney. During the trial it developed that the affiant had no personal knowledge of the matters charged and his own information was what he had obtained from the report of the two men who had made the purchase. The defendant filed a motion to quash the information on that ground, which motion was overruled by the trial court. Judge Richardson stated in his opinion:

“We think there was no error in the court’s ruling. An information which is not verified at all, or which on its face shows that it is verified only on information and belief, should be quashed or set aside on a timely motion for that purpose, for the reason that such verification constitutes no sufficient showing of probable cause. But, where the information is verified in positive terms as true, it constitutes a showing of probable cause, even though it may subsequently develop that the affiant had no personal knowledge of the facts alleged. Such verification makes a prima facie showing, which is all that is required; and on a motion to quash no issue can be made as to the knowledge or want of knowledge of the person who verified the information.”

Judge Richardson explained the rationale of the ruling, stating as he did so that:

“ * * * in many instances the various and disconnected sources from which fragmentary pieces of evidence must be obtained, conclusive when considered together, but no portion of which is sufficient alone, and the further fact that the circumstances are often such that no one witness in the case can truthfully say that he has personal knowledge that all the facts necessary to be charged in the information are true, it may well be doubted whether the law contemplates that the verification of an information must be made by one having personal knowledge of all the essential facts charged.”

The identical question here presented was considered by this Court in Logan v. State, 42 Okl.Cr. 1, 274 P. 39, where a defendant in the trial court filed a Motion to Quash and dismiss the information for the reason that the affiant had no personal knowledge of the facts and the affidavit was made on information and belief. This Court, speaking through the Honorable Judge Davenport, concurred in by Edwards, P. J., and Chappell, J., stated:

“The cases cited by the defendant correctly state the law; in each of these cases the affidavit was made on information and belief. In this case the affidavit to the complaint is positive in its terms, and was not made on information and belief, as argued by the defendant.

This affidavit was sufficient to authorize the issuance of the warrant of arrest, and was sufficient to preclude an inquiry into the question of fact of the personal knowledge of the affiant as to the facts thus positively sworn to.”

There are numerous other cases decided by this Court, both felony and misdemeanors, and they are uniform in their holding that when the verification is positive in its terms, neither an information or preliminary complaint can be attacked on the ground that the affiant had no personal knowledge of the facts contained within the information or complaint.

Counsel for defendant, while recognizing the rule enunciated in Moss v. State, supra, urges that under our decision in Ivy v. State, Okl.Cr., 414 P.2d 1007, we should overrule the unbroken line of decisions which cite the rule enunciated in Moss v. State, supra, with approval. We are of the opinion that the ruling in Ivy v. State, supra, has no application in the instant case. In Ivy, where the information charging defendant with driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, was supported by an invalid verification because the police officer who allegedly signed the affidavit in support of the information was outside the state at the time the oath was allegedly administered, defendant properly challenged the information’s sufficiency in due time, and the county attorney failed to correct the error, we held the defendant’s conviction could not be sustained. We were careful to point out in Ivy that the ruling enunciated in Moss had no application under the facts there presented and it follows that in applying Moss in the instant case, the Ivy rule is clearly inapplicable here.

In accordance with the authorities above set forth, we are of the opinion that this assignment of error is without merit.

Under separate propositions,' the defendant contends that the trial court erred in the giving of Instruction # 4 and in refusing to give defendant’s Instructions # 2, 3, 5 and 6. We observe that since no objection was interposed to the giving of Instruction # 4, there is nothing preserved for review on appeal, and further, that the instructions, when considered as a whole, fairly and fully state the law applicable to the case. For this reason we hold that these assignments of error are without merit.

It is next contended that the trial court erred in refusing to allow one of the defendant’s witnesses to introduce evidence of how the car was identified and registered by the garageman who had been called by the Highway Patrol to remove the Hover vehicle from the side of 1-35. It is abundantly clear the evidence sought to be proved by this witness was at best based on hearsay evidence gained by the witness from the attendant at the parking lot and was, therefore, inadmissible. For that reason we are of the opinion that the trial court did not err in excluding the same.

It is lastly contended that because of the cumulative errors committed during the course of the trial, the punishment imposed should be modified. Having carefully examined the record, we are of the opinion that it is free of any error which would require reversal or modification, and for all the reasons above set forth, the judgment and sentence appealed from is affirmed.