Housing Authority of Portland v. Comstock

988 P.2d 407, 163 Or. App. 463, 1999 Ore. App. LEXIS 1831

• Court: Court of Appeals of Oregon
• Decided: October 27, 1999
• Docket: 98F 002785; CA A101517
• Status: Published

Opinions

LANDAU, P. J.

Plaintiff Housing Authority of Portland (HAP) initiated this action to terminate defendant’s residential tenancy under ORS 90.400(3) on the ground that defendant had threatened one of HAP’s employees with bodily injury. The trial court held in favor of HAP, and defendant appeals. Defendant concedes that, under ORS 90.400(3), a tenancy may be terminated for threatening a “landlord,” but argues that the statute does not authorize termination in this case because the person he threatened was merely an employee of the landlord and not the landlord itself. We affirm.

The pertinent facts are not in dispute. Defendant leased an apartment from HAP. On February 11, 1998, Charles Moss, a superintendent for a construction company working on contract for HAP, met with defendant to discuss construction work that was taking place at the apartment building. Defendant became angry, directed obscene and threatening language at Moss, told him to leave, and turned to a room where Moss knew that defendant kept a rifle. Moss left “very speedily.” That same day, Thomas Popiel, a construction management specialist who worked for HAP, met with defendant. Defendant again became angry and threatened to hit Popiel in the face if he did not leave.

On February 13, 1988, HAP mailed a notice of termination of tenancy to defendant. The notice stated:

“Your lease is being terminated because of the following acts: On February 11, 1998, you threatened a contractor working for HAP with a gun, threatened to hit a HAP employee in the face, and were verbally abusive, intimidating and threatening to other HAP employees and contract workers.”

A week later, HAP initiated this action. Defendant answered, among other things, challenging the sufficiency of the notice under ORS 90.400(3).

After trial, the court found that defendant had threatened Popiel with personal injury. The court then concluded that, because Popiel was an employee of HAP, he was HAP for the purposes of ORS 90.400(3). Thus, because defendant threatened HAP, the court concluded that HAP’s notice was sufficient under ORS 90.400(3).

It is that ruling that defendant challenges on appeal. According to defendant, ORS 90.400(3) provides for termination on 24 hours’ notice only when a tenant threatens a “landlord” with personal injury. It does not apply, he contends, when the tenant threatens an employee of the landlord. HAP argues that the statute expressly defines “landlord” to include corporate entities, which only exist through the actions of their agents. Thus, an act taken against the agent in the scope of its agency, HAP argues, is an act taken against the corporation. We agree with HAP.

ORS 90.400(3) provides, in part:

“The landlord, after 24 hours’ written notice specifying the causes, may immediately terminate the rental agreement and take possession in the manner provided * * * if:

“(a) The tenant * * * seriously threatens immediately to inflict personal injury, or inflicts any substantial personal injury, upon the landlord or other tenants!)]”

ORS 90.100(15) defines the term “landlord” as, among other things, “the owner, lessor or sublessor of the dwelling unit or the building of which it is a part.” The term “owner” is defined in ORS 90.100(20) as “one or more persons, jointly or severally, in whom is vested” title to the property. “Person,” in turn, is defined in ORS 90.100(21) as including “an individual or organization.” “Organization,” finally, is defined in ORS 90.100(19) as including “a corporation, government, governmental subdivision or agency.” Thus, a “landlord” includes a “corporation, government, governmental subdivision or agency.” It necessarily follows that a tenant’s threat of personal injury to “a corporation, government, governmental subdivision or agency” suffices to authorize termination of a tenancy with 24 hours’ notice under ORS 90.400(3).

By definition, a corporation can act only through its officers and agents. See, e.g., Alexander v. U.S. Tank & Const. Co., Inc., 114 Or App 266, 268, 834 P2d 532 (1992), rev den 315 Or 442 (1993) (“corporations can only act through natural persons”); State v. Oregon City Elks, 17 Or App 124, 130, 520 P2d 900 (1974) (“Since a corporation is not a natural person, it can, by definition, act only through its officers and agents.”). It must be assumed, therefore, that, when the legislature referred to making threats of personal injury to a corporation, it meant threats to the agents of the corporation. Any other construction would necessitate concluding that, when the legislature referred to making threats against a landlord, it did not mean to include corporations. That would require us not only to leave a sizeable loophole in the statute but also to conclude that the statute — which expressly defines “landlord” to include corporations — does not mean what it plainly says. We are constrained not to omit from a statute language that the legislature has included. ORS 174.020.

The dissent ignores that important constraint. It concludes that the statutory term “landlord” does not include “corporations” and instead is limited to “natural persons.” It arrives at that conclusion by observing that the term “landlord” is expressed in the singular, as are the components, “owner, lessor, or sublessor,” and then reasoning that, if the legislature wanted to include agents of the owner, lessor, or sublessor, then it would have said so.

The problem with the dissent’s reasoning is that it stops too quickly in defining the relevant terms and neglects to consider how the same statute defines “owner, lessor, or sublessor.” The express definition of relevant statutory terms cannot simply be ignored or written off as unduly attenuated “context.” The legislature defined “owner” to include corporations, that is to say, entities other than natural persons. If, as the statute expressly provides, such corporate owners may be threatened with “personal injury,” then our interpretive choices are limited: Either the legislature intended that the term “corporation” refers to those who act on its behalf, or the legislature made a mistake in defining the term “landlord” to refer to corporations at all. Mindful of our obligation not to presume to correct possible legislative mistakes, Monaco v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar., 275 Or 183, 188, 550 P2d 422 (1976), we have chosen the only logical interpretive alternative. The trial court did not err in concluding that defendant’s threats to an employee of HAP were sufficient to permit HAP to terminate defendant’s tenancy under ORS 90.400(3).

Defendant asserts other arguments in favor of reversal, which we reject without discussion.

Affirmed.