Houweling v. Miltner-Vaitys

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: October 27, 2023
• Docket: 2:23-cv-00181
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 TIMOTHY HOUWELING, No. 2:23-cv-00181-MCE-DB 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 JUDITH MILTNER-VAITYS, doing business as Strawberry Inn, 15 Defendant. 16

17 Plaintiff Timothy Houweling (“Plaintiff”) initiated this action against Defendant 18 Judith Miltner-Vaitys, doing business as Strawberry Inn, (“Defendant”) for purportedly 19 discriminating against him on the basis of his disability by denying his service animal 20 access to the inn. Plaintiff brings claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 21 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., and California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act, California Civil Code 22 §§ 51-53. 23 For her part, Defendant filed a Counterclaim, ECF No. 7, an Answer to the 24 Complaint, ECF No. 8, and a First Amended Counterclaim, ECF No. 10. According to 25 Defendant, during her one phone interaction with Plaintiff, he verbally abused and 26 berated her based on his belief that she would not accept any animals, even service 27 animals, at her establishment. In addition, Plaintiff allegedly proceeded to orchestrate 28 1 an online campaign to harass Defendant and smear her reputation. Plaintiff thus alleges 2 causes of action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress and Elder Abuse under 3 California law. 4 Presently before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss Defendant’s First 5 Amended Counterclaim for failure to state a claim. ECF No. 11.1 After briefing was 6 complete and the Court had undertaken an evaluation of the case, it issued the following 7 Minute Order: 8 The Court has reviewed the docket in this case in its entirety and is not convinced that it has jurisdiction or that it must 9 exercise jurisdiction over the pending counterclaim, which this Court views as permissive. Not later than October 13, 2023, 10 the parties are directed to file simultaneous supplement briefs not to exceed ten (10) pages advising as to why the Court 11 should or should not exercise jurisdiction over Defendant’s counterclaim. 12 ECF No. 14. The parties timely responded, and the Court has reviewed their additional 13 positions. ECF Nos. 15-16. 14 The Court has original federal question jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Complaint 15 under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. However, there is no independent basis for establishing 16 jurisdiction over Defendant’s First Amended Counterclaim because it raises only state 17 law claims between non-diverse parties. Defendant thus asks the Court to exercise 18 supplemental jurisdiction over that counterclaim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 19 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, federal courts may, in specific 20 instances, maintain supplemental jurisdiction over claims and counterclaims which have no other basis for jurisdiction in 21 federal court. A court has jurisdiction over state law claims “that are so related to claims” brought under the Court’s federal 22 question jurisdiction “that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367. In 23 determining whether such a claim forms part of the same “case or controversy,” the Court must determine whether the federal 24 claim and the state law claim arise from the same “common nucleus of operative fact.” In re Pegasus Gold Corp., 394 F.3d 25 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966)); Bahrampour v. Lampert, 26 356 F.3d 969, 978 (9th Cir. 2004).

27 1 Because oral argument would not have been of material assistance, the Court ordered this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Local Rule 230(g). 28 1 Closely related to the Court’s jurisdictional limit under § 1367 is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13, which governs the 2 process by which a defendant may allege counterclaims. A counterclaim may be compulsory or permissive. If a 3 counterclaim “arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim,” it is 4 compulsory and must be raised in response to the opposing party’s claim unless an exception applies. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 13(a). Thus, under Rule 13(a), a court must consider whether “the essential facts of the various claims are so logically 6 connected that considerations of judicial economy and fairness dictate that all the issues be resolved in one lawsuit.” 7 Pochiro v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 827 F.2d 1246, 1249 (9th Cir. 1987). All other counterclaims are permissive and need 8 not be raised in the same lawsuit. Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(b). 9 Prior to the passage of § 1367, courts relied on the distinction between compulsory and permissive counterclaims to 10 determine whether jurisdiction over a counterclaim was proper absent an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction. 11 See Sparrow v. Mazda Am. Credit, 385 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1066 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (collecting cases). Although § 1367 now 12 governs the limits on supplemental jurisdiction, the distinction between permissive and compulsory counterclaims still proves 13 useful. For example, if a counterclaim is compulsory, the Court has supplemental jurisdiction because a counterclaim “which 14 arises out of the same transaction or occurrence” as the plaintiff’s claim also necessarily arises from the same 15 “common nucleus of operative fact.” See id. at 1067 (“The § 1367 test for supplemental jurisdiction is broader than the 16 test for compulsory counterclaims . . . . “). However, because the test for supplemental jurisdiction is broader than the test 17 under Rule 13(a), a counterclaim arising from a different transaction or occurrence may still arise from a “common 18 nucleus of operative fact,” thus satisfying the test for jurisdiction under § 1367. See id.; see also Rothman v. Emory 19 Univ., 123 F.3d 446, 454 (7th Cir. 1997); Jones v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 358 F.3d 205, 212–13 (2d Cir. 2004). 20 Krupa v. 5 & Diner N 16th Street LLC, No. CV-20-00721-PHX-JJT, 2020 WL 7698624, at 21 *2-3 (D. Ariz. 2020) (internal footnotes omitted). 22 The Court concludes it does not have supplemental jurisdiction over Defendant’s 23 First Amended Counterclaim because it does not arise from the same common nucleus 24 of operative fact as does Plaintiff’s Complaint. Plaintiff’s claims turn on establishing 25 Defendant’s legal duties under the ADA and the Unruh Act and proving that Defendant 26 refused him a reasonable accommodation for his service animal. Defendant’s causes of 27 action, on the other hand, require analysis of everything that happened after she 28 1 | purportedly advised Plaintiff that no animals were permitted at the inn (e.g., whether 2 | Plaintiff verbally attacked Defendant, initiated a campaign to harass her over the 3 | following weeks, and caused Defendant to suffer severe emotional distress). The fact 4 | that each parties’ claims share a phone call in common creates some overlap in the 5 | facts, but that overlap does not create a common “nucleus” of facts between their causes 6 | of action. Accordingly, the Court concludes it lacks supplemental jurisdiction over the 7 | First Amended Counterclaim, and it is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. 8 9 CONCLUSION 10 11 For the reasons set forth above, the Court DISMISSES Defendant's First 12 | Amended Counterclaim (ECF No. 10) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff's 13 | Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 11) is DENIED as moot. 14 IS SO ORDERED. 15 | Dated: October 27, 2023 ° Mates LEK Whig { AX Xo - " SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28