Appellate Case: 25-1119 Document: 17 Date Filed: 05/29/2025 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT May 29, 2025 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court DESHAWN DEMARCUS HOUSE,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v. No. 25-1119 (D.C. No. 1:23-CV-02072-SKC) JEFF LONG; PHIL WEISER, Attorney (D. Colo.) General,
Respondents - Appellees. _________________________________
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY* _________________________________
Before MATHESON, PHILLIPS, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
To appeal the denial of an application for a writ of habeas corpus, the applicant
must first obtain a Certificate of Appealability (“COA”). 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1).
Petitioner-Appellant DeShawn Demarcus House, a prisoner in state custody, seeks a
COA regarding the district court’s denial of his habeas application. Because reasonable
jurists could not debate the district court’s rejection of Mr. House’s constitutional claims,
we deny his application for a COA. We also deny Mr. House’s motion for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF No. 13, his motion for discovery, ECF No. 14,
and his motion for a transfer or conditional bail, ECF No. 15.
* This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1. Appellate Case: 25-1119 Document: 17 Date Filed: 05/29/2025 Page: 2
I. BACKGROUND
On February 25, 2022, Mr. House was convicted by a jury in Colorado state court
for first-degree assault, second-degree burglary, second-degree kidnapping, third-degree
assault, two counts of menacing, two counts of violating a protection order, and two
sentence enhancers for using a deadly weapon and causing serious bodily injury. On
direct appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals (“CCA”) affirmed all his convictions.
Mr. House then filed the instant application for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in
the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado.
A. Relevant Factual Background
Mr. House’s habeas claims largely stem from his dissatisfaction with (1) delays in
bringing his case to trial, (2) the efficacy of his trial counsel’s representation, and (3) the
trial court’s refusal to allow him to proceed pro se until it was satisfied that his waiver of
counsel was knowing and voluntary. Thus, we first outline the procedural history relevant
to these concerns.
Mr. House was arrested on May 24, 2020, after kicking in the front door to his ex-
girlfriend’s home and stabbing her sister and stepfather as they tried to defend her.
Mr. House appeared in state court on June 1, 2020, and on June 3 the state filed a
complaint charging Mr. House with thirteen offenses. Additional charges were added in
superseding complaints, including two charges for attempted first-degree murder. On
October 19, 2020, Mr. House entered a plea of not guilty to all charges against him. At
that time, his trial was set for March 16, 2021.
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On February 3, 2021, defense counsel notified the trial court that the prosecution
had not yet produced medical records it was required to produce under Colorado Rule of
Criminal Procedure 16(I)(a)(3). The prosecution agreed “that it needed to provide some
medical records and DNA evidence to the defense.” ROA Vol. I at 251. On February 9,
which was the relevant discovery deadline, the prosecution asked the trial court to extend
its deadline by fourteen days, averring that it had requested the records and followed up
multiple times but “had not yet received them.” Id. at 52, 251. Defense counsel objected
to an extension—noting that further delay would not provide enough time to prepare for
the March 16 trial date—but the trial court granted the prosecution’s request and
extended the prosecution’s supplemental expert disclosure deadline. Defense counsel
soon after asked the court to reset the trial date because counsel “needed time to
investigate information in the newly disclosed medical records.” Id. at 252.
Consequently, the trial court granted the motion and rescheduled the trial for May 25.
On May 13, defense counsel filed a motion to determine whether Mr. House was
competent to stand trial, which the court considered at a hearing the next day. At that
hearing, Mr. House told the trial court he wanted to proceed pro se because he was
frustrated with the delays in going to trial; the competency motion was meritless; and his
attorney was withholding relevant discovery from him. The trial court denied the request,
finding Mr. House’s “request to proceed pro se was the result of his frustration with being
held in custody” and was not a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel. Id. at 262. The
trial court ordered Mr. House’s competency to be evaluated and stayed all proceedings,
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including the trial, pending the outcome of that evaluation. On June 21, the trial court
found that Mr. House was competent.
Also on June 21, Mr. House’s counsel requested permission to withdraw from
representing Mr. House, at Mr. House’s request. At a hearing into this matter on June 22,
the court told Mr. House “that appointing new counsel would cause delays in his case
while they prepared” for trial. Id. at 263. Because he did not want further delays,
Mr. House agreed to move ahead with his current counsel. As such, the court found there
was “no legal conflict between [Mr. House] and his attorney and ordered his appointed
counsel to remain on the case.” ROA Vol. III at 120. The trial date was thereafter set for
September 14, 2021.
But then on August 6, Mr. House filed motions asking the trial court to appoint
him new counsel. The court conducted a hearing into this matter on August 19, at which
Mr. House asserted that his counsel “had ignored his speedy trial complaints and had not
provided him with discovery materials, and that [counsel’s] request for a continuance and
competency concerns were baseless.” ROA Vol. I at 264. When Mr. House’s counsel
agreed that there had been a breakdown of communication and trust, the court allowed
counsel to withdraw from the case.
The court then again warned Mr. House that if he was appointed new counsel,
counsel likely “would need extra time to prepare for trial.” Id. Mr. House responded that
he was willing “to proceed pro se if an attorney could not prepare in time.” Id. The court
expressed concern that Mr. House “was not competent to represent himself at trial,” and
explained “the complexities and stakes in the case at length.” Id. at 264–65. Considering
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the complex nature of his case, the court asked Mr. House if he wanted “an attorney to
represent him,” and Mr. House responded, “Yes.” Id. at 265. The court thus appointed
counsel from the Colorado Office of the Alternate Defense Counsel (“ADC”), and as
expected ADC counsel promptly asked the court to extend several deadlines and to
continue the September 14 trial date.
At this point, Mr. House objected to resetting the trial date and again asked to
proceed pro se. The trial court responded with several mandatory advisements about the
risks of proceeding pro se—the court explained the many charges against Mr. House and
the penalties they carried, reminded him about his inexperience with criminal law,
inquired whether he was under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and explained the
benefits of having counsel. The court also expressed it was concerned that Mr. House’s
request “might be motivated by the desire to get the case over with quickly.” Id. at 267.
The court then terminated the hearing until the next day, August 20, so that it could try to
find counsel that could be ready for trial by September 14. At the resumed hearing, the
court informed Mr. House that it had checked with other attorneys and “none believed
they could prepare and competently represent House in the short time before the
September 14 trial.” Id. The court told Mr. House he could proceed pro se if he was truly
unwilling to extend the trial date, and Mr. House responded “that he felt pressured by the
trial court to go pro se to preserve his speedy trial right.” Id. at 268. On hearing this, the
trial court found that Mr. House’s desire to proceed pro se was not knowing and
intelligent, noting that he did not have enough time to “adequately prepare for trial, was
fixated on alleged speedy trial violations, and had vacillated numerous times on whether
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he wanted an attorney.” Id. Accordingly, the court granted the ADC counsel’s request for
a continuance and reset the trial for January 18, 2022.
After this point, Mr. House continued to argue that his speedy trial rights were
being violated and that he wanted to proceed pro se, causing the trial court to conduct
another hearing into this matter on October 9, 2021. After again stressing the dangers of
proceeding pro se and giving all mandatory advisements, the court found that Mr. House
“persisted in his desire to represent himself, and that his decision was voluntary,
knowing, and intelligent.” ROA Vol. III at 121. The district court therefore allowed
Mr. House to proceed pro se.
On November 19, 2021, Mr. House filed a motion asking the trial court to appoint
advisory counsel. The court conducted a hearing on November 29, at which Mr. House
told the court “he wanted advisory counsel solely” for the purpose of pursuing “his
speedy trial claims.” ROA Vol. I at 282. The trial court denied Mr. House’s request
because “it had already considered the [speedy trial] issue and denied [his] speedy trial
claims by written order.” Id.
Finally, one week before the January 18 trial, the trial court declared a mistrial
pursuant to a local court order “suspend[ing] jury trials until January 28[] due to rising
Covid-19 rates” in the area. Id. at 283–84. Mr. House’s trial was reset for February 22,
2022, and took place on that date. At trial, the jury acquitted Mr. House of both counts of
attempted first-degree murder, one count of first-degree assault, and one count of second-
degree assault. But it convicted him of first-degree assault, second-degree burglary,
second-degree kidnapping, third-degree assault, two counts of menacing, two counts of
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violating a protection order, and two sentence enhancers for using a deadly weapon and
causing serious bodily injury. Mr. House was sentenced, in total, to thirty-two years in
custody. The trial court awarded him 643 days of credit for the time he spent confined
prior to sentencing.
Mr. House directly appealed his convictions to the CCA and raised seven claims
for review. His claims centered on alleged violations of his speedy trial rights, his right to
effective assistance of counsel, and a First Amendment violation. On December 7, 2023,
the CCA issued a forty-two-page order rejecting all these claims. Specifically, the CCA
held that (1) Mr. House’s right to a speedy trial was not infringed by the discovery
extension, by any extensions of the trial date, or by defense counsel’s motion to evaluate
Mr. House’s competency; (2) the trial court correctly refused his initial requests to
proceed pro se; (3) the trial court properly denied his request for advisory counsel; (4) the
trial court’s declaration of a mistrial did not abridge his speedy trial rights; and (5) the
trial court’s refusal to respond to various pro se motions Mr. House had filed while he
was represented by counsel did not violate the First Amendment.
B. Federal Habeas Case
Mr. House filed the instant application for habeas relief on December 22, 2023.1
The district court noted that the habeas application was “disjointed and difficult to
1 Mr. House initiated his habeas case on August 14, 2023, before the CCA rendered its decision in his direct appeal. But Mr. House filed that initial habeas application under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, prompting the district court to order Mr. House to amend the application so that it was brought under § 2254, which is the proper vehicle for a prisoner in state custody to challenge a sentence’s validity. Mr. House filed that
7 Appellate Case: 25-1119 Document: 17 Date Filed: 05/29/2025 Page: 8
follow,” but identified eight claims of constitutional error in the application that tracked
Mr. House’s arguments to the CCA. Id. at 1. Specifically, the district court determined
Mr. House had argued that:
1. The trial court violated his Sixth Amendment rights to effective assistance of
counsel and to a speedy trial by granting the prosecution’s February 9, 2021
request to extend the expert discovery deadline.
2. The prosecution abridged Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by calling only
one of multiple expert witnesses it had endorsed.
3. The prosecution violated his right to a speedy trial by failing to meet its initial
expert discovery deadline.
4. His trial counsel provided ineffective assistance and violated his speedy trial rights
by filing a “‘falsified’ request for a competency evaluation.” Id. at 321.
5. The trial court violated his rights to effective assistance of counsel and a speedy
trial by denying his request for substitute counsel.
6. The trial court violated his right to a speedy trial by declaring a mistrial when it
could not empanel a jury because of a Covid-19 outbreak.
7. The trial court violated his First Amendment rights by not considering motions he
had submitted pro se while he was simultaneously represented by counsel.
8. The trial court violated his right to a speedy trial and his Sixth Amendment right to
represent himself by denying his initial requests to proceed pro se.
amended application under § 2254 on December 22, after the CCA had rendered its judgment. 8 Appellate Case: 25-1119 Document: 17 Date Filed: 05/29/2025 Page: 9
The district court addressed Mr. House’s claims in two separate orders. On
May 10, 2024, the court entered an order dismissing as procedurally barred the second
claim, in which Mr. House alleged a Brady violation. The district court found
(1) Mr. House had not exhausted this claim by raising it with the CCA; (2) Mr. House is
no longer able to raise the claim in state court because a Colorado procedural rule
required him to raise it in his direct appeal; (3) the claim is thus subject to an anticipatory
procedural bar; and (4) Mr. House has neither shown cause and prejudice for his failure
to exhaust this claim nor shown a clear miscarriage of justice. As such, the district court
dismissed the second claim as procedurally barred.
On March 4, the district court issued a thirty-one-page order denying Mr. House’s
remaining claims. The court categorized those claims as asserting (1) violations of the
right to a speedy trial; (2) ineffective assistance of counsel; (3) First Amendment
violations; and (4) a claim that the district court abridged his right to proceed pro se. The
court noted that the CCA had rejected these claims on the merits, and thus to obtain relief
Mr. House must establish the CCA’s decision either (1) “was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceeding.” Id. at 243 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)).
As explained in greater detail below, the district court found the CCA reasonably
rejected Mr. House’s claims, and therefore dismissed the habeas application with
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prejudice. The district court also denied Mr. House leave to proceed IFP on appeal.
Mr. House then timely filed the instant application for a COA.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
To obtain a COA, Mr. House must demonstrate “that jurists of reason could
disagree with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists
could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed
further.” United States v. Silva, 430 F.3d 1096, 1100 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Miller-El.
Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003)). And to the extent the district court denied his habeas
application on procedural grounds, Mr. House must show “that jurists of reason would
find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional
right and . . . whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Although a COA applicant “is not required to prove
the merits of his case, he must demonstrate ‘something more than the absence of frivolity
or the existence of mere good faith.’” Silva, 430 F.3d at 1100 (quoting Miller-El, 537
U.S. at 338).
In concluding whether reasonable jurists could find the district court’s decision
debatable, we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal
conclusions de novo. See United States v. Denny, 694 F.3d 1185, 1189 (10th Cir. 2012).
As the district court correctly notes, to receive habeas relief, Mr. House must demonstrate
that the CCA’s denial of his direct appeal either “(1) resulted in a decision that was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision
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that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
III. DISCUSSION
Mr. House has not shown that reasonable jurists could disagree with the district
court’s conclusion that the CCA reasonably rejected his constitutional claims. In his brief
in support of a COA, Mr. House mainly advances conclusory statements, rhetorical
questions, and the same arguments he made before the CCA and the district court without
explaining how either court’s analysis is flawed. See Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux &
Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 841 (10th Cir. 2005) (rejecting arguments that consisted “of mere
conclusory allegations with no citations to the record or any legal authority for support”).
But even construing Mr. House’s brief liberally,2 we conclude that reasonable jurists
could not debate the correctness of the district court’s denial of his (1) speedy trial
claims, (2) ineffective assistance of counsel claims, or (3) First Amendment and pro se
rights claims. We also reject Mr. House’s baseless claim that the district court was biased
against him.
A. Speedy Trial Claims
Mr. House has not shown that it is reasonably debatable whether his constitutional
right to a speedy trial was abridged. In considering this claim, the district court weighed
the four factors set forth Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972): (1) the length of the
delay, (2) the reasons for the delay, (3) whether he timely asserted his speedy trial rights,
2 “Because [Mr. House] is pro se, we liberally construe his filings, but we will not act as his advocate.” James v. Wadas, 724 F.3d 1312, 1315 (10th Cir. 2013). 11 Appellate Case: 25-1119 Document: 17 Date Filed: 05/29/2025 Page: 12
and (4) whether any delays caused prejudice. The court found that: (1) it took twenty-one
months to bring Mr. House’s case to trial, which weighed in favor of a speedy trial
violation because a delay of more than a year is presumptively prejudicial; (2) the reasons
for the delay weighed against Mr. House because the prosecution’s failure to meet its
initial discovery deadline was not motivated by bad faith, and Mr. House himself caused
delays by requesting new counsel and erratically asking to proceed pro se; (3) Mr. House
consistently asserted his speedy trial rights throughout the case, weighing in his favor;
and (4) Mr. House’s ability to mount a defense was not prejudiced by the twenty-one-
month delay, and this failure to show prejudice weighed heavily against him. Weighing
all factors, the district court found the CCA reasonably determined that Mr. House’s
constitutional right to a speedy trial was not abridged.
Mr. House argues the district court erroneously ruled that he was not prejudiced by
the twenty-one-month delay in bringing his case to trial because, while awaiting trial, “he
was assaulted by deputies twice during the week before trial,” “falsely charged criminally
with assault on a deputy,” “removed from population for months,” had his “phone
privileges [] taken away,” subjected to “repeated unnecessary shakedowns,” and
“deprived of his mental and physical safety by staff.” Appellant’s Br. at 11–12. These
injuries, he argues, would not have occurred but for his prolonged pretrial detention.
Mr. House asserts he can prove that he suffered these injuries by producing
administrative “grievances filed [at the] Arapahoe County detention facility” and through
testimony from “impartial co-workers of [the] deputies” who assaulted him. Id. at 12.
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Mr. House presented this same argument to the district court, and the district court
addressed it. When considering whether a delayed trial has caused prejudice, the court
explained, the most important form of prejudice to a defendant “is the impairment of the
defense.” ROA Vol. IV at 257 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 532). And when a defendant
argues only that he or she was prejudiced due to “prolonged pretrial incarceration,” that
defendant must “show some special harm suffered which distinguishes his case.” Id.
at 258 (quoting United States v. Hicks, 779 F.3d 1163, 1169 (10th Cir. 2015)). Based on
those legal standards, the court found Mr. House’s bare allegations that “he was assaulted
by officers” and “harassed” do not establish “that he was subjected to harsher conditions
than other detainees.” Id. And the court noted that Mr. House received 643 days of
presentence confinement credit for the time he spent in detention, which mitigates “the
impact of his confinement.” Id. at 259.
The district court correctly found that the mere existence of prolonged pretrial
detention—and the hardships that commonly accompany such detention—does not
establish prejudice in the speedy trial context. Mr. House must demonstrate prejudice: the
absence of “prejudice will eviscerate the [his] claim.” United States v. Margheim, 770
F.3d 1312, 1329 (10th Cir. 2014). To establish prejudice, Mr. House must show the
twenty-one-month delay implicates “interests that the speedy trial right protects:
(i) preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) minimizing [his] anxiety and concern;
and (iii) minimizing the possibility of impairing the defense.” United States v. Garcia, 59
F.4th 1059, 1069 (10th Cir. 2023). Of these factors, impairment to the defense “is the
most serious because the inability of a defendant to adequately prepare his case skews the
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fairness of the entire system.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). And “pretrial detainment
alone (that is not presumptively extreme) is insufficient proof of prejudice.” Id. at 1071.
Here, Mr. House claims he suffered oppressive pretrial detention because prison
guards “assaulted” him, isolated him from the general population, revoked his phone
privileges, and generally harassed him and impaired his “mental and physical safety.”
Appellant’s Br. at 11–12. But merely “[a]nnouncing that pretrial incarceration is
oppressive does not make it so.” United States v. Landa-Arevalo, 104 F.4th 1246, 1257
(10th Cir. 2024). Mr. House alleges that officers twice “assaulted” him while he was in
pretrial detention, but he provides no information or evidence about the circumstances
surrounding these alleged assaults. And to the extent Mr. House asserts he can prove
these assaults took place using direct testimony and administrative grievances he filed
while in pretrial detention, he did not mention this purported evidence of oppressive
pretrial detention in his direct appeal to the CCA, nor even argue in that forum that he
was assaulted in pretrial detention. Mr. House cannot establish prejudice in this forum by
relying on evidence that he did not raise in his direct appeal: “Federal courts sitting in
habeas are not an alternative forum for trying facts and issues which a prisoner made
insufficient effort to pursue in state proceedings.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 437
(2000); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(ii) (stating that when a habeas applicant “has
failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings,” new evidence
cannot be admitted unless it “could not have been previously discovered through the
exercise of due diligence”).
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Altogether, Mr. House’s unsupported claims of oppressive pretrial detention
cannot constitute “a particularized showing of prejudice.” Landa-Arevalo, 104 F.4th
at 1257. Additionally, as the district court held, Mr. House received credit for his pretrial
detention at sentencing, which “mitigate[es] the potential oppressive effects of
incarceration.” Garcia, 59 F.4th at 1071. And while Mr. House asserts that he was
prejudiced by the allegedly ineffective representation of his counsel, “[e]ffectiveness of
defense counsel’s representation has no bearing on this analysis.” United States v. Lewis,
116 F.4th 1144, 1168 (10th Cir. 2024).
In sum, Mr. House has not shown that he was prejudiced by the twenty-one-month
delay in bringing his case to trial. Absent any showing of prejudice, it is not reasonably
debatable that the district court correctly rejected this claim.
B. Ineffective Assistance Claims
Mr. House has not shown that jurists of reason could debate whether the CCA
reasonably determined that he received constitutionally effective assistance of counsel. In
considering this claim, the district court considered whether there was “any reasonable
argument” that Mr. House’s appointed counsel effectively represented him under the
standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). ROA Vol. IV
at 261–62 (quoting Harmon v. Sharp, 936 F.3d 1044, 1058 (10th Cir. 2019)). The court
found Mr. House had not shown his counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable
because (1) the trial court’s decision to grant the prosecution a continuance for purposes
of discovery is irrelevant to defense counsel’s representation, id. at 262–63; (2) defense
counsel did not provide ineffective assistance merely by requesting a continuance to
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adequately prepare for trial, id. at 263–64; (3) defense counsel had an ethical duty—and
thus was not ineffective—to ask the district court to evaluate Mr. House’s competency
before proceeding to trial, id. at 264–65; and (4) the trial court’s denials of Mr. House’s
initial requests to proceed pro se are irrelevant to whether his counsel’s performance was
objectively reasonable, id. at 265–66. Therefore, the trial court found the CCA reasonably
decided that Mr. House had not shown he received constitutionally ineffective assistance
of counsel.
In his brief supporting a COA, Mr. House does not engage with the district court’s
analysis. Instead, he claims that defense counsel was ineffective by not seeking sanctions
against the prosecution for failing to meet the discovery deadline on February 9.
Mr. House asserts that the trial court’s extension of that discovery deadline was caused
by ineffective assistance, as well as the trial court’s extension of the initial trial date in
response to defense counsel’s request for extra time to prepare due to the late-disclosed
discovery. And he argues defense counsel’s motion to evaluate his competency was
evidently “falsified” because he was thereafter deemed competent for trial. Appellant’s
Br. at 8; see also id. at 9 (arguing no evidence shows “that defense counsel was
requesting a competency [evaluation] in good faith”).
Mr. House’s application does not engage with the district court’s analysis, and
therefore does nothing to demonstrate “that jurists of reason could disagree with the
district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims.” Silva, 430 F.3d at 1100. Here, the
CCA rejected the ineffective assistance claims on the merits, rendering our review
“doubly deferential” in that we defer both to the CCA’s “determination that counsel’s
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performance was not deficient” and “to the attorney’s decision in how to best represent a
client.” Harmon, 936 F.3d at 1058 (quotation marks omitted). By failing to explain why
the CCA and district court erroneously rejected his claims of ineffective assistance,
Mr. House’s claims do not meet this heightened deferential standard.
Further, on their merits, Mr. House’s assertions of ineffective assistance “are
conclusory and are also contradicted by the record.” United States v. Snisky, 725 F.
App’x 666, 671 (10th Cir. 2018) (unpublished).3 The mere fact that the prosecution
requested an extension of the expert discovery deadline is irrelevant to defense counsel’s
representation, just as the trial court’s decision to grant that extension—over defense
counsel’s objection—does not reflect on defense counsel’s representation. Mr. House
cites no authority indicating that his counsel had a professional duty to seek sanctions
against the prosecution for requesting an extension of a discovery deadline. Nor is it
apparent that defense counsel provided constitutionally defective assistance by (1) asking
the trial court to reset the trial date to allow sufficient time for counsel to review the
tardily disclosed discovery, or (2) asking the trial court to evaluate whether Mr. House
was competent to stand trial. As the CCA explained, under Colorado law “[i]t is not only
the duty of defense counsel and the prosecution, but also the obligation of the court, to
raise the issue of the competency of the accused to stand trial when facts dictate that such
a hearing should be held.” ROA Vol. I at 259 (quoting Parks v. Denver Dist. Ct., 503
P.2d 1029, 1032 (Colo. 1972)).
3 We cite unpublished cases for their persuasive value only and do not treat them as binding authority. See United States v. Ellis, 23 F.4th 1228, 1238 n.6 (10th Cir. 2022). 17 Appellate Case: 25-1119 Document: 17 Date Filed: 05/29/2025 Page: 18
Accordingly, Mr. House has not shown that the district court’s denial of his
ineffective assistance claims is reasonably debatable.
C. First Amendment and Self-Representation Claims
Mr. House similarly has not shown that jurists of reason could debate the district
court’s rejection of his First Amendment and right-to-self-representation claims. The
district court found Mr. House had not cited any caselaw showing that the First
Amendment obligated the trial court to consider pro se motions filed while he was
represented by counsel. And absent any such caselaw, the CCA reasonably rejected
Mr. House’s claim. The district court also ruled that the CCA reasonably determined “the
trial court had ‘valid reasons to doubt’ that [Mr. House’s] first three requests to proceed
pro se ‘were made unequivocally and knowingly.’” Id. at 267–68 (quoting ROA Vol. I
at 272).
Mr. House reasserts both claims in his application for a COA, but he does not
explain where the CCA or district court went wrong. He asserts that by not considering
various pro se motions he submitted while he was counseled, the trial court violated the
First Amendment by denying his “right to petition the government for redress of his
grievances [against] defense counsel[].” Appellant’s Br. at 17–18. And he urges that the
trial court violated his “right to self-representation” by denying him leave to proceed pro
se on August 20, 2021, by which point he had “validly waived his right to counsel.” Id.
at 12–13. Neither argument shows that reasonable jurists could debate the district court’s
conclusions.
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First, the district court correctly noted that Mr. House cites no authority from the
Supreme Court showing the trial court was required to consider pro se motions submitted
by a counseled defendant.4 And contrary to Mr. House’s argument, Tenth Circuit and
Colorado caselaw shows that “[w]hen individual parties have the assistance of counsel,
courts need not consider any filings made pro se.” Bunn v. Perdue, 966 F.3d 1094, 1098
(10th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted); People v. Gess, 250 P.3d 734, 737
(Colo. Ct. App. 2010) (noting that a trial court “may ignore” pro se motions “filed by a
represented defendant”). Thus, our precedent precludes Mr. House’s argument that the
trial court violated the First Amendment by not ruling on any pro se motions filed while
he was represented by counsel. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (requiring a habeas applicant
asserting that a state court violated constitutional law to show the court violated “clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States”).
Second, as detailed above, the record shows that the trial court diligently fulfilled
its duty to ensure that Mr. House’s requests to proceed pro se were knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary. See United States v. Hamett, 961 F.3d 1249, 1255 (10th Cir. 2022)
(explaining that trial courts have a responsibility to “assess whether a waiver is being
made knowingly and intelligently”). The trial court spoke with Mr. House at length about
the difficulties attendant to proceeding pro se, and on August 19, 2021, attempted to
4 In the context of this First Amendment argument, Mr. House cites BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516 (2002), which does not involve pro se parties or any judicial duty to consider pro se motions; Betschart v. Oregon, 103 F.4th 607 (9th Cir. 2024), which does not discuss the First Amendment or any duty to consider pro se motions; and United States v. Tigano, 880 F.3d 602 (2d Cir. 2018), which does not discuss the First Amendment. 19 Appellate Case: 25-1119 Document: 17 Date Filed: 05/29/2025 Page: 20
locate an attorney who could adequately represent Mr. House at his September 14 trial
date. And on August 20, the trial court was prepared to allow Mr. House to proceed pro
se, until Mr. House told the court that he was being “pressured” into relinquishing his
right to counsel in order “to preserve his speedy trial right.” ROA Vol. I at 268. Where
Mr. House expressly told the trial court he was being “pressured” to proceed pro se, the
trial court had good reason to deny his August 20, 2021 request because his waiver of
counsel was involuntary.
Accordingly, Mr. House has not shown the district court’s rejection of his First
Amendment and self-representation claims is reasonably debatable.
D. Brady Claim
In his brief, Mr. House reasserts his claim that the prosecution committed a Brady
violation through its late disclosure of experts and by calling only one of its disclosed
experts at trial. The district court rejected this claim because Mr. House did not exhaust it
with the CCA and Colorado’s procedural rules required him to present it in his direct
appeal. As a result, the claim is now subject to an anticipatory procedural bar under the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Mr. House does not
dispute the district court’s procedural ruling, nor does he argue that any exceptions to
AEDPA’s exhaustion requirement are applicable. Accordingly, it is not reasonably
debatable “whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling,” Slack, 529 U.S.
at 484, and we deny a COA on this issue.
20 Appellate Case: 25-1119 Document: 17 Date Filed: 05/29/2025 Page: 21
E. Claim of Bias
In his application, Mr. House argues the district “court handled his case with bias
and prejudice” by failing to “consider any of his exhibits that proved the lower courts and
professional parties did not comply with constitutional law.” Appellant’s Br. at 1. He also
avers that because the district court judge was at one time “a pro bono lawyer for
‘survivors of domestic violence,’” the court’s decision was borne out of “its personal bias
against” him. Id. at 6. More broadly, he argues every court that has considered his case
thus far—the trial court, the CCA, and the district court—all “committed fraud and
perjury” and “disparaged, abridged, [and] deprived” him of his constitutional rights. Id.
at 19–20.
Mr. House’s claim of bias lacks merit. He does not specify which exhibits the
district court failed to consider, nor explain how any such exhibits could cause reasonable
jurists to question the district court’s conclusions. Without substantiating his bald
assertion that the district court failed “consider any of his exhibits,” id. at 1, Mr. House
cannot demonstrate that the district court failed to consider any portion of his habeas
application. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(6) (requiring that arguments on appeal be
supported by “citations to the authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant
relies”). Nor does Mr. House point to anything in the record indicating that the district
court rejected his habeas arguments for improper reasons. To the contrary, as outlined
above, the district court carefully considered Mr. House’s habeas application, analyzed
his arguments under appropriate legal standards, and thoroughly explained its
conclusions. In short, we reject Mr. House’s argument of bias, which is nothing “more
21 Appellate Case: 25-1119 Document: 17 Date Filed: 05/29/2025 Page: 22
than [an] attempt to impugn (without basis) the integrity of the district judge.” Garrett,
425 F.3d at 841.
F. Additional Motions
Last, we address Mr. House’s motion to proceed IFP, motion for discovery, and
motion for a transfer. As detailed above, Mr. House has not presented “a reasoned,
nonfrivolous argument” that a COA should be granted. Watkins v. Leyba, 543 F.3d 624,
627 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we deny his request to
proceed IFP. See id.
In his motion requesting discovery from the Arapahoe County Public Defender’s
Office, Mr. House seeks a memorandum in which his public defender asked a state
prosecutor to agree to a “favorable” disposition to the case. Mot. Discovery at 1–2, ECF
No. 14. But Mr. House “is not entitled to discovery as a matter of ordinary course.” Bracy
v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997). To obtain discovery, Mr. House must show there
was “good cause” for the district court to exercise its discretion to order discovery.
Moore v. Gibson, 195 F.3d 1152, 1165 (10th Cir. 1999). To the extent Mr. House asks
this court to order discovery, “we are a court of review, not first view,” and we will not
order discovery in the first instance. Chegup v. Ute Indian Tribe, 28 F.4th 1051 (10th
Cir. 2022) (quotation marks omitted). To the extent he argues the district court abused its
discretion by not ordering this discovery, Mr. House has not shown that he requested this
discovery from the district court or attempted to establish good cause in that forum. See
Mann v. United States, 204 F.3d 1012, 1017 (10th Cir. 2000) (“Issues and arguments
22 Appellate Case: 25-1119 Document: 17 Date Filed: 05/29/2025 Page: 23
which are not raised below will not ordinarily be considered on appeal.”). We therefore
deny Mr. House’s motion for discovery.
In his motion for a transfer, Mr. House states that he fears for his safety in the
facility in which he is currently incarcerated, because prison officials have allowed
narcotics to be smuggled into the facility and are “putting the whole population at risk.”
See Mot. Transfer at 2, ECF No. 15. Mr. House thus requests “immediate bail or transfer
pending” our decision in this matter. Because we deny Mr. House’s application for a
COA, we also deny his motion for a transfer pending our decision as moot.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, we DENY Mr. House’s application for a COA, DENY his
motion to proceed IFP, DENY his motion for discovery, DENY his transfer motion as
moot, and DISMISS this matter.
Entered for the Court
Carolyn B. McHugh Circuit Judge